But his work is mostly based on logic. Could you please elaborate (prove your assertion) to me why you think this and other statements, essays etc betray such a poor comprehension of basic logic?
And if you do not feel you have the time could you please send me a link where someone has already done so? [:)] Thank you.
since Rothbard referenced another’s work, if one desires to flesh out the text behind the brief Rothbardian passage it would be great to read Rothbard’s source. Unfortunately it doesn’t seem to be available, digitally, in full.
loweleif,
Do this experiment with basic logic –
Therefore, both sets of premises are semantically equivalent, i.e. two ways of saying the same thing.
Here’s an example.
Rothbard criticises Hume for “begging the question,” while not understanding that all valid deductions, if the premises are expected to justify the conclusion, must beg the question or else be invalid.
the premise that P is true, and the premise that P implies Q entail the conclusion Q
if one concludes ‘Q’ having deducted from p and p-> Q has one ‘begged the question of Q’?
Not necessarily, because the petitio principii fallacy is one of intent, and not an error of logical form. In other words, whether an argument is “begging the question” depends on what you expect the argument to achieve. If you expect the premises of a valid argument to justify the conclusion, then you would be commiting the petitio principii fallacy. However, if you are merely testing the premises for validity, exploring their consequences, or demonstrating them to others, then no fallacy is being committed. In any case, the is-ought problem is only really a problem for positivists, who believed that legitimate knowledge must be derived from sense experience (which corresponded to descriptive statements of particulars). Once you drop the notion that sense experience is the fountain of all legitimate knowledge, the is-ought problem really should cease to be a problem.
Sure, it ceases to be a problem, and the resulting conclusions cease to be relevant.
Thanks Lee Kelley. Unfortunately, I’m even more confused then when I started this thread.[:S]
I think I get the experiment.
I don’t see how it ties into the statement below.
I also don’t remember in logic being taught that all valid deductions (and in a valid deductions is it not necessary that the premises justify the conclusion? Or is that not equivalent to the conclusion following from the premises?) beg the question.
I’m honestly trying to grasp all sides of the issue as well as I can. As much as I like Rothbard I don’t consider anyone’s work Dogma, and so I genuinely trying to understand this in order to judge for myself whether or not Rothbards counter is correct.
How is this…
Different from deriving values from facts? They sound equivalent to me. And if that is correct, then how can Rothbards statement be accurate?
This was some BAD philosophy by Rothbard.
To say that a conclusion is “validly deduced” from a set of premises means that the conclusion IS IN ONE OR MORE OF THE PREMISES.
Yeah, that is correct. It is definitenely not fallacious. A valid argument is one whereby the conclusion is warranted inferentially by the premises.
No, he does a good job making Mises’s work more accessible to people and also he touches upon historical studies with perspectives and questions others often do not ask. There may be “better” economists and historians but one would be depriving themselves by omitting Rothbard. Of course, TEOL can be ommitted as far as I am concerned unless one wishes to comprehend where most libertarians are coming from.
Deductions, by themselves, beg the question. That’s why you have to establish the truth of the premises so they dont beg the question.
Absolutely irrelevant?
Can someone help me out and give a simple example of starting with two facts and arriving at an “ought” conclusion?
Good luck. We had an entire thread on just this subject a while ago, and not one surfaced that wasn’t guilty of containing hidden ought premises.
Moral Fact : murder is morally wrong - it follows : you ought not to murder.
Actually the ‘ought’ part is irrelevant - some things are morally wrong but of course you are free to do them anyway - free will.
The issue at hand is whether moral facts exist or not. All this babbling about deriving an “ought” from an “is” is just pseudo-philosophical quibbling.
Why is murdering wrong?
Most of your reply is over my head, I freely admit. The only part I “got”, sort of, is the very first sentence.
I’m not sure Hume and Rothbard were talking about the example you gave. I got the impression they were discussing facts that can be picked up by a dead instrument such as a camera, and the debate is about can “oughts” be deduced from such facts.
Because you shouldn’t murder [:D]
Seriously Juan, for all your vitriolic hatred towards theists, you sure know how to argue like one. Argument by assertion, is that how philosophy is done these days?