Huh? I just said I don’t think it contradicts my claim. I don’t see how you can get that out of the quote.
Those last two sentences seem to me to be yet another distinction without a difference.
I’ll probably disagree with him. I’ll bet Roderick will too, and Roderick sees himself as a Wittgensteinian and seems pretty knowledgeable with regard to Wittgenstein.
Are you a non-cognitivist in action, epistemology and ethics?
Sometimes, yes. An example might be a soldier reacting reflexively to a loud noise. This would reveal the soldier’s preference not to get blown up.
No, it does not. I would classify that as an involuntary action.
Because making decisions takes time, brains (and computers) must economize in order to function well. A soldier cannot stop to think about every loud noise he hears before reacting to it, because this would take too much time. He must react as quickly as possible. In the same manner, a driver cannot reflect on her ultimate ends when approaching every stop sign; this would be an extremely inefficient use of brain power. Instead, both the soldier and the driver react to things they have determined to be important to their ultimate ends in some way. To the soldier this is staying alive, and to the driver this is following the rules of the road. Reactions are simply far more efficient means of making many decisions, even if they sometimes lead to undesirable outcomes (such as the veteran with shell shock reacting to a car’s backfire). But they do often reveal preferences.
In the world of computers, we’d call mechanisms like this caching. Its something which must be used quite often in order for computers to have a usable level of performance. Strageties like this are so critical to performance, I’d bet almost everything we do is a reaction to some previously determined end.
I believe you’re utterly and fatally misinterpreting Mises’ conception of conscious thought. I think it is often said that the “conscious” thought which you seem to be referring to only makes up something like 10% of our brain. The idea that actions are governed or directed by the “conscious” thought which you mistakenly attribute to Mises’ conception of conscious thought is utterly absurd. Consciousness in your sense is more so a reflection of past action or contemplation of future action. I don’t believe the verbal or symbolic thought which runs through our minds (that which is operating as you read this) is the part of your brain which is governing or directing you to actually read. Do you know why you’re reading? And if so why are you doing that? It just keeps going. The truth is, it’s deeply imbedded in our brains and our verbal way of describing it is to call it “purpose”.
I’ve always liked the following analogy because it conveys what “conscious” really is. If we think of mansion and it’s inner workings there are maids, cooks, etc. and the butler. The butler is the face of the mansion. He does not really comprehend what’s going on behind the scenes, i.e., the precise operations of the mansion; but he serves to maintain a certain image. He is, more or less, consciousness. In truth, the “conscious” thought which you refer to does not really direct any action at all. It is awareness more than anything.
Of course Mises’ conception of conscious action leaves room for subconcious means/ends considerations. In fact, I would say that’s precisely what he’s referring too. Do you really believe that Mises thought every action we engage in is governed by the reflective concept of conscious! You seem to think that just because we are not precisely aware of the reason why we do something that something is suddenly not purposeful. The brain is incredibly mysterious but that doesn’t mean it’s not purposeful. Remember, your “conscious” is more of a prisoner than a director!
I know it’s exciting to hold to the idea that you’ve somehow discovered a flaw in the great work of Mises. That he’s bamboozled us all with his deceitful characterization of purposeful action. Or that he himself was mistaken in his own concept of action. Many many before you had the same delusions. And I’m not suggesting that Mises was invincible because that’s absurd. But this sort of pedantic argument over the concept of what constitutes purposeful action will ultimately prove a fruitless endeavor. Mises developed a starting point for where action starts. That’s not to say that there isn’t a different starting point but that we can’t comprehend that starting point if it’s merely a link in the chain of previous starting points. If you start from a point that has meaning to human beings; a point which in no way necessitates the “verbal conscious” direction of thought, you develop the beginnings of something which is scientific, meaningful, and fruitful.
The fact that you’re holding onto this idea right now is itself rooted in a subconcious desire which even you have no chance of pinning down. Perhaps it’s because you desire noteriety. Perhaps your subconcious has a disdain for established thought. Perhaps it loves to play the devil’s advocate. The point is, you don’t know and can’t know. But the other point is, these subconscious desires themselves have evolved as a result of the physical stimuli which has penetrated your mind since your birth. They themselves are a product of something else. But we have not pinned down these precise causal connections. And even if we had, those starting points would have no meaning to us in the human sense. Our scope of perception is terribly confined. That is why praxeology starts at a given point. A point which is not characterized by the “verbal” governace of action. It is a point which is characterized by purposeful action that of which stems from the deep recessess of our brain. A point which is not perfectly conceivable by our petty “conscious”. But it is a point which we can relate to. It is not mechanical. It is not a dry construct of inhumane causal connections. These things may be useful but they have no meaning for our perception of reality. Purpose does. It means something. Even if that’s only because we believe it does.
I am not sure where I claimed praxeology requires infinite regress, but this may be a typo. Regardless, I was wondering is this meant as a anwser to the questions I raise? I cannot tell whether you affirm that praxeology does indeed provide a self-evident system of epistemology or not. This particularly puzzles me since my question was regarding the a priorism of the non-biological kind. I do not want to explain why the example you give does not work, but essentially the same reasons Descartes, " Cogito ergo sum" fell flat. I will say Descartes deliberately left empirical observation out of his foundational axiom because this is simply challenged by base problems of perception (welcome to old Barn facade county) . Though i do not think the axiom humans act is meant in a empirical fashion (which strikes me as bizzare that people are debating it here from an empirical standpoint), but I may be wrong. If it is meant emprically its position as a foundational axiom seems untenable. In regards to Godel, I qualified my response in my original post and confined his conclusions to the appropriate realm.
