Thanks for the paper, Vichy. It’s too long for me to read now, but I read a fifth of the way.
So far the ambiguity of the word “logic” and the conception of things in terms of truth as the fundamental unit of analysis seem misguided. I’ve been arguing that truth is merely a useful heuristic, but that at a deep enough level of analysis* there is only utility. Perhaps inadvertently, Long illustrates this here:
Why do the wood-sellers seem irrational? Consider: I could buy a tall, narrow pile
of wood from them for a low price, rearrange it, and then resell it to them at a high price.
How can they guard against being exploited in this manner?
In order to explain why an action seems irrational or illogical, he at last refers to utility. This ultimate reference back to utility is a common theme that you’ll find appearing in all kinds of discussions about logic and truth. For example, a more direct refutation of Hoppe’s argumentation ethics goes simply, “So what? Suppose I really do contradict myself. What disutility do I experience from that?”
*That is, fully individualized - thinking only from my own perspective - and realizing that I can know nothing beyond my own sensory experience (which I’m claiming includes all conscious thought) so I cannot make claims about any objective truth. This does not invalidate Mises’s approach or his attacks on polylogism; at the level of analysis he is talking about these are all valid, or rather, useful points.
[EDIT] Just read section 4 and liked it a lot. Although it may not be directly relevant to this discussion.
[EDIT 2] Section 7 is also good. This passage is directly relevant, although Long is addressing a different point:
What, for example, is involved in thinking “there are no tigers in the room”? It can’t
simply be a matter of imagining the room without tigers in it, for that image could serve
just as well as a sign of the thought “there are no buffalo in the room.” (Unless I imagine
the room with buffalo but no tigers; but then it would serve equally well as a sign for
“there are buffalo in the room,” which is not what I am thinking when I think there are no
tigers in the room.) Or do I perhaps imagine the room with tigers in it, but with a big X
through it? Well, in that case, what do I mean by the X? After all, such an image could
serve just as well to represent the thought “tigers should not be in the room,” or the
thought “there are no rooms, and no tigers,” or the thought “the room contains tigers and
a large X-shaped thing.”
I am suggesting that the meaning of the X through the image of tigers in the room is determined by experience as one grows up, just like the meaning of certain computer bleeps is determined by my experience using it (assuming I don’t look it up in the manual). The conception of things in terms of utility instead of in terms of truth solves this problem. Although it seems that Wittgenstein was either very close to this or already had reached this conception. Perhaps Heidegger too. I don’t know, I almost never read philosophy. In any case it definitely does not seem to have been absorbed into modern paradigms.
[EDIT 3] Section 8 was problematic in two ways. First, Long doesn’t disambiguate between “language” and actual acts of uttering things, so he ends up with a terribly confused notion of what language is and how it relates to thought. The other problem is that the whole section goes in circles by trying to conceive of truth as the fundamental concept, rather than one’s own utility. Hence the mucking about with realism, post-realism, anti-realism, idealism, and rail-less realism.
The frustrating thing about this part is that Long seems to be aware of some of these finer points in one section, note them, and then forget them later in another section. I can’t really blame him as he is juggling a lot in this paper, and the discussion in this section is pretty fascinating for how it dances around the above two issues. It reminds me just how confused you can get when you don’t distinguish words from thoughts and don’t clearly define all the terms your argument hinges on.
I’m glad these issues are/were being addressed by such able thinkers as Long and Wittgenstein, even if I don’t agree with the approach exactly. I’d like to respond to Long’s paper at length because it is loaded with content that I can already see how I could turn into good illustrations of the issues I’ve been talking about, but it’d take ages. I can probably respond to specific points if anyone cares.
What, for example, is involved in thinking “there are no tigers in the room”? It can’t
simply be a matter of imagining the room without tigers in it, for that image could serve
just as well as a sign of the thought “there are no buffalo in the room.” (Unless I imagine
the room with buffalo but no tigers; but then it would serve equally well as a sign for
“there are buffalo in the room,” which is not what I am thinking when I think there are no
tigers in the room.) Or do I perhaps imagine the room with tigers in it, but with a big X
Roderick T. Long – Wittgenstein, Austrian Economics, and the Logic of Action, p. 73
through it? Well, in that case, what do I mean by the X? After all, such an image could
serve just as well to represent the thought “tigers should not be in the room,” or the
thought “there are no rooms, and no tigers,” or the thought “the room contains tigers and
a large X-shaped thing.”
of wood,m from them for a low price, rearrange it, and then resell it to them at a high price.
How can they guard against being exploited in this manner?