Mises Science of Ought

Economics Political Theory
1

Liberalism

This is for those that visit the forum that have consistently conflated personal ethics with political-ethics. And have therefore also conflated economics with political-ethics, as well as, law in the legal sense of the term. It is not that human action does not partake with politics. Yet it is another thing to suggest that there is no politics and that human action has nothing to do with content whatsoever. Praxeology doesn’t study the content of means to ends, but this doesn’t mean that there are not contextualized means and ends to study with the axiom of human action always active in such a pursuit.

“In the Prefaces of both the second (1963) and third (1966) editions of his magnum opus, Human Action , Mises wrote that the advocates of the freedom philosophy should reclaim “the term ‘liberal’. . . because there is simply no other term available to signify the great political and intellectual movement” that ushered in modern civilization by fostering the free market economy, limited government and individual freedom. It is in this sense that “liberalism” is used throughout this book.” [Preface written by Bettina Bien Greaves to the book Liberalism by Mises]

Mises advocated liberalism as it “signif(ies) the great political and intellectual movement”.

“Liberalism does not say that men always act intelligently, but rather that they ought, in their own rightly understood interest, always to act intelligently. And the essence of liberalism is just this, that it wants to have conceded to reason in the sphere of social policy the acceptance that is conceded to it without dispute in all other spheres of human action.” [Mises; p. 5]

Mises saying people “ought… always to act intelligently.”

“Liberalism is not a completed doctrine or a fixed dogma. On the contrary: it is the application of the teachings of science to the social life of man.” [Mises; p. 3]

A science of ought.

“Liberalism is a doctrine directed entirely towards the conduct of men in this world.” [Mises; p.

Mises is writing a book on how the conduct of men in this world ought to be scientifically speaking.

"Liberalism has always had in view the good of the whole, not that of any special group. It was this that the English utilitarians meant to express-although, it is true, not very aptly-in their famous formula, "the
greatest happiness of the greatest number." Historically, liberalism was the first political movement that aimed at promoting the welfare of all, not that of special groups." [Mises; p. 4]

He is advocating liberalism which he writes “has always had in view the good of the whole”. He is writing about all of society. It’s a political book on what he values and says it is a science of ought for the whole of society (he says men) and says how the conduct of men ought to be using science. He says it is a “great political and intellectual movement”, because the whole of society (again he says men, but I assume he means women too) “ought… always to act intelligently.”

“Liberalism is not a policy in the interest of any particular group, but a policy in the interest of all mankind. It is, therefore, incorrect to assert that the entrepreneurs and capitalists have any special interest in supporting liberalism. Their interest in championing the liberal program is exactly the same as that of everyone else.” [Mises; p. 12]

Liberals are not only capitalists nor only entrepreneurs, but it’s interest champions “everyone else” too - “all mankind”.

"The program of liberalism, therefore, if condensed into a single word, would have to read: property, that is, private ownership of the means of production (for in regard to commodities ready for consumption, private ownership is a matter of course and is not disputed even by the socialists and communists). All the other demands of liberalism result from this fundamental demand. Side by side with the word “property” in the program of liberalism one may quite appropriately place the words "freedom" and “peace.” [Mises; 19]

Mises saying Liberalism is a science of ought for all mankind can be condensed to property and side by side with the terms freedom and peace.

“…liberalism has outgrown that of the older liberalism, that it is based on a deeper and better insight into interrelationships, since it can reap the benefit of the advances that science has made in the last decades. Freedom and peace have been placed in the forefront of the program of liberalism… liberals have not wanted to give the appearance, through the omission of these principles, that they in any way acknowledged the justness of the objections raised against them.” [Mises; p. 20]

Liberalism, being a political-ethic, can benefit from the advances of science in order to have better insight into interrelationships, and liberals advocating freedom and peace to so because of the objections raised against them are NOT just.

