No, it’s pretty simple.
Unfortunately usually re-stating the obvious is pretty necessary.
A “libertarian world” wouldn’t be “one in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own ends”, but would only be one in which certain kinds of individuals - social people - would at last be free to seek and pursue their own ends.
Can you explain what I missed?
“Unfortunately usually re-stating the obvious is pretty necessary.”
Yeah, some people can be pretty ignorant.
“Can you explain what I missed?”
“Political philosophy is that subset of ethical philosophy which deals specifically with politics, that is, the proper role of violence in human life (and hence the explication of such concepts as crime and property).”
Do you not understand what that means given the context (i.e …)?
“A “libertarian world” wouldn’t be “one in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own ends”, but would only be one in which certain kinds of individuals - social people - would at last be free to seek and pursue their own ends.”
You’ve ignored the preceeding sentence, or clearly don’t understand what it means. You are just reiterating. Great. Like I said, waste of time.
I read it, so I don’t think that I’m ignoring it.
Well, maybe I don’t.
Can you explain what it means in that context?
“I read it, so I don’t think that I’m ignoring it.”
Except you are.
"Well, maybe I don’t.
Can you explain what it means in that context?"
It is not the intention of this book [The Ethics of Liberty] to expound or defend at length the philosophy of natural law, or to elaborate a natural law ethic for the personal morality of man. The intention is to set forth a social ethic of liberty, i.e., to elaborate that subset of natural law that develops the concept of natural rights, and that deals with the proper sphere of ‘politics’, i.e. with violence and nonviolence as modes of interpersonal relations. In short, to set forth a political philosophy of liberty. ~ MNR: The Ethics of Liberty, p.25
And:
“For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not herewith concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression.” ~ MNR, TEOL CHp. 20
Thus:
“Unless your ends are anything like those of Charles Whitman on the last day of his life.”
Those ends he sought involves INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (conflict), i.e violence, rights violations, criminality and aggression. The means he used to try achieve his ends, was violence. They are within the political philosophical sphere. Not personal, individualized ethics.
Libertarianism presents the framework. So -
Indeed, a libertarian world [non aggression etc.] would beone in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own [personal ethical individual] ends-to “pursue happiness,” in the felicitous Jeffersonian phrase."
This is essentially the same as what you re-interated by adding “social people”. That concept though was present in the preceeding sentence and is what the whole book was about.
All good now? Because:
Highest political end, of course, does not mean “highest end” for man in general. Indeed, every individual has a variety of personal ends and differing hierarchies of importance for these goals on his personal scale of values.
So you are basically concerned with how you want a certain legal theory to run in society X, and are not concerned with ethics at all?
Hm, I guess that we’re just using two different definitions of the word “ignore”.
Does that mean that, by definition, in “a libertarian world”, there just wouldn’t be anybody with any anti-social ends?
“So you are basically concerned with how you want a certain legal theory to run in society X, and are not concerned with ethics at all?”
Don’t think I get your question. Not concerned with ethics? How are you defining it. I’m interested in political philosophy. As well as personal ethics (which is individualized). But there isn’t really a point of discussing that here, more suitable for other forums.
In terms of a certain legal theory - I’m down with Murphy’s conception and how the market would probably work, (very briefly: “We immediately see two things in this contract. First, it is completely voluntary; any “laws” binding the employee have been acknowledged by him, beforehand. Second, the existence of Arbitration Agency X ensures fairness and objectivity in any disputes.”)
So folks can voluntarily agree to whatever “law” they want, but libertarianism sets the framework. See above Hoppe quote: “the validity of the principle of self-ownership and original appropriation - is demonstrably not dependent and contingent upon agreement or contract”.
“Does that mean that, by definition, in a libertarian world, there just wouldn’t be anybody with anti-social ends?” [And if by anti-social you mean rights violations, aggressions etc.]
No. There will always be those who are anti-social or criminal & violate others rights. This ain’t utopian. It sets the framework.
“My entire argument, then, claims to be an impossibility proof. But not, as the mentioned critics seem to think, a proof that means to show the impossibility of certain empirical events so that it could be refuted, by empirical evidence. Instead, it is a proof that it is impossible to propositionally justify non-libertarian principles without falling into contradictions.”
For whatever such a thing is worth (and I’ll come to this shortly), it should be clear that empirical evidence has absolutely no bearing on it. So what if there is slavery, the Gulag, taxation? The proof concerns the issue that claiming such institutions can be justified, involves a performative contradiction. It is purely intellectual in nature, like logical, mathematical, or praxeological proofs." - Hoppe
Then I still don’t understand this.
