Aslo, in my New Rationalist Directions in Libertarian Rights Theory I summarized my estoppel approach, Hoppe’s AE, and a “third” approach that just tried to show the contradictions of rights skepticism – Larry Sechrest mentions this approach approvingly here, BTW: Praxeology, Economics, and Law: Issues and Implications (p. 37). But I wouldn’t say this is a differnt or “betteR” approach; all these approaches are basically getting at this idea: first, if you want to establish some kind of ought, you have to either prove it by deducing an ought from an is (tricky task); or you have to just point to or appeal to some unchallengeable or uncontroversial grundnorm; AE and related views try to show that it is only libertarian-supporting norms that are necessarily presupposed in all these contexts. The various arguments are just ways of showing this to people who keep failing ot see this–
Sorry about being vague, it’s hard to go into detail without either turning this into an excessively long post or missing an important detail. As I see it, the is-ought gap is bridged by the existence of a natural, objective end for human beings. You accept rights, because you recognize that they are necessary for you and everyone else to live a life of flourishing. I have an older post here where I go into more detail, and I am basically just using the neo-Aristotelian arguments put out by Rasmussen, Den Uyl, Long, and Plauche, with which I know you are familiar (no snarkiness intended in this last sentence [:)]). And just because certain values are presupposed by questioning or argumentation, doesn’t necessarily mean that those values are right or good; here is where I don’t see where ought is derived from is.
I think it’s a bit misleading to say we accept rights. Rather, I think that this is a way to describe the normative consequences of already having adopted certain grundnorms.
Rather, it influences how we see the object, not how the object really is. Also, it’s true that measurements can change the object measured but that’s a technological problem, not a fundamental philosophical fact.
You can’t measure velocity if you can’t measure position…since velocity is defined as rate of change of position wrt time. Not to mention that there’s no agreement as to what an electron is and what EM radiation is. It seems ‘particles’ are at least partly waves and measuring the position of a wave is not straightforward. Bottom line : experiments don’t necessarily mean what you may think they mean.
How do you measure velocity ?
I’m not sure what you mean by that.
Yes, but I’m objecting to your introduction of subjectivism in physics, which apparently you think opens the door to introduce subjectivity in other spheres - if I understood you correctly.
True, but still moral facts can be ‘real’ and ‘objective’ just like physical reality is ‘real’.
We don’t know that. How we see the object could very well be what the object really is.
True it is a technological problem so we haven’t tested the fundaments to know if they are truly fact. But when all the rational arguments and the evidence shown using the current technology matches up we do have a strong case.
yeap
With a technological instrument.
I’m saying that whatever measurement instrument we desire to use at the time will limit our results based on what that measuring instrument, well, measures. There are two current technological instruments being used that are grand in size. Now they are not currently operational for after some tests they needed to do some repairs. Maybe you have heard of these machines in Europe. One is the Large Hadron Collider: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Large_Hadron_Collider but it will have numerous measuring instruments. Some measuring instruments are left out, some have been used in the project. It is based on which measuring devices the scientists have found to be the most valuable for their long term plans on testing theories and hypothesis. They would also like to make an even larger collider, but they are investing their time in this one currently and if fruitful, maybe they will move on to even larger ones in time. Each of these colliders are also testing the technology and their measurement capacities so it’s not highly valued to jump to scales that are way larger than what the scientists are currently capable of understanding. This collider is presumed to at least provide some promising results according to some current understandings such as possibly seeing the Higgs Boson (a particle), but the scientists are also saying not all that will happen will be in accord with their current theorems. Which in science is good cause that means they think it is a high probably that they will discover something new.
Yes, physics is subjective. But it’s experiments and hypothesis in many cases have been proven over and over again that it builds a strong case that those findings are true. But I am saying they are not True, but true. For science itself doesn’t not claim absolutism. It’s most wonderful understanding is that something can come along and change everything even long held theories due to some new discovery that would change the whole paradigm even in physics. You can use objective in physics if you want, but commonly objective has become such an overused concept to mean truth and subjectivism has been given such a dirty value that inclines fallacy. Objectivity is no more true than subjectivity. These concepts are outdated and have lost their meaning at times. I would rather use other terms than subjectivity and objectivity to try to provide clarity to what I mean. These two concepts are full of baggage that even right now I don’t see the harm in allowing subjectivity in physics. To me that just means physics is still dynamic and open to a world of possibilities in new discoveries. If you want to understand more about what I mean I would check out: Metaphysics of Quality.
I agree. I’m glad you said this. It helps convey what I mean by how objectivity and subjectivity have become very unuseful and I don’t value these concepts. They are full of so many meanings and cultural baggage the clarity in ‘what is objectivity’ and ‘what is subjectivity’ is gone in my opinion. lol… look at this post. It took so long for me to explain just because those two concepts were involved so I had to make sure you were understanding in what way I was trying to use those concepts.
I recall a comedian saying, that collectivists basically want to force you into a gang bang - you figure out the assumptions [:P]
Anyways, I think the homesteading argument is not only weak but also intellectually arrogant. Why should others accept such weak prescribed rules that will guide an entire society? Of course it doesn’t matter if you’re a collectivist or libertarian in this sense, the problem remains.
If we picture a piece of ‘free land’. Why should the muscular but less intelligent accept that the more intelligent ‘homesteaded’ the land right before he arrived? Nothing would keep him from just taking the land by force, using it as he saw fit… Or?
A “might makes right” argument is untenable because it goes against the very idea of ethics, namely, resolving conflicts. If might really does make right, then there is nothing stopping the displaced landowners from forcing their way back on to the land, except the practical matter of acquiring the armed strength necessary to do so. The people that invaded the land in the first place, by taking a “might makes right” position, have denied themselves any means (other than violence) of objecting to being forced back off, and so their claim over the land is simply not relevant.