“The liberal thinks otherwise. He is convinced that victorious war is an evil even for the victor, that peace is always better than war. He demands no sacrifice from the stronger, but only that he should come to realize where his true interests lie and should learn to understand that peace is for him, the stronger, just as advantageous as it is for the weaker.” [Mises; p. 24]

The liberal in which Mises says is for all mankind and that being a science all men ought to follow states war is evil even for the victor because what all mankind ought to know scientifically is that peace is… the stronger and advantageous. Again - war is evil and peace is always better.

"Human actions become good or bad only through the end that they serve and the consequences they entail."[Mises; p. 24]

Human actions, praxeologically speaking, become good or bad through the end… This quote basically reads for itself.

“As the liberal sees it, the task of the state consists solely and exclusively in guaranteeing the protection of life, health, liberty, and private property against violent attacks. Everything that goes beyond this is an evil. A government that, instead of fulfilling its task, sought to go so far as actually to infringe on personal security of life and health, freedom, and property would, of course, be altogether bad.” [Mises; p. 52]

Anti-gov’t people may forgive Mises here on his gov’t view, but Mises states here John Locke’s natural rights of life, health, liberty, and private property are to be protected by the gov’t and if infringed by gov’t that is bad. Mises advocating natural rights of the natural law of human nature. And as a science of ought for all mankind it is these natural rights that are to be protected and "everything (a universal proposition by the great logical thinker Mises) that goes beyond this is an evil". Well, science has moved beyond Mises here as gov’t has been logically been conceptualized as not necessary.

“This question cannot be treated exclusively in reference to alcoholism, morphinism, cocainism, etc., which all reasonable men acknowledge to be evils.” [Mises; p. 53]

Now I am able to conceive that Mises is talking about personal ethics, and being the reasonable man Mises was he states these acts of humans are evil. He knows the difference between personal and political ethics because he argues further in this part of the book that the state need not intervene to stop what Mises calls evils. I personally don’t know if these are evil. Maybe bad, but bad might simply be evil. Yet Mises outrightly calls them evil.

Mises is using a science of ought, ie. Liberalism, in which all mankind ought to always act intellectual, protect natural rights (via a gov’t which is simply an extension of individuals), advocates that the advances in science can make better interrelationships, ie. ethics, which in terms of the book also entail political ethics of what all mankind ought to do in accord with science. Though he makes some personal ethical comments about alcoholism, etc… being evil, and I know he was for gov’t but science has moved on [though it seems that it has been sorted out that Mises would be fine with a voluntary gov’t].

2

Human actions become good or bad only through the end that they serve and the consequences they entail."[Mises; p. 24]

I thought it was the means and not the ends that mattered?

3

Depends who you ask.

4

wilderness,

You’ve managed to misinterpret every single one of those passages. I don’t have time right now to explain to you each and every way you’ve done so. And anyway, I doubt you’d ever change your mind on the subject. Fortunately for the sake of other readers, I don’t really need to address all your backwards-bending attempts to extract a moralist interpretation of Mises’ thought, since Mises himself was no obscurantist. All I need do is again quote the following:

"It must be emphasized again: there is no such thing as a scientific ought."

The above sentence is short, simple, direct, and crystal clear. Yet I know you will unleash a torrent of sentences to insist that, even though he denied scientific oughts, he also somehow accepted scientific oughts at the same time. I can only trust that readers will accept Mises’ own unambiguous words directly asserting his own position on the matter, over your spurious inferences from unrelated passages.

5

When you do, I’d be interested in the response.

"The planners pretend that their plans are scientific and that there cannot be disagreement with regard to them among well-intentioned and decent people. However, there is no such thing as a scientific ought. Science is competent to establish what is. It can never dictate what ought to be and what ends people should aim at. It is a fact that men disagree in their value judgments. It is insolent to arrogate to oneself the right to overrule the plans of other people and to force them to submit to the plan of the planner. Whose plan should be executed? The plan of the CIO or those of any other group? The plan of Trotsky or that of Stalin? The plan of Hitler or that of Strasser?