I am not sure how determinism plays any role in my questions, but I do not deny that determinism would provide substantial challenges to the axiom of action. Again, in the exchange taking place in this thread it seems to me the arguements against the thread starter verge on determinism as acting without conscience on preceding structures present, suggests innate responses to certain stimuli. Are we determined to act in certain ways due to certain external stimuli? Even if this actions were learned empirically they suggest a uniform human response, so then if we can condition human response to certain external stimuli such as stop signs why could we not condition economic responses as well? My point here is I am not sure the approaches to denying the thread starters conclusions take the arguements where they want it to go. It seems the farther you seperate cognition from action the closer you get to determinism.
I don’t think you did, I was just mentioning it because it is an implication of the formal systems covered by Gödel’s theorems. I don’t believe praxeology is one of those systems for the reasons I mentioned.
I wasn’t affirming it one way or the other. I don’t want to bore you with my own personal views of epistemology, although I do believe that the action axiom is impossible to refute.
Well, I don’t follow. Unless you are talking about semantical criticisms over what is ment by “I”, I don’t know of any reason why “cogito, ergo sum” would be false.
I don’t disagree with your last point, although I don’t believe the action axiom is incompatible with determinism. Praxeology provides a useful abstraction of the complexities of human action. Abstractions encapsulate details into systems more easily understood - in this case the underlying reasons behind action. Mises called these the “ultimate ends”, and treated them as givens. I don’t believe Mises believed it mattered why these ends are striven for - stimuli or some free will - only that they are.
Geoffrey, Grant & edward_1313,
Thank you for your (continued) patience with me. Most of the points you raise seem to me quite justified, however, I think I already addressed them in some form in my previous comments. That is why I will try to start all over again and try demonstrate the following points in some length (and hopefully more clearly than before):
1: Praxeology shares the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model of action.
2: These two claims put forward by the belief/desire model are wrong.
2.1: Beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons.
2.2: There are actions which are caused by non-teleological reasons.
3: Praxeology is right in its conclusions about the concept of teleological action even though teleological action is slightly different from what, at least according to an unfavorable interpretation of Mises, praxeology claims it to be.
4: Praxeology can’t account for acions which are caused by non-teleological reasons but still tries to. In trying so, it draws wrong conclusions.
Ok, here we go…
1: Praxeology shares the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model of action.
What are the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model?
The belief/desire model as explored by Donald Davidson in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” and subsequent papers and by Michael Smith in “The Possibility of Philosophy of Action” makes the following claims:
a) Reasons which cause action can always be traced back to teleological reasons.
b) These teleological reasons exist in a psychological state of the agent, i.e. beliefs and desires. The agent desires X and believes that doing A will help achieve X.
Evidence that praxeology makes these claims too
Evidence for claim a: See Human Action, p. 11: “Human action is purposeful behavior. . . is aiming at ends and goals.” Thus, according to Mises, all action is teleological and as such caused by teleological reasons.
Evidence for claim b: See Human Action, p. 14:
[T]o make a man act, uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state alone are not sufficient. A third condition is required: the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness.
We can rephrase this passage with the terminology used by the belief/desire model:
[T]o make a man act, the desire of a more satisfactory state alone is not sufficient. Another condition is required: the belief that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness.
The fact that Mises says that uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state alone are not sufficient and then goes on to talk about the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness indicates that, according to him and phrased with the help of the belief/desire model terminology, a desire and a belief are sufficient to “make a man act”. Or in other words, beliefs and desires constitute teleological reasons.
2: These two claims put forward by the belief/desire model are wrong.
2.1: Beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons.
Since my argument here isn’t original, I will simply paraphrase the arguments Frederick Stoutland lays down in “Reaktives Handeln und das Überzeugung/Wunsch-Modell“. Because Stoutlands paper is, unfortunately, only available in German, I will spare you exact references to page numbers.
To make his point that beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons, Stoutland first distinguishes between two points of view from which reasons for actions can be given: the normative point of view and the explanatory point of view. The normative point of view describes which is the reason R for person P to do action A. The explanatory point of view describes the reason R because of which P A-ed.
Stoutland argues that R can be the same from the normative and from the explanatory point of view. If P approaches a sign which reads “turn left” then that is a reason for P to turn left. If P actually does turn left because of the sign, then the sign is the reason because of which P turned left.
Now, Stoutland asks what constitutes the teleological reason for P to turn left at the sign (just to avoid confusion, later I will discuss turning left as an action caused by a non-teleological reason). Is it the psychological state of desiring to follow traffic rules and the psychological state of believing that turning left will help achieve this desire? Or is it the sign which reads “turn left” itself? Clearly, says Stoutland, from a normative point of view it can’t be the psychological state, it has to be the sign itself. And since, as established before, the reason to turn left and the reason because of which P turns left can be the same, it is impossible for the “reason because of which” to consist of psychological states if the possibly identical “reason to” is the sign.
