Once again, this is fundamentally untrue.
To see why, explain what praxeology demands of a human’s mental content (e.g., satisfaction, desire, etc.). I contend that praxeology is a stripped-down version of psychology, including only what seems necessary for purposeful behavior, but even that only makes sense within the context of a larger conception of the psyche.
I want to add that it’s not that I am simply confused by what you mean by “trying.” I get it. I really do.
I simply don’t conceive of “trying” the same way you do: as a motivational umph possessed by a self-determining being that acts apart from the causal world.
Once again, what appears “self-evident” to the Austrian epistemology is not: the ideas are theory-laden, which colors your observations, much like the geocentric theory helped color our view of the sun.
What I am suggesting, and what I think most have missed, is that what you consider “self-evident” is actually theory-laden
What theory do you suppose lies behind the notion of trying?
That is, praxeology conceives of the human mind in a scientifically backwards way, and it does so proudly, championing an approach that disregards a naturalistic understanding.
If a certain approach is not useful for explaining something one wants to understand (like why interest rates rise and fall), then it is that approach that is backward, and that should be disregarded. To do otherwise is to make the given approach itself a fetish.
If you attempt to define “trying” or “choice” as I asked, you might start grappling with the problem I am addressing. Your plea that “but you must know what I mean!” doesn’t work.
Trying is behavior with an objective. Are you or are you not trying to show me that I’m wrong?
I also want to compare methodological dualism to an empirico-mathematical methodology by contrasting what fruits have grown from each.
To quote Caplan, Here are a few of the best new ideas to come out of academic economics since 1949:
- Human capital theory
- Rational expectations macroeconomics
- The random walk view of financial markets
- Signaling models
- Public choice theory
- Natural rate models of unemployment
- Time consistency
- The Prisoners’ Dilemma, coordination games, and hawk-dove games
- The Ricardian equivalence argument for debt-neutrality
- Contestable markets
That list is meaningless, unless you show me (a) how each of these items are demonstrated by an empirico-mathematical approach and (b) how each of these items is useful in understanding the economy.
There isn’t a satisfactory one. I am an eliminative materialist about propositional attitudes.
I totally agree. The academic stagnation of Austrian economics attests to its epistemological fetish.
In what sense does a “choice” control a human’s behavior? Do you believe that the world surrounding a particular human fully conforms to causality?
Fair criticism. I ultimately mean that nothing prohibits the methodology of neoclassical economics from using a non-mentalese language (e.g., physics)
[EDIT: Replaced old response with the following new one, since I originally misunderstood you] Well, there’s the fact that the very notions of “goods”, “money”, “profit”, “loss”, “income”, etc. are meaningless outside of a means-ends framework. That seems pretty prohibitive to me.
Suppose you had the choice of receiving a free $10 Amazon gift certificate or the opportunity to pay seven dollars for a $20 Amazon gift certificate.
Most people instinctively chose the free $10 Amazon gift certificate, even though purchasing the $20 gift certificate brings you more profit – $10 vs $13 ($20-$7) – and thus is the better choice.
That conflates gift certificate credit and cash as identical goods. They are not. Choosing the free $10 gift certificate simply means keeping the $7 in cash to spend on whatsoever the person pleases (in addition to the $10 certificate) is preferred over having the extra $3 which can only be spent on Amazon.
Could Austrian economists have made this prediction?
Given the above, the more appropriate question would be, “would Austrian economists have committed this error in reasoning?” Likely not.
[EDIT: With that, I’ve gotta run some errands. I’ll respond to your other posts when I get back.]
Once again, this is fundamentally untrue.
To see why, explain what praxeology demands of a human’s mental content (e.g., satisfaction, desire, etc.).
Reference to mind makes something what David Hume called a “moral science”, and what German scholars refer to as Geisteswissenschaft, and what now in America is called part of the “humanities” or “social sciences”. It does not make it psychology. Again psychology refers to, 'the internal events that result or can result in a definite action", not action as such.
I simply don’t conceive of “trying” the same way you do: as a motivational umph possessed by a self-determining being that acts apart from the causal world.
I do not conceive of trying as a motivational umph. That would describe feelings that may impel a person to try, not the trying itself.
There isn’t a satisfactory one.
Then what unsatisfactory theory do you suppose lies behind the notion of trying?
In what sense does a “choice” control a human’s behavior?
Choice does not control a human’s behavior. It is an aspect of human behavior. It is what qualifies any change in the world as human.
Do you believe that the world surrounding a particular human fully conforms to causality?
Yes. But, again, so long as I don’t know how specific external facts produce in a human mind definite thoughts and volitions resulting in specific, concrete acts, the mechanistic approach to studying human society doesn’t do me any good.
No more than are causation and ampliative induction.