When people were committed to the idea that in the field of religion only one plan must be adopted, bloody wars resulted. With the acknowledgment of the principle of religious freedom these wars ceased. The market economy safeguards peaceful economic co-operation because it does not use force upon the economic plans of the citizens. If one master plan is to be substituted for the plans of each citizen, endless fighting must emerge. Those who disagree with the dictator’s plan have no other means to carry on than to defeat the despot by force of arms." ~ Planned Chaos, pg 10

Now this time with context:

"The eugenists pretend that they want to eliminate criminal individuals. But the qualification of a man as a criminal depends upon the prevailing laws of the country and varies with the change in social and political ideologies. John Huss, Giordano Bruno and Galileo Galilei were criminals from the point of view of the laws which their judges applied. When Stalin robbed the Russian State Bank of several million rubles, he committed a crime. Today it is an offence in Russia to disagree with Stalin. In Nazi Germany sexual intercourse between “Aryans” and the members of an “inferior” race was a crime. Whom do the eugenists want to eliminate, Brutus or Caesar? Both violated the laws of their country. If eighteenth century eugenists had prevented alcohol addicts from generating children, their planning would have eliminated Beethoven.

It must be emphasized again: there is no such thing as a scientific ought. Which men are superior and which are inferior can only be decided by personal value judgments not liable to Verification or falsification. The eugenists delude themselves in assuming that they themselves will be called to decide what qualities are to be conserved in the human stock. They are too dull to take into account the possibility that other people might make the choice according to their own value judgments. [28] In the eyes of the Nazis the brutal killer, the “fair-haired beast,” is the most perfect specimen of mankind."

What do you believe he is referring to here? Seems to me that it’s an attack on others using “personal ethics” i.e their own take on what is right and wrong and imposing that on others, no? So that when he says there are no “scientific oughts”, it means that it’s not scientific at all to impose your personal value judgments on others. Which it clearly isn’t.

So do you believe Mises acknowledged the difference between political philosophy, and personal ethics? Yes, or no?

It sure seems like he did to me, as from various other passages in Planned Chaos. There is this from Liberalism though:

"No words need be wasted over the fact that all these narcotics are harmful. The question whether even a small quantity of alcohol is harmful or whether the harm results only from the abuse of alcoholic beverages is not at issue here. It is an established fact that alcoholism, cocainism, and morphinism are deadly enemies of life, of health, and of the capacity for work and enjoyment; and a utilitarian must therefore consider them as vices.

But this is far from demonstrating that the authorities must interpose to suppress these vices by commercial prohibitions, nor is it by any means evident that such intervention on the part of the government is really capable of suppressing them or that, even if this end could be attained, it might not therewith open up a Pandora’s box of other dangers, no less mischievous than alcoholism and morphinism.

Whoever is convinced that indulgence or excessive indulgence in these poisons is pernicious is not hindered from living abstemiously or temperately. This question cannot be treated exclusively in reference to alcoholism, morphinism, cocainism, etc., which all reasonable men acknowledge to be evils." - Mises, Liberalism, p 53

He considers it to be evil, his personal ethics, but he makes the distinction - that in regards to political philosophy, he wouldn’t impose violence on anyone else, it gives no reason at all for the state to do so either. And that is where the Nazi’s, the planners go wrong.

6

Even if true, what does that have to do with this? Please let’s leave the team sports attitude out of it.

I’ve changed my mind, and admitted I was wrong openly on these forums. Have you?

Your two quotes only amplify the fact that, contra wilderness’s title to this thread, there is no such thing as a Misesian science of “ought”.

Yes.

7

Any time someone is making a utilitarian argument, they are arguign ethically. I don’t see how it could be stated otherwise.

Look if our goal was to enslave the vast majority of people then the right thing to do for that goal would be an economic model that supports that. Some type of collectivism. (Ethically)

On the flip side, if our goal is to support individual freedom, and further increase one’s economic possibilities then Austrian Economics would be the right thing to do. (ethically)

People confuse themselves if they think no ethics are involved or do not exist. Ethics exist in the very root of Human action as a set of guidelines directing actions. It is because Mises, and myself, and Wilderness, prefer economic freedom to slavery that we have ethics. That preference is the ethical one. Ethics are always involved. You cannot presume that all socialists want socialism for the wellbeing of men. Some socialists want it for control and power, and to them it’s the ethical way of doing it.

