What is your problem with ‘rights’ in a legal context?
Sloppy phrasing on my part, I meant to imply I may see a problem with thinking in terms of imposing a universal legal standard. That is concerning oneself with theoretical social affairs that are beyond ones sphere of influence (outside of intellectualism, in a Shumpeterian sense of the word) is probably not going to sit well with me.
“Frankly, this argument is disproven by a tiny bit of reflection and experience. It depends on giving “private property rights” a metaphysical status. But it is blatantly not true that one needs to have private property rights or assent to their validity to argue or act at all. To argue, all one needs to do is exist in a context with other language speakers. To act, one simply needs to be concious. Argumentation and action predate and do not require Hoppe’s norms. If it’s meant to be said that “legitimate” argument and action require such norms, then this is just beginning the question of those norms. But Hoppe wants to define all actual argumentation about those norms as self-destructing by simply taking those norms for granted via false claims which try to render libertarianism as a metaphysical foundation that is prior to all discourse and thought.”
“it would be…impossible to sustain argumentation for any length of time and rely on the prepositional force of one’s arguments, if one were not allowed to appropriate next to one’s body other scarce means though homesteading action, i.e., by putting them to use before someone else does, and if such means, and the rights of exclusive control regarding them, were not defined in objective, physical terms. For if no one had the right to control anything at all except his own body, then we would all cease to exist and the problem of justifying norms-as well as all other human problems-simply would not exist. Thus, by virtue of the fact of being alive, then, property rights to other things must be presupposed to be valid too. No one who is alive could argue otherwise. And if a person did not acquire the right of exclusive control over such goods by homesteading action, i.e., by establishing some objective link between a particular person and a particular scarce resource before anybody else had done so, but if instead, late-comers were assumed to have ownership claims to things, then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything as one would have to have all of the later-comer’s consent prior to ever doing what one wanted to do. Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do or will survive if one were to follow this rule.” [11] ~ Hans-Hermann Hoppe, EEPP, 206
These are two fundamentally different things. That value judgments (about justice, rights, etc.) are existentially intrinsic to a decision maker is undeniable. I’m only asking you to agree with this because I think that is is an (obvious) fact of reality.
However, the content of my value judgments are not facts. They are not even propositional. How do you propose that we determine the ‘truth’ of a particular value judgment (e.g., a particular definition of justice)?
Gotcha.
How do you propose that we determine the ‘truth’ of a particular value judgment (e.g., a particular definition of justice)?
You are presupposing that definitions of justice are value judgements (rather than supposing the opposite, or remaining agnostic about it)
If it is claimed that a particular definition of justice is supported by reasons to endorse it as the correct view, then the truth of that might be tested in argumentation…
Can you give me a reason to think of justice as something more than a value judgment?
only if one takes positive action (agression), then yes, but that wasn’t that I argued about.
Probably, maybe I could have phrased it better. I’ll try again.
I think you’re creating a false dichotomy between ‘objective value’ and ‘pure emotion’. The reason an appeal to emotion isn’t a valid argument is pyschological statements aren’t logical propositions, they don’t have to follow from one to the other according to any rules, so an argument along the lines of “central planning: happiness” can rightly be rejected as nonsense. I’m disputing whether the same can be said about subjective values because logic does enter into our evaluations. The reason
P1: Taking ownership by force is wrong
P2: Tax is taking ownership by force therefore,
Taxation is wrong
would be a valid argument is because it consists of logical propositions rather than emotions. If subjective values weren’t propositions then no one would ever be convinced by this sort of argument. If you try to replace the proposition “this is wrong” with “yuck!” or “boo!” then the sequence makes no sense because there is no reason one emotion has to follow from the other one. The only way to say otherwise would be admitting emotions have cognitive content in which case appealing to emotions is no longer a logical fallacy.
To sum up: Do we desire something because we believe it’s valuable or is something valuable because we desire it? I’m opting for the former because if desire is the origin of value then our motives would be devoid of all rationality. Since they aren’t it’s more sensible to consider them a response to apparent value at which point you can make an argument based on them. Even subjective values allow hypothetical imperatives.
“that using either one in the extreme cases leads to absurdities.”
Please provide examples on the deontological one thanks.
