Re: NAP. Where are the lines drawn between individuals who are persons/rational agents and those who are not?
It’s clear that there IS a boundary. My responsibilities to another person I recognize as a rational agent are defined by NAP. On the other hand, my responsibilities to an individual I do NOT recognize as a rational agent would be to the extent that I had voluntarily taken them on, yes? The care of a baby or a dog, for example. Which are not relationships that are dealt with by NAP.
So on the scale of consciousness/sapience or whatever one calls it, when exactly does the individual become a rational agent? How are those boundaries established and logically defended?
For those individuals BELOW that line (dolpheeens or whatever, heh heh) how does one define one’s actual responsibilities? The creature, if someone assumes responsibility for it, counts as property but it’s sentient property. Does this change anything in terms of the responsibilities of the property owner?
There are two other threads active right now that are tangentially related to my question, and I really just wanted to direct the conversation this way, so I chose to make it its own thread.
So on the scale of consciousness/sapience or whatever one calls it, when exactly does the individual become a rational agent? How are those boundaries established and logically defended?
If the question you are asking is a scientific one, it is simply whenever science says it is so.
If It is psychological, it is the same answer. Whatever theory happens to be accepted at that time with whichever authority you wish to go off of (Cognitive, Freudian, Behavioral, etc)
If you are asking anything beyond that (and I woud say far more practicle), the only honest answer is custom.
The best dramatic illustration and “answer” to go along after that is: do you have more apprehension seeing a bunch of 2 month old baby humans get slaughtered or 4 year old pigs?
I wish I could say there was a clear cultural answer to that illustration in this day and age, but anymore I am not so sure. So the more comforting answer is how you actually factually react when you are presented with these situations in real life.
In terms of libertarianism. In reading this article, I was hoping that the issues contained in the final couple of paragraphs had been given more particular treatment elsewhere.
Obviously one of the issues that my question dances around is the whole “animal rights” sort of thing, and of course I personally consider my responsibilities toward sentient beings to be of a different nature than those toward purely inanimate objects, with NAP being a sort of special-case axiom specific to rational sentient beings. But I can’t say that it’s easy to classify some beings as on one side or another of that divide.
Kinsella is always a great read, but I caution anyone to be careful whenever someone writes:
The words “best” and “objective” should not be used to qualify the same idea.
Libertarianism is a philosophy about human social interactions. Specifically, it has to do with what the law ought to be. Libertarianism makes no claims to the morality of actions such as adultery, lying, prostitution, stinginess, etc. It is your decision if you think these are good or bad. But libertarian ethics does claim that these actions in and of themselves ought to be legal.
Dietary and pacifist beliefs are external to libertarianism. Someone can be a vegan and a libertarian, but the two are separate from one another. Being a vegan in addition to being a libertarian requires extra premises. The NAP makes no claims to animals other than humans. It is strictly between humans, and this is because law is strictly between humans.
If you and I have a dispute, we can fight, posture, walk away, etc. But we can also argue about it. Law is based on argumentation. And humans cannot argue with other animals. Perhaps someday there will be some gorillas or primates that may be able to learn enough sign language in order to argue about disputes with humans. But as of now, even the most learned gorilla cannot argue with humans. There just cannot be law with humans and other animals.
But people who eat meat typically don’t want to see animals suffer. Look at the kosher laws. They aren’t just prescriptions against eating pigs, there are rules as to how one must slaughter an animal, and the goal is to be as humane about it as possible. Look at the free range animals. Now, I don’t know if you knew this, but free range turkeys are not always “free range” (there is some deception by some many companies). But the point is that the consumers don’t want their food to have suffered.
So, while it is legal within libertarianism to torture an animal if it is your property, you need to ask yourself one question: Do you want to live near and associate with someone who tortures animals? I sure don’t. So in a decentralized system of law, even if there is no law against torturing animals, people will avoid the ones that do. Torturing animals is a sign of anger and instability. No one wants to associate with someone like that. Ostracization is a perfectly good punishment in that regard.
I hope some of this answers your questions. If not, just ask again and I’ll try again!
Well, I don’t think you’ve given me an answer to my question, gotlucky. I think vive came closer, by suggesting there are different avenues to go about defining “rational agent”. He didn’t specify what those definitions were, though, or if any libertarian thinker has proposed one or another of these and why.
The animal “rights” thing was only secondary to this. I’m aware that prevailing wisdom suggests that sentient beings are due certain humane treatment, and I’m curious if libertarian philosophy actually encompasses defining what these dues, if any, are. It’s not an economic question, per se. So my general impression is that it’s not relevant or interesting to libertarian discourse?
Well, it really comes down to dispute resolution. Can there be any meaningful dispute resolution between the two agents? Can you argue with an infant regarding whatever dispute you may have with him? Can you argue with someone who mentally retarded? If yes, then you can come to a resolution without further violence, and that is the realm of law. If not, then either someone has to argue on his behalf or he goes unprotected by the law.
Rothbard talked about recognizing full personhood when a child demonstrates that he is one. His example was the act of running away. But what the issue really comes down to is this: can this person argue on his own behalf?
