Personal values and bias don’t affect the proces**s of logic, but does affect the presuppositions you hold when initially attempting to deduce logically, and therefore affects your conclusion.
It’s similar to the old computer adage,
“Garbage in, garbage out”
Logic does not provide answers without input. That input is determined by the user. Imperfect input will yield an imperfect result, even when implementing a rigid precess of deduction, such as Aristolean logic.
“Stirnerite turds” think alike, eh?
My pet theory on the matter is that the world was a very different place when the Sumerian kings and the pharaohs came to power. Also, those people probably weren’t “intentionally anarchic”, merely “coincidentally anarchic”, which is a completely different ballgame.
Also, good to see you posting again, libery student!
Yeah, I’d say that’s about the best humanity can do at the moment.
I’m afraid I don’t understand.
OK, sorry for the mix-up. Perhaps I should’ve said “false distinction” instead?
+1
…and same goes to you too, Jackson.
Z.
“Intuition. Nothing more, nothing less.”
Hahah.
"To restate the question more broadly: will free-market adjudication result in just decisions?
Leoni (1961) provides a theoretical framework on which we can build an answer to this question. We offer a sketch of his theory. In a market, economic operators regard prices to be ultimate data upon which they base their calculations and actions, fully realizing that these are flexible to some extent, but quite fixed for a particular transaction. By analogy, Leoni suggests that legal operators regard legal norms to be the ultimate data upon which they base their actions, fully realizing these are flexible to some extent, but fixed for a particular adjudication. Extending the analogy, Leoni notes that the economist does not regard prices to be fixed at all, but subject to immutable rules of distribution acting on contingent facts. Likewise, the proper legal theorist does not regard legal norms to be fixed, but subject to immutable rules of argumentation acting on contingent facts of cases within particular cultural contexts. Indeed, the direction of causation of these social elements is often misapprehended. It is the offers to buy and sell in the market that causes prices (the norms of the market) to settle into relative fixity; they are not fixed before agents enter the market, though it appears that way to most economic agents. Likewise, it is the advancing of legal claims in an adjudicative setting and hearing the arguments on both sides that determines the outcomes of proceedings; and the outcomes of many proceedings thereby establish legal norms. It is not the case that legal norms are fixed before legal agents advance their arguments, although it appears that way to lawyers who learn legal norms in law school and then apply them to cases to guess how judges will rule on cases.
But does this mean that legal norms could be anything at all? No, and a number of libertarian theorists have explained why.
As Hoppe pointed out, by rationally advancing your claim against another, you are implicitly claiming that your claim is rationally defensible to a greater extent than your opponent’s: “…any ethical proposal, as well as any other proposition, must be assumed to claim that it is capable of being validated by propositional or argumentative means.” (Hoppe 1993, Ch. 10) All who make claims; or who criticize torts, crimes, legislation, laws, and judicial decisions—in short, all who debate legal norms—implicitly hold that there is a standard against which these decisions are to be measured.
Narveson agrees, applying the insight in the context of egalitarianism:
Here I need merely remind the reader that we are talking about arguments for equality, as distinct from sheer assertions of it. Appeals to intuition—that the commitment to equality is “moral bedrock,” as I have heard it said—must, on the face of it, count in the latter category. As a device for supporting equality, this invites the response that, unfortunately, my “moral bedrock” might be something quite incompatible with the proponent’s: say, that equality is a snare and a delusion. Strange bedrockfellows! So where would we go from there? If it’s anywhere, it’s going to have to be either back to arguments, or to non-rational or irrational activity, such as politics—waving flags, Bosnia, etc. [Narveson 2002, p. 51]
But if the continual clash of individual claims results in rational adjudications, to what legal norms are we led? Narveson takes the case of murder:
It is absurd to say that what’s wrong with murder is that I don’t like it. The obvious response is: “So?” The reason it is the obvious response is that if we are out to regulate the behavior of people in general by suggesting a rule for their deliberate action, then the plausibility of our effort is zero if it turns out that all my proposal has going for it is that I want it or would like it. Who, indeed, cares? Until I can explain why others should care, my proposal will be irrelevant to them. And if it isn’t directed to them, we’re wasting their time. [Ibid.]
… snip …
But where will all of these arguments be advanced? Indeed, where will the complementary arguments of Hoppe (1993), Kinsella (2008), and others (Kinsella 1996) be advanced? We argue that two of the important venues for these arguments, or at least practical applications of them, are mediations and arbitrations.