One might object that this argument is circular. However, I don’t think it is. The argument simply explicates what is already inherent in the way we talk about reasons from an explicatory point of view. If we say we (purposefully) turn left at the sign because there was a sign then this reason can’t be reduced to our beliefs and desires. It is the existence of the sign which ultimately made us turn left. However, and Stoutland also admits this, having beliefs and desires concerning the sign and following traffic rules are necessary conditions for the sign to be a teleological reason because of which we turn left. If we don’t desire to follow traffic rules or if we don’t believe that the sign needs to be followed if we want to follow traffic rules (or both), then the existence of the sign can’t be a reason because of which we turn left.
So to conclude, beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons, they are merely necessary conditions for something to be a teleological reason. Furthermore, we need to have both beliefs and desires for something to be a teleological reason, having only one of the two isn’t enough.
After these explanations it could be argued that my interpretation of Mises is unfavorable. After all, he talks about the “image of a more satisfactory state” as a constituent for teleological reasons. And even more so, in Nationalökonomie (p. 30) “image” is substituted by “Wissen”, which means “knowledge”. This would require the existence of of something which can be the object of the “image/knowledge of a more satisfactory state”. I admit that Mises could be interpreted this way. However, this doesn’t change the fact that the reason for an action doesn’t consist in the agent’s psychological state but in the object of the agent’s belief and desire.
2.2: There are actions which are caused by non-teleological reasons.
In the first part of his paper Stoutland appeals to our intuitions to make his point that some actions aren’t caused by teleological reasons, that “in reaction to something”-reasons are sometimes enough. He says that, for example, the existence of a stop sign is sometimes the only reason for us to stop our car. Now, many of you don’t accept this appeal to our intuitions and claim that even a seemingly reactive action as our stopping our car can be traced back to subconscious teleological reasons. As much as I would like to agree with this, I think Stoutland’s Wittgensteinian argument for the primacy of reactive actions which do not require the agent having certain beliefs concerning the action in question makes it impossible for every action to be caused by teleological reasons. I already paraphrased Stoutlands argument in this post, but to make make the current post a bit more coherent I will copy what I had written in that earlier post.
Stoutland borrows Wittgenstein’s example of a sign which reads “←” and on which Wittgenstein elaborates in §201 (and in other paragraphs) of Philosophical Investigations. Stoutland’s reading of Wittgenstein is that we don’t turn left when we see that sign because we interpret [deuten] the symbol as telling us to turn left. If that were the case we would have to ask ourselves if “turn left” also needs to be interpreted. And if it does, the question arises as to how we interpret our interpretation of “turn left”. This would lead to an infinite regress. Thus, we turn left when we see the sign because we’ve learned, in our social context, to turn left when we see a sign which reads “←”. Now, Stoutland takes this example to the level of philosophy of action and says that, when we turn left, we don’t need to have the belief that the sign means “turn left” because that would lead to the same infinite regress.
Of course, this does not mean every time we turn left at such a sign we do so reactively. Neither does it actually prove that we ever turn left at a “turn left” sign (or stop at a stop sign) reactively. What it does prove, though, is that purposeful action is impossible without the existence of reactive action. Because I can’t say it any better myself here’s my translation of Stoutland’s concluding paragraph:
An agent’s mental attitudes cannot be a necessary condition for reasons to explain an action, if there do not exist any reasons for actions which do not require the existence of beliefs or desires concerning the circumstances to which we react. That is why reactive action, which is carried out for “in reaction to something”-reasons, is basic since only the ability to act reactively makes acting for other reasons possible.
To conclude, the claim that every reason can be traced back to a teleological reason (which itself requires the agent having certain beliefs and desires concerning the action in question) is wrong. There are reactive actions which do not require the agent having such beliefs and desires.
3: Praxeology is right in its conclusions about the concept of teleological action even though teleological action is slightly different from what, at least according to an unfavorable interpretation of Mises, praxeology claims it to be.
We established above that teleological reasons necessitate the agent having certain beliefs and desires concerning the action in question. That is why, the praxeologist claim that purposeful action reveals the agent’s preference is correct. If a person does something for teleological reasons she has certain desires and the belief that the action in question will help satisfy her desires. If she didn’t have these beliefs and desires she woudln’t act purposefully. Consequently, everything which follows from this insight is correct too, such as the fact that if a person voluntarily trades good A for good B she values good B more highly than good A.
4: Praxeology can’t account for acions which are caused by non-teleological reasons but still tries to. In trying so, it draws wrong conclusions.
If a person carries out an action for non-teleological reasons she can’t be said to reveal any preference. She can only be said to reveal a preference if she can be said to have the belief that the action in question is a means to one of her ends. If she doesn’t have such a belief she can’t be said to value her non-teleological actions in the same way as she values her teleological actions.
Now, because reactive actions are basic and teleological acion is unimaginable without reactive action, I think comprehensive economic analysis would need to take reactive action into account. Because there is no way to say which actions are reactive and which are teleological without taking a specific social context into account and understanding the social rules that underlie that context, a priori economic analysis is impossible.
So I hope I cleared my claims and my/Stoutland’s arguments if favor them a bit. I apologize for the lenght of this post.
