‘Ownership’ in physical control is implied by human action. Ownership (legitemate title) is not. These are two unrelated concepts. The former is a matter of physics, the latter is a matter of jurisprudence norms.
So either one acts & has implied ownership, or one doesn’t act and is a complete vegetable? How does this make sense when there are millions of cases of co-operation amid individuals for projects, products, strategies, goals, etc. that in the end, none may end up owning the results?
I mean, yesterday, I helped someone construct a website, & fully understood the end result was not going to be owned by me. It may have had my input, but ultimatley, my human action per construction did not automatically make the site my own.
This was reinforced by my insistience, per perfectionism, to continue work on the site beyond specified agreement with the person, whom at that point had the perojative to say “Nope, my site is fine now, but thanks a lot for helping to make it.”
So: human action implies ownership, contractual agreements that say otherwise on certain parties efforts regarding the end result / product / etc., be damned?
You understand why it seems human action in this context sounds like “labor” and that whatever I extend my labor into, implies ownership, despite contractual conditions that stipulate otherwise.
Perhaps I am interpreting this wrong?
Right.
Nitro: “So either one acts & has implied ownership, or one doesn’t act and is a complete vegetable? How does this make sense when there are millions of cases of co-operation amid individuals for projects, products, strategies, goals, etc. that in the end, none may end up owning the results?”
Me: No. I meant “vegetable” in medical terms.
Nitro: “I mean, yesterday, I helped someone construct a website, & fully understood the end result was not going to be owned by me. It may have had my input, but ultimatley, my human action per construction did not automatically make the site my own.”
me: The action was your action. The end result in which you labored is divided up in capitalistic ways as LTV socialism has been proven false.
Nitro: So: human action implies ownership, contractual agreements that say otherwise on certain parties efforts regarding the end result / product / etc., be damned?"
You understand why it seems human action in this context sounds like “labor” and that whatever I extend my labor into, implies ownership, despite contractual conditions that stipulate otherwise.
Perhaps I am interpreting this wrong?"
me: Yes interpreting it wrong. Did you read the link I gave to filc’s post on this? I don’t know why you interpreted the physical act of controlling yourself and conflated it into labor theory of value.
“Except that ‘ownership’ is nothing but a legal term, not an ontological relationship (unless you mean ownership in the Stirnerian sense, i.e., control, in which case whomever can control you ‘owns’ you).”
"After all, a property right is simply the exclusive right to control a scarce resource.[4] Property rights specify which persons own — that is, have the right to control — various scarce resources in a given region or jurisdiction. Yet everyone and every political theory advance some theory of property. None of the various forms of socialism deny property rights; each version will specify an owner for every scarce resource.[5] If the state nationalizes an industry, it is asserting ownership of these means of production. If the state taxes you, it is implicitly asserting ownership of the funds taken. If my land is transferred to a private developer by eminent domain statutes, the developer is now the owner. If the law allows a recipient of racial discrimination to sue his employer for a sum of money, he is the owner of the money.[6]
Protection of and respect for property rights is thus not unique to libertarianism. What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules: its view concerning who is the owner of each contestable resource, and how to determine this."
…
The libertarian says that each person is the full owner of his body: he has the right to control his body, to decide whether or not he ingests narcotics, joins an army, and so on. Those various nonlibertarians who endorse any such state prohibitions, however, necessarily maintain that the state, or society, is at least a partial owner of the body of those subject to such laws — or even a complete owner in the case of conscriptees or nonaggressor “criminals” incarcerated for life. Libertarians believe in self-ownership. Nonlibertarians — statists — of all stripes advocate some form of slavery."
Is each person the full owner of his/her body & do they have the right to control it?
Self-ownership and Conflict-avoidance
Without property rights, there is always the possibility of conflict over contestable (scarce) resources. By assigning an owner to each resource, legal systems make possible conflict-free use of resources, by establishing visible boundaries that nonowners can avoid. Libertarianism does not endorse just any property assignment rule, however.[13] It favors self-ownership over other-ownership (slavery).
The libertarian seeks property assignment rules because he values or accepts various grundnorms such as justice, peace, prosperity, cooperation, conflict-avoidance, and civilization.[14] The libertarian view is that self-ownership is the only property assignment rule compatible with these grundorms; it is implied by them.