Why can’t somebody’s “personal ethical individual ends” be to shoot as many people as possible from a tower?
“Then I still don’t understand this.”
Edited.
“Why can’t somebody’s “personal ethical individual ends” be to shoot as many people as possible from a tower?”
It can be. But when he uses the means of violence - when he violates the rights of others with aggression etc, it stops being in the sphere of personal ethics (individualized) and enters political philosophy (universalized).
It can be. But when he uses the means of violence - when he violates the rights of others with aggression etc, it stops being in the sphere of personal ethics (individualized) and enters political philosophy (universalized).
So rights, by the definition you are using are inherently interpersonal, imply some form of punishment, and recognize some form of legislator, correct?
“So rights, by the definition you are using are inherently interpersonal, imply some form of punishment, and recognize some form of legislator, correct?”
I reject the use of “legislator”.
"All actions in a purely free society[4] would be subject to contract. For example, it is currently a crime to steal, because the legislature says so. A prospective employer knows that if I steal from his firm, he can notify the government and it will punish me.
But in a stateless society there wouldn’t be a legislated body of laws, nor would there be government courts or police. Nonetheless, employers would still like some protection from theft by their employees. So before hiring an applicant, the employer would make him sign a document 5 that had clauses to the effect of…" - Murphy, Choas Theory
[4] A free society [libertarian] is one in which property rights are *(generally) respected. The existence of a State—an institution that uses force to place itself above property rights—thus precludes freedom as we shall use the term.
Also - rights stem from the principle of self-ownership & original appropriation, as outlined in the Hoppe quote way above. Rights are interpersonal, because obviously:
“Alone on his island, Robinson Crusoe can do whatever he pleases. For him, the question concerning rules of orderly human conduct — social cooperation — simply does not arise. This question can only arise once a second person, Friday, arrives on the island. Yet even then, the question remains largely irrelevant so long as no scarcity exists…” - Hoppe, Idea of Private Law Society
I think this is confused because the very nature of claiming rights inherently implies that others ought not violate them. A rights claim functions as an interpersonal standard of conduct. To say that you have a right is to make a claim that about how others should act relative to you. If I have a “right to life”, this is to put foreward a normative standard that others ought not murder me. If I have a “property right”, this is to put foreward a normative standard that I ought to have decision-making power over something and others ought not have it. It simply makes no sense to attempt to divorce rights-concepts from normativity.
It simply makes no sense to attempt to divorce rights-concepts from normativity.
It should be stated that whatever theory of justice/law, or however one views justice/law, the word “right” can never be divorced from legal theory; it doesn’t matter if you think law comes from God, is 100% arbitrary, or doesn’t exist the word has no meaning outside of the context of the specific legal theory it is refering to.
The minute the word tries to be used in any other context chaos will ensue, as the word will be undermined. Definitions such as “everything is right”, “nothing is right”, or “right has no meaning” are going to have to be used (it’s forced), which will cause nothing productive in dialogue, as the word has been used where it ought not to have been used.
What is better for discussion when speaking of rights it is best to explore; how they ought to come about, why they exist in a certain framework, is there any way to calculate for them, are they nonsense in a certian existing framwork, etc. The question"where do they come from?" can only be met with either very basic answers/ definitions or a history lesson. It is no different to use the word “right” outside of legal theory than it is to use words such as “guilty”, “murder”, “jury”, “court”, “law”, etc.
As far as “why is liberty important” and what that has it to do with rights, well"liberty" is a very tricky word, is the class using it as a synonym for free markets?
“I think this is confused because the very nature of claiming rights inherently implies that others ought not violate them. A rights claim functions as an interpersonal standard of conduct. To say that you have a right is to make a claim that about how others should act relative to you. If I have a “right to life”, this is to put foreward a normative standard that others ought not murder me. If I have a “property right”, this is to put foreward a normative standard that I ought to have decision-making power over something and others ought not have it. It simply makes no sense to attempt to divorce rights-concepts from normativity.”
I’ll extend this quote with the example, so you can see it’s application. An it outlines the concept better.
