Justification

The last couple days in my moral/political philosophy class we have been going over libertarianism. At the end we went over criticisms of the philosophy and its brought up some questions that I have been wrestling with.

How do we derive rights? Or, another way, why is liberty important?

I guess my questions hinges on how does the NAP, argumentation ethics, property rights, and other concepts all relate to each other. I’ve sometimes viewed it that argumentation ethics proves self-ownership which proves NAP which is the foundation for rights, but I’m not sure if that is the correct way of looking at it. Especially since Mises was a utilitarian and Hazlitt derived rights from a rule utilitarian position.

Thoughts?

My answer:

http://www.vforvoluntary.com/wiki/MoralityFromASocietalPerspective

why is liberty important?

what do you mean by ‘important’?

By important, I mean “worth defending.” Why should liberty be valued? Why should we be fighting for people to be free rather than unfree?

I’m not saying we shouldn’t, but its hard to find a definite answer beyond something like freedom is good or beneficial.

Utility.

Because it helps people like us get what we want.

(But it might not help people like Adolf Hitler get what they want!)

There can be no justification by ethics for any theory, any political theory that states otherwise has you chasing ghosts. The best thing you can do with “ethics” is to show how a persons “ethics” can not be applied to anything worth mentioning and exposing it as gibberish.

The “justification” of markets comes from the nature of reality and the social organization within civilization and actual measurable material prosperity.

Rights are created by agreement (contract) or by the command of the sovereign. Other “rights” (if they exist) cannot be verified to exist. Why is liberty important… for what? There is no Platonic heaven (that I know of) containing a set of things that are important as such. Something can be important for society to function, for you and I to achieve a specific end or ends, etc…

If we cannot sum utilities of different individuals and an increase in liberty increases the utility of some individuals but decreases the utility of other individuals, then whether or not utility has been increased/decreased (in aggregate) is indeterminate. Freeing a slave may very well increase the utility of the slave and decrease the utility of the master, so unless we can weigh the increase against the decrease using a common measure we wouldn’t really know if total utility has gone up or done. IMO, utilitarian arguments are insufficient to intellectually defend liberty.

You hinted at this problem when you said that:

Rights are created by agreement (contract) or by the command of the sovereign.

There is this as well, in which case it is simply best to show the obviousness of custom and the benefits of decentralized order (or more correctly, the idiocy of centralized planning)

“By important, I mean “worth defending.” Why should liberty be valued? Why should we be fighting for people to be free rather than unfree?”

This has nothing to do with libertarianism (political philosophy), which is meta-normative. It only deals with what you have a right to do, not what you should or ought to do. For that you need personal ethics.

And as such the “criticism” or question is completely invalid.

“Libertarianism, then, is a philosophy seeking a policy. But what else can a libertarian philosophy say about strategy, about “policy”? In the first place, surely-again in Acton’s words-it must say that liberty is the “highest political end,” the overriding goal of libertarian philosophy. Highest political end, of course, does not mean “highest end” for man in general. Indeed, every individual has a variety of personal ends and differing hierarchies of importance for these goals on his personal scale of values. Political philosophy is that subset of ethical philosophy which deals specifically with politics, that is, the proper role of violence in human life (and hence the explication of such concepts as crime and property). Indeed, a libertarian world would beone in which every individual would at last be free to seek and pursue his own ends-to “pursue happiness,” in the felicitous Jeffersonian phrase.” - MNR, TEOL chp 30.

“It only deals with what you have a right to do, not what you should or ought to do.”

Alright. Then how do I know what I have a right to do? I guess that’s my question. How are rights derived? Where do they come from?

Wait, who am I in that story?

If I’m the slave, then I vote for liberty!

Solid_Choke, I rather expected you to say that freedom does not require justification, rather claims to curtail freedom require justification (De Jasay style argument). I’m rather glad you didn’t cause it gave me the chance :slight_smile:

He didn’t ask how to justify freedom (liberty); he asked where rights come from. Be my guest, I’m tired of being the only one to actually play by the rules of honest argument (accepting the burden or proof when it is mine and rejecting it when it isn’t).

If that is all you are saying, then you can skip the talk of “rights” and “utility” and simply affirm your preference for greater freedom rather than less.

Unless your ends are anything like those of Charles Whitman on the last day of his life.

But let’s not get ahead of ourselves here.

Simply put, I had much different preferences before I read Human Action.

(Particular kinds of rights, moralities, manners, and so on are useful to me, simply because being a part of society is useful to me. It’s a lot more complex than just a random preference.)

Alright. Then how do I know what I have a right to do? I guess that’s my question. How are rights derived? Where do they come from?

Rights are derived from any legislator of rights that you wish to / have to conform to (both of those terms may be synonomous, depending on context) . You know what rights you have by acting out in an acceptable manner by what ever legislative authority you subscribe to at the moment (be it yourself or the emperor of Japan it makes no difference).

“Alright. Then how do I know what I have a right to do?”

The use of reason.

