It seems like it’s a slippery slope from thinking of rights as property - which can be waived by contract - to medieval serfdom.
More nonsense. Parents have no right to sell children into slavery and such juridical statuses can’t be passed from generation to generation. As opposed to the leftist deification of the central planner, libertarianism necessarily demands equality under the law. Leftists propound an unattainable goal of economic equality in order to seize power for themselves.
of course, but this does not address the question… what is the difference between just and unjust contracts.
Nope. The problem only concerns A and B. If B gets tired of ‘voluntary’ slavery but A wants to enforce slavery, then A becomes an aggressor. C never enters the picture. Well, maybe you want C to help A beat B? That might be suble communism. Or not so subtle.
Hmm. Let me give you an example. A contract that forces people into slavery is not a just contract 
Those are really poor and completely invalid arguments WillBlake.
the word slavery is not technical enough,
besides a contract that forces people into anything may not be just…
but let us consider if there are any unjust contracts where the contract is but a word to describe the complex phenomenon of mutual obligations forming after a meeting of the minds causes an exchange of titles over property?
Again this is all covered in Block’s essay… “Ownership” = “legitimate control”
Yes, I’m aware, I’ve already made it clear that I disagree with what constitutes legitimate, so obviously “ownership” shall differ as well.
But why is it thought that the voluntary slave contract transfers property which is not owned, or illegitimately owned? The slave is transferring the right to control himself; and who, if not this person himself, has the right to do so? Surely, there can be no one else with this right. There is no third party C in a position to protest that the sale of A to B is a violation of C’s rights.
Because one cannot actually transfer their control of themselves. Its blatant fraud. Surely, there can be no one at all with this right. Further, I’m not protesting one “selling” themselves, if the two parties want to play make-believe thats all well and proper, its when party A leaves that party C shall step in.
All scarce objects can be physically controlled. Neo-Lockean homesteading (or some other theory) assigns legitimacy to certain modes of coming into control, then the word “ownership” applies versus mere control. In a pseudo-libertarian legal schema which forbids this form of voluntary interaction, some 3rd party, C, has a legal claim to interfere in the affairs of A and B. By the law of the excluded middle, there is no true self-ownership in place, instead a subtle communism, with public control over certain forms of trade.
See above.
The problem with this is that such clauses are used in contracts, although less frequently. I might not care about the ability to command specific performance when I sign a contract with you to have you sing Happy Birthday to me. For one thing, it would be past my birthday by the time I tracked you down, for another you might sing the song, but poorly in an annoying falsetto. The remedy for breach of contract tends towards monetary remuneration for such reasons, but clauses enabling the demand of specific performance can be and are used throughout the history of common law.
So what? That doesn’t make it any more “libertarian,” “valid” or “just.”
Whatever we would call a fully voluntary contract of total slavery (right to punish in any way) is possible to be carried out. The terms do not involve some impossible soul-transfer. It is just the right to exert physical force on another’s body, to restrict their movement or to inflict pain in order to direct their actions.
It being possible to be carried out doesn’t make it any more valid (look at IP) the terms involve the future self and the current self, which aren’t the same.
Does a murderer have to agree with his captors in order for them to punish him? Only the intersubjective justification amongst those holding a balance of power matter for whatever form of “justice” to be carried out. The subject of an aprioristic doctrine of right’s legal schema conforming to the nature of Man’s preferred pattern of societal cooperation, versus the incoherent legal doctrines stemming from such ideologies of divine right or democratic civil legislation, is another matter entirely.
No. Apprehension of a murderer doesn’t rest on a voluntary contract to begin with, comparing the two is silly.
Because one cannot actually transfer their control of themselves. Its blatant fraud. Surely, there can be no one at all with this right. Further, I’m not protesting one “selling” themselves, if the two parties want play make-believe thats all well and proper, its when party A leaves that party C shall step in.
…
It being possible to be carried out doesn’t make it any more valid (look at IP) the terms involve the future self and the current self, which aren’t the same.
does not compute
does not compute
How can I clarify this for you?
you are denying that the self that hands over money to a shopkeep is the same self that expects to receive a sack of potatoes within moments of an ‘exchange’?
(or i misunderstood your point)
Is it possible to:
exert physical force on another’s body, to restrict their movement or to inflict pain in order to direct their actions.
???
“Control” in this sense is control by the person holding title to an external thing. The term for this is “indirect control” versus the “direct control” of an individual to blink their eyelashes or whatever. The type of voluntary slavery contract we are concerned with is only a legal transfer of rights to indirectly control. This is possible, look up videos of prisons if you don’t believe me.
I think that I have done more than enough to prove why such transfer is legitimate and anyone opposing it holds an internally contradictory theory. I will, nonetheless, “concede” two points:
It is highly unlikely that anyone would agree to such contracts, so whatever theory is adopted will have little application anyhow. Therefore continuing to debate this again is a waste of my time.
Even though I am right, people’s preferences will shape the “landscape” of polycentric legal institutions regardless. Any judge can conceive of the correctness of a certain punishment yet refuse to act on it. This is what I term the via negativa of libertarian jurisprudence. I would take issue with Block on this part:
Gordon maintains that to give or sell yourself (not merely your physical property) to someone else would be a per se violation of self-ownership. I claim, very much to the contrary, that to forbid this and to fail to legally enforce such contracts would violate the rights of self-ownership of the person.
