For one, I don’t believe in a “right” to property once homesteaded or contractually aquired. Also, one might be a property relativist, or property utilitarian.
You can be those things, but what you say is unscientific and incoherent. By now, you have to be familiar with what is presupposed by argumentation. I don’t really want to get into this here. If you think you have a valid case against Hoppe, please make it in the appropriate thread. These objections have been dealt with long ago, and you are just placing yourself in a position of performative contradiction.
I would agree, but my understanding of the action axiom is that means can only be determined if there are defined ends (or vice versa). I suppose this is a moot point when Libertarians are dealing with other Libertarians, since the moral principles of Libertarianism (the “ends” the court attempts to achieve) are already agreed upon and considered “law”.
Economics doesn’t prescribe certain means and ends. It only evaluates the suitability of certain means in reaching given ends. Austrian legal philosophy divides categories of action into barbarism/criminality, from which came autistic exchange, followed by societal cooperation. You can say, “Murder is awesome! I think I am going to go murder some people.”, but if you go do such, you can’t coherently object to the same actions being done to you (within the framework of proportionality).
Really in the end, “libertarian” is meaningless. You are either pro-human rights or anti-human. Most people value the ends of the political ideology concomitant to praxeological legal philosophy, whether or not they realize it or are confused by statist mythology.
On the other hand, if there exists a “polymorality” in a society, strictly adhering to Libertarian doctrine may not be the most desireable end, and therefore, the means (the judge’s ruling) would also be affected in turn.
Since I think we can agree that not everyone we interact with in our society is a strict adherent to Libertarian principles, the question of what ends are most desireable, and what are the optimum means to achieve them, becomes more complex.
Your willing desires face boundaries with other people’s. Justice is only concerned when you cross these lines, not when you contemplate doing so. Terms like “polymorality” confuse the discussion. This is why I have mentioned the “ethical-aesthetical” vs. “moral-legal” dichotomy. Do the actions stemming from your valuations concern other people or just yourself and your property?