Likewise for Mises, liberalism is the ethical way of fostering economic prosperity, and I agree with him. I am utilitarian to. [:)]

Am I bad? [:(]

8

filc,

Mises’ utilitarianism is different from what people usually think of regarding that term.

Roderick Long:

"you might think that if someone says economics implies utilitarianism, it sounds like they think that economics implies a positive ethical theory — because we usually think of utilitarianism as a particular ethical theory, a theory that says that certain things are objectively good. The standard versions of utilitarianism, like John Stuart Mill’s version, assert that a certain goal — human welfare, happiness, pleasure, satisfaction — is intrinsically valuable and worth pursuing, objectively so. And then our job is to pursue it.

Clearly Mises can’t mean that. Since Mises thinks that there are no objective values, when Mises embraces utilitarianism he can’t be embracing the view that human welfare is an objective value. What Mises means by “utilitarianism” is a little bit different from the kind of utilitarianism that people like John Stuart Mill advocate. By “utilitarianism” Mises means something like simply giving people advice about how to achieve the goals they already have. So you’re not necessarily endorsing their goals, but utilitarianism says that really the only real role for any kind of evaluation is simply to talk about means to ends, because you can’t evaluate the ends."

9

For background on this discussion read this recent thread.

10

So do you adhere to the fact/value dichotomy? If so, what do you make of Putnam’s arguments against it?

11

That’s why I edited it out. Before I saw your response btw. What does it have to do with this? Well you have nothing but praise for the exact same styled attempts from others.

You’ve admitted you were wrong, and changed your mind on this subject? Where?

Not in personal ethics.. Yet, I don’t believe that was ever suggested. Was it?

Oh good… and do you? What about the rest of the post?

12

Filic, I am also a utilitarian. A hedonist, or whatever one wishes to call me. I am not sure, but my unscientific survey of this forum reveals that a majority are beholden to some ‘natural rights’ view, because utilitarianism seems too weak a foundation to them. I am often confused about “natural rights”, since it has always seemed to me simply utilitarianism dressed up in religious sanctimony. Their argument boils down to “God wants us all to be free.” or some other supernatural appeal to authority. Do I misunderstand?

13

To be clear, I am not saying that Mises did not have his own personal moral “oughts”. Every man who doesn’t suffer from a pathological condition does. However, to Mises, moral “oughts”, like all values, are unanalyzable givens, and thus are not objects of science.

“Concrete value judgments and definite human actions are not open to further analysis.” (Human Action)

Science, to Mises, does not concern itself with value judgments (“ought” statements), but only what he called “existential propositions” (“is” statements).

14

Yes, as did Mises:

"PROPOSITIONS asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.

Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence."

Theory and History, Chapter 1

I’m not familiar with them. Can you paraphrase them for me?

15

I didn’t mean on this subject.

Do you suppose Mises believed in scientific “oughts” in political philosophy?

Yes.

What do you mean?

16

"One common philosophic objection to natural law ethics is that it confuses, or identifies, the realism of fact and value. For purposes of our brief discussion, John Wild’s reply will suffice:

In answer we may point out that their [natural law] view identifies value not with existence but rather with the fulfillment of tendencies determined by the structure of the existent entity. Furthermore, it identifies evil not with non-existence but rather with a mode of existence in which natural tendencies are thwarted and deprived of realization…. The young plant whose leaves are withering for lack of light is not nonexistent. It exists, but in an unhealthy or privative mode. The lame man is not nonexistent. He exists, but with a natural power partially unrealized. … This metaphysical objection is based upon the common assumption that existence is fully finished or complete. … [But] what is good is the fulfillment of being.[30]

After stating that ethics, for man as for any other entity, are determined by investigating verifiable existing tendencies of that entity, Wild asks a question crucial to all non-theological ethics: “why are such principles felt to be binding on me?” How do such universal tendencies of human nature become incorporated into a person’s subjective value scale? Because

the factual needs which underlie the whole procedure are common to man. The values founded on them are universal. Hence, if I made no mistake in my tendential analysis of human nature, and if I understand myself, I must exemplify the tendency and must feel it subjectively as an imperative urge to action.[31]

David Hume is the philosopher supposed by modern philosophers to have effectively demolished the theory of natural law. Hume’s “demolition” was two-pronged: the raising of the alleged “fact-value” dichotomy, thus debarring the inference of value from fact,[32] and his view that reason is and can only be a slave to the passions.

