How does that support your case that “[I am] crazy”, that “[I] can’t be an empiricist like Hume and a rationalist like Mises”, that '[I] ha[ve] to budge", that “[they] aren’t compatible”, and that “[he …] was a proto-logical positivist”? Why don’t you just read the thread that I was referring to?
I. Ryan: "I don’t think that you are using the word “sensation” how Neoclassical defined it, as experience of the public world.
In my signature, the first link is one to a thread in which I show that Mises and Hume, two of my favorite writers, weren’t opposed to each other at all at least in epistemology, though most people would think that they were, because they would see the words that they used, such as “experience” and so on, and see that they used those words in superficially contradictory ways.
If you don’t want to read it, I can give you a quick summary of what I was saying, and why it is relevant to what is going on here. Mises defined “experience” as that of the public world, and “reason” as that of the private world, yet Hume defined “experience” as that of either the private world or the public world. So people see Hume talk about experience like it is the only thing that matters to science, and see Mises talk about experience like it can’t tell us anything about praxeology, and they think that they are saying entirely different things, and would be super opposed to each other. But they are missing what I already said, that they defined the terms in different ways.
I think that you are doing the same thing.
I asked Neoclassical whether he was using the word “sensation” to mean experience of the public world, and he said yes. But I think that you are switching it up to mean experience either of the private world or the public world. How Hume used the word “experience”, yes, I think that experience is the only basis of science. But, how Mises used the word “experience”, no, I don’t think that experience is the only basis of science. So, in the same way, how you used the word “sensation”, yes, I think that sensation is the only basis of science, but, how Neoclassical used the word “sensation”, no, I don’t think that sensatian is the only basis of science."
You have this exactly correct as far as my position, and that is very illuminating regarding Mises and Hume.
OK, words are very hard to parse at this level of analysis. The word “sensation” auto-equivocates between, for lack of better wording, “public” and “private” sensation. If Neoclassical means public, then his position makes sense. I mean private. Or rather, I reject the public/private distinction as anything other than an explanatory device of convenience. And I suppose that’s the real core issue:
At this deep level of analysis, “reality” is just a term of convenience for that set of sensations that presents in more permanent and “high-detail” fashion, relatively consistently day after day, and where I can only control things by means of this physical body; unlike, say, “the fantasy world” or “dreams,” where sensations are not as permanent or high-detail, and I may actually be able to control things just by thinking something different.
“I am an empiricist in the tradition of Hume, but a rationalist in the tradition of Mises. I think that the same thing probably applies to you. How that is possible is that people just got tripped up by the words that each of them used, and didn’t get a good understanding of what they actually were saying, and they came up with terms to use to contrast them.”
Indeed, I am probably the same, although I am a “first-person empiricist” w.r.t. myself, and I believe that’s the only coherent position.
“How is it possible” for words to trip people up? Words just suck as explanatory devices, but they’re all we have - for now. In fact, in most all arguments of this nature I don’t think there would be any disagreement if the semantic issues were resolved. As your example of Mises and Hume shows.
I did read it.
Hume never catered any of the ideas that define Misesean epistemology.
You don’t believe in self-deception?
Neoclassical to I. Ryan: “How do you know what I “prefer”?”
It’s not that he knows what you prefer, it’s that (presumably) you do. Mises terms these concepts “self-evident,” not “other-evident.” Again, subjectivity: I don’t think you have yet understood what Mises meant by it. (He does not mean it in the sense or context that Dennett apparently does in the article you linked.)
Neoclassical: “You don’t believe in self-deception?”
Not my own deception of myself regarding my own subjective experience of sensations qua sensations, which are all I have to go on. In fact, self-deception in that arena wouldn’t even be a coherent notion. It doesn’t even make sense, in my own mind, to talk about my deceiving myself about a presently-sensed pain. And I presume the same is true for you, in terms of your own mind. Sure, looking at someone else we can say they are deceiving themselves (or appearing to) in contrast with what they report. But that is an entirely different matter.
If you mean, can my modeling of the “outside world” based on the sensations I experience make predictions about future sensations that ever differ from from the sensations I actually experience in the future? Then yes, I can indeed create models with poor predictive performance as far as the sensations I will experience in the future.
I would argue that he did, but I don’t know why that matters, unless I am misunderstanding what you mean. I was saying that they are compatible in the way that people often act like they are opposites, not that Hume came up with “any of the ideas that define Misesian epistemology”. If I am misunderstanding you, tell me what you mean by “catered”. What does it mean that Hume never “catered” any of those ideas?
That I have “preferences” in some foggy mentalese sense is not at all “self-evident” to me.
Many people believe they “prefer” losing weight to gaining weight, but still eat cake rather than exercise.
For clarification, I am an eliminative materialist, and I contend "common sense mental notions do not pick out anything real "
Either their beliefs of causal connections aren’t correct from your point of view, they aren’t giving you the whole story, or they prefer the pleasure that they think that they would get from eating cake to the pleasure that they think that they would get from losing weight.
Hume differentiated “matters of fact” and “relations of ideas.” Are you suggesting that Hume conceived of “relations of ideas” as Mises conceived of his praxeology?
That I have “preferences” in some foggy mentalese sense is not at all “self-evident” to me.
Not mentalese or foggy, but simply that you indeed are aware that you don’t want to be eaten by sharks right now, for example. I can imagine our conversation going like this:
Me: Do you want to be eaten by sharks now?
You: No.
Me: How do you know?
You: My sensory receptors are firing in such a way.
Me: I don’t mean, by what mechanism did you come to you know, I mean, how can you be sure?
You: The word “want” doesn’t make sense, it’s just a folk term.
Me: Indeed, it’s a term of convenience, but you seem to agree that “wanting” is just some sensory receptors firing. How can you be sure, without any scientific equipment, that your sensory receptors are really firing in such a way?
You: [Your answer here]
Many people believe they “prefer” losing weight to gaining weight, but still eat cake rather than exercise.
That’s a separate issue: “want to do” vs. “want to have done.” In Austrian terms, time preference. They want to eat cake, but they don’t want to have eaten cake. This semantic ambiguity in the English language can’t be a reason for my rejecting my subjective sensation I call “wanting” (or, you rejecting that subjective sensation you presumably experience).
Note that by calling a sensation “wanting” in the first place, I am simply sending you a signal in the hopes that you find a similar sensation in yourself and identify that sensation as what I am probably also experiencing and referring to by that word.
Words != concepts. Words are just communication devices.
Holy shit, I hadn’t ever thought of that. What an awesome point.
I don’t know. What do you think?
I would rely on previous scientific research.
I think Hume considered “relations of ideas” exactly how the logical positivists did: analytic truths because they are tautologous. That is, “a triangle has three sides” is necessarily true, because it’s a tautology. There is no knowledge per se being presented. I believe that is very dissimilar to how praxeologists conceive of their practice.
are there mathematical truths that are not tautological? is no mathematical knowledge per se ever being presented? you think everyone that goes to study math is wasting their time? (like you think praxeologists are wasting their time?)
I was not defending the logical positivists, but presenting their ideas, which reflect Hume’s thinking. I consider Quine’s criticism, contained in his essay, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” to be correct.
My view is reflected more accurately in this article: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics#Empiricism. Quoting from the article, “Empiricism is a form of realism that denies that mathematics can be known a priori at all.”
so now you deny that ‘triangles are 3 sided’ is an a-priori mathematical truth? rather you think that we need to go out into nature in search of things that have 3 sides and find out whether our hypothesis that ‘3 sided things are triangles’ is true?