"The error here on the part of the “…” libertarians is to confuse the question of the moral course of action for the person in such a tragic situation with the totally separate question of whether or not his seizing of lifeboat or plank space by force constitutes an invasion of someone else’s property right. For we are not, in constructing a theory of liberty and property, i.e., a “political” ethic, concerned with all personal moral principles. We are not here with concerned whether it is moral or immoral for someone to lie, to be a good person, to develop his faculties, or be kind or mean to his neighbors. We are concerned, in this sort of discussion, solely with such “political ethical” questions as the proper role of violence, the sphere of rights, or the definitions of criminality and aggression. Whether or not it is moral or immoral for “Smith” — the fellow excluded by the owner from the plank or the lifeboat — to force someone else out of the lifeboat, or whether he should die heroically instead, is not our concern, and not the proper concern of a theory of political ethics.[5]
The crucial point is that even if the “…” libertarian may say that, given the tragic context, Smith should throw someone else out of the lifeboat to save his own life, he is still committing, at the very least, invasion of property rights, and probably also murder of the person thrown out. So that even if one says that he should try to save his life by forcibly grabbing a seat in the lifeboat, he is still, in our view, liable to prosecution as a criminal invader of property right, and perhaps as a murderer as well. After he is convicted, it would be the right of the lifeboat owner or the heir of the person tossed out to forgive Smith, to pardon him because of the unusual circumstances; but it would also be their right not to pardon and to proceed with the full force of their legal right to punish.
Once again, we are concerned in this theory with the rights of the case, not with whether or not a person chooses voluntarily to exercise his rights. In our view, the property owner or the heir of the killed would have a right to prosecute and to exact proper punishment upon the aggressor. The fallacy of the “…” is to confuse considerations of individual, personal morality (what should Smith do?) with the question of the rights of the case. The right of property continues, then, to be absolute, even in the tragic lifeboat situation…
To sum up the application of our theory to extreme situations: if a man aggresses against another’s person or property to save his own life, he may or may not be acting morally in so doing. That is none of our particular concern in this work. Regardless of whether his action is moral or immoral, by any criterion, he is still a criminal aggressor against the property of another, and the victim is within his right to repel that aggression by force, and to prosecute the aggressor afterward for his crime."
~ MNR, TEOL CHp. 20
And here is Block who agrees with Rothbard:
"Libertarianism is limited to political philosophy; it does not include [personal] ethics. It takes no view whatsoever as to the moralitv of pornography, prostitution, homosexuality, gambling, drugs, etc. It states only that, given that these acts take place between consenting adults, they should not be proscribed by law. When prohibited they are victimless crimes, and thus should be legalized [decriminalized].
…
“Even more narrowly, libertarianism may properly be construed solely as a theory of punishment. If someone uses coercion, then it is proper to utilize physical force against him, with the goal of rectifying the injustice, compensating the victim, as much as possible7. A side order claim of libertarianism, something not intrinsic to it, is that it will in some sense lead to the ''greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.” In other words, this philosophy claims a compatibility with utilitarianism. But not a direct one. Were libertarianism a mere branch of utilitarianism, it would ask of every contemplated action in order to determine its legitimacy, not whether it constitutes an invasion of person or property, but rather whether it will maximize utility’. That there is nevertheless an important connection is a pretty reasonable claim."
So essentially, if you don’t want to get punished - then you probably shouldn’t violate my rights. This isn’t being said libertarian qua libertarian though. You can choose to violate them, libertarianism says nothing about that - only that you have a right to be punished & the use of violence in doing so would be justified.
"Radical Privatization and other Libertarian Conundrums by Walter Block
Block, Walter. 2002. “Radical Privatization and other Libertarian Conundrums,” The International Journal of Politics and Ethics, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 165-175
On the other hand, given that libertarianism, strictly and narrowly construed, does not forbid killing the innocent, but only requires that such a person be duly punished, its claim to promote utility can still be maintained.
Very interesting stuff.. obviously this appears out of context, lol so everyone should read the link - as there is way too much to paste here. "
You already have the answer right there! To me, freedom (libertarianism) is good, meaning it jives with my personal ethical values: my sense of good/bad and right/wrong and ethical/unethical; I just feel that its wrong for individuals to aggress against and enslave other individuals. It’s my taste, my preference. And freedom (libertarianism) is beneficial, because it gives rise to free markets, and therefore prosperity and peace, which I happen to prefer over poverty and war. These are two very good reasons why liberty should be valued and is worth defending.
Here’s my take on the foundations of libertarianism…
All political philosophies are concerned with who has ultimate decision-making jurisdiction (ownership rights) over which scarce objects (property). That is, they are concerned with how property rights are assigned. Different political philosophies have different principles by which they assign property rights. Libertarianism is based on the principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange. Those principles are used to determine who owns what, and hence who has what rights.
The NAP is in one sense trivial, because aggression is really defined as a violation of a legitimate property boundary, so it all depends on what property boundaries are legitimate. Everyone supports “non-aggression”, except that libertarians and non-libertarians have a different idea of what constitutes aggression, because they assign property rights according to different principles. In this sense, NAP is a fairly useless term, as it is simply a re-statement of the task of political philosophy: to give meaning to aggression, to explain what constitutes aggression, to say what property boundaries are legitimate.
