Robinson Crusoe had property T/F (Property is a social institution? No)

Ive been bothered by some comments of posters who treat property as a social institution. An object that does not occur praxeologically, but an object that is fabricated by man. IMHO this is inconsistent with AE, Praxeology, and a even other principle we’ve adopted, like the homesteading principle.

Their definition of property follows something like this.

Property is a concept of possession over an object, where the possession is legitimately accepted by all due to social norms.

I am goign to try and explain below why the above definition talks about Property Rights, but not about Property. First off I don’t disagree that social norms of legitimizing possession of property is extremely important and relevant to certain discussions. However I feel that it is a massive mis-characterisation to label the above definition as property.

Property a descriptive distinction involving the human interaction of physical objects. More accurately described as a praxeological concept employed by man, since it inherently involves human action. There requires no need for society to exist, for there to be property. Only man. Those who think that property is a societal institution run into the following dilemmas.

Crusoe Land.

Lets visit Robinson Crusoe’s island for illustration.

In Robinson Crusoe’s interactions throughout his day, he encounters various objects.There are two main categories. First, objects like sticks, and grains of sand picked up by Crusoe and promptly discarded with disinterest. Other objects however have been homesteaded, and created. These objects are cared for, maintained, and are given extra attention to by Crusoe as compared to the random sticks Crusoe finds on the ground.

The first catagory are objects which at least in Crusoe’s islands are non-economic objects. Objects of super-abundance or which currently present no economic value. Obviously this is due to change, but this is why Crusoe is not interested in rationing and caring for grains of sand. These objects may be in temporary possession of Crusoe, but are not in permanent possesion

The other categories are objects in permanent possession by Crusoe. Objects for example safely stowed away in his tool shed back next to his hut. A hammer, a hoe, and an axe. All objects that Crusoe keeps, maintains, and protects from the elements in his shed. Many of these objects have been crafted by Crusoe, but don’t have to be. For instance Crusoe may be attempting to safely care for a ruby he found on the beach. Perhaps he stores it under his pillow for luck.

Dilemmas

Given our Crusoe world, those who believe that property is a social institution are faced with these problems.

What is the descriptive term regarding an object that Crusoe only temporarily possesses but discards. Some, like myself, would call this possessing. The object is possessed by Crusoe.

What is the descriptive term called when Crusoe keeps, maintains, and cares for physical objects permanently? Like objects Crusoe stores in his tool shed? Or objects that Crusoe has collected from nature and granted extra attention to, like placing a ruby under his pillow. I call these objects property, and are for now in the ownership of Crusoe.

Notice how many objects which can be in temporary possession are not economically relevant objects, however all property labeled objects are economically relevant objects.

Despite the fact that there are no other other individuals on Crusoe’s paradise Island, there is a very important behavioral distinction between the way Crusoe interacts with objects. Some objects he’s collected, homesteaded, and even improved as capital goods. Other objects he discards. Some objects he’s temporarily come into possession with, while others he owns in permanent possession.

If we pretended that property did not exist in Crusoe’s island, then we could make no distinction between the tools he cares for in his shed, and the random sticks found on the ground. As such the original definition I provided in bold above is unsatisfactory. We would have no way of describing economic objects Crusoe finds relevant, and non-economic objects which are not currently relevant to human action.

Property

As far as society is concerned. Property is a praxeological subject as I demonstrate, and its existence is not dependent on the existence of “society”. By society I mean, more then one person socially interacting.

What happens in society is that property is recognized.

What does it mean that property is recognized? It means that:

  • Man recognizes that he must occupy scarce objects over time, to create expected satisfaction.(Praxeology)

So property is just an object, an economic object of interest to man. It is irrelevant whether the property is currently in the possession of a thief, or the rightful owner. Because the term property simply identifies it as an economic good of interest to man, it makes no statement over who the rightful owner is. That is the task of rights, and claims to human action. This is why thieves steal property, not grains of sand.(Unless of coarse the grains of sand are property! IE Property makes a distinction between economic goods(Wood), and non-economic goods(oxygen). Obviously human action is the concept responsible for what each object is.