I suspect that I have strayed too far into favored philosophies, rather than focusing on the argument itself.
You claim that “methodological dualism” is an approach for “genuine knowledge.”
You, rightfully, clarified that such an approach isn’t substance dualism; I used hyperbole. My fundamental point is that, epistemologically, Mises theorizes as if substance dualism is true, separating human minds and ascribing them properties contradictory to the rest of the universe.
You, likewise, seem to agree that humans are determined beings, inseparable from the mechanistic nature of the universe. However, you assert, to properly explain and predict economic phenomena, it is wiser to assume methodological dualism.
I then present several questions:
I hope you can answer each of those issues. And, for the debate so far, I say thank you! I believe that, unlike some sideline viewers, you actually understand my arguments and are treating them sensibly, and I’ve valued your responses.
Neoclassical,
Thank you for your kind words. I appreciate your manifest sincerity in endeavoring to understand what I am saying too.
If we are assuming “methodological dualism,” despite what we know to be true, then isn’t Mises simply subscribing to Friedman’s methodology for positive economics? That is, Mises is erecting an unreal foundation for the sake of pursuing knowledge that clarifies and predicts observations.
The two things are fundamentally different. While our purposiveness does have mechanistic causes, it is as real for me and for any other being like me (in that they experience purposive life) as anything is, because to explore any other real thing is itself intentional behavior. Economics itself is something that we intentionally pursue. Furthermore, the very primary impetus for pursuing it has been to know how the workings of society can best serve our own wants. Economics with no regard to intentionality is an empty notion.
Mises, HA:
“If we had not in our mind the schemes provided by praxeological reasoning, we should never be in a position to discern and to grasp any action. We would perceive motions, but neither buying nor selling, nor prices, wage rates, interest rates, and so on. It is only through the utilization of the praxeological scheme that we become able to have an experience concerning an act of buying and selling, but then independently of the fact of whether or not our senses concomitantly perceive any motions of men and of nonhuman elements of the external world. Unaided by praxeological knowledge we would never learn anything about media of exchange. If we approach coins without such preexisting knowledge, we would see in them only round plates of metal, nothing more. Experience concerning money requires familiarity with the praxeological category medium of exchange.”
The use of economic models in neoclassical economics is on an entirely different footing from that.
How do you explain the research findings of neoclassical economics?
Insofar as they are alleged to have been derived from observations, they are untenably supported. Insofar as they are derived, free of fallacy, from the categories of choice and intentionality, then they are sound, whether they call the reasoning “Austrian”, “praxeological”, or not. Insofar as they are not economics proper, but instead, economic history, then they must be judged by the soundness of the economic theory they use and by how well they handled the relevant data.
Do you agree with Rothbard that even the first axioms of Austrian economics are empiric in nature?
Only in the limited sense I explained earlier (with regard to the experience of reflection, and not of the sense organs).
(A) the logical positivists believed that analyticity was tautology (e.g., “Bachelors are unmarried”)
Analytic judgments are not tautologies (in the sense of “Bachelors are unmarried”). In an analytic judgment, the conclusion is contained in the premise. In a tautology (in the sense of “Bachelors are unmarried”), the conclusion is the premise. For the person who is unaware of everything that is packed into a premise, an analytic judgment does give that person knowledge that is new to him.
(B) Quine believed that a priori thinking was an unjustified category and our entire web of belief was linked to observations–that is, empirical sources.
Any kind of inference from observation itself must be based on the a priori categories of causation and ampliative induction.
Hey, I’m curious, was that gift card thing from a neoclassical textbook?
From a Wikipedia article, According to the analytic explanation of the a priori, all a priori knowledge is analytic; so a priori knowledge need not require a special faculty of pure intuition, since it can be accounted for simply by one’s ability to understand the meaning of the proposition in question. In short, proponents of this explanation claimed to have reduced a dubious metaphysical faculty of pure reason to a legitimate linguistic notion of analyticity.
I found it on a blog, actually. I was searching from an example I read in one of Bernanke’s textbook, though! The example I had wanted to use actually maintains a homogenous good being saved, so let me explain it.
Would you travel downtown to purchase a video game if the price is $10 less than the $25 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said yes. Would you travel down to purchase a computer if the price is $10 less than the $2,250 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said no.
Here’s that passage in more context:
“One theory, popular among the logical positivists of the early twentieth century, is what Boghossian calls the “analytic explanation of the a priori.”[3] The distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions was first introduced by Kant. While Kant’s original distinction was primarily drawn in terms of conceptual containment, the contemporary version of the distinction primarily involves, as Quine put it, the notions of “true by virtue of meanings and independently of fact.”[4] Analytic propositions are thought to be true in virtue of their meaning alone, while a priori synthetic propositions are thought to be true in virtue of their meaning and certain facts about the world. According to the analytic explanation of the a priori, all a priori knowledge is analytic; so a priori knowledge need not require a special faculty of pure intuition, since it can be accounted for simply by one’s ability to understand the meaning of the proposition in question.”
