I always thought that libertarian punishment was about proportionality. Walter Block seems to have a different view.
He said, ‘it is necessary to first discuss the punishment theory of this philosophy. In encapsulated form, it calls for two teeth for a tooth, plus costs of capture and a premium for scaring. How does this work? Suppose I steal a TV set from you. Surely, the first thing that should occur when I am captured is that I be forced to return to you my ill-gotten gains. So, based on the first of two “teeth,” I must return this appliance to you. But this is hardly enough. Merely returning the TV to you its rightful owner is certainly no punishment to me the criminal. All I have been forced to do is not give up my own TV to you, but to return yours to you. Thus enters the second tooth: what I did (tried to do) to you should instead be done to me. I took your TV set; therefore, as punishment, you should be able to get mine (or some monetary equivalent). This is the second tooth.’
This seems disproportional. He continues, “But this is only the beginning of the attempt to turn the future back into the sort of place it would have been had the theft not occurred in the first place, the ultimate (and of course impossible) goal of libertarian justice. For so far we have ignored the costs of searching for the criminal, capturing him, trying him, etc. These, too, must be taken into account, apart from the rare exception where the guilt struck criminal turns himself in to the authorities immediately, with a full confession. But even here there is the fourth dimension of crime to be considered. For when I entered your home, in order to steal your TV, you didn’t know what I was capable of, or intended. In short, I scared you half to death, in addition to making off with your valuable property. Where is the compensation, the “making whole” for that bit of wickedness . . . In order to make good this imbalance, the libertarian code of justice requires that the perpetrator pay for the fear he imposed upon his victim, in addition to the more objective costs. To this end, all criminals shall be forced to play a game of Russian roulette, with the number of bullets and the total number of chambers to be determined by the severity threat he imposed on his victim. For example, for a relatively minor crime of TV theft, when the owner was not home and the criminal unarmed, with no record of past violence, there might be 1,000 chambers and only one bullet. But, with the victim at home, who is tied up, an armed criminal, a violent background, etc. – as the risk increases, so does the punishment – the number of bullets increases and the number of chambers decreases.”
How many libertarians seriously believe that Russian roulette is a proportional punishment to TV theft?
You steal a TV. You return it. Giving back the TV, plus another one, seems to be double punishment, twice what is justified. Risking one’s life on Russian roulette seems extremely distortional, approaching a bad satire of libertarian justice. Or I could be wrong. Block’s views may changed or been better explained, so I apologize if I am overlooking some relevant material.
![Action-based legal theory provides tools to take into each case. It supplies some of the underlying questions to which case-specific details shape answers. Legal principles guide inquiry into specifics while emerging details suggest the most relevant set of legal principles to apply. Justice may be found at the meeting theory and practice—of deduction, institutions, and the details of specific cases. Sound theory functions as a service to legal practitioners, enabling them do their jobs more easily and reliably. [] Legal practice should always be on trial in the court of legal theory, while legal theory should be recognized as insufficient to do justice in any real case. Legal theory and legal practice must therefore persist in a challenging but necessary marriage between distinctive partners if they are to produce the offspring of justice. Used properly, praxeological legal concepts not only boost the clarity of legal theorizing from “the armchair,” they also enhance the ability of practitioners to parse specific cases from “the bench.”](https://forum.freecapitalists.org/uploads/mises/original/2X/b/bd7085287f5884d9abc31660d2687429ad98ff31.jpeg)