Geoffrey,
About Roderick being a Wittgensteinian: This is confusing me quite a bit, especially because he writes here that Wittgenstein made contribution to praxeological theory. Is he just talking about how Wittgenstein’s anti-psychologism can be used to support the allegedly universal nature of praxeological conclusions? If so, then I would of course agree with him. But if he claims that Wittgenstein actually made contributions to praxeological theory of action (in the way Anscombe can be argued to have done), then I’d disagree. This means that either I or Roderick misinterpreted Wittgenstein. I would never claim that my understanding of Wittgenstein is better than Roderick’s, but since my conclusions about praxeology are based on Stoutland’s paper, it could be that Roderick’s interpretation of Wittgenstein different from Stoutland’s.
As to whether I am a non-cognitivist: No, I wouldn’t say so. What makes you think so?
On empirical vs. a priori truths, the latter, whilst they can be known empirically, they cannot be so refuted. I think this is something that gets lost in debates surrounding the matter. It is usually taken that a priori truths are those which are not known empirically, but this is not what the term means. What matters is how it may be refuted - logically or empirically.
Geoffrey, Grant & edward_1313,
Thank you for your (continued) patience with me. Most of the points you raise seem to me quite justified, however, I think I already addressed them in some form in my previous comments. That is why I will try to start all over again and try demonstrate the following points in some length (and hopefully more clearly than before):
1: Praxeology shares the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model of action.
2: These two claims put forward by the belief/desire model are wrong.
2.1: Beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons.
2.2: There are actions which are caused by non-teleological reasons.
3: Praxeology is right in its conclusions about the concept of teleological action even though teleological action is slightly different from what, at least according to an unfavorable interpretation of Mises, praxeology claims it to be.
4: Praxeology can’t account for acions which are caused by non-teleological reasons but still tries to. In trying so, it draws wrong conclusions.
Ok, here we go…
1: Praxeology shares the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model of action.
What are the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model?
The belief/desire model as explored by Donald Davidson in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” and subsequent papers and by Michael Smith in “The Possibility of Philosophy of Action” makes the following claims:
a) Reasons which cause action can always be traced back to teleological reasons.
b) These teleological reasons exist in a psychological state of the agent, i.e. beliefs and desires. The agent desires X and believes that doing A will help achieve X.
Evidence that praxeology makes these claims too
Evidence for claim a: See Human Action, p. 11: “Human action is purposeful behavior. . . is aiming at ends and goals.” Thus, according to Mises, all action is teleological and as such caused by teleological reasons.
Evidence for claim b: See Human Action, p. 14:
[T]o make a man act, uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state alone are not sufficient. A third condition is required: the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness.
We can rephrase this passage with the terminology used by the belief/desire model:
[T]o make a man act, the desire of a more satisfactory state alone is not sufficient. Another condition is required: the belief that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness.
The fact that Mises says that uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state alone are not sufficient and then goes on to talk about the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness indicates that, according to him and phrased with the help of the belief/desire model terminology, a desire and a belief are sufficient to “make a man act”. Or in other words, beliefs and desires constitute teleological reasons.
2: These two claims put forward by the belief/desire model are wrong.
2.1: Beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons.
Since my argument here isn’t original, I will simply paraphrase the arguments Frederick Stoutland lays down in “Reaktives Handeln und das Überzeugung/Wunsch-Modell“. Because Stoutlands paper is, unfortunately, only available in German, I will spare you exact references to page numbers.
To make his point that beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons, Stoutland first distinguishes between two points of view from which reasons for actions can be given: the normative point of view and the explanatory point of view. The normative point of view describes which is the reason R for person P to do action A. The explanatory point of view describes the reason R because of which P A-ed.
Stoutland argues that R can be the same from the normative and from the explanatory point of view. If P approaches a sign which reads “turn left” then that is a reason for P to turn left. If P actually does turn left because of the sign, then the sign is the reason because of which P turned left.
Now, Stoutland asks what constitutes the teleological reason for P to turn left at the sign (just to avoid confusion, later I will discuss turning left as an action caused by a non-teleological reason). Is it the psychological state of desiring to follow traffic rules and the psychological state of believing that turning left will help achieve this desire? Or is it the sign which reads “turn left” itself? Clearly, says Stoutland, from a normative point of view it can’t be the psychological state, it has to be the sign itself. And since, as established before, the reason to turn left and the reason because of which P turns left can be the same, it is impossible for the “reason because of which” to consist of psychological states if the possibly identical “reason to” is the sign.
One might object that this argument is circular. However, I don’t think it is. The argument simply explicates what is already inherent in the way we talk about reasons from an explicatory point of view. If we say we (purposefully) turn left at the sign because there was a sign then this reason can’t be reduced to our beliefs and desires. It is the existence of the sign which ultimately made us turn left. However, and Stoutland also admits this, having beliefs and desires concerning the sign and following traffic rules are necessary conditions for the sign to be a teleological reason because of which we turn left. If we don’t desire to follow traffic rules or if we don’t believe that the sign needs to be followed if we want to follow traffic rules (or both), then the existence of the sign can’t be a reason because of which we turn left.
So to conclude, beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons, they are merely necessary conditions for something to be a teleological reason. Furthermore, we need to have both beliefs and desires for something to be a teleological reason, having only one of the two isn’t enough.
After these explanations it could be argued that my interpretation of Mises is unfavorable. After all, he talks about the “image of a more satisfactory state” as a constituent for teleological reasons. And even more so, in Nationalökonomie (p. 30) “image” is substituted by “Wissen”, which means “knowledge”. This would require the existence of of something which can be the object of the “image/knowledge of a more satisfactory state”. I admit that Mises could be interpreted this way. However, this doesn’t change the fact that the reason for an action doesn’t consist in the agent’s psychological state but in the object of the agent’s belief and desire.