This is what I mean by intellectual arrogance. You fail to see things from the ‘muscles’ point of view and so you discard valid standpoints without proper arguments.
I dare say I’ve met people to whom violence did solve their conflicts - pathetic often ignorant people, but still…
But what if those means serves them fine?
In my perspective then intellect has to argue that the muscle should submit to their ruling for the benefit of both.
You’re absolutely right that it doesn’t matter to the naturally strong which kind of land distribution rule they ought to follow - unless the cost associated with deliberately breaking it becomes too high. This is the case whenever an offender may face serious blackballing or outright force by others due to his breaking the rules of property.
How are the rules of property defined? In a statist society, they are shaped by codified law. But codified law only defines the reaction of state organs to an offense, not the reaction of the general public. As a rule of thumb, the codified laws of property should somewhat match the intersubjective consensus among the general public or else they would be largely ignored, such as marijuana bans. The intersubjective consensus is sort of a compromise between dominant perceptions of morality and justice, shaped by countless factors among which we find education, social status, personal wealth and philosophical knowledgeability.
Thus, we can say that the intersubjective consensus ultimately regulates the distribution of property. Does that mean “might makes right”, the most enforceable view of justice is “right”? No. We cannot derive an “ought” from an “is”. Libertarian property theory is well thought out, universally applicable and, generally, practicable. That doesn’t mean it’s “right”, though. No ought from an is.
If libertarian property theory is to be successful, its obvious benefits need to influence the intersubjective consensus in its favor. Then, the strong will have an incentive to spare the property-owning weak - avoiding economic disadvantages. Unfortunately, much time is being spent on trying to prove that “our theory” is “objective” instead of communicating its already evidenced benefits to the outside world. That’s why nobody has an incentive to defend us from the tax man.
Not quite… A majority of brawn will still be able to surpress the brains regardless of ‘natural rights’ - which if you think about it doesn’t make much sense anyway - or any other intellectual invention.
When you have something OTHER than “a lot of people think that initiating force is fine”, please let me know. It’s entirely irrelevant that some people hold to it.
He’s asking why the use of force makes it a valid argument… strictly speaking, force has no justificatory relevance as far as arguments go. And if the advocate of force realises it, they also realise their arguments are groundless. At which point they resort to force, and are treated as mere technical obstacles, i.e. much like animals. But most advocates of force are interested in the intellectual coherence of their ideas, and this is what’s being discussed here. It’s also relevant to courts which have to decide whether or not to legitimate a particular decision, hence the discussion is not as theoretical as you might think, in any developed society (as opposed to jungle.)
First of all, where do you get the idea that “weak intellectuals” would be doing the homesteading? Huh? Homesteading has been going on for centuries by all manner of people. Courts and their armed subsidiaries enforce the rights. What is arrogant is going up to a person who has expended effort and action on something, and saying “I am stronger” or “I am smarter” or whatever, and saying it is therefore “mine”. Why? Because you felt like it? You presumably claim the right to your body and to resources to survive, so what is your reason for excluding others from them? That you’re somehow “better”? In what regard that is relevant? It’s rarely the “strong” that rule anyway. They are mere cannon fodder for the state. So I take it you mean the “better”. So basically the question should be, “why should arrogant, self-serving individuals accept my claim to a resource over which I have expended effort”? Argumentatively because they need to provide a coherent account of it and in terms of force, because they will be repelled if they try…
You have to show that it is, and no, history doesn’t. So please: disabuse yourself of the notion that it’s relevant just because some savages believe it.
The issue is not some sort of collective conflict between “strong people” and “smart people.” The conflict is between people who believe that the fact that someone is physically able to do something implies that they are ethically right in doing so, and those who don’t. People who take the former position—which I refer to as “might makes right”—must also then believe that if the displaced landowners can force the invaders off the land, they would be ethically right in doing so. If they resist, then they are, as Jon Irenicus said, “mere technical obstacles, i.e. much like animals.”
If in a conflict you say that it is necessary for your adversary to provide argumentative justification for their claim (as you have done), then you are assuming that mere force is insufficient to ethically settle the conflict, because if it were sufficient, then argumentative justification would not be necessary. If on the other hand you do not request argumentative justification from your adversary, then they need not supply any, and you cannot coherently argue against their use of force against you. (This is my understanding of Hoppe’s argument.)
If the majority only cares about muscles and strength, has no inclinations towards rational thought whatsoever and is not willing to adhere to any kind of standard either, then yes, society at large will probably never reach a higher level. But people generally do adhere to some kind of morality, and if it’s only from a holy book. Since not everyone adheres to the same moral code, but willingness to interact exists, an intersubjective consensus emerges - i.e., A believes that walking in sandals is godless, B believes that oranges are the devil’s work, but on neutral ground, they’ll tolerate sandals and oranges to facilitate trade. That’s a simplified example of an IC.
It doesn’t always work that peacefully, though. When European settlers met Indian natives on their west bound journey, they had fundamentally different concepts of property and homesteading. This could apparently not be resolved, and thus war ensued. So yes, reaching an agreement concerning property may remain difficult after all.
One last thing: in your debates with others here, you’re arguing a “can”. They are arguing an “ought to”. You’re asking why A cannot expropriate B, they’re answering that A ought to not exproriate B. In reality, most things can be done even if they are considered highly immoral. The only thing we can do is point out why they should not be done (inner consistency, false premises, false privileging), and hope that it is convincing enough to shift the IC in our favor.