“I guess that’s my question. How are rights derived? Where do they come from?”

Natural law perspective. Which essentially shows the praxeological absurdity of everything else, bar self ownership. It is grounded in the nature of man. It is an axiomatic-deductive method.

Argumentation ethics.

“Whether or not something is true, false, or undecidable; whether or not it has been justified; what is required in order to justify it; whether I, my opponents, or none of us is right - all of this must be decided in the course of argumentation. This proposition is true a priori, because it cannot be denied without affirming it in the act of denying it. One cannot argue that one cannot argue, and one cannot dispute knowing what it means to raise a validity claim without implicitly claiming at least the negation of this proposition to be true.”

With the a priori of argumentation established as an axiomatic starting point, it follows that anything that must be presupposed in the act of proposition-making cannot be propositionally disputed again. It would be meaningless to ask for a justification of presuppositions which make the production of meaningful propositions possible in the first place. Instead, they must be regarded as ultimately justified by every proposition-maker. And any specific propositional content that disputed their validity could be understood as implying a performative contradiction […], and hence, as ultimately falsified.”

“The law of contradiction is one such presupposition. One cannot deny this law without presupposing its validity in the act of denying it. But there is another such presupposition. Propositions are not free-floating entities. They require a proposition maker who in order to produce any validity-claiming proposition whatsoever must have exclusive control (property) over some scarce means defined in objective terms and appropriated (brought under control) at definite points in time through homesteading action. Thus, any proposition that would dispute the validity of the homesteading principle of property acquisition, or that would assert the validity of a different, incompatible principle, would be falsified by the act of proposition-making in the same way as the proposition ‘the law of contradiction is false’ would be contradicted by the very fact of asserting it. As the praxeological presupposition of proposition-making, the validity of the homesteading principle cannot be argumentatively disputed without running into a performative contradiction. Any other principle of property acquisition can then be understood - reflectively - by every proposition maker as ultimately incapable of propositional justification.”

“(Note, in particular, that this includes all proposals which claim it is justified to restrict the range of objects which may be homesteaded. They fail because once the exclusive control over some homesteaded means is admitted as justified, it becomes impossible to justify any restriction in the homesteading process - except for a self-imposed one - without thereby running into a contradiction. For if the proponent of such a restriction were consistent, he could have justified control only over some physical means which he would not be allowed to employ for any additional homesteading. Obviously, he could not interfere with another’s extended homesteading, simply because of his own lack of physical means to justifiably do anything about it. But if he did interfere, he would thereby inconsistently extend his ownership claims beyond his own justly homesteaded means. Moreover, in order to justify this extension he would have to invoke a principle of property acquisition incompatible with the homesteading principle whose validity he would already have admitted.)”

“Unless your ends are anything like those of Charles Whitman on the last day of his life.”

Former marine (state employee who has been trained to kill innocents). Looks like he was trained well.

“Rights are derived from any legislator of rights that you wish to / have to conform to (both of those terms may be synonomous, depending on context) . You know what rights you have by acting out in an acceptable manner by what ever legislative authority you subscribe to at the moment (be it yourself or the emperor of Japan it makes no difference).”

Those aren’t rights at all. They are privledges. You’ve been given the privledge to do those things because the overlords have deemed it necessary to give you a modicum of freedom, to thus be a producer - so they can be parasites.

How’s that relevant?

(Don’t you think that his upbringing had something to do with why he enlisted?)

Either way, let’s avoid that and talk about Seung-Hui Cho instead.

Unless your ends are anything like those of Seung-Hui Cho on the last day of his life.

“Rights are created by agreement (contract) or by the command of the sovereign.”

Nope.

“Ethics - the validity of the principle of self-ownership and original appropriation - is demonstrably not dependent and contingent upon agreement or contract; and the universality claim connected with Rothbard’s libertarianism is not affected in the slightest by the circumstance that moral discussants may or may not always come to an agreement or contract. Ethics is the logical-praxeological presupposition - in Kantian terminology: die Bedingung der Moeglichkeit - rather than the result of agreement or contract. The principles of self-ownership and original appropriation make agreement and contract - including that of not agreeing and contracting - possible. Set in motion and stimulated by the universal experience of conflict, moral discussion and argument can discover, reconstruct, explicate, and formulate the principles of self-ownership and original appropriation, but their validity in no way depends on whether or not this is the case, and if so whether or not these formulations then find universal assent.” - Hoppe, Intro to TEOL.

“How’s that relevant?”

Using the remnants of a statist system to criticise? a non-statist one.

“(Don’t you think that his upbringing had something to do with why he enlisted?)”

You mean where his dad tried to get his enlistment cancelled?

“Unless your ends are anything like those of Seung-Hui Cho on the last day of his life.”

What are you getting at? At first I thought you were making some kind of advanced point, but now I think it’s just an attempt to re-state the obvious. You do realise you’ve taken the quote out of context. And what you left out - specifically deals with the point I believe you are now trying to make. Waste of time.