So defining sentience and it’s consequences are only relevant to libertarianism insofar as it pertains to law. Anything else is irrelevant to libertarianism per se, however interesting it may be.
Okay, but even a very small child can offer rationalizations. They can also be pursuaded, or attempt pursuasion of others. How do you identify argumentation in contrast to this?
Rationalizations such as…? There is no hard and fast rule as to when someone can argue for himself. He either can or can’t. If a child keys your car, you have a dispute with either him or his parents. If the child can argue on his behalf, then your dispute is with him. If he cannot, then your dispute is with those who are supposed to be his guardians, typically his parents.
Being capable of offering rationalizations in no way means that you are capable of arguing with another to resolve a dispute. If you start yelling and saying how the child is responsible and has to pay for the damages, I find it hard to believe that a 4 year old would be able to function in that situation. Maybe an adult might also freak out and break down, but adults can hire other people to do their arguing for them (e.g. lawyers). If an adult breaks down and can’t even hire someone else, then that adult obviously can’t engage in argumentation, even if he can go to the store and buy goods.
But if you can find a genius 4 year old who can hold his own against you in court, then absolutely, that kid is legally responsible for his actions.
Your definition does not work. In essense, you’re saying that if it’s possible to make a person quail before you as a result of the force of your argument, they have given up their rights as a rational agent to do as they please with their own person.
You still haven’t offered a definition of what it means to BE rational, or what it means to be able to demonstrate it.
The ability to carry on disputes relies on both parties sharing a language. But surely NAP does not suggest that if they cannot communicate, they need not treat each other as rational or deserving of freedom from aggression? So it’s not impossible that a monkey, or a dolphin, or an elephant, or a parrot might have the ability to engage in argumentation but not the language to do so with humans. Do you contend that NAP is irrelevant in these instances? At some stage Stephen Hawking will become totally unable to communicate, and without technology he would be at that stage already, but as I understand it his disease does not affect his intellect. Does his status as a rational agent diminish with his ability to physically engage in argumentation?
I would-thinking out loud-be willing to contend that Hawking’s status as a LEGAL agent diminishes. It seems from a practical standpoint that such a person could only continue to manifest their own will upon their person to the extent that they had left instructions prior to their illness and had established another person as their willing agent to enact those wishes. Some wishes can be understood, though, even without explication. Wouldn’t NAP require his agent to comply with any understood wishes? What I’m driving at is that sometimes we know, without engaging in the actual dispute, that an individual has certain wishes. Life being a somewhat universal desire, for example.
So communication is the key? If so, Kinsella’s “rational agent” wording isn’t very useful, re: the Hawking example. The difficulty is that we definitely do recognize that Hawking, totally infirm, would still have a nature that made him other than a commodity to be owned by others. And under the “communication” definition, one might freely take slaves and keep them as long as they did not speak enough of one’s language to object! One might even raise one’s children in such a way that they never learn how to communicate their desires. In theory.
So on the one hand I’ve got the situation of children-or perhaps the mentally ill-who can communicate and engage in some sort of persuasive dialog but are not self-responsible, rational agents in the sense we instinctively intend. On the other side, we have the situation of individuals who have the intellectual capacity for rationality but not the physical ability to demonstrate it. Both sides of this argument offer difficulties to the “ability to carry on disputes” theory.
In other words, one still needs an actual threshold. THIS is not a rational agent, THIS is.
This is incorrect. I have stated this nowhere, nor does my reasoning imply this.
I don’t believe I have ever used the term rational agent. I think that has been what you have been saying. I am not talking about rational agents or irrational agents. If Stephen Hawking can no longer argue on his own behalf, then someone must do this for him, no? Law requires argumentation. If Hawking wants to be part of the legal system, then either he or someone on his behalf must argue for him. I am not claiming that this is right or wrong, only that it is the case.
We are talking about libertarianism and law. Wolves do not have law. They have disputes, and they settle them one way or the other. But they do not have law. The difference between having law and not having law is the ability to argue in order to resolve disputes. Humans have the ability to argue in order to resolve disputes. If you and your dog have a dispute, you can settle in different ways. You could beat your dog. Your dog could bite you. You both could posture and growl at one another. But what you absolutely cannot do is argue with your dog.
If a human cannot communicate with others, then if there is a dispute, that human must have someone argue on his behalf if he wants to participate in a court of law. The state does this today, whether or not the agents do have that person’s wellbeing in mind is another debate entirely. Sometimes parents do this for their children, and they hire a lawyer on the child’s behalf. Sometimes people give another power of attorney in case of emergencies.
The specifics don’t matter. The point is, if you can’t speak up for yourself, you need someone else to do it. I am not saying this is right or wrong. This is merely a statement of fact.
I guess this is the problem. You are fixated on rational agents. This is why Rothbard suggested that when a child runs away, that is a good criterion. When the child demonstrates that he doesn’t want the protection of his parents, then he either wants the protection of someone else as his guardian, or he is ready to claim himself as a legal adult. Maybe this is a good point, maybe it isn’t. My point is that all that matters is that someone argue for himself or get another to do it on his behalf.