Section Conclusion
Narveson’s vision of norms is well-adapted to considering the question of this section. The arbiter of a dispute is led by contractarian logic to choose minimally-constraining norms to apply to disputes. One way to consider contractarianism is as a philosophical theory of how free-market adjudication of norms results in the minimal legal norms of libertarian ethics.
This theory of adjudication is confirmed in history. All of the historical free or nearly free markets in law (Roman law, common law, Law Merchant, etc.) have resulted in libertarian-leaning decisions and legal norms."
I logged out, not intending to log back in anytime soon, but when I saw the response this morning, I had to.
Conza, you’re one of the brightest posters around here, but you have a terrible habit of posting walls of other people’s words and ideas in a discussion, and for me, my eyes just glaze over it.
If you can’t articulate your own position clearly in a paragraph or less, then there isn’t alot of value in my conversing with you. I don’t really care what Hoppe, Narveson or Kinsella have to say wrt to this discussion, because none of them are here to expand upon or defend their point of view to me.
It is a fine line between appealing to authority and proper sourcing, and when you and I are having a discussion, it seems to me you don’t need to source anyone, because you are going to discuss with me via your own understanding.
And the wall of text, long quotes (if you had to type it all from scratch you would probably respond with shorter posts) is hard to read and not particularly interesting.
I did however like your contribution to the discussion. "Hahah."
Interesting post Conza, although I’m not sure how it disproves intuition as the germ of ajudication.
As I understand, in the first case a court hears, both sides present their case, and a judge, without a precedent, must still determine which party is “right”. What would he rely on to decide, other than his intuition?
Again, intersubjective consensus is a determinant on appropriate morality in a given society. Any claim of law is a sales pitch, and just like in any market, the consumers ultimately decide what “product” (law) is preferable, again utilizing their intuition. Why they prefer what they do is a wholly different question, and dangerously off topic.
“Conza, you’re one of the brightest posters around here”
Why thank you.
“but you have a terrible habit of posting walls of other people’s words and ideas in a discussion”
Why re-invent the wheel? Why waste my time trying to improve upon something that already says what I agree with? I can point folks to the source that convinced me or deals with the relevant idea, I can directly quote it or I can not post at all. Sometimes it’s worth the effort [spell out my thoughts / conceptions - if it hasn’t already been said], and I do, do that. Yet most of the time it isn’t. Just because someone chooses to type something out doesn’t mean it’s origional, better or more relevant.
“and for me, my eyes just glaze over it.”
Well that’s a shame, your loss then I guess. I wonder… did your eyes also glaze over the posts from the OP? (Which are considerably longer than the text I quoted?) No? Anyway, I’m sure others will value the contribution / highlighting of the ideas / source. For you though, of all people, I thought would have been interested in the content of the journal article and quite probably already read it. I guess not?
"I did however like your contribution to the discussion. "Hahah.**"
As did I, of yours.
“Personal values and bias don’t affect the proces**s of logic, but does affect the presuppositions you hold when initially attempting to deduce logically, and therefore affects your conclusion.”
Which is the exact opposite of it effecting logic.
“Yeah, I’d say that’s about the best humanity can do at the moment.”
No, the best they could do is not contradict themselves.
“I’m afraid I don’t understand.”
Heres my original question: “Are you sure that has anything to do with logic and isn’t just people’s opinions about value(s)?” You are admitting its their opinion about what is logical or illogical, which really has no bearing on whether it actually is logical or illogical, just as your opinion doesn’t render your math anymore correct or incorrect. Its just adding an unnecessary step. More importantly, you’ve still missed the point of the question, which is whether they are making logical inductions and deductions at all. Logic, like mathematics, isn’t used in every facet of human thought, and Liberty Student already proposed the idea of intuition, which, like much of what he posts, I’m inclined to agree with, there isn’t a reason to think that two strangers use logic (it would be nice and all but…). (Also, points for Conza for posting a Narveson quote)
“OK, sorry for the mix-up. Perhaps I should’ve said “false distinction” instead?”
Not at all, its a very apt distinction, logic is a very different thing than personal values and intuition.
“As I understand, in the first case a court hears, both sides present their case, and a judge, without a precedent, must still determine which party is “right”. What would he rely on to decide, other than his intuition?”
