I have sought the assistance of both my ethics and logic professors with regards to clarifying the paragraph below. Neither were able to assist me. [:'(]
Can you help explain it to me?
“Murray N Rothbard argued that Hume’s argument that values cannot be derived from facts is unpersuasive. Some allege that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument that was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an “ought” conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the “ought” need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. Rothbard concluded that to say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question”
Cheers,
Loweleif
EDIT: -.- Your breaking my balls NirgrahamUK.
I can’t remember where I got the above quote, however, the source for that quote would be the quote below.
The Ethics of Liberty by Murray N. Rotbhard.
Page 14, Footnote 15.
“Hurme in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an “ought” conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the “ought” need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question. See Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978),pp. 99-105.”
[15]Hume in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an “ought” conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the “ought” need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question. See Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 99–105.
If that was Hume’s derivation, Rothbard’s critique is on target.
However, the issue of whether values can be derived from facts is silly to begin with, unless we specify whose values. Since value (noun) means “something that someone places importance on,” the notion of values divorced from that “someone” is incoherent - unless we use some non-common-sense definition of value.
This is an accurate statement, but it was not what Hume was saying or trying to prove. An “ought” is an imperative to act. Hume was saying you can not start with a description of things and then derive how an individual should act. The way a person acts, given what is, depends on their values. Are a persons values necessarily derived from a description of what is? I don’t know I haven’t been convinced either way. My opinion is that a persons values come from many places and that we naturally associate with those that are most similar to us if we are in the absence of a state and then those groups that most correctly hold proper values will be the most successful.
“The ought need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced”
Rothbard is basically saying that “you can derrive something as long as its possible to derive it”.
When you’re doing a priori theorizing, the definitions of the symbols you use in your derrivation have to be equivalent to your conclusion. If you don’t do this, it ain’t a priori, it’s just fluff.
I mean the libertarian formulation of ethics is highly rhetorical. Even if we concede that someone “owns” themslves etc etc it does not follow that we ought to respect those rights, since we can’t say anything about what ownership is equivalent to (other than itself and its definition of course).
Libertarian ethics is not metaphysical; it makes a leap from concepts of ownership to the moral duty to respect this ownership.
It can’t be validly deduced, except from another “ought”. Deriving “ought” from “is” is akin to deriving “has” from “is”, like saying, “All bachelors are men; all men are human; therefore all bachelors have humans.” It simply does not follow.
I have indeed been somewhat out of the ethics discussion loop lately. I rotate from being obsessed with ethics (and philosophy in general), economics, and history. And lately I’ve been in full-on history mode.
Fair enough, I find myself going through the same process; I’ve been focusing more on economics recently myself. I’m currently reading through Hayek’s History of Economic Thought, which will be followed by Lachmann’s Capital and its Structure. Very interesting stuff. Of course, I recently purchased Hume’s posthumous “Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary” which may draw me back into philosophy.
Hume doesn’t have any argument. He just declared that ‘objective’ morality is not possible since it can’t be derived from ‘facts’. That begs a lot of question that Hume never answered. Hume’s dictum is just an article of faith.
Nobody has ever given a justifiable derivation of an ought from solely factual premises. Natural rights philosophers tend to eschew syllogisms altogether, often hiding their premises or leaps of logic from undiscerning eyes. Hume’s dictum is an article of faith in the same manner as the first law of thermodynamics. After all, it hasn’t been proven to the degree that Juan demands of Hume, and we all know how consistent Juan is in the application of his principles.
So, what ‘facts’ do you think that ‘really’ exist ? You know, your little skeptic game is easy to play.
That sounds kinda obscure. Or perhaps confused ?
We all know how consistent cheap skeptics are when skepticism is applied to their own nonsense.
Let’s see. How do you derive ‘ideas’ from ‘facts’ ? Do ideas exist ‘in the real world’ ? Or are ideas just ‘subjective’ creations of the mind ? If you can’t find any idea out there in the real world, that is, you can ‘observe’ ideas, do ideas exist at all ?
This sentence is nonsensical. ‘Ideas’ are not derived from anything, although they do have a relation to things. To be precise, they are representations of phenomenal experience.
The latter. They are constructs that represent phenomenal experience, allowing for efficient understanding of complex relationships. All language is metaphorical, or ‘subjective’ creations to represent “the real world”.
It depends on your definition of exist. Webster would say yes, because they
“have being in a specified place or with respect to understood limitations or conditions <strange ideas existed in his mind>”
I’m not going to play anymore of your silly games, but an important point that seems to escape you is that ‘skepticism’ is a matter of degree. I am not a complete skeptic, meaning I accept some assumptions on faith, albeit as few as possible and only those instrumental in constructing a model with the greatest amount of explanatory power, see Occam’s Razor.
There are no absolute skeptics that I know of, as such a person would be unable to justify the use of logical reasoning or even attempt justification, see Munchhausen Trilemma.
Semantics. What’s the origin of ideas ? And what sort of relation do ideas have to “things” ? Oh wait. “Things” is just another non-material concept is it ?
What real world ?
LOL. I see you are a philosopher as great as bill clinton eh ? It depends on “what the meaning of is is” ?
Oh boy. So you are not going to stick to your skeptical principles - you are only going to apply them when it suits you ? Maybe that’s a bit hypocritical ?
Zefreak dear, didn’t you attempt to gain the a-moral ground by stating
And yet, now, you are not going to consistently apply your skepticism ? Too bad…
By the way, who is “we” ? The zealots of the stirner church ?
“Hume in fact failed to prove that values cannot be derived from facts. It is frequently alleged that nothing can be in the conclusion of an argument which was not in one of the premises; and that therefore, an “ought” conclusion cannot follow from descriptive premises. But a conclusion follows from both premises taken together; the “ought” need not be present in either one of the premises so long as it has been validly deduced. To say that it cannot be so deduced simply begs the question. See Philippa R. Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978),pp. 99-105.”
I have never read any of Rothbard’s work, besides a few essays, and quotes like this are one of the reasons why. It betrays such a poor comprehension of basic logic that I struggle to take rothbard seriously.
I suspect he is, but I also think there are much better historians and economists than Rothbard, so I find myself with little incentive to read his work.
First I would like to say thanks for all the interest, but could we please maintain focus on the issue at hand, and for those of you who have personal differences set them aside or continue to debate them via PM because they don’t really help solve my original question. [:S]
So it was not Hume’s derivation? I can’t present the source right now, but I remember Rothbard or another Austrian stating that Hume’s argument may in fact have been misinterpreted (I’m pretty sure its in the The Ethics of Liberty), is that why you said if?
So your saying it is ok to derive facts from value if we specify whose values? What if we were to specify that who as Humanity (a collective, not an individual)? Are there not some basic values that all humans have? e.g murder is wrong, stealing is wrong, lying is wrong, self-ownership etc