Libertarianism without natural rights?

[Angurse]

This “absolute truth” nonsense has been well know for some time, a better question is who’s really going to waste their time thinking about it.

[Amanojack]

^^ Ahem, that would be me [8-|]

@Jackson LaRose

@Angurse

You happen to agree with it, well that’s odd, as it is nothing more than observations. What is there to agree with about math, particularly given that is made up?

Math makes sense to me. Although I don’t desperately cling to the notion that just because I observe something, or it makes sense, that it is true or real. You can have it both ways. Unless you are certain about everything at once, which I think we both concede is a fairly tall order.

I have done a tremendous amount of thinking on the nature of “reality” and here’s how I look at it:

Puzzle Piece 1: The only thing I can really claim to know is that I am experiencing sensations. I see stuff, hear stuff, feel stuff, smell stuff, and taste stuff. Whether “real” or “imagined,” these things I do indeed sense. It’s not, “I sense, therefore I exist.” It’s rather, “When I say I exist, I just mean that I sense” - that is what I mean when I think to myself that I exist: “I am experiencing sensations.” Hence all the input I have from any “outside world” is patterns of sensation.

Puzzle Piece 2: Thoughts and emotions are not different from sensory experience. Along with Einstein I can say that thoughts are visual, auditory, olfactory, and “muscular” as he put it. Taste surely plays a role as well. Emotions are physical sensations as well, as I suggest some introspection will reveal. This puzzle piece will not sit well with those who believe that “words are the stuff of thought,” but I hold that this is the first illusion one must put aside if clear thinking is the goal. For those that have come to this revelation, combined with Puzzle Piece 1 it should not be surprising when I say that all experience is patterns of sensation.

Now the philosopher comes along and asks, “What is truth?” Well that is already getting caught up in words. A better question would be, “What am I trying to get at when I say X is true? - if there is in fact a coherent notion I’m trying to get at.” The answer I have come up with is, "If there is any coherent notion like that, it can only be that I mean:

X is true = X follows from my premises/beliefs." (More precisely, “X seems to follow from my premises.”)

By the way, this neatly disposes of Moore’s Paradox. But anyway, for example, “There [seem to] have been black dogs” follows from my premises: 1) I [seem to] have seen dogs that looked black in daylight. 2) [It seems that] things that look black in daylight are black. 3) Anything I [seem to] have seen has been. QED

Now any or all of those premises may be “wrong,” but from my own point of view - knowing this could all be a dream and I’m the only sentient being in the universe - I can have no knowledge of such things being wrong apart from my senses and memories (which in turn I am only consciously aware of via the sensations). Someone else may say the premises are wrong, but my acceptance of that as actual “wrongness” is dependent on whether I have chosen to believe what others say, hence it still either follows from my premises (beliefs) or it doesn’t.

Next the philosopher asks, “What is reality?” From above, what I name reality is merely a set of sensual patterns that have certain unique or semi-unique characteristics, primarily these two: 1) the sensations cannot be controlled directly merely by intention (except some parts of my own body), and 2) the patterns of sensation seem to have a remarkable stability and permanence, down to very fine details - much finer and more permanent than my short-term memory faculty seems to be able to accurately store.

A little reflection on this should allow one to dismantle the paradoxical aspect of Curry’s Paradox.

As for mathematics, it is just sets of assumed premises (called axioms) and definitions, so anything is true (false) in mathematics if it follows from premises (doesn’t follow from premises). Of course, truth is a norm of assertion - i.e., “2+2=4” states nothing less than “This whole sentence follows from the premises, and 2+2=4”. In other words, an assertion by definition asserts its own truth automatically. Hence the age-old Liar Paradox isn’t a paradox; it’s simply false.

[Angurse]

@AJ

^^ Ahem, that would be me

Whoops!

I meant “who is willing to take the time out of their busy schedule to figure out such important concepts is the better question.”

[apehead]

Thanks AJ, that was a lot more concise than I’m capable of being.

“Absolutes are garbage”

Hmm, that might be a catchy sig.

[Amanojack]

@Zavoi

@AJ

I don’t think he does, but the implication seems to be, “You don’t want to be wrong and contradicted, do you?”

This implication only comes, and the lack of happiness-correlation is only a “problem”, if one begins with a preconceived idea that ethics has to be about increasing one’s own happiness. But whether or not an action increases the actor’s happiness is not the only useful thing that can be said about the action

I don’t see how the word “useful” can be interpreted so that it means anything other than “increases one’s happiness” (although the mental process connecting utility to happiness may have several steps).

@Zavoi

and restricting the domain of ethics to this aspect renders it incapable of resolving conflicts of terminal values (which do in fact occur, or else everyone’s goals would align, and one could resolve any dispute by reasoning it through scientifically/praxeologically until the disputants agree; in any case, this would make any non-happiness-oriented conceptions of ethics practically irrelevant but not theoretically invalid).

I agree that subjective ethics and praxeology don’t provide a dispute resolution system on their own. Objective ethics does provide that. However, that could only be a deficiency on the part of subjective ethics and praxeology if objective ethics (and the dispute resolution systems therein provided) were valid in the first place.

[Amanojack]

@Angurse

@AJ

^^ Ahem, that would be me

Whoops!

I meant “who is willing to take the time out of their busy schedule to figure out such important concepts is the better question.”

No problem, I’ve spent large parts of my life “lost in thought.”

[adam_knott]

@Jon Irenicus

Does Hoppe claim that performative contradiction impairs one’s happiness?

No. His argument is purely that as a theory, one containing or premised on contradictions is invalid and false, and thus useless. It’s a litmus test.

Jon:

According to what you are writing above, Hoppe is claiming that a theory that is contradictory is unutilizable (usesless).

