That’s kind of what he’s saying. I think the way you put it gives it a different connotation though…as if those wanting to use the article are principled individuals who “reject” any kind of restriction…like “I can either have free reign over the info or I won’t use it at all.” He gives a bit more fleshed out example in the blog post he was talking about in his first response here:
“For example, suppose you have a deal with a publisher, and you want to use a CC share-alike licensed work in your book. But the publisher you are using refuses to grant a “share alike” license. So now, you can’t use the CC licensed work. I.e., if you publish your paper with a CC attribution license, the other guy can use it in his book. But if you do a share alike one, he can’t. He’s prevented by your copyright assertion threat.”
I agree with him in this respect. And as I said, it is actually this utilitarian ground on which I was able to be persuaded. However it is his other argument that I don’t find convincing…the notion that it is “weird” that you are using copyright to restrict what others can do…because you don’t believe copyright is legitimate. Sure it’s ironic. But so is “to make peace you must prepare for war.” That doesn’t make it a good argument against doing it.
In my view, if you do not believe copyright to be legitimate, then there is no argument on philosophical or ethical grounds against using copyright (as it exists) to prevent more restrictive uses of copyright. In other words, if everything in the world were licensed SA, it would effectively be the same as if copyright didn’t exist (save for the attribution, which, Kinsella admits is trivial, as the user of the work would probably do so anyway.) I don’t see a philosophical argument against CC BY-SA on the grounds that it’s “restrictive”.
If you don’t believe anyone has a right to enforce copyright (i.e. a restriction on what others can do with their own property), then you can’t really make an argument against preventing people from enforcing such a restriction. Otherwise you end up having to make the same argument against preventing (or punishing) aggressive violence. I do not agree with the notion that “people should be free do do whatever they want…including restricting or infringing the freedom of others.” And it is that very notion that an argument on philosophical grounds against SA as being “restrictive” implies.
However, as Kinsella points out, in our IP world, SA does effectively end up restricting the spread of ideas, and therefore there is a case to be made…that while removing the SA provision from the CC licesnse does allow the opportunity for more copyright, the benefits gained from the further dissemination of the ideas outweigh the losses due to possible future derivative copyright. It is on this ground that I agree and am against the use of SA.