Given these facts of reality, society can build a social construction of rights regarding property.

Rights

Society recognizes that property exists and may employ different ways of handling iy via the social medium(The market). This is where claims to actions come into play(Rights). Rights are nothing more then claims to human action, often times involving a physical object(property).

This is why it is called Property Rights, and not simply property alone. For if property implied rights then the term Property Right would be redundant.

It is the task of society, and it’s marketplace(The social medium) to decide what system of rights it wishes to employ regarding the use of property. The conflation that is occuring is one of rights, and property, when the two words have different meanings and different origins.

Thanks.

My question is: Who cares?

Certainly not Crusoe. Should he be struck with amnesia and forget his experience in society, I don’t think he would even understand the concept of property. It only becomes relevant when another actor (Friday) enters the picture and comes into conflict with Crusoe over who gets to use what. At that point, Crusoe and Friday work out an understanding as to who has rightful ownership over what and under what conditions, and thus the idea of private property arises. If the island is abundant in resources or Crusoe and Friday have very modest preferences, it’s possible they will never come into conflict and a convention is not even needed (and so does not arise). This is the explanation to the questionable claim that some Native American tribes had little or no understanding of property, as the land was abundant enough that conflicts did not arise and so there was no use for property claims.

The problem I see is that you’re practically offering a circular argument: You’re appealing to our own understanding of what property is (informed by growing up in a culture with a well-defined concept of property) in order to prove that property ‘exists.’ Obviously I’d call the tools that Crusoe makes his property, because according to the social norm I have been raised to accept, that’s what I consider to be property.

And regarding property vs property rights, I believe Anthony de Jasay and others (perhaps Narveson? I’m blanking here) argue that the term property rights should be avoided in favor of simply ‘property.’

I would argue that he would, lest he stop being human. He probably just wouldn’t call it property. It’s not a cognitive concept. It’s inherent to human behavior. Property is a descriptive term which signifies a distinction between the relationship of man, and scarce objects.

Right, and I am arguing that If it’s not relevant then we can make no distinctions in our discussions between economic goods, and non-economic goods.

Given my definition of property provided above you would have known that my argument is that “Property” is not a cognitive concept. It’s not something you learn. It’s inherent to human behavior.

Let me say it again. No social norm taught me:

  • Objects are Scarce
  • Time is Scarce
  • I must occupy scarce objects over time to alleviate uneasiness

Social norms do not teach praxeology. Human Action just is.

What I am trying to do is offer a descriptive distinction between non-economic goods which are not of interest to human action, and economic goods which are of interest to human action. Where is the circularity?

Because the terms Property, and rights carry two entirely different, yet equally significant, meanings. And conflating them together opens you up for massive confusion between yourself, and your audience. Cases where one party is discussing economics, and the other is discussing ethics.

Michael some of my comments were flippant and just rude. So I edited my post. Please re-evaluate it. I let this guy get under my skin in another post and took it out on you acting in haste. I hope you’ll forgive me and take no offense to it.

Don’t worry; I deserved much of it. I did read your post, but then zeroed in on the Dilemma section and started to ignore the actual point being made. Missed the forest for a very insignificant, freakish tree.

I should hold off on trying to explain my thoughts/confusions further, as chances are I’ll get up in the morning and everything will click, but I’m gonna be stupid and keep writing. I do better understand what you’re saying, but I think we may be talking about different things. I agree that this “relationship” exists between man and economic good, but I don’t think that is what we call property. Property entails ownership, and I can only conceive of ownership as a concept subject to social norms.

At the end of your post, you said that property rights concern claims to action. I would agree, but notice that this is not how you claimed others wrongly defined property at the top. You summarized their definition, “Property is a concept of possession over an object, where the possession is legitimately accepted by all due to social norms.” There is nothing in here about rights or action; it concerns not the lawful use of property, but what property is. Something is my property, is owned by me, because it qualifies as such according to social norms (say, I employed my labor on an unowned resource to make an economic good); and I may consume, exchange, rent or destroy this property due to property rights. You could perhaps argue that there is really no difference here; that the former is only meaningful because of the latter and so both are simply property rights. But I don’t think that’s right.

