Is This Principled Libertarianism (Walter Block on Child Abuse)?

http://www.lewrockwell.com/block/block167.html

From my own judgment, Walter Block never satisfactorily addresses Michael Fleischer’s argument: if a person, according to the principled libertarians, is sovereign in his own home and can raise his child as he sees fit, then how could private police agencies interfere?

Child abuse, I believe, is one of the weakest points of the anarcho-capitalist argument: Fleischer is right to emphasize, in a utilitarian fashion, that such abuse could very well be much less in an anarchistic society and so anarchy is thus preferable. However, I’m not sure libertarian moralists can easily claim that private police will forcibly reduce such harm.

Let us suppose there is a community of individuals who traffick in child abuse (acts of an especially deviant nature) and have fully-implemented (even competing) legal systems and enforcement agencies that never, ever consider such abuse criminal. What then? Do outside communities impose their morality? It would, perhaps, be a truly moral crusade, but it’s a coercive war nonetheless.

In a Friedmanite fashion, I tend to believe laws will be enacted to deter such crime (e.g., I would be happy to pay more for such services, in fact), but I also can easily conceive of alternative communities that don’t actively deter such harm. It always seems to me that Rothbardian libertarians imagine they can centrally plan the moralized legislation for society.

I think Block points out that you’re forestalling homesteading of the child, since if you’re not being his guardian, there is a guardianship-right “floating” out there to be claimed.

In my view, this is a little wonky since I don’t belive in metaphysics (much less ad hoc metaphysics). This is also a loaded issue because we begin by already knowing what the right outcome should be - protect the child. So we’re sitting around judging moral standards with our ulterior moral standards that were never justified in the first place.

If you want to avoid the circularity, the problem should be framed as “what if libertarian rights conflict with extreme emotional instincts?”, and then just discuss whether objective ethics ought to weigh more than emotions. At this point, I will walk away from the conversation because I am bored and don’t have energy to tell people what logical positivism is.

You certainly don’t have to tell me what logical positivism is, but you might need to explain its relevance (logical positivists decry the “objective ethics” you assert).

If a man is self-owning, on his own property, and parenting his child as he prefers, then at what point is an outside agency permitted to interfere?

My thought would be that such a rogue cult of child abusers would find it difficult to compete with legitimate, moral communities for both scarce resources and membership. I don’t think most people want to live in or support such a community, so it would suffer from ostracism and boycott, not to mention the costs of internal moral decay. As its members became poorer relative to the upstanding communities, their time preference and marginal utility of money would increase, and it would be cheaper for outsiders to rescue children by buying them away. Would child abuse disappear entirely? No, but there would undoubtably be a stronger economic disincentive against engaging in it.

Not necessarily. The community can be economically isolated by pure voluntary means.

But you’re almost describing a Statist community here. I mean you’re either assuming that everyone in this community is voluntarily seeking such immorality or that individuals are somehow trapped in their community, in which case you’re describing some sort of a State.

Objective ethics is just a subset of metaphysical voodoo which fails the verification principle.

I wouldn’t focus on the territorial aspect. Serious libertarians think people own use-rights, not molecular or cardinal rights.

I guess you’re allowed to interfere whenever you think that the guardianship rights are being forestalled. So if the parent isn’t acting as the guardian, you can become the guardian of the child. The same way that if a farmer isn’t farming, you can take over.

Au contraire, it is unprincipled libertarianism which sucks.

And link.

I’m pretty much in agreement with this. Back in my parent’s villages, if the man of a household was acting strange or out of line, the other men would give him a stern talking to. If he didn’t get his act together, they’d apply their own form of justice to him. It’s very effective in small communities. I believe in some kind of a libertopia, communities would be much more bound together than they are today.

You’re right, he didn’t. I do have a problem with any of this being called “principled libertarianism”. You might be surprised with how many of us disagree with Block on this issue.

Then you do not understand the ancap argument. And it doesn’t surprise me, though for as much as you post and cite, I wish it did.

In this regard, some Rothbardians are more Objectivists than Austrians.

“It always seems to me that Rothbardian libertarians imagine they can centrally plan the moralized legislation for society.”

Complete bs. Want to try back up your claim?