In another sense, if we take the A of “NAP” as meaning specifically the libertarian idea of aggression, then it is simply a restatement of the libertarian principles for assigning property rights. To “prove the NAP” (in this second sense) would be to “prove the libertarian principles of homesteading and voluntary exchange for assigning property rights”.
Can this be proved? To prove it would mean to say that homesteading and voluntary exchange, as principles for assigning property rights, are not just a preference (subjective), but that they are the objectively correct principles for assigning property rights. Argumentation ethics is one attempt to do this.
What argumentation ethics actually proves, in my opinion, is different. I do not believe it “proves the NAP” or “proves libertarian ethics” which is what I believe it sets out to do. I think the clearest explanation of argumentation ethics comes from Stephan Kinsella: here.
The problem is right here at the start. Is a theory of rights something that can be justified through argumentation? Is there a correct view of rights? Does that question even make sense?
Libertarian rights can be argued for because they are good (they appeal to our human senses of right/wrong) and beneficial (breed prosperity). But this is a justification of libertarianism as a means for already existing ends. It is not justifying them as an end, saying “this is the correct theory of rights, anyone supporting any other theory of rights is incorrect.” It is saying “if you think initiating coercion is unethical, or if you just prefer prosperity to poverty, then libertarian ethic is the correct ethic for you”.
The rest of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics may be (and, I think, is) sound, but what I think it proves is if there is such a thing as objective ethics, i.e. if it is possible to show that one ethic is correct and all others are incorrect, then the libertarian ethic is the only correct and true theory of ethics.
So if a socialist says “I support socialism because it is correct and libertarianism is incorrect”, then we could show that he is making a performative contradiction and what he says is not true. If there is such a thing as a correct ethic, libertarianism is it.
But most socialists don’t claim that their ethic is correct, just that (they think) it is good and beneficial. The way to counter this is to show that the libertarian ethic is actually the most beneficial ethic (using Austrian economics) and by appealing to their personal ethical values, their sense of justice, of right and wrong, and helping them to see that the socialist ethic is really not one that any good person should be in favor of.
I don’t think it makes sense to talk about correctness/incorrectness, and hence of proofs, in the realm of ethics. Ethical values are values; they are subjective. We can appeal to non-libertarians’ personal ethical values (showing they conflict with their political ethical values), and we can show them their political ethical values, when implemented via laws, have bad consequences; but we cannot present them with any proof that they are incorrect to hold to the ethical values that they do. Political philosophy is simply not a subject which has objectively correct and incorrect answers, except as a means of achieving a particular goal.
“Libertarian rights can be argued for because they are good (they appeal to our human senses of right/wrong) and beneficial (breed prosperity).”
That would be the consequentalist argument. It’s wrong. When it comes to rights i.e ethics, it’s illegitimate.
“As regards the utilitarian position, the proof contains its ultimate refutation. It demonstrates that simply in order to propose the utilitarian position, exclusive rights of control over one’s body and one’s homesteaded goods already must be presupposed as valid. More specifically, as regards the consequentialist aspect of libertarianism, the proof shows its praxeological impossibility: the assignment of rights of exclusive control cannot be dependent on certain outcomes. One could never act and propose anything unless private property rights existed prior to a later outcome. A consequentialist ethic is a praxeological absurdity. Any ethic must instead be “aprioristic” or instantaneous in order to make it possible that one can act here and now and propose this or that rather than having to suspend acting until later. Nobody advocating a wait-for-the-outcome ethic would be around to say anything if he took his own advice seriously. Also, to the extent that utilitarian proponents are still around, they demonstrate through their actions that their consequentialist doctrine is and must be regarded as false. Acting and proposition-making require private property rights now and cannot wait for them to be assigned only later.” - Hoppe - Economics & Ethics of Private Property, p354
“If there is such a thing as a correct ethic, libertarianism is it.”
There is & it is.
“But most socialists don’t claim that their ethic is correct”
lolwut. Yes they do.
“I don’t think it makes sense to talk about correctness/incorrectness, and hence of proofs, in the realm of ethics. Ethical values are values; they are subjective.”
Eh, really? Because showing the incorrectness of slavery is just something that shouldn’t be done right? . No, personal ethical values are objective but they are individualized… (Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics - David Gordon Review):
The combination of an objective personal ethics with a political system of freedom is, then, logically consistent. But why should we adopt it? Why not, rather, enact a political system whose metanorms require that people conform to their objective end?