Can’t do it now, blank head. Just like using scientific method in the extreme cases lead to absurdity, the principle is the same. In case you think I am moral subjectivist/relativist/nihilist, for the record - I am not. But I am not moral absolutist either, I believe in objetive morality, that’s why I do not take neither deontological nor consequential arguments for granted (so to speak) and use both to form my own principles. Also empathy & compassion has everything to do to this debate. Otherwise we wouldn’t discuss such things just shoot each other’s head. Empathy and compasion is one of the things that make us humans.
Negative rights impose an obligation on everyone else in the world. Everyone is obligated to make only those choices that are consistent with your rights (whatever you define them to be).
no, negative rights only restricts using agression over a persons body/property. But if I defined a word “obligation” like you do, sure you would be right, but I use different and specific defition, that’s why you disagree. You want to take it into extremes, I do not.
By definition, ‘rights’ are obligations of other people. I’m not being extreme. This is what your view logically entails.
I can’t give a reason for you to think that ‘liking’ justice is not merely a value judgement, but a reason for thinking that ‘justice is not simply a value judgement’ is that Justice can be thought of in formal terms, it can be though of as a set of propositions that can be brought to bear on a case so that a classification can occur, whether one attaches ‘valuational weight’ to these conclusions is another issue apart from the question of whether one can perform the classifications ‘under the system’. And whilst you might say that a theory of ‘beauty’ may be put forth such that dry facts can be interpreted by the ‘beauty principles’ entailling a classification of an object as ‘beautiful or ugly’, there are an infinite variety of such possible theories, and so no-reason to adopt one over another, this causes one to reject ‘objective theories of beauty’ and fall back on the pragmatic subjective theories of beauty.
Whereas, the objective theory of libertarian justice is superior to its non libertarian rivals, given Hoppe’s arguments, and also on epistemological grounds given De Jasay’s compatible non-cognitivist arguments.
Alternative ‘objective’ theories of justice to the libertarian theory are epistemologically deficient, and self-refuting by performative contradiction, so we need not embrace subjectivity.
Liberty must be presumed… one can’t say the same for beauty, there is no requirement to presume beauty or ugliness in things…
What do you mean obligated? By who or what?
Give me one example of an aggressive act according to your ideas.
You tell me. You’re the one using the term ‘right.’ What does it mean for someone to have a de facto right in, say, his body? Why to I have to respect this right?
When you turn on a light in your house, and your photons cross my border and hit me in the eyes.
Is your argument is that justice might be more than a value judgment, because we can imagine it as something else?
Forgive my diplomatic language. It is not a mere value judgement because it is something else, it is a formal system capable of being objective, and because it claims objectivity and this claim is not refuted…
How would you respond to the demand to give a reason for thinking that a mathematical identities truth is not a mere value judgement? or that simple facts of the world are not mere value judgements?
How is justice objective? What does that even mean? How do you know? You can’t just keep throwing the burdon of proof back on me. It’s not an argument to say “you can’t refute me.”
I would respond by asking for a definition of value. Clearly, math and “simple facts of the world” don’t fit any normal definition of the word.
It is not a mere value judgement because it is something else, it is a formal system capable of being objective, and because it claims objectivity and this claim is not refuted
How on earth is the practiced art of jurisprudence objective? For that matter, can you explain the difference to be “free from” and to be “free to do”? Do you not see how these are just words that can be juxtaposed?
EDIT: What good is it to be “free from”, other than to be rid of something undesirable and to be “free to do” something else?
That in fact, right now, he has ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over how “his” (the?) body is used.
You don’t.
OK, so what you’ve done there is made a statement about you how think property rights should be assigned. In your view of justice (whatever reasons you have for holding the views you do) I don’t have a normative right to turn on the light in question. That is just a translation of your statement into my terms. You are saying I ought not have a legal right to turn it on, and that if I do turn on the light (an act of aggression in your view of justice), you can justly force me to stop using the light, according to your view of justice. That is what aggression means.
I lol’d at your example, being that it is one that is supposed to be “awkward”* for libertarians, but it has actually helped with what I am saying. Because you have a view on justice (for some reason), you necessarily have a judgment about how property rights should be assigned, that is, who should have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over which scarce objects. You are saying you ought to have some degree of ownership rights to “my” light. OK. Where your view of justice comes from - reason, preferences, feelings, instincts, God, whatever - is irrelevant. Political philosophy is all about deciding how property rights should be assigned.