Cultural norms.
How can anyone know what is actually logical?
I agree. What I was trying to say is that one (values, knowledge, perception, bias) affects the other (conclusions from utilizing logical methods).
As I understand, in the first case a court hears, both sides present their case, and a judge, without a precedent, must still determine which party is “right”. What would he rely on to decide, other than his intuition?
which are derived from?
“How can anyone know what is actually logical?”
Off topic, and not pertinent. And we’ve been over this here.
“I agree. What I was trying to say is that one (values, knowledge, perception, bias) affects the other (conclusions from utilizing logical methods).”
You are still assuming that logical methods are utilized at all, my point of contention.
“Which are derived from?”
Culture.
So your saying that logic is not used when judging disputes?
And culture is derived from?
“So your saying that logic is not used when judging disputes?”
That depends on the case, in the case of two strangers in dispute, the case presented, no. They won’t use logic, more than likely they won’t even understand how to use logic, they’ll go by norms (what everyone else does) and feelings. A trained judge may use logic, like when using precedents, but that isn’t the case.
“And culture is derived from?”
People living within close proximity to each other.
The problem is the model of courts as “decision-makers” to begin with. In the absence of a State, courts are not entities that impose decisions, they are arbitrators who assist disputants in finding non-violent resolution to their disputes.
Corrupt courts are not - in themselves - the problem. It is the alliance between corrupt courts and criminals (princes and their minions), usually sanctified by corrupt priests and dishonest scholars, that combines to give birth to the territorial monopoly of law and security called “the State.” LvMI, FFF, FEE and other economic-liberty groups focus on the dishonest scholarship. LRC exposes the criminals. That’s well and good but I think there needs to be a direct focus on the corrupt courts (as well as the corrupt priests/theologians), as well. You could say the Harris-Dawkins-Dennet “Reason” crowd are taking the fight to the corrupts priests, though I think they are doing a really lousy job of it (science is not the answer to bad religion… good religion is). But the one group that skates by through all of this are the lawyers and judges and the blatant law-monopoly called the “bar”. I am not aware of any anti-state organizations that focus on the law-monopoly itself. That is my area of interest.
Absence of free entry to the arbitration market. We don’t need a pre-existing legal system to be able to define monopolization. If you employ leg-breakers to intimidate your business competitors and drive them out of business, you are a monopolist. That definition holds regardless of the legal system.
I do not pretend to be giving conditions for prevention of the emergence of a State. That will probably not be possible until a sufficient number of people (especially natural elites) come to the view that the State is an unmitigated evil whose emergence must be circumspectly prevented. Hoppe expresses this idea when he says (paraphrase) that a natural order society would likely have to physically remove proponents of homosexuality, communism, democracy, etc. from the community. He argues that employees of a State would be classified in the same category - for purposes of aggression insurance - as any other criminal. Living next door to an employee of a State would drive up your premiums and those who live near the borders of State-controlled territories would have to pay much higher aggression-insurance premiums.
But we’re a long ways from such a society, so not much point in talking about it, yet.
Clayton -
Which begs the question, how did the first tribe decide how to interact amongst itself?
“Which begs the question, how did the first tribe decide how to interact amongst itself?”
No it doesn’t. Environment, technology, dominant religion, etc… all effect norms. How the first tribe decided is completely irrelevant.
Expressions establish the commonly accepted course of action(the qualitative evaluation), or endorse a particular definition of proportionality (the quantitative evaluation inferred from qualitative data) i.e. this is not a lime, it’s a lemon, there are several lemons because they cannot be several limes because they are all lemons. But what if they’re all just limes painted yellow to look like lemons? Although I believe One True logic exists, description of logic’s consistency is established through intersubjective speculation, therefore I cannot say whether or not the fact that human observations on phenomenon are absolutely factual. They’re just commonly and articulately upheld as being so. This is why no matter how many times I attempt to quantitatively dentify a heap of grains, I will always come up with a paradox with regards to the qualitative properties.
I’m playing devil’s advocate. Your proof of logic is what most commonly occurs given a certain set of values, circumstances, and intersubjective verification (historical evidence + the here-and-now discussion of a thread of logic’s consistency)…
The only true logic can come from God itself. Until that is discovered, if ever, we really are ALL just “polylogists” in a sense of the word.
I like your personality so I’m more inclined to agree with you, however. <— take heed of this statement