First, if this topic has been covered, please let me know. I tried searching, but I either didn’t phrase it correctly, or it was buried too deep.
The background for the following problem comes from Hoppe’s The Myth of National Defense, and the variety of work that Block has produced re: wage rate arbitrage under racism.
I had been reading Myth, and I was struck by the power of many of the arguments for the evolution private security, and the arguments for why it should be superior, and how it is a legitimate market phenomena (Block’s chapter in particular, but then, I’m a huge Block fan).
Suffice it to say, that by halfway through the book, a nagging question began to form in my mind, which was: if private security is so great, then why don’t we have it?
About that point in my reading, I encountered what I will call the “apology” chapter which tried to explain this very phenomena.
That chapter, to me, was wholly unsatisfactory. It attempted to explain that the reason for our lack of private security was because of a lack of ideological knowledge in the market of ideas. As in our modern parlance, that we lacked a meme viral enough to convince everyone of this. That once this ideology was sufficiently dispersed, we would voluntarily switch to private security production.
But, I mean, come on. It’s a whole article expanding the more succinct phrase “and then the people will rise up and revolt”. This argument has been used by so many martyred revolutionaries that it’s a complete joke. The whole point of free-market theory is that everyone acting in their self-interest results in market efficiency. We don’t have to rely on ideology. The market just works, like gravity. Any defense of the market in this manner is akin to arguing that we can all flap our wings and fly if everyone gets on board and just wishes hard enough.
As Dr. Block has pointed out regarding wage disparities, the ideological components, that is the consumer preference for some market-inefficient result, does not have any bearing on the market outcome. His example, as I said, is racism in wage pricing. For those unfamiliar with the argument, it goes as such: if employers choose to discriminate against some class, then some employer will revolt because they will choose the arbitrage opportunity of below-market-wages over their preference for discrimination. Because of this, the wage rates of all classes will reach equilibrium, despite consumer preference for discrimination. We can then say that the same argument holds for the weaker class of “regardless of consumer preference.”
The general argument is that the free market finds price equilibrium (and hence efficiencies) regardless of consumer preference. So where is private security as a dominate market force? Either the theory is correct, and free market forces dominate, or something is wrong. If consumer preference for public security can hold over the free-market here, then why can’t it hold in the case of discrimination? Shall our free-market theory hold for everything except private security? How and why could we exclude this?
This led me down a very dark path. Either there was an exception to free market theory for security production, or the free-market theory was wrong. Rothbard points out that a theory that doesn’t work in practice is no theory at all. And here, the theory clearly isn’t panning out.
I tried to think of it in a couple other ways. For instance, what if the market equilibrium is government security production. That is, despite our aesthetic appeals to the contrary, the government is the most efficient producer of security? Again, the only justification for this would be that somehow consumer preference dominated market forces. This is further defenestration of our theory. Unsatisfactory.
Well, then I considered that there are many market operations that are handled by the government, and our market theory still holds. For instance, private road production is (or should be…) more efficient than public road production. Where are the private roads? Well, we can point out that the government has leveraged it’s monopoly power to distort this market. The same argument applies to all other cases of market distortion.
But that argument can’t apply for security production. The reason the government can distort the market in other areas is because they have a monopoly on violence. But to say that we can’t produce private security because the government is too violent, is self-contradictory. It fails the self-argument test. The government violence argument works in every case except the case of private defense against government violence.
This is very bad from a free-market theory perspective. If our theory cannot support itself in practice in the most important area, then what theory is it at all?
Before I conclude with what I think is the answer (or if anyone is even interested…) to this dilemma, I am looking to see if there are simpler holes in my argument here. Have I misunderstood the role of free-market arbitrage in consumer preference? Something else?