I_Ryan
April 20, 2010, 12:29pm
11
Before I respond more fully, I want to try to clear up a few things.
By definition, at least as Menger and Mises conceive things, then we are not talking about praxeology.
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So what I am arguing is that the method of supposing a consciousness or an intention to be an attribute of physical nature, and then trying to predict a future state of nature based on this supposition, is essentially an empirical method. By it’s very procedure and presuppositions, this method is an attempt to establish empirical laws, not laws that are guaranteed to be absolutely valid a priori, which is what praxeology is concerned with.
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Further, I’m arguing that because the widespread belief persists, that the ONLY method of dealing with the problem of other minds is the empirical method, THIS is what is preventing praxeology or formal/analytical social science from advancing.
We are not talking only about “pure praxeology”, yes; we are talking about “applied praxeology”. My contention, albeit, to an extent, tentative, is that “pure praxeology”, the origin and method of which I explain here , especially between my first and second post, is the foundation of many fields that I call “applied praxeology”, including evolutionary biology, economics, and other things.
Also, you responded only to my stronger claim, that it is a model that helps us predict things. What about my weaker claim, that “if we find that certain things, like taking control of the provision of education, help that cause, that is, to survive, we are able to understand why so many states have done that”? I might be wrong that my approach allows us to predict things. But what about whether it simply allows us to understand things; in that example, what if it just allows us to understand why states take control of the provision of education but does not allow us to predict anything?
My argument is not that a person cannot suppose that various entities of his experience are conscious as he himself is, and on the basis of this, try to predict the future state of things. My argument is that there is a praxeological approach possible for dealing with the subject or phenomenon of other consciousnesses.
That approach would be to seek the logically necessary implications, in individual action, of the supposition that another consciousness is an object of the actor’s action.
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Thus in praxeology, we would proceed not on the assumption that another consciousness or another intention is a part of nature, and try to predict the causal effects of this initial state of nature on a later state of nature. Rather, we would proceed on the assumption that another consciousness or another intention is an object of an actor’s action, and try to conceive the logical implications of this supposition, in the same way Hayek is indicating when we assume that the object of an actor’s action is food, a word, or money.
Do you have any idea what that would entail? An example of it would help.
What I’m saying is this: If a person makes a conscious decision to choose the empirical as opposed to the praxeological approach in dealing with the subject of other minds, this is one thing. This is simply a choice to pursue one path of inquiry versus another.
But the implicit or explicit conclusion that the empirical approach is the ONLY possible approach to the subject of other minds (other intentions, other consciousnesses, etc…) is another thing. I’m addressing this latter notion that I believe is implicit in the approach you are outlining, and which notion has been explicitly claimed by other social thinkers. It is the same thing that Hayek asserted when he claimed that market theory is empirical not a priori. This assertion of Hayek, I will argue, is based on a mistaken premise, and touches on the issues you are dealing with in your approach. The idea that we can only treat the problem of other minds by means of spatio-temporal concepts resulting in or amounting to, an empirical approach.
As I’ve tried to demonstrate, this is a mistake, and this is what is preventing praxeology from progressing. We can arrive at a priori propositions, necessary truths, or exact laws, concerning other minds, by conceiving other minds (other intentions, other consciousnesses, etc.) as objects of the individual’s action, and by drawing analytical conclusions from the supposition that another mind, consciousness, intention, etc., is an object of the individual’s action.
This procedure is nothing new, and is not a new discovery. Because the law of marginal utility which forms the core insight of Austrian economics, is based on the analytical supposition that a new unit of supply has become the object of an individual’s action. And from the passages of Hayek provided above, we can see that he sees this same procedure, and is applying it to the supposition that food, a word, or money, is the object of an individual’s action.
So the idea that we proceed by supposing that another consciousness or intention or mind is the object of an individual’s action is not new in principle. All that would be new is the precise way this might be done.
I am partly interpreting your proposal for an empirical approach to the problem of other minds as based on an implicit belief that the problem of other minds cannot be meaningfully solved by praxeology. My argument is that this implicit belief, or even this belief explicitly stated, is mistaken.
You have just stated that it might be possible and gave an analogy, the one concerning marginal utility. But you have not shown me why it might be possible.