I have finished chapter 1, which is about money and credit…
It is NOT Austrian, which is surprising from a lot of what he initially says. One particular instance was the Spanish mining of silver in Mexico/central America. The Spanish found the mountain of money they inherited unable to produce real goods, basically. He drew the analogy between the non-linear real economic gains of monetary expansion, highlighting that its main benefit was simply redirecting producers’ focus more towards the crown’s wishes, not magically enhancing economy.
Yet in talking about banking, he decribes fractional reserve banking simply as evolution, and never questions it. He correctly describes runs, reserve requirements, etc., yet he always presumes that runs are avoidable, via central banking. He blames the great depression on the youth of the Federal Reserve and its reluctance to expand credit. [+o(]
He blames the current crisis on securitization, and says traditional banking and money/credit creation have no part, which to him include central banking.[+o(][+o(]
…I have yet to read his analysis of bond, stock, insurance, real estate, and global finance markets, but I predict it will suck. Once we got to banking, it seems to have fallen apart. (Stock market section is called “Blowing Bubbles”)
One inference he drew about money was that it was bound by trust. It thus seemed no different than credit in his mind. I don’t think this is correct. Money is bound by the laws of supply and demand. Money substitutes are bound by trust…or in many cases, ignorance. He should have at least seen the severely different scales of trust. Of course a whole market will “trust” money’s purchasing power, when past experience and prices earn such trust, which is why money emerges from a commodity. Any “trust” earned by a money substitute then must clearly compete/cooperate with established money, which is why artificial credit expansion must occur slowly. But the trust becomes ever-more fragile. His knowledge of banking accounting should make it clear that inifinitely short-term liabilities cannot be matched with fixed-term assets. He even acknowledges that such assets cannot be liquidated quickly (deleveraging) in a manner that would not make the bank more insolvent. He never understands that credit must always relate to saving real goods, rather than promises of repayment. He never questions government, although his history is entirely accurate from what I can tell. It is frustrating to read.