Peter Schiff has been critical of the U.S. economy for a reason, not because of a natural pessimism. He responded to criticisms of his views earlier: First of all, the hyper inflation issue is a straw man at best. While I often talk about the possibility of hyper inflation, I have always said that it would be a worse-case scenario that would play out over many years. The fact that it did not appear in the first year of the economic crash (2008) does not invalidate my position. I have always maintained that this worst-case scenario will likely be avoided by what will ultimately be a dramatic shift in policy once our leaders come to their senses. However, until then the dollar will likely lose a substantial portion of its value.
Second, I never said that the dollar would go to zero, either in 2008 or any year thereafter. I have said that in the event of hyper inflation the dollar’s value would approach zero. My actual forecast in my book “Crash Proof” was that the Dollar Index would fall to 40 (currently about 85), with a realistic worst case scenario, assuming very high but not hyper inflation, of 20 or lower.
Third, the blogger points out that because the decoupling theory (foreign economies improving while the U.S. falters) that I wrote about in “Crash Proof” has yet to occur, that the theory itself was ridiculous. In my book I wrote that this process would not occur overnight, that initially our creditors would come to our aid, and in so doing our problems would become manifest abroad. I wrote that it would take time for the world to realize that what had been decoupled from the economic train was not the engine but the caboose. In fact, that is precisely the way it is playing out.
Chapter Ten of “Crash Proof” is specifically focused on the need to keep funds liquid to take advantage of the buying opportunity that would initially develop once our stock market began its collapse. I specifically mentioned that when U.S. stocks began to fall, we could expect sympathetic declines overseas. While I did not know the precise timing of those events, I advised readers to prepare.
I did not expect the huge dollar rally of 2008. But to discredit my long-term view of the dollar based on an eight month move is absurd. So while I believed that a weak dollar would cushion the temporary decline I expected in foreign stocks, a strong dollar ended up exacerbating it. In the meantime, I believed that the high dividends these stocks were paying would make it easier to ride out any correction. The problem was that the dollar fell so far leading up to the crisis (in 2005-2007) that by the time the crisis finally erupted the dollar was poised for a bounce.
Central to the argument that my investment thesis is wrong is the belief that the crisis is over or that the recent trends will continue until it is. But the crisis is just beginning and the movements thus far in the dollar, commodities, and foreign stocks, are mere head fakes. Once the speculators have been flushed from the markets, the underlying long-term trends I have been following should return in earnest.
Schiff also said: My central investing premise, a weakening dollar and safety in gold, commodities and foreign stocks, didn’t materialize in 2008. But all the ingredients were (and remain) present for those movements to occur. Over the past year, market reactions that I didn’t foresee – massive global deleveraging, a knee-jerk “flight to quality” into U.S. Treasurys and a sharp countertrend rally in the U.S. dollar – have kept the scenario from playing out.
Throughout my career, I have never claimed great ability to time markets. I was against tech stocks in 1998, and homebuilders and financials in 2004. These stands cost me (and my clients) short-term profits. In contrast, my record of long-term forecasts is well above par and has produced solid long-term results. My clients understand this and, backing their belief with their dollars, have largely remained invested.