2.2: There are actions which are caused by non-teleological reasons.
In the first part of his paper Stoutland appeals to our intuitions to make his point that some actions aren’t caused by teleological reasons, that “in reaction to something”-reasons are sometimes enough. He says that, for example, the existence of a stop sign is sometimes the only reason for us to stop our car. Now, many of you don’t accept this appeal to our intuitions and claim that even a seemingly reactive action as our stopping our car can be traced back to subconscious teleological reasons. As much as I would like to agree with this, I think Stoutland’s Wittgensteinian argument for the primacy of reactive actions which do not require the agent having certain beliefs concerning the action in question makes it impossible for every action to be caused by teleological reasons. I already paraphrased Stoutlands argument in this post, but to make make the current post a bit more coherent I will copy what I had written in that earlier post.
Stoutland borrows Wittgenstein’s example of a sign which reads “←” and on which Wittgenstein elaborates in §201 (and in other paragraphs) of Philosophical Investigations. Stoutland’s reading of Wittgenstein is that we don’t turn left when we see that sign because we interpret [deuten] the symbol as telling us to turn left. If that were the case we would have to ask ourselves if “turn left” also needs to be interpreted. And if it does, the question arises as to how we interpret our interpretation of “turn left”. This would lead to an infinite regress. Thus, we turn left when we see the sign because we’ve learned, in our social context, to turn left when we see a sign which reads “←”. Now, Stoutland takes this example to the level of philosophy of action and says that, when we turn left, we don’t need to have the belief that the sign means “turn left” because that would lead to the same infinite regress.
Of course, this does not mean every time we turn left at such a sign we do so reactively. Neither does it actually prove that we ever turn left at a “turn left” sign (or stop at a stop sign) reactively. What it does prove, though, is that purposeful action is impossible without the existence of reactive action. Because I can’t say it any better myself here’s my translation of Stoutland’s concluding paragraph:
An agent’s mental attitudes cannot be a necessary condition for reasons to explain an action, if there do not exist any reasons for actions which do not require the existence of beliefs or desires concerning the circumstances to which we react. That is why reactive action, which is carried out for “in reaction to something”-reasons, is basic since only the ability to act reactively makes acting for other reasons possible.
To conclude, the claim that every reason can be traced back to a teleological reason (which itself requires the agent having certain beliefs and desires concerning the action in question) is wrong. There are reactive actions which do not require the agent having such beliefs and desires.
3: Praxeology is right in its conclusions about the concept of teleological action even though teleological action is slightly different from what, at least according to an unfavorable interpretation of Mises, praxeology claims it to be.
We established above that teleological reasons necessitate the agent having certain beliefs and desires concerning the action in question. That is why, the praxeologist claim that purposeful action reveals the agent’s preference is correct. If a person does something for teleological reasons she has certain desires and the belief that the action in question will help satisfy her desires. If she didn’t have these beliefs and desires she woudln’t act purposefully. Consequently, everything which follows from this insight is correct too, such as the fact that if a person voluntarily trades good A for good B she values good B more highly than good A.
4: Praxeology can’t account for acions which are caused by non-teleological reasons but still tries to. In trying so, it draws wrong conclusions.
If a person carries out an action for non-teleological reasons she can’t be said to reveal any preference. She can only be said to reveal a preference if she can be said to have the belief that the action in question is a means to one of her ends. If she doesn’t have such a belief she can’t be said to value her non-teleological actions in the same way as she values her teleological actions.
Now, because reactive actions are basic and teleological acion is unimaginable without reactive action, I think comprehensive economic analysis would need to take reactive action into account. Because there is no way to say which actions are reactive and which are teleological without taking a specific social context into account and understanding the social rules that underlie that context, a priori economic analysis is impossible.
So I hope I cleared my claims and my/Stoutland’s arguments if favor them a bit. I apologize for the lenght of this post.
Geoffrey,
About Roderick being a Wittgensteinian: This is confusing me quite a bit, especially because he writes here that Wittgenstein made contribution to praxeological theory. Is he just talking about how Wittgenstein’s anti-psychologism can be used to support the allegedly universal nature of praxeological conclusions? If so, then I would of course agree with him. But if he claims that Wittgenstein actually made contributions to praxeological theory of action (in the way Anscombe can be argued to have done), then I’d disagree. This means that either I or Roderick misinterpreted Wittgenstein. I would never claim that my understanding of Wittgenstein is better than Roderick’s, but since my conclusions about praxeology are based on Stoutland’s paper, it could be that Roderick’s interpretation of Wittgenstein different from Stoutland’s.
As to whether I am a non-cognitivist: No, I wouldn’t say so. What makes you think so?
The following post got caught in the moderation cue twice, probably because it’s too long. I’m going to split it up and post it as two separate entries.
Geoffrey, Grant & edward_1313,
Thank you for your (continued) patience with me. Most of the points you raise seem to me quite justified, however, I think I already addressed them in some form in my previous comments. That is why I will try to start all over again and try demonstrate the following points in some length (and hopefully more clearly than before):
1: Praxeology shares the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model of action.