If a thief steals a good, we do not say it is his property, even if it is in his possession and he uses it. We can say that the good is still property, but this is only meaningful in that it is the victim’s property. It is owned by the victim. Something is property if it is owned by someone. It is not property simply by virtue of being an economic good*.

OK, I need to wrap this up for tonight. Again, I think you’re ignoring ownership and its relationship to property. You mention Crusoe owning his tools early in your post, but then drop that language.

  • you keep distinguishing between “non-economic goods which are not of interest to human action, and economic goods which are of interest to human action.” Isn’t this redundant? An economic good, by definition, is a scarce good that an actor considers useful/relevent/of interest. In which case, distinguishing between non-economic goods and economic goods is accomplished by… distinguishing between non-economic goods and economic goods as you did in the first post (sand vs tools). Property does not need to enter the discussion.

First this is kind of a strawman, because it usally says that private property is a social institution.

Second what exactly makes something an economic good? Why is wood property but oxygen not?

Thought-provoking post. I disagree with your main point though. I wrote out a similar analysis of the terms property, rights and property rights a few months ago: What Is A Right?

No, property relates to the relationship between men with respect to physical (scarce) objects. It does not describe the relationship between a man and a physical object. Property is a social institution. If he had never met another human being, I do not think that Crusoe would think in terms of ‘mine’ and ‘not mine’. I do not think he would consider his tools or wood “his” as opposed to sticks or sand being “unowned”. What does it mean to say that Crusoe owns the ruby under the pillow? That no other individual has a right to take it away from him. So if no other individual exists, it makes no sense to think of the ruby as owned, or of Crusoe as owning anything.

Crusoe is just faced with an environment full of scarce resources, some of which he values higher than others. Unless he is expecting company any time soon, presumably he keeps his tools in his shed for convenience, protection from weather, animals, etc. It does not make sense to talk of homesteading, ownership, rights or property, until another human being comes along and there is potential for conflict: rivalries, or disagreements between men about how scarce objects should be used.

Praxeology does not need the concept of property. Only when we start applying praxeology to interpersonal exchanges do we need to think about property and ownership.

Yep. Reading this all again with a clearer head, I stand by this and my last post. Property does concern the legitimate ownership/possession of a good. This question of legitimacy is determined by social norms and the whole concept of property is only relevant in a social setting. To disagree over who legitimately owns a good is not to invoke property rights. Property is the legitimate possession of a good, and property rights are the lawful uses of property/that which is legitimately owned.

You and I are in a room, and a tool is on the ground between us. We can both find useful employment for the tool; we both see it as a valuable economic good. What does it mean to talk of property in this scenario? We must address who the rightful owner of the tool is.

These are the points I am trying to raise. The concept of “Private Property” is meaningless. It’s only useful for political distinctions.

That is dependant on human action. Just as there is no perfect classification of higher order goods, theres no clear distinction between various types of economic goods. It all depends on it’s praxeological origins, and what man chooses to do with it.

Trulib and Michael,

If what you say is correct then we could not call Robinson Crusoe’s tools property. What terms would we use to distinguish between objects he discards and objects he maintains?

What are these objects called.

I feel that many libertarian’s load their definitions to imply more things than they should. They do so to push an agenda. What results however is the encouragement of nihilism as other individuals choose not to accept your terms. Since you’ve convinced them that property and rights mean a certain thing, they reject the whole framework. I feel that property is an economic term, is value free, and neutral. The concept of rights in and of itself is the same thing.

I also, like you, posted about this a long time ago. My definition, unlike yours, is highly neutral and fits all occassions where the term “rights” are used so there is no obscurity. There are many advantages in keeping the term “property” and “property right” separate.

What advantage in understanding do you gain in conflating the two? I read your post and I disagreed from the first line “All rights are property rights,”.

It’s a loaded definition, your granting it more credit than it’s worth, in an attempt to influence people in a certain way.

I wrote about rights here.