By “special faculty of pure intuition”, I assume this passage basically means the logical structure of the human mind.
How is the a priori category of causality analytic? If we know causality due to an analytic judgment, then what premise is the category of causality contained in?
Once again, I deny any a priori knowledge whatsoever. For instance, I would claim that causality is part of our theory of the world, but revisable.
I found it on a blog, actually. I was searching from an example I read in one of Bernanke’s textbook, though! The example I had wanted to use actually maintains a homogenous good being saved, so let me explain it.
Would you travel downtown to purchase a video game if the price is $10 less than the $25 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said yes. Would you travel down to purchase a computer if the price is $10 less than the $2,250 copy you can purchase nearby? Most people surveyed said no.
Yes, I actually have a copy of that Bernanke textbook, which actually has the higher computer price at $2,020.
It is a simple fact that people like getting high-percentage discounts on their purchases (a rule of thumb that is lucrative over the course of many purchases), and that will be a factor in the preferences they demonstrate. Daniel Kahneman’s research (which is what Bernanke draws from for his “decision pitfalls” in chapter 1) sounds interesting. But, insofar as it is like the example above, it is concerned with factors which have led to action (psychology) and actions that have taken place in the past (history), not with the logical implications of action as such. Therefore it is not economics. For economics to be a distinct discipline, it cannot be defined as “any words strung together that have to do with money”
Once again, I deny any a priori knowledge whatsoever. For instance, I would claim that causality is part of our theory of the world, but revisable.
Upon what basis do we formulate this theory? On the basis of induction with regard to the regularity of contiguity and succession? As David Hume pointed out, contiguity and succession are not enough in-and-of-themselves. From A Treatise of Human Nature:
Shall we then rest contented with these two relations of contiguity and succession, as affording a complete idea of causation? By, no means. An object may be contiguous and prior to another, without being considered as its cause. There is a NECESSARY CONNEXION to be taken into consideration; and that relation is of much greater importance, than any of the other two above-mention’d.
Here again I turn the object on all sides, in order to discover the nature of this necessary connexion, and find the impression, or impressions, from which its idea may be deriv’d. When I cast my eye on the known Qualities of objects, I immediately discover that the relation of cause and effect depends not in the least on them. When I consider their relations, I can find none but those of contiguity and succession; which I have already regarded as imperfect and unsatisfactory. (…)
What is our idea of necessity, when we say that two objects are necessarily connected together. Upon this head I repeat what I have often had occasion to observe, that as we have no idea, that is not deriv’d from an impression, we must find some impression, that gives rise to this idea of necessity, if we assert we have really such an idea. In order to this I consider, in what objects necessity is commonly suppos’d to lie; and finding that it is always ascrib’d to causes and effects, I turn my eye to two objects suppos’d to be plac’d in that relation; and examine them in all the situations, of which they are susceptible. I immediately perceive, that they are contiguous in time and place, and that the object we -call cause precedes the other we call effect. In no one instance can I go any farther, nor is it possible for me to discover any third relation betwixt these objects. I therefore enlarge my view to comprehend several instances; where I find like objects always existing in like relations of contiguity and succession. At first sight this seems to serve but little to my purpose. The reflection on several instances only repeats the same objects; and therefore can never give rise to a new idea. But upon farther enquiry I find, that the repetition is not in every particular the same, but produces a new impression, and by that means the idea, which I at present examine. For after a frequent repetition, I find, that upon the appearance of one of the objects, the mind is determin’d by custom to consider its usual attendant, and to consider it in a stronger light upon account of its relation to the first object. 'Tis this impression, then, or determination, which affords me the idea of necessity.(…)
I begin with observing that the terms of efficacy, agency, power, force, energy, necessity, connexion, and productive quality, are all nearly synonymous; and therefore 'tis an absurdity to employ any of them in defining the rest. (…)
The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression convey’d by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be deriv’d from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. (…)
This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists in the mind, not in objects; nor -is it possible for us ever to form the most distant idea of it, considered as a quality in bodies. (…)
the necessity or power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other.
Locke said “there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses”, to which Leibniz appended, “except the intellect itself”.
And Hume would have agreed with both Mises and Leibniz on that account. He recognized that there must be some “determination of the mind” to make the leap from regular contiguity/succession to causation. This leap is an a priori from which we theorize, not a theory itself.
Furthermore, inferences from regularity (or any other kind of induction) are themselves based on an a priori. Hume’s problem of induction only fails to be a practical problem for us, because the structure of our minds simply accepts induction on an a priori basis.