2: These two claims put forward by the belief/desire model are wrong.
2.1: Beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons.
2.2: There are actions which are caused by non-teleological reasons.
3: Praxeology is right in its conclusions about the concept of teleological action even though teleological action is slightly different from what, at least according to an unfavorable interpretation of Mises, praxeology claims it to be.
4: Praxeology can’t account for acions which are caused by non-teleological reasons but still tries to. In trying so, it draws wrong conclusions.
Ok, here we go…
1: Praxeology shares the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model of action.
What are the two main claims put forward by the belief/desire model?
The belief/desire model as explored by Donald Davidson in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” and subsequent papers and by Michael Smith in “The Possibility of Philosophy of Action” makes the following claims:
a) Reasons which cause action can always be traced back to teleological reasons.
b) These teleological reasons exist in a psychological state of the agent, i.e. beliefs and desires. The agent desires X and believes that doing A will help achieve X.
Evidence that praxeology makes these claims too
Evidence for claim a: See Human Action, p. 11: “Human action is purposeful behavior. . . is aiming at ends and goals.” Thus, according to Mises, all action is teleological and as such caused by teleological reasons.
Evidence for claim b: See Human Action, p. 14:
[T]o make a man act, uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state alone are not sufficient. A third condition is required: the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness.
We can rephrase this passage with the terminology used by the belief/desire model:
[T]o make a man act, the desire of a more satisfactory state alone is not sufficient. Another condition is required: the belief that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness.
The fact that Mises says that uneasiness and the image of a more satisfactory state alone are not sufficient and then goes on to talk about the expectation that purposeful behavior has the power to remove or at least to alleviate the felt uneasiness indicates that, according to him and phrased with the help of the belief/desire model terminology, a desire and a belief are sufficient to “make a man act”. Or in other words, beliefs and desires constitute teleological reasons.
2: These two claims put forward by the belief/desire model are wrong.
2.1: Beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons.
Since my argument here isn’t original, I will simply paraphrase the arguments Frederick Stoutland lays down in “Reaktives Handeln und das Überzeugung/Wunsch-Modell“. Because Stoutlands paper is, unfortunately, only available in German, I will spare you exact references to page numbers.
To make his point that beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons, Stoutland first distinguishes between two points of view from which reasons for actions can be given: the normative point of view and the explanatory point of view. The normative point of view describes which is the reason R for person P to do action A. The explanatory point of view describes the reason R because of which P A-ed.
Stoutland argues that R can be the same from the normative and from the explanatory point of view. If P approaches a sign which reads “turn left” then that is a reason for P to turn left. If P actually does turn left because of the sign, then the sign is the reason because of which P turned left.
Now, Stoutland asks what constitutes the teleological reason for P to turn left at the sign (just to avoid confusion, later I will discuss turning left as an action caused by a non-teleological reason). Is it the psychological state of desiring to follow traffic rules and the psychological state of believing that turning left will help achieve this desire? Or is it the sign which reads “turn left” itself? Clearly, says Stoutland, from a normative point of view it can’t be the psychological state, it has to be the sign itself. And since, as established before, the reason to turn left and the reason because of which P turns left can be the same, it is impossible for the “reason because of which” to consist of psychological states if the possibly identical “reason to” is the sign.
One might object that this argument is circular. However, I don’t think it is. The argument simply explicates what is already inherent in the way we talk about reasons from an explicatory point of view. If we say we (purposefully) turn left at the sign because there was a sign then this reason can’t be reduced to our beliefs and desires. It is the existence of the sign which ultimately made us turn left. However, and Stoutland also admits this, having beliefs and desires concerning the sign and following traffic rules are necessary conditions for the sign to be a teleological reason because of which we turn left. If we don’t desire to follow traffic rules or if we don’t believe that the sign needs to be followed if we want to follow traffic rules (or both), then the existence of the sign can’t be a reason because of which we turn left.
So to conclude, beliefs and desires don’t constitute teleological reasons, they are merely necessary conditions for something to be a teleological reason. Furthermore, we need to have both beliefs and desires for something to be a teleological reason, having only one of the two isn’t enough.
After these explanations it could be argued that my interpretation of Mises is unfavorable. After all, he talks about the “image of a more satisfactory state” as a constituent for teleological reasons. And even more so, in Nationalökonomie (p. 30) “image” is substituted by “Wissen”, which means “knowledge”. This would require the existence of of something which can be the object of the “image/knowledge of a more satisfactory state”. I admit that Mises could be interpreted this way. However, this doesn’t change the fact that the reason for an action doesn’t consist in the agent’s psychological state but in the object of the agent’s belief and desire.
2.2: There are actions which are caused by non-teleological reasons.
In the first part of his paper Stoutland appeals to our intuitions to make his point that some actions aren’t caused by teleological reasons, that “in reaction to something”-reasons are sometimes enough. He says that, for example, the existence of a stop sign is sometimes the only reason for us to stop our car. Now, many of you don’t accept this appeal to our intuitions and claim that even a seemingly reactive action as our stopping our car can be traced back to subconscious teleological reasons. As much as I would like to agree with this, I think Stoutland’s Wittgensteinian argument for the primacy of reactive actions which do not require the agent having certain beliefs concerning the action in question makes it impossible for every action to be caused by teleological reasons. I already paraphrased Stoutlands argument in this post, but to make make the current post a bit more coherent I will copy what I had written in that earlier post.