As Professor Hoppe has shown, the assignment of ownership to a given resource must not be random, arbitrary, particularistic, or biased, if it is actually to be a property norm that can serve the function of conflict-avoidance.[15] Property title has to be assigned to one of competing claimants based on “the existence of an objective, intersubjectively ascertainable link between owner and the” resource claimed.[16] In the case of one’s own body, it is the unique relationship between a person and his body — his direct and immediate control over his body, and the fact that, at least in some sense, a body is a given person and vice versa — that constitutes the objective link sufficient to give that person a claim to his body superior to typical third party claimants.
Moreover, any outsider who claims another’s body cannot deny this objective link and its special status, since the outsider also necessarily presupposes this in his own case. This is so because, in seeking dominion over the other and in asserting ownership over the other’s body, he has to presuppose his own ownership of his body. In so doing, the outsider demonstrates that he does place a certain significance on this link, even as (at the same time) he disregards the significance of the other’s link to his own body.[17]
Libertarianism recognizes that only the self-ownership rule is universalizable and compatible with the goals of peace, cooperation, and conflict-avoidance. We recognize that each person is prima facie the owner of his own body because, by virtue of his unique link to and connection with his own body — his direct and immediate control over it — he has a better claim to it than anyone else.
I commented on that already; it was in what you quoted, even:
Just that people misunderstand morality does not mean that it does not exist. From our point of view, many people misunderstand economics; but that does not imply that economics does not exist.
So you claim to not experience moral sentiments. But that neither invalidates the fact that most people do nor calls into question the reliability of those of the people who do. Just because some people do not have a faculty of taste does not make the advisements of those faculties of the people who do have it more or less incorrect. You happen to not experience moral sentiments. That means that you are a psychopath in the formal sense of the term and that it is only up to your conscious thought to decide how to treat other people; you are not able to rely on any sorts of advisements from your subconsciousness, like most other people are.
What you should say is that no “objective” morality exists, that a “morality” pretending to transcend or ignore the nexus of means and ends is not only false but is also an absurd instance of mysticism.
If you do not accept that, what is your definition of morality and what about it is false? What is “morality as a philosophical proposition”, anyway? Do you reject “utilitarianism” or “consequentalism” as not even about “morality”?
Does being “outside the nexus of means and ends” mean that it is not even talking about morality or what? If not, again, you are not dismissing morality any more than Mises was. You are just saying that no “objective” morality exists, that no morality “outside the nexus of means and ends” exists. But, if you were to do that, your views would no longer seem very extreme; they would seem respectable but wrong to many of the people here. But that is not what you want; you want to be sensational.
Do you reject “utilitarianism” or “consequentalism” as not even about “morality”?
Consequentialism that strays outside the realm of personal preference (i.e., I would like this or that consequence) is nonsense. Consequentialism that simply refers to personal preferences has nothing to do with morality as people talk about it. A morality that has no interpersonal imperative significance is not a meaningful morality. It is a misuse of the word ‘morality’.
Liberte,
But there are some people that do use the term ‘morality’ in reference to their own preferences. Who is the one speaking at any one point in time when such a person is talking about ‘morality’?
So you believe that Mises rejected “morality”, that he was an “amoralist”?
Perhaps, questions of free will aside (not the main issue here), but even though I mis-interpreted your post (see below), I still disagreed that action denotes ownership over something.
The end result, product, whatever due to collaboration can ensure that no one ends up being a sole or even partial owner, no how much human action was contributed.
You didn’t specify self-ownership (which is what I gather what you mean by “controlling yourself”), you simply said ownership, which was a little confusing.
This led me to see a parallel to the assumption of huamn action denoting ownership, over whatever human action contributed towards, & human labor denoting ownership per the LTV.
I apologize for the tangent, I just thought there was an interesting similarity between human action & labor.
Nitro: "Perhaps, questions of free will aside (not the main issue here), but even though I mis-interpreted your post (see below), I still disagreed that action denotes ownership over something.
The end result, product, whatever due to collaboration can ensure that no one ends up being a sole or even partial owner, no how much human action was contributed."
Ownership in how I was using it was referring to the human acting. Not the product.
Nitro: “You didn’t specify self-ownership (which is what I gather what you mean by “controlling yourself”), you simply said ownership, which was a little confusing.”
I referred to filc’s post that explained what I meant further. I had also agreed with what Liberte had said in this context. Did you disagree with how she put it? Concepts undoubtedly have built in assumptions and I tried to denote what I said with filc’s post and then agreeing with Liberte only put what I had meant into further context.
Nitro: “This led me to see a parallel to the assumption of huamn action denoting ownership, over whatever human action contributed towards, & human labor denoting ownership per the LTV.”
ok
Nitro: “I apologize for the tangent, I just thought there was an interesting similarity between human action & labor.”