In short, in contrast to the natural-law view that man’s reason can discover the proper ends for man to follow, Hume held that only the emotions can ultimately set man’s ends, and that reason’s place is as the technician and handmaiden to the emotions. (Here Hume has been followed by modern social scientists since Max Weber.) According to this view, people’s emotions are assumed to be primary and unanalyzable givens.

Professor Hesselberg has shown, however, that Hume, in the course of his own discussions, was compelled to reintroduce a natural-law conception into his social philosophy and particularly into his theory of justice, thus illustrating the gibe of Etienne Gilson: “The natural law always buries its undertakers.” For Hume, in Hesselberg’s words, “recognized and accepted that the social … order is an indispensable prerequisite to man’s well-being and happiness: and that this is a statement of fact.” The social order, therefore, must be maintained by man. Hesselberg continues:

But a social order is not possible unless man is able to conceive what it is, and what its advantages are, and also conceive those norms of conduct which are necessary to its establishment and preservation, namely, respect for another’s person and for his rightful possessions, which is the substance of justice … But justice is the product of reason, not the passions. And justice is the necessary support of the social order; and the social order is necessary to man’s well-being and happiness. If this is so, the norms of justice must control and regulate the passions, and not vice versa.[33]

Hesselberg concludes that “thus Hume’s original ‘primacy of the passions’ thesis is seen to be utterly untenable for his social and political theory, and … he is compelled to reintroduce reason as a cognitive-normative factor in human social relations.”[34]

Indeed, in discussing justice and the importance of the rights of private property, Hume was compelled to write that reason can establish such a social ethic: “nature provides a remedy in the judgment and understanding for what is irregular and uncommodious in the affections” — in short, reason can be superior to the passions.[35]

We have seen from our discussion that the doctrine of natural law — the view that an objective ethics can be established through reason — has had to face two powerful groups of enemies in the modern world: both anxious to denigrate the power of man’s reason to decide upon his destiny. These are the fideists who believe that ethics can only be given to man by supernatural revelation, and the skeptics who believe that man must take his ethics from arbitrary whim or emotion. We may sum up with Professor Grant’s harsh but penetrating view of

the strange contemporary alliance between those who doubt the capacity of human reason in the name of scepticism (probably scientific in origin) and those who denigrate its capacity in the name of revealed religion. It is only necessary to study the thought of Ockham to see how ancient this strange alliance is. For in Ockham can be seen how philosophic nominalism, unable to face the question of practical certainty, solves it by the arbitrary hypothesis of revelation. The will detached from the intellect (as it must be in a nominalism) can seek certainty only through such arbitrary hypotheses.

The interesting fact historically is that these two anti-rationalist traditions — that of the liberal skeptic and the Protestant revelationist — should originally have come from two … opposite views of man. The Protestant dependence upon revelation arose from a great pessimism about human nature … The immediately apprehended values of the liberal originate in a great optimism. Yet … after all, is not the dominating tradition in North America a Protestantism which has been transformed by pragmatic technology and liberal aspirations?[36]"

Notes:

[30] Wild, “Natural Law,” pp. 4–5. Wild continues on p.11:

Existence is … not a property but a structuralized activity. Such activities are a kind of fact. They can be observed and described by judgments that are true or false: human life needs material artifacts; technological endeavors need rational guidance; the child has cognitive faculties that need education. Value statements are founded on the directly verifiable fact of tendency or need. The value or realization is required not merely by us but by the existent tendency for its completion. From a sound description and analysis of the given tendency we can infer the value founded upon it This is why we do not say that moral principles are mere statements of fact, but rather that they are “founded” on facts.