Forbidding voluntary transactions (1) is unjust. Failing to act on rights violations (2) is not unjust. To claim (2), leads to support of positive rights. A judge could refuse to prescribe punishment for a “roving band of voluntary slavery abolitionists”, if he fears what he stands to gain runs so counter to public opinion that his reputation, and thus his livelihood, would suffer.
Yes, but enforcing slavery is a different matter. Thus your assertion is true and irrelevant. You don’t seem to be addressing the points raised.
Yes, but enforcing slavery is a different matter.
Only if you strawman me and start talking about chattel slavery. Your points above were fallacious and not worth addressing.
you are denying that the self that hands over money to a shopkeep is the same self that expects to receive a sack of potatoes within moments of an ‘exchange’?
(or i misunderstood your point)
Not exactly, I see how got that though, you are the same physically (although, you do change physically over a longer period of time), what I meant was your mind could change. In your example, it would be demanding your money back.
???
Of course.
“Control” in this sense is control by the person holding title to an external thing. The term for this is “indirect control” versus the “direct control” of an individual to blink their eyelashes or whatever. The type of voluntary slavery contract we are concerned with is only a legal transfer of rights to indirectly control. This is possible, look up videos of prisons if you don’t believe me.
Not necessary, I’m on the same page here.
I think that I have done more than enough to prove why such transfer is legitimate and anyone opposing it holds an internally contradictory theory. I will, nonetheless, “concede” two points:
I disagree, I don’t think any sort of “legitimacy” has been proven, it has just simply been asserted.
I disagree, I don’t think any sort of “legitimacy” has been proven, it has just simply been asserted.
As the 3rd party, C, the burden of proof lies on you to justify your interdiction in the mutually beneficial trade that occurs between A and B.
As the 3rd party, C, the burden of proof lies on you to justify your interdiction in the mutually beneficial trade that occurs between A and B.
I’m not necessarily forbidding it…
Further, I’m not protesting one “selling” themselves, if the two parties want to play make-believe thats all well and proper, its when party A leaves that party C shall step in.
There must be thousands of BDSM people in the world, they may certainly proceed without my permission. However, assuming they’ve come to me for judgement:
Not all contracts are valid, any contract lacking the option to opt out isn’t valid and shouldn’t be upheld. Or as Jan Narveson put it " What we probably should say is that people may enslave themselves to others for as long as they want to, but beyond that, we should not uphold the contract."
However, assuming they’ve come to me for judgement
Good! We are in agreement now. If the only way a man could acquire the large amount of money to save his son who suffers from some rare disease was for him to sell himself to the hypothetical “deranged millionaire”, I would act to save the boy’s life. To each his own though I guess. This is yet another example of pathological hypotheticals not being all that useful.
The actual fun comes in evaluating various types of cases of “partial slavery”, voluntarily or involuntarily occurring.
Good! We are in agreement now. If the only way a man could acquire the large amount of money to save his son who suffers from some rare disease was for him to sell himself to the hypothetical “deranged millionaire”, I would act to save the boy’s life. To each his own though I guess. This is yet another example of pathological hypotheticals not being all that useful
Ruling that the man wasn’t a slave doesn’t necessarily kill the boy, however if the man really wanted to save his son he’d honour his agreement and it wouldn’t come to me at all. Saying you’d act to save the boy’s life just sounds emotional, what if the father stole (We can agree that stealing is wrong? Right?) the money instead would you then act to not save the boys life?
The actual fun comes in evaluating various types of cases of “partial slavery”, voluntarily or involuntarily occurring.
I’m going to rule out that you can sell the rights to your left arm, for the same reasons as before.
Ruling that the man wasn’t a slave doesn’t necessarily kill the boy, however if the man really wanted to save his son he’d honour his agreement and it wouldn’t come to me at all. Saying you’d act to save the boy’s life just sounds emotional, what if the father stole (We can agree that stealing is wrong? Right?) the money instead would you then act to not save the boys life?
OK, it was a bit of an emotional appeal, but I still don’t think you have justified your intervention
Consider this scenario. The father works as a laborer and lives pretty much hand to mouth. He can afford to buy his kids Christmas presents, take them to the beach once a year, etc. but has little saved. The family lives modestly, but even if the parents worked harder and scrimped even more, they are never going to be millionaires.
The son gets sick, Dad “sells” himself off, the kid gets treatment, Dad escapes the wicked millionaire, the VSC abolitionists apprehend the slavemaster in the process of capturing his property, and finally Angurse’s court nullifies the slave contract.
You are either then: depriving the millionaire of his money (assume the treatment money was all consumed already), or must order restitution in the sum of $1 million to be paid by the ex-slave. If Dad resists the latter judgment, what option do we have to recapture the funds besides throwing him in a prison to do hard labor? What if it is unlikely for the prisoner to live to be 250 years old, when he might pay off the million+interest?
It still seems most fair to me to honor agreements and that there is nothing special about transactions involving one’s body. There’s a really interesting book, Discipline and Punish by Michel Foucalt, on judges washing their hands of responsibility for the suffering of prisoners by shifting the form of punishment from body to “soul”, via such institutions as psychologists, over the past ~200 years.
I see this continuing myth of inalienability as a remnant of the limited state and constitution worship of classical liberalism, along with the facade of “humane punishment” in the modern penal system.