Stoutland borrows Wittgenstein’s example of a sign which reads “←” and on which Wittgenstein elaborates in §201 (and in other paragraphs) of Philosophical Investigations. Stoutland’s reading of Wittgenstein is that we don’t turn left when we see that sign because we interpret [deuten] the symbol as telling us to turn left. If that were the case we would have to ask ourselves if “turn left” also needs to be interpreted. And if it does, the question arises as to how we interpret our interpretation of “turn left”. This would lead to an infinite regress. Thus, we turn left when we see the sign because we’ve learned, in our social context, to turn left when we see a sign which reads “←”. Now, Stoutland takes this example to the level of philosophy of action and says that, when we turn left, we don’t need to have the belief that the sign means “turn left” because that would lead to the same infinite regress.
Of course, this does not mean every time we turn left at such a sign we do so reactively. Neither does it actually prove that we ever turn left at a “turn left” sign (or stop at a stop sign) reactively. What it does prove, though, is that purposeful action is impossible without the existence of reactive action. Because I can’t say it any better myself here’s my translation of Stoutland’s concluding paragraph:
An agent’s mental attitudes cannot be a necessary condition for reasons to explain an action, if there do not exist any reasons for actions which do not require the existence of beliefs or desires concerning the circumstances to which we react. That is why reactive action, which is carried out for “in reaction to something”-reasons, is basic since only the ability to act reactively makes acting for other reasons possible.
To conclude, the claim that every reason can be traced back to a teleological reason (which itself requires the agent having certain beliefs and desires concerning the action in question) is wrong. There are reactive actions which do not require the agent having such beliefs and desires.
3: Praxeology is right in its conclusions about the concept of teleological action even though teleological action is slightly different from what, at least according to an unfavorable interpretation of Mises, praxeology claims it to be.
We established above that teleological reasons necessitate the agent having certain beliefs and desires concerning the action in question. That is why, the praxeologist claim that purposeful action reveals the agent’s preference is correct. If a person does something for teleological reasons she has certain desires and the belief that the action in question will help satisfy her desires. If she didn’t have these beliefs and desires she woudln’t act purposefully. Consequently, everything which follows from this insight is correct too, such as the fact that if a person voluntarily trades good A for good B she values good B more highly than good A.
4: Praxeology can’t account for acions which are caused by non-teleological reasons but still tries to. In trying so, it draws wrong conclusions.
If a person carries out an action for non-teleological reasons she can’t be said to reveal any preference. She can only be said to reveal a preference if she can be said to have the belief that the action in question is a means to one of her ends. If she doesn’t have such a belief she can’t be said to value her non-teleological actions in the same way as she values her teleological actions.
Now, because reactive actions are basic and teleological acion is unimaginable without reactive action, I think comprehensive economic analysis would need to take reactive action into account. Because there is no way to say which actions are reactive and which are teleological without taking a specific social context into account and understanding the social rules that underlie that context, a priori economic analysis is impossible.
So I hope I cleared my claims and my/Stoutland’s arguments if favor them a bit. I apologize for the lenght of this post.
Geoffrey,
About Roderick being a Wittgensteinian: This is confusing me quite a bit, especially because he writes here that Wittgenstein made contribution to praxeological theory. Is he just talking about how Wittgenstein’s anti-psychologism can be used to support the allegedly universal nature of praxeological conclusions? If so, then I would of course agree with him. But if he claims that Wittgenstein actually made contributions to praxeological theory of action (in the way Anscombe can be argued to have done), then I’d disagree. This means that either I or Roderick misinterpreted Wittgenstein. I would never claim that my understanding of Wittgenstein is better than Roderick’s, but since my conclusions about praxeology are based on Stoutland’s paper, it could be that Roderick’s interpretation of Wittgenstein different from Stoutland’s.
As to whether I am a non-cognitivist: No, I wouldn’t say so. What makes you think so?
I still don’t agree there are any non-teleological actions or non-teleological reasons. I daresay you’ll be hard-pressed to find any Aristotelian or praxeologist who will.
Roderick is first and Aristotelian, but I think he would say he is also in many ways a Wittgensteinian. As to whether his interpretation of Wittgenstein differs with Stoutland’s, I don’t know. I don’t know if Roderick has discussed Stoutland’s interpretation in print. If they differ, I also couldn’t say which interpretation is correct, although I would tend to lean in favor of Roderick because I have rarely known him to be wrong in such matters. If they don’t differ and Stoutland’s interpretation is correct, I’m sure Roderick would be in disagreement with Wittgenstein on the existence of non-teleological actions and reasons; here too I would tend to side with Roderick. If Wittgenstein does indeed hold to such views, I think they are wrong and Wittgenstein is very much capable of being wrong. I suggest you read his book draft (and eventually the published book) to find out more on his interpretation of Wittgenstein.
Because you accept the validity of non-teleological actions and reasons, which seem to me to be non-cognitivist.
I will definitely do that some day. But, as I said before (and correct me if I’m wrong), his book only deals with the methodological issues of praxeology but doesn’t discuss any of it’s substantial claims about the concept action. I just searched the draft for the most famous (analytical) philosophers of action (D. Davidson, Anscombe, Bratman, M. Smith) without any success. Of course I don’t hold that against the book, it just means that it’s not exactly what I’m looking for in my further studies on the subject.
