Could the statement People Are Ignorant be taken as a praxeological axiom? For this discussion, ignorance can be defined as lacking knowledge and not necessarily a statement about a person’s reasoning ability, although it could be argued that this too, is finite.
If so, what ramifications could be drawn against Austrian Economic theory?
That’s subjective.
So, because it is an observation of the mind, it would not be a praxeological axiom?
Wouldn’t the attempt to disprove the statement tend to display it’s correctness, thus making it self-proving?
Can a person be found who knows everything?
No one is all knowing. If someone was, they could forecast future prices and costs. Same can be given to an individual making choices, and in time realizing a more productive or cost efficient method to their goal. If you add in that people are ignorant as an axiom, what of it? Are we to distinguish good and bad choices? I don’t feel that’s what praxeology is about. If someone makes an “ignorant” choice, it’s not praxeology’s place to evaulate it. The fact is that a choice is made, whether it was good or bad.
I do not speak to any concept of “good” or “bad”. There are certain conclusions that can be extrapolated from the axiom, just as they can be extrapolated from the famous axiom People Act. For example, People are Ignorant figures in to why people often choose things that are not always in the best interests of themselves or why people contine to follow totalitarian leaders instead of choosing to live in a more libertarian environment.
I’d argue that “people are ignorant” can be logically dervied from “humans act”, i.e. the action axiom.
Perhaps, the Action axiom can be extended to People Act Ignorantly.
You mean “the future is uncertain?” Austrians already agree with this one and prove it as follows: If an agent is omniscient, such that for it the future is not uncertain, then it, by definition, knows the choices that it will make.
If it just makes the actions it already knows it will make, then can it be said to be making decisions at all? It’s just following a rigid, static script. One that’s not even complicated enough to be able to construct internal models.
If it can see a choice it will make, and instead choose to act differently under a path that it didn’t already know it would take, then this contradicts our assumption of omniscience.
Therefore, true omniscience within an acting mind is contradictory and impossible.
Though this is not an argument austrians usually make, I feel it’s relevant to add something else: Absolute certainty of knowledge isn’t possible. The only way to update a hypothesis to probability 1 (saying “I’m absolutely sure” and actually being absolutely sure are very different things) is to have an infinite amount of evidence in support of that hypothesis. The only way to get rid of the uncertainty within the mind is for that mind to stop functioning.
I agree with Azure, this is just that the future is uncertain.
You mean “the future is uncertain?”
I would argue that everything is uncertain. By extension, people must be ignorant. And if people are ignorant, then all actions taken by people are inherently ignorant. The only certainty people have is of their own perceptions. Perceptions, though, are not reality. They are totally subjective.
The fact that people are ignorant, i.e., that uncertainty exists, is so obviously true that it doesn’t need to be re-stated. And, as Jonathan Mariano already mentioned, it is presupposed in the action axiom.
But, wouldn’t this presupposition, if stated, be better to state it as “partial ignorance”? Yes that within human boundaries, the future is uncertain, but behind an action, an agent operates with some knowledge as well that compels it along with it’s desire to remove uneasiness. (And for the record, using the Misesian definitions here).
“an agent operates with some knowledge as well that compels it along with it’s desire to remove uneasiness.”
What knowledge are you suggesting? We only assume that we know that whatever choice we make removes the uneasiness…
A person will act only if he desires a particular state of affairs
and only if he believes he has the capacity to bring this about.
Of course.
Hypothesis that are not infinitely certain aren’t useless. If you buy a lottery ticket, afterall, the chance of winning is nonzero. Is it a good idea to play?
A rock isn’t sure that it’s a rock. Does that mean it could be something else?
Reminds me of a Wilson quote:
"A Zen koan of long standing goes as follows: The roshi holds up a staff and says, “If you call this a staff, you affirm. If you say it is not a staff, you deny. Beyond affirmation and denial, what is it?”
What knowledge are you suggesting? We only assume that we know that whatever choice we make removes the uneasiness...
Mmhhh, I would say a “prior” knowledge that activates an act, wether by the data of sensory input one recieves as one acts, or a prior “It’s possible to do this” capacity when planning an act. Admittedly though, I may be overthinking it, since I sometimes have a habit of doing that, so I could be mistaken.
A person will act only if he desires a particular state of affairs
True true.
and only if he believes he has the capacity to bring this about.
And that believe factor is the said knowledge I am suggesting. After all, are not beliefs also knowledge/data or whatever term you fancy? I am open to correcting good sir.
are you basically saying that we have partial knowledge to our actions because we know the law of praxeology?
No, it’s a terrible idea. What I am saying is that no one ever makes a fully informed decision, regardless of the circumstance. But some are certainly more informed than others.
As has been said, it’s too subjective.
Further, ?
Unless deductions are to be made from this, it’s too broad in my opinion.
*However, you may be on to something, if ignorance is merely defined as “lacking knowledge”. But then again, action seems to presuppose ignorance (esp. when the actor has discovered s/he has made an error). If we all were not ignorant, I (personally, subjectively) infer that we would cease to be actors as we would necessarily know what was going to happen, &c. (actually didn’t Mises say this in Human Action?). Unless you distinguish ignorance from foreknowledge, which then seems to come back to a) being subjective, b) what objective measurement would be taken, and c)…
…I’m having an extremely hard time separating ignorance and foreknowledge; can someone critique me and get me back on track? Heh…
The fact that people are ignorant, i.e., that uncertainty exists, is so obviously true that it doesn’t need to be re-stated. And, as Jonathan Mariano already mentioned, it is presupposed in the action axiom.
Obviously true? Is not the axiom “People Act” also so obvious as not needing to be restated? People Act - duh! And yet, from this “obvious” statement, Mises made his important contributions to economics.
The axiom “People are Ignorant” may be obvious but it is also important. It has a bearing on both outcome and motivation. I think it’s most important application however, is in determining action. A shrewd propagandist, for example, instinctively makes use of this axiom every day as he disseminates information in a manner to twist circumstances to his advantage. It also explains the success of dictators and the like.