I don’t wouldn’t know how to make that connect.
- thanks
So you believe that Mises rejected “morality”, that he was an “amoralist”?
Evidence indicates he was a social rationalist and a moral noncognitivist.
Is that a yes or a no?
It means he probably considered a certain kind of amoralist claim justifiable, but he didn’t necessarily embrace conscious egoism (ala Stirner).
OP: I am currently in the same situation. I would advise you to check out Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperatives, they make a good basis for a society based on non-coercion.
Jesse, my first exposure to Hume’s thought was through that Rothbard passage. Even through the medium of a hostile interpretation, Hume’s analysis seemed so sound to me, and Rothbard’s attempted refutation so off-the-mark, that I became something of a Humean, oddly enough, through reading Rothbard’s Ethics of Liberty.
Did you bother to read the other cited works on the issue?
If so which ones.
Conza,
The paper you linked to me and I linked in another thread on how to derived an ought from an is by John Searle is very interesting so far. Good term to learn at this point since it came up in that paper and is very significant is: enthymeme. I’ll get back to you when I’m completely finished with the paper. There is the other way that Hoppe and some others have already shown but they have taken a different route. They don’t even need to attempt to bridge the ought/is is divide cause they demonstrate the question is invalid in the first place. Hoppe and others demonstrate the method of ‘is-ness’. So two ways appear to be able to demonstrate how the is/ought is purely analytical and not evidentially grounded. Hoppe’s is certain. I’m not yet sure with Rothbards footnoting of Searle’s approach. I’m still doing research on it. That’s the wonderful beauty of doing science. Various theories can crop up even within the same field which demonstrates how fruitful the field really is. Thus is science.
Conza, if you have an argument to make, go ahead and make it. A generic “but what about Rothbard’s footnotes?” is even more indolent than “but what about argumentation ethics?”
Anyway, in case you felt like doing so here, you never responded to this:
or this:
Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Argumentation implies that, at the moment of utterance, the speaker values present argumentation over present violence. It implies nothing about the speaker’s present valuations regarding future states of affairs.
A pro-aggression justification is just as much a matter of value-judgment as a libertarian justification is. Therefore, such justifications also can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Hoppe is trying to refute justifications. You cannot refute something that can be neither true nor false in the first place.
"PROPOSITIONS asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.
Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence.
Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence --I prefer Beethoven to Lehar-- refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition “Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar” may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people."
Mises, Theory and History
Whether something is justified is a judgment of value. Judgments of value are not existential propositions, and therefore they can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Argumentation implies that, at the moment of utterance, the speaker values present argumentation over present violence. It implies nothing about the speaker’s present valuations regarding future states of affairs.
A pro-aggression justification is just as much a matter of value-judgment as a libertarian justification is. Therefore, such justifications also can neither be validated nor invalidated.
Hoppe is trying to refute justifications. You cannot refute something that can be neither true nor false in the first place.
"PROPOSITIONS asserting existence (affirmative existential propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential propositions) are descriptive. They assert something about the state of the whole universe or of parts of the universe. With regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant. They must not be confounded with judgments of value.
Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence.
Judgments of value are mental acts of the individual concerned. As such they must be sharply distinguished from the sentences by means of which an individual tries to inform other people about the content of his judgments of value. A man may have some reason to lie about his valuations. We may describe this state of affairs in the following way: Every judgment of value is in itself also a fact of the actual state of the universe and as such may be the topic of existential propositions. The sentence --I prefer Beethoven to Lehar-- refers to a judgment of value. If looked upon as an existential proposition, it is true if I really prefer Beethoven and act accordingly and false if I in fact prefer Lehar and for some reasons lie about my real feelings, taste, or preferences. In an analogous way the existential proposition “Paul prefers Beethoven to Lehar” may be true or false. In declaring that with regard to a judgment of value there cannot be any question of truth or falsity, we refer to the judgment as such and not to the sentences communicating the content of such a judgment of value to other people."
Mises, Theory and History
I’ll take that as a big fat “no I didn’t” then. It was a simple question, I was just wondering.. since as wilderness pointed out I’m interested in that at the moment. It wasn’t even an attempt at such, and your emotional reaction is telling.
I’ll make the argument from the other thread (that you have now spammed into here), when I have the time to get to it & enough of the ‘effort factor’ to wade through the morass of claptrap.
Now if you’re going to go around throwing out “never responding to”'s, there is plenty you never address or respond to from my posts towards you; in that thread - that you completely ignore. Simple example, the part about vicious distraction.