" In the first place, surely-again in Acton’s words-it must say that liberty is the “highest political end,” the overriding goal of libertarian philosophy. Highest political end, of course, does not mean “highest end” for man in general. Indeed, every individual has a variety of personal ends and differing hierarchies of importance for these goals on his personal scale of values. Political philosophy is that subset of ethical philosophy which deals specifically with politics, that is, the proper role of violence in human life (and hence the explication of such concepts as crime and property). Indeed, a libertarian world would beone in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own ends-to “pursue happiness,” in the felicitous Jeffersonian phrase." - TEOL, Chp. 30"

Oh yeah, totally wants to centrally plan all personal ethics in society, definitely a despot in the making..

This is a subject which I’ve spent quite a lot of time thinking about. It’s an issue that strikes deeper at libertarian moral theory than many may want to admit.

I think another way of asking that question is, “Does a man own his child?” My own answer to that is a resounding no.

This means that children are self-owners. If you’re the parent of a child and you’re abusing* her, even on your own property, I’d say you’re violating her self-ownership. I therefore find it morally justifiable to invade your property to protect the life of the child who you happpen to be a parent of.

But let’s say, arguendo, that the hypothetical stateless society under which we live is more “propertarian” than that. So were I to invade your property to prevent you from abusing your child, I would be found liable for trespass, if not also property damage/destruction. Perhaps, though, I’d still consider it worth it to protect your child from your abuse in spite of the legal consequences. In that case, I’d invade your property anyway. Of course, if many (let alone most) other people felt that way, the legal “regime” of the stateless society would likely change to reflect that.

Also note that, in spite of all the supposed protections against child abuse provided by modern states, situations like that of Josef Fritzl, his poor daughter, and their(!) poor children still happen.

  • As with other terms of immorality, such as “murder” and “rape”, the legal definition for “abuse” is subject to boundary conditions, which would presumably be determined by courts.

Right now, there are industries trafficking in child abuse that can be geographically located (e.g., Thailand), but they don’t suffer economic sanctions.

And, if people wanted to cut off economic transactions with such a community, a problem that plagues cartels would present itself: there is an incentive to break away from the sanctions and make a profit.

If we are allowing competing legal decisions to determine what is “reasonable,” then I believe we are forsaking “principled” grounds (and thank goodness for that).

But, supposedly, anarcho-capitalism is ideal since it decentralizes law and can differentiate products (a taste for one’s prefered law will be honored if one is willing to pay); hence, shouldn’t we be able to imagine a community whose preferences demand legal systems that treat child abuse (e.g., sex trafficking) as lawful?

“If we are allowing competing legal decisions to determine what is “reasonable,” then I believe we are forsaking “principled” grounds”

Seems like you have no idea what political philosophy is. Those principles are of “guardianship rights” and they haven’t been forsaken at all. They are in fact applying the principle to the case.

How about you go do some actual reading on the matter, before spewing ignorance left, right and center.

Essentially there already are communities where child abuse is allowed. You make it seem as if everything is hunky dorey now.

Why not? What is so wrong about this response by Block:

Posit that 99.9% of the people in society oppose rapes, murders, cases of child abuse (if the overwhelming majority of people favor these depravities, no system can stop them). Under these conditions, don’t you think that the contracts written up by police forces, courts, road owners, would stipulate that when they occur, the forces of law and order may “trespass” on otherwise private property to stop them? It seems to me obvious that this is precisely what would take place.

Okay, so here’s the scenario. The cops break into someone’s house while he is committing one of these dastardly acts. They catch him red-handed. His “court-police” agency defends the criminal on the ground that the police violated their client’s private property rights, they kicked down his door, etc. Under my 99.9% assumption, no court police agency would take this view. If one of them did, it would be considered a bandit court, and would presumably, and quickly, go out of business, a point made very clearly by Hoppe, Rothbard, and other libertarian anarchists on my reading list; even David Friedman would agree with this, I presume.

I believe the failure is in trying to a priori apply principles (or, moral philosophy) to an issue that can only find resolution in a discovery market process.

How does believing the issue of child abuse to be one of the weakest points of anarcho-capitalist theory mean I do not understand it? I could believe environmental policy for controlling negative externalities is a weak point, too. That doesn’t mean I believe these absolutely undermine the philosophy or would create irreparable failures in an anarcho-capitalist society. Another theorist can believe different areas are the “weakest points”–not a big deal.

How does Block in this particular instance not base his “resolution” on a discovery market process?

And by the way, a “discovery market process” is in fact deduced by a priori principles. Unless you’re going to argue that it can be induced by the scientific method, which would be another absurd proposition.

He does; that’s why I think libertarian “rights” break down. If a man wants to voluntarily secede his home from all external forces, then how can an external agency forcibly interfere?

May I please have my title converted back to its original form?

That’s the word I chose. Deal with it.