If property and rights inherently meant the same thing, why are their two different words for them? Why are they used in seperate situations implying different meanings? Does it expand our understanding of each concept to conflate the two?

I feel that my definition of rights, and property is more compatible with remaining neutral, and is complimentary to the praxeological framework of AE.

It means that you’ve identified a piece of property in the room. Where as the smudge of dirt in the corner is not. As far as allocating that property between us, thats where rights come into play.

There is a reason why we say, the thief stole “property”. We call it property as an adjective, a descriptive term. However the term is neutral, the word property doesn’t imply that Joe Shmoe owns it.

A truck driver may transport property for his business. IT’s irrelevant whos it is. A system of rights handle the order in how the property is to be managed, but all that is aside the fact that he has property in his truck.

Much of our literature makes a logical distinction between property(A physical object, simply a descriptive term), and property rights(where specific ownership comes into play, and who has a legitimate claim on said property).

There is a reason why you ask. WHOS property is that? We know it’s property even before we know if someone owns it.

Back in your hypothetical situation, I could ask. Is that property yours? The tool ofcoarse. From there we can discuss a system of rights, or claims over the tool. But I recognize it as property right off the bat.

‘Objects he discards’ and ‘objects he maintains’.

I don’t have a term for them. Why do we need one? It appears from Crusoe’s actions that he values the tools more than the other objects around him, and presumably this is because he plans to use them as a means in future actions. What more is there to say?

Wow, you seem to have completely misunderstood my post. First off, “all rights are property rights” is a non-controversial statement about the logic of the situation. As Conza posted on your thread from Rothbard: “the concept of “rights” only makes sense as property rights. For not only are there no human rights which are not also property rights, but the former rights lose their absoluteness and clarity and become fuzzy and vulnerable when property rights are not used as the standard.”

There is nothing sneaky going on here. This is merely the point that when anyone talks about rights, they are talking about property rights. “Right to free speech” means the property rights to use one’s vocal cords as one wishes. “Right to an education” means the property rights to use other people against their will to educate you. Every conflict you can think of is a conflict about property rights; it is a conflict between two individuals about how a certain scarce resource is used.

My definitions of property, and of rights (which always logically means property rights), and of aggression, are entirely value-free. I suggest re-reading my blog post, but here are the most relevant passages:

So the definition is given in a neutral way. Then each philosophy has its own principles for assigning property rights, i.e. for determining what constitutes a legitimate property boundary. For libertarians, the principles are simple: homesteading and voluntary exchange.

Non-libertarians have some other principles they use, like the principle of “the greatest good for the greater number”. Applying this to the case of two dying patients needing a heart and kidney transplant, and a guy with a broken arm, we see that the dying patients have a right (a property right, of course) to the heart and kidney of the guy with the broken arm. The non-libertarian is making a particular assertion about how property rights are justly allocated.

In no way does the language of property and property rights exclude non-libertarian philosophies. The definition is not loaded. It brings enormous clarity to all political issues to think of political philosophies in this neutral language of property and property rights.

What advantage do we gain by conflating rights and ethics, with the concept of property? Why is that a superior definition and how does it foster a more clear discussion? As opposed to the alternative, defining rights and property as being separate, but using them together in tandem.

You said, "Each philosophy has its own principles for assigning property rights.

But notice you said “Property Rights” and not property alone. All philosophies recognize the existence of property, the rights they assign to them is the variable which changes.

Property implies rights, which is to say that if a scarce object is property (claimed, controlled and bounded), then…

  • someone must have a de facto right to it, i.e. the person that actually in fact has ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over it…

  • and someone must have a legal right to it, i.e. the person that a given court would ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over it to should a conflict arise…

  • and someone must have a normative right to it, i.e. the person that a given political philosophy says should have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over it.

And rights are always property rights, as Rothbard explained in the above quote. All conflicts over rights can be expressed in terms of property rights, and this facilitates a clear discussion. The question is always: who should have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over this scarce resource? Who should own this property?