The authors’ version of ethics excludes this suggestion. They embrace “individualistic perfectionism.” There is no fixed pattern to which every individual, in his pursuit of eudaimonia, must conform. Rather, “the generic goods and virtues that constitute human flourishing only become actual, determinate, and valuable realities when they are given particular form by the choices of flesh-and-blood persons. The importance or value of these goods and virtues is rooted in factors that are unique to each person, for it is not the universal as such that is valuable. . .Human flourishing is not simply achieved and enjoyed by individuals, but it is individualized.”(pp.132-33)
And this - (http://libertarianpapers.org/2010/35-younkins-human-nature-flourishing-and-happiness/).
“Political philosophy is simply not a subject which has objectively correct and incorrect answers”
Nope.
“[5] And there is a further point: the very existence of a difference of opinion seems to imply that there is something objective about which disagreement can take place; for otherwise, there would be no contradictions in the different “opinions” and no worry about these conflicts. For a similar argument in refutation of moral subjectivism see G.E. Moore, Ethics (Oxford, 1963 [1912]), pp. 63ff.” - MNR
So a libertarian world is a world where everybody is free to pursue their non-aggressive ends?
Is that what he was saying?
“So a libertarian world is a world where everybody is free to pursue their non-aggressive ends?”
Did you not see or read any of the above? About punishment etc?
“[4] A free society [libertarian] is one in which property rights are *(generally) respected. The existence of a State—an institution that uses force to place itself above property rights—thus precludes freedom as we shall use the term.”
You can choose to violate the rights of others & pursue your aggressive ends but is not justified & there will be consequences to those actions i.e justified punishment.
This follows from the earlier quote, which might clear things up for you:
“It might be thought that the libertarian, the person committed to the “natural system of liberty” (in Adam Smith’s phrase), almost by definition holds the goal of liberty as his highest political end. But this is often not true; for many libertarians, the desire for self-expression, or for bearing witness to the truth of the excellence of liberty, frequently takes precedence over the goal of the triumph of liberty in the real world. Yet surely, as will be seen further below, the victory of liberty will never come to pass unless the goal of victory in the real world takes precedence over more esthetic and passive considerations.”
I have been discussing this with my professor for the past few days and we seem to be going in circles. The conversation started with us agreeing that we all have some form of moral duty to help other human beings. For me, this comes from the fact that I am a Christian and Christ has taught me to help others. (Please don’t turn this into a thread about how I should abandon my faith.) We disagree on the point where this moral claim can be enforced. I, of course, am arguing that I have no right to use violence to take property to get them to help; he argues that by admitting a moral duty to help others, that others have a claim on your property.
I have tried to draw a distinction between violent and non-violent action, arguing that the initiation of violence or aggression is wrong and can be responded in kind and this is why we can punish murderers and why you cannot take money from peaceful people. He argues that I have not offered a clear enough distinction between negative and positive obligations and why violence can be used to enforce negative obligations, but cannot be used to enforce positive ones. I feel like I’m missing some key point to make this clearer, but we’ve just been talking in circles.
I’m planning on pointing out some of the flaws of his philosophy and some of his own contradictions within his thinking, since he calls himself a Kantian. He seems to be arguing that morality is different for different people (IRS agents can steal to help, but civilians cannot) and that the morality of the State taking money depends on what the money is being used for, which opposes the Kantian idea of morality being about the action itself and not the consequences.
“The conversation started with us agreeing that we all have some form of moral duty to help other human beings.”
And therein lies your problem. No-one has a positive obligation to anyone else. Narrowly though, say if you push someone into a lake and they begin to drown - you have a positive obligation to get them out/save them, otherwise you’re going to be considered a murderer.
“We disagree on the point where this moral claim can be enforced. I, of course, am arguing that I have no right to use violence to take property to get them to help; he argues that by admitting a moral duty to help others, that others have a claim on your property.”
I’d say he’s right. I guess it would be ideal to hear your definition of “duty”, and provide some examples.
“I have tried to draw a distinction between violent and non-violent action, arguing that the initiation of violence or aggression is wrong and can be responded in kind and this is why we can punish murderers and why you cannot take money from peaceful people. He argues that I have not offered a clear enough distinction between negative and positive obligations and why violence can be used to enforce negative obligations, but cannot be used to enforce positive ones. I feel like I’m missing some key point to make this clearer, but we’ve just been talking in circles.”
And I’d suggest he’s right again. You’ve accepted a flawed premise (that we have a moral duty to others). And this is where the reasoning takes you. What is a duty, besides a positive obligation? Better yet, what is a negative obligation?