On pp. 2–4, Wild says:

The ethics of natural law … recognizes prescriptive moral laws but asserts that these are founded on tendential facts which may be described…. Goodness … must … be conceived dynamically as an existential mode, the realization of natural tendency. In this view, the world is not made up of determinate structures alone, but of determinate structures in an act of existing which they determine toward further appropriate acts of existing…. No determinate structure cart be given existence without determining active tendencies. When such a tendency is fulfilled in accordance with natural law, the entity is said to be in a stable, healthy, or sound condition — adjectives of value. When it is obstructed or distorted, the entity is said to be in an unstable, diseased or unsound condition — adjectives of disvalue. Goodness and badness in their ontological sense are not phases of abstract structure, but rather modes of existence, ways in which the existential tendencies determined by such structures are either fulfilled or barely sustained in a deprived, distorted state.

[31] Ibid., p. 12. For more on a defense of natural law ethics, see John Wild, Plato’s Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); Henry Veatch, Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1962); and Veatch, For An Ontology of Morals.

[32] Hume in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an “ought” conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the “ought” need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question. See Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 99–105.

[33] A. Kenneth Hesselberg, “Hume, Natural Law and Justice,” Duquesne Review (Spring 1961): 46–47.

[34] Ibid.

[35] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, quoted in Hesselberg, “Hume, Natural Law, and Justice,” p. 61. Hesselberg adds perceptively that Hume’s sharp ought-is dichotomy in the earlier chapters of Hume’s Treatise stemmed from his restricting the meaning of “reason” to finding pleasure — pain objects, and determining the means to achieve them. But, in the later chapters on justice, the very nature of the concept compelled Hume “to assign a third role to reason, namely its power to judge actions in terms of their suitability, or conformity or disconformity, to man’s social nature, and thus paved the way for the return to a natural law concept of justice.” Ibid., pp. 61–62.

For some doubt whether or not Hume himself intended to assert the fact-value dichotomy, see A.C. MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and 'Ought,” in W.D. Hudson, ed., The Is-Ought Question (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp*.* 35–50.

[36] George P. Grant, “Plato and Popper,” The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science (May 1954): 191–92.

17

Conza, It’s a forum, not a journal, so you don’t need to comprehensively source your quotes. But could you at least type the word “Rothbard” at the top of your quote bombs, so as to not bewilder the uninitiated? Thanks.

The inconsistency Rothbard believes Hesselberg has discovered in Hume’s theory is simply not there. In Hume’s construction, the social order is a means to the end of human happiness. And, as Rothbard himself recognizes, Hume recognizes the value of natural law in choosing means. And, nowhere in his construction, does Hume ever promote the use of natural law to choose the end of human happiness; it is only promoted for choosing the means of social order.

18

From the mere fact that a class of being has a certain tendency, it does not follow that a member of that class ought to fulfill that tendency. The human body has an inherent tendency to degenerate; we are hardwired to age and die. For a geneticist to discover a way to safely undo that hardwiring would be in direct contravention of our nature. Are we to stand in his way?

19

But you did, when you said what you did to wilderness.

Grayson Lilburne: “And anyway, I doubt you’d ever change your mind on the subject.”

That’s what promoted my response. Since I doubt you’d ever change your mind on the subject either. Hence, pot calling kettle black. But hey, who knows.. we’re all intellectually honest here, right? If anything, I didn’t think your comment was of *‘*the sporting attitude’.

And what precisely do you mean by “oughts” in political philosophy?

The other questions that weren’t answered… stuff that actually had to do with the analysis. Or I guess you agreed with it, so felt no need?

The reason I stopped doing that because several people, including an admin/moderator ignorantly believed I was making or attempting to make an appeal to authority. So to stop that false assumption, I decided to stop openly stating who I was quoting and instead leave the arguments, but with links for the curious person to follow. I’m sorry, it appears I can’t please everyone.

20

It seems that Wild would have us believe that he has discovered an apodictic law… not a praxeological, mathematical, or mechanical law; but an apodictic psychological law that says that every being who comprehends the tendencies of the human species, and who comprehends that he himself is a human, MUST feel a specific, determinate urge. It baffles me that anyone would find that convincing.