So if this is what you mean by conflating rights and property, what advantage is there in not conflating them? What is the point of saying Crusoe has property? A right is not just a claim to action, but more specifically a claim to have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over some scarce resource, i.e. a claim to have ownership of some property.

I could easily have said “assigning property” without changing the meaning, because “assigning property” can only mean “assigning property rights” (and “assigning rights”). What else could “assigning property” mean except “assigning ultimate decision-making jurisdiction (the right of ownership) over property”?

Yes. They acknowledge the existence of property when they assign rights, i.e. when they say P should have ultimate decision-making jurisdiction over X, where P is a person and X is a scarce object. They are assigning P a property right over property X.

Just because one may imply the other, doesn’t mean that the two are the same. That is where I believe the error lies, when we pretend that the two are synonymous terms. They are not synonymous and great confusion will result if we do not correctly comprehend the differences between the difference between, Property, and Rights, and how the two compliment each other.

Your own definitions refer to each object as separate.

Here’s a question: if property in the phrase “property right’s” is used as an adjective which ‘flavours’ what it is attached to.. the ‘rights’, is “property rights” merely a useful yet pleonastic term?.

I say pleonasm as there are no ‘rights’ which are not ‘property rights’, and there are no ‘property rights’ which are not ‘rights’ (in my understanding of Libertarian political philosophy). Yet I don’t object to a useful pleonasm… those not au-fait with political philosophy (and many of those who are!) may disagree that the term is pleonastic, and so repetition of the term whenever ‘rights’ are discussed is part of the art of education.

Agree?Disagree?

Even if I agreed that in all cases Property goes hand in hand with rights, and that all rights imply or involve some form of property(The body). I still think it’s unproductive, confusing, and potentially dangerous to conflate the two terms as one. In this way I don’t see it as a pleonasm.

My issue comes back to the Crusoe example. It has been stated by a previous posters that a system of rights is incoherent in the Crusoe example, as Crusoe is alone. Who does he appeal his rights to? I argue that property still exists however. I argue that there is an obvious distinction between idle sticks discarded in the forest, and the tools or capital equipment Crusoe develops and maintains to make himself more productive. I argue that Crusoe’s behavior regarding the objects he’s homesteaded differ than idle discarded sticks in the woods. As a result the objects are identified as property. Crusoe’s property in this case.

I guess my assertion is coming from the premise that rights are merely a social framework, simply because I was directing the argument against those who stated that. If your referring to “Rights” as meaning something deeper then that I’d have to re-evaluate my argument. I’d would appreciate a response because that could be where I am in error.

[Edit] I re-worded my opening statement.

I agree with you that the term/label ‘property’ by which I mean, ‘object capable of being owned’ is not identical with ‘property rights’ or more simply ‘rights’. My interjection was motivated by the Rothbardian insight that ‘property rights’ is a redundancy (even if useful in speech) because all rights are property rights (and all property rights are trivially… rights)

Rights concern objects capable of being owned and they concern agents capable of being owners.

Agree 100%. Well put.

I just don’t see any reason to have a label to distinguish the tools/capital from the idle sticks. What would be the point?

Regardless, the labels property, rights, ownership, aggression, homesteading, “his”, “mine”, etc, only make sense when there is a potential for conflict between individuals (which must necessarily be conflicts over scarce goods). Stephan Kinsella puts it nicely:

Thinking about this subject though has made me see a way I can refine my definition. That is by substituting the term ‘rivalrous’ for ‘scarce’. Kinsella uses the two terms interchangeably, but there is a difference, and this substitution may make it clearer why property does not make sense in an economy of a single individual.

If scarcity were defined the same way rivalrous is defined - as an object over which there could be conflict - then we would have to say that Crusoe faces no scarcity. This is obviously not in accord with the Misesean/Rothbardian conceptions of scarcity. Among scarce goods, then, it is in fact more specifically only rivalrous goods that can be labelled property. Scarce and rivalrous mean the same thing in a society (of more than one individual) - so they might as well be used interchangeably in most contexts - but Crusoe faces a world of scarcity (this is why he must produce to consume) but no rivalry (because there are no rivals, no possibility for conflict).