That is, if someone tries to use (utilize) such a theory, they won’t be able to. Their intention, to use the theory in question to guide their actions, cannot be realized. (their end cannot be attained by the supposed means)

If someone has designed a very large butterfly net that contains only a large metal ring, but with no netting, then we can tell that person that by and large, for the purpose of catching butterflies, such a “net” is useless. The concept of “use” implies human purpose.

Is it your contention that Hoppe’s theory intends to show an actor how a theory they hold is useless, but at the same time, Hoppe’s theory conceives that the attempt to utilize that useless theory has absolutely no impact on that actor’s well-being ?

---

In Hoppe’s original presentation of his theory, he provides what appear to be the various ways an actor’s well-being would be negatively impacted were that actor to try to implement a nonlibertarian ethic:

…then literally no one would be allowed to do anything with anything…

…one would have to have all the late-comers’ consent prior to ever doing what one wanted to do…

…Neither we, our forefathers, nor our progeny could, do or will survive…

…it would be impossible for anyone to first say anything at a definite point in time and for someone else to be able to reply…

…acting and proposition making would also be impossible…

…One would have to interrogate and come to agreement with the entire world population…

…surely, everyone would be long dead before this was accomplished…

If according to Hoppe, adopting a libertarian ethic is not conducive to a person’s well-being, while adopting a nonlibertarian ethic is not detrimental to a person’s well-being, then what is the purpose of listing all of these consequences of adopting a nonlibertarian ethic?

[adam_knott]

@Zavoi

@AJ

I don’t think he does, but the implication seems to be, “You don’t want to be wrong and contradicted, do you?”

This implication only comes, and the lack of happiness-correlation is only a “problem”, if one begins with a preconceived idea that ethics has to be about increasing one’s own happiness. But whether or not an action increases the actor’s happiness is not the only useful thing that can be said about the action, and restricting the domain of ethics to this aspect renders it incapable of resolving conflicts of terminal values (which do in fact occur, or else everyone’s goals would align, and one could resolve any dispute by reasoning it through scientifically/praxeologically until the disputants agree; in any case, this would make any non-happiness-oriented conceptions of ethics practically irrelevant but not theoretically invalid).

@Adam Knott

2. I have been reading in the area of ethics theory for several years, and I have yet to come across an ethical theory that did not explicitly state, or imply without explicit statement, a constant relationship between specific conduct, and some state of affairs that an actor may want to attain or avoid.

All ethical theory that I am aware of----and this definitely includes the theories you are advocating----expresses a constant relationship between conduct and some state of affairs an actor may want to attain or avoid.

Given a very broad definition of ethics as “a way of assigning attributes to actions,” the body of any ethical theory will consist of statements such as [1] “Action X has attribute B.” Such statements can always be reformulated (to incorporate what you call a “constant relationship”) as [2] “If you want to avoid doing actions with attribute B, then you’ll want to avoid doing action X”. However, [2] is a direct implication of [1] and adds no new information. So you’re right that an ethical theory cannot avoid making statements of constant relationship (thereby providing information that can be used to maximize utility), but that doesn’t mean that such statements must be the fundamental elements of an ethical theory. (Indeed, strictly speaking, [2] does not imply [1], and [2] is therefore a weaker claim than [1].)

Zavoi:

“…an ethical theory cannot avoid making statements of constant relationship (thereby providing information that can be used to maximize utility/happiness), but that doesn’t mean that such statements must be the fundamental elements of an ethical theory. (Indeed, strictly speaking, [2] does not imply [1], and [2] is therefore a weaker claim than [1].)”

“…in any case, this [removing the non-utility/happiness elements] would make any non-utility/happiness-oriented conceptions of ethics practically irrelevant but not theoretically invalid).”

I interpret you as saying that removing utility/happiness elements from ethical theory would render such a theory practically irrelevant, but that this doesn’t mean such elements are fundamental to ethics theory.

Removing such elements from the theory makes the theory of no practical use, but the theory itself may be internally consistent?

Is that correct ?

[adam_knott]

“We need not go further into the fact that every ethic, no matter how strict an opponent of eudaemonism it may at first appear to be, must somehow clandestinely smuggle the idea of happiness into its system.”

(Epistemological Problems of Economics, p.151/152)

[Zavoi]

@AJ

I don’t see how the word “useful” can be interpreted so that it means anything other than “increases one’s happiness” (although the mental process connecting utility to happiness may have several steps).

I mean “useful” in a certain specific sense of “intellectually interesting.” I could try to hash through it again, if you think it would be at all helpful…

@Adam Knott

I interpret you as saying that removing utility/happiness elements from ethical theory would render such a theory practically irrelevant, but that this doesn’t mean such elements are fundamental to ethics theory.

Removing such elements from the theory makes the theory of no practical use, but the theory itself may be internally consistent?

Is that correct ?

I think you misunderstood. When I say “in any case, this would make [it] practically irrelevant…”, by “this” I’m referring to the hypothetical situation where everyone shares the same set of terminal values, and any seeming “conflicts” that arise between people are due only to confusion/misinformedness over the objective issue of how best to achieve those values. As a matter of empirical observation, it seems unlikely that this is the case, but even if it were the case, this fact by itself would not refute non-happiness-oriented ethics – it would just make it so that questions about non-happiness-oriented ethics would never be asked (in the context of a real-life scenario) in the first place.

@Adam Knott

“We need not go further into the fact that every ethic, no matter how strict an opponent of eudaemonism it may at first appear to be, must somehow clandestinely smuggle the idea of happiness into its system.”

Why must it do this? Again it seems that “ethics” has already been defined as having to do with the actor’s happiness. But of course there’s no point in arguing semantics – just say what you have to say about human actions, and call it what you will.