I have to admit that I don’t know the non-cognitivist position very well, but it doesn’t strike me as obvious that the acceptance of the existence of non-teleological actions and reasons is only possible on non-cognitivist grounds.
By the way, does anyone think that it would make any sense to expand my earlier extensive post(s) and try to get it published as an article somewhere?
He discusses action in terms of its necessary means-end (i.e., teleological) structure and probably with reasons as well. It’s been a while since I read the whole thing.
Neither of those are points of view; they are methods of communication. As communication, they are grossly incomplete without certain assumptions made by the receiver. Most importantly, anyone listening to the sentence “There was a R in the road, and because of that P A-ed” without knowing the many other causes which lead to action A. No one would believe some action had a singular cause, its just often convenient to only refer to one, obvious cause instead of many.
One of the reasons the driver turns left is undoubtebly the existence of the sign, and the driver is reacting to that sign. However, there are many other causes of the left turn than simply the sign. In any (huge) set of reasons for a person to perform an action, there would almost certainly be reasons which are internal to the person’s mind.
Suppose a person will turn left iff X, Y and S are true. S is the presense of a “left turn” sign, while X and Y are psychological states. X, Y and S must all be causes of the action to turn left. If any of these factors are not present, there will be no left turn. Its impossible to point to one singular cause, so as long as the state space of psychological states includes states where the action will not be performed regardless of external factors, we can’t say the action is performed purely to react to external stimuli.
The whole example just seems strange to me. Perhaps I’m not grasping the main point. I agree with the Grant, there’s never just one reason that a person turns left; the sign in your example. Not only does the sign have to indicate left, the road has to go left as well, the brain has to comprehend the symbol used to indicate left, etc.(all of these things are by no means consciously computated, much of it is done subconciously simply because it’s faster) and all of these factors have to coordinate with the ultimate end desired by that person. For instance, if the sign said left and the road only went right, I doubt people would begin driving off the road (And even if they did, this would still not prove your point). I suppose according to Stoutland’s logic he would say the reason they now turn left is because the road went left? Perhaps I’m off. But the whole idea that “People turn left because the sign indicates left” is so overly simple and mistaken. In reality, whoever this person is, he or she has a destination which they’re trying to get to. In doing so they’ll follow those rules and those routes which they believe to be the best most efficient way of arriving at that destination
Stoutland seems attracted to the idea that people are, more or less, zombies simply doing whatever various external stimuli prompt them to do. He breaks things down into small sequences where a person simply does something and the reason for doing it has nothing to do with some ultimate purpose.
It’s like saying someone drives 25 mph because that’s the speed limit. First, most people I know drive over that speed and second that’s not the reason at all! It’s a factor undoubtedly. But a person is constantly considering the costs and benefits of whether they should go faster than, slower than, or the same as the speed limit while simultaneously comparing these with their desired end. If they’re rushing to the hospital they’ll go faster. If they see a policeman they’ll probably go slower. If they have no where to get too they’ll also probably go slower. If they’re in a new area they’ll probably be more attentive for fear that they might crash. If they’re in an area they’re familiar with they’ll probably be less attentive, oh but wait then, isn’t that just reactive? No it’s not. People sometimes go into auto pilot because they’re familiar enough with the circumstances and it allows time to pass time more easily, i.e. they sacrifice attentiveness for random thought (it’s a weighing of means and ends, etc.)
Let me go back to the example of the person who’s aware of a new law but inadvertently drives according to an old law. This is still purposeful as I understand it. The subconscious is still operating in accordance with some ultimate purpose, only it is doing so in error. Just because it is in error does not mean it is not purposeful. Oh, and just to clarify, when I say subconscious I mean it in the psychological sense not the praxeological sense. In praxeology the subconscious is contained within or treated as the conscious.
Just to be clear:
The theme of praxeology is action as such. This also settles the relation of praxeology to the psychoanalytical concept of subconscious. Psychoanalysis too is psycholoy and does not investigate action but the forces and factors that impel a man toward a definite action. The psycho analytical subconscious is a psychological and not a praxeological category. Whether an action stems from clear deliberation, or from forgetten memories and suppressed desires which from submerged regions, as it were, direct the will, does not influence the nature of the action. Mises; Human Action Pg. 12
To me, this seems to be precisely what you’re doing. You’re trying dissect and figure out the forces which direct action. Is it reactive? Is it deliberate? Is it habitual? They’re all irrelevant when dealing with praxeology. You have stepped outside the realm of praxeology. I just don’t see why you’re not grasping this.
Ironic…a Wittgensteinian mired in psychologism.
More or less my thoughts too. We covered Wittgenstein on rule-following last week, and as far as I could tell his point regarding signs was that it could not compel (as in logically) to act in a certain way.
There clearly can be many different reasons to do something. But I don’t think it makes sense to assume that there can be various reasons because of which something is done. If there have been various factors play a role in causing an action then those factors together constitute the reason because of which the action is done.
Maybe the example is flawed. But that wouldn’t refute Stoutlands general claim that reactive actions are more basic than teleological ones.
No, Stoutland admits that many actions are teleological. He just disputes the claim that all actions are.
Just to clear that up: I think the distinction between teleological action and reactive action is a conceptual one, not a psychological one.
I don’t understand your point here. Could you elaborate on this?