If a father claims his child as his, then he assumes the responsibility of the child’s actions, until such a time the child demonstrates that he is an adult. Historically, adulthood had been around 12 years old, but in the last 150 years, nations throughout the world have raised it to 16-18 and sometimes even 21.
Either way, if a child keys your car, your beef is either with him or with his parents/guardians. If the child is really an adult, perhaps something like 12 years old or 16 years old, then your beef is with him, unless the parents wish to assume responsibility I suppose. I think the rational agents approach is probably not a very good one though.
“Maybe an adult might also freak out and break down, but adults can hire other people to do their arguing for them (e.g. lawyers). If an adult breaks down and can’t even hire someone else, then that adult obviously can’t engage in argumentation, even if he can go to the store and buy goods.”
Ok, this is where you made that first point.
Now, you argue positively that the need for communication is key to being covered by NAP. You fail, however, to address my specific concerns re: the ability to communicate.
The only other positive definition you give me is “the ability to run away”. Okay so you’re asserting that this is another individual way to assert agency. These don’t offer a specific definition, though. Only examples.
Either way, if a child keys your car, your beef is either with him or with his parents/guardians. If the child is really an adult, perhaps something like 12 years old or 16 years old, then your beef is with him, unless the parents wish to assume responsibility I suppose.
This causes your whole statement to break down. You say here that if someone else assumes responsibility for the kid, that the kid can be considered property and treated as such under NAP. Well, to this day my mom would love to be able to do such a thing to me, regardless of my own ability to communicate, ambulate, or whatever. Are you saying that she would have that right? You still don’t offer any way of distinguishing the party who is covered by NAP and the one who is not.
Basically, I would like someone else to get a word in edgewise, here.
Notice how I said, “I suppose.” It means that I was not committed to that statement. I certainly believe that if the parent is an actual guardian, then the parent or whoever is responsible at the time in question (e.g. babysitter) is liable for the actions of someone who needs guardianship. If the person does not require guardianship, then they are definitely liable legally for their actions.
But I would really appreciate it if you would stop putting words in my mouth. I made no such claim that if an adult could not argue on his behalf, that the NAP did not apply to him.
I was rereading the thread, and I think the confusion is that you think I am saying that if someone cannot communicate, then the NAP doesn’t apply to that person (I am basing this on the fact that you have made that claim about me twice). I just want to be clear that I am not saying this. I am making two separate points:
Practically speaking, communication is necessary for law. If a victim or aggressor or general disputant cannot communicate, then if that person does not have someone to speak on his behalf, then he is not protected by law. This is not a claim about libertarianism or statism or any political theory. This is pure fact. In our statist system, the state is the one that claims to speak on behalf of those that have no one else. Of course, this does not actually happen all the time, but the state at least claims to speak on behalf of those who have no one else. But if even the state doesn’t speak up, then that person necessarily goes unprotected by law.
The NAP covers all people. Why? Well, I know you won’t like it, because you despise the ethic of reciprocity, but it is what protects everyone. I suggest you watch some of Nielsio’s videos on youtube. He doesn’t quite agree with me on the NAP/golden rule, as he accepts it for consequentialist reasons whereas I accept it for deontological reasons, but his argument is incredibly similar to mine. The point is, you want everyone to be protected because what happens if you end up one of those who might be aggressed against? You would want to be protected, so you want it to be universally applied. I suggest just watching his videos.
These are two separate points entirely. A fully decentralized society may not be perfectly in line with libertarianism ethics, but libertarianism is more of an ideal to work towards than something that will be perfectly achieved. There is no way to know for sure what a fully decentralized society would look like. So there are only two claims we can make, those that we think it ought to be like and those that we think it will probably look like.
There is no way to know what a decentralized society would consider to be a rational agent. And to a large degree it’s irrelevant. What is relevant is what would be considered a legal agent. It doesn’t matter if Stephen Hawking is the smartest person in the world if he can’t speak up for himself. He would need someone to speak up for him, and preferably he will designate who that would be should he no longer be able to communicate (though I imagine he could always blink communicate). The NAP would still apply to Hawking even if he couldn’t communicate for at least consequentialist reasons, if you can’t accept it for deontological reasons.
Now I’m just repeating myself. I suggest you watch and listen to what Nielsio has to say. There is a lot to be learned from his analyses.
For a thing to be a person, it needs to be capable of respecting property rights.
That is the only criterion in my opinion. Whether the thing is sentient or not doesn’t matter. If an automaton is capable of respecting property rights (his software was designed by a libertarian programmer), he’s a person as far as I’m concerned. And at the other end, suppose there’s some monster which sustains itself on human beings, and therefore is by nature incapable of respecting property rights, but this monster happens to have an IQ of 350 (uh oh! run!) it is not a person.
EDIT: note that rationality is not part of this criterion. Insofar as understanding is involved at all (in theory it is not, as with the automaton, in reality of course it is), it is understanding of property rights. Bob may think the TV is run by a little elf inside, and think the Earth is flat, and think that he’s the Buddha, but if he understands property rights, he’s a person.