Firstly, thank you for the clarification. : ) That makes sense.
I
This is not axiomatic. What is axiomatic is that humans act to achieve goals, but it does not follow that they “ought” to do so or are “obligated” to do so.
“All bodies are subject to gravitational forces” is a different proposition than “all bodies should be subject to gravitational forces”
“Zefreak ought to achieve what he desires” is immaterial. “Zefreak will always try to achieve what he desires,” is undeniably true.
Correct. It is a factual statement, as the definition of action is purposeful behavior, IE behavior with a given end. The question is can you deduce any sort of value statement from the axiom? No, because the action axiom simply elucidates how people will act, not how they should. Therefore the previous syllogism I constructed still requires the 3rd (ought) premise to deduce the conclusion, as the conclusion isn’t that zefreak will cease posting in the thread but that zefreak ought to cease posting in the thread.
That is correct. I was thinking about that after I made that post.
Then the use of the language ought seems to be incorrect in this thread and instead should read…
"Zefreak will stop debating in this thread. "
(Obviously that conclusion is not true, which means that either our assumed axiom is false, or one of the premises is false.)
But does the above exercise refute Rothbards post? Because we have not concluded a value from a fact. We have merely concluded a fact, from a fact.
A.L.:
I believe this is the relevant passage from Hume:
“I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations and propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not concerned with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from the others, which are entirely different from it. I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.”
(A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Of Morals, Part 1, Of virtue and vice in general, Sect. 1, Moral distinctions not deriv’d from reason.)
As far as I know, the most important article on this subject in the libertarian literature is Patrick M. O’Neil’s 1983 article “Ayn Rand and the Is-Ought Problem.” http://mises.org/journals/jls/7_1/7_1_4.pdf
The argument O’Neil makes applies to objective ethical systems generally, including Rothbard’s.
In your original post, you ask for help in clarifying and explaining the Rothbard quote. The difficulty in what you are asking for would seem to be the following. Hume is suggesting that we cannot deduce an ought from an is, and he is asking for an explanation or reason for any ought that claims to have been deduced from an is. The quote you provide from Rothbard says in effect: “Yes, an ought can be derived from an is, for this reason, or in this way…”
This is an assertion that in general, or in the abstract, by approaching things in this general way, that an ought can be deduced from an is. As long as we stay at this abstract level, then no particular ought is claimed to have been deduced from a particular is. The problem arises when one tries to deduce a specific or concrete ought from a specific or concrete is.
This is what some of the prior posts have touched on. When one tries to apply the general assertion—that an ought can be deduced from an is—to specific examples or specific instances, this is where things become unclear.
So your request for a clarification or explanation may be interpreted as a request for a clarification or explanation of how an ought can be derived from an is in a concrete example, as distinct from the assertion that such can be done as a matter of general principle.
As an example of this, take page 90 of O’Neils article, where Den Uyl and Rasmussen present a general syllogistic formula that would allow an ought to be deduced from an is.
What demonstrates the importance of Hume’s insight, is to be understood when the attempt is made to deduce a specific ought from a specific is.
I may say to person B: “It is impossible for you to lift yourself up off the ground by placing your hands under your feet and lifting.”
And person B may say in reply: “As a matter of fact, yes I can, for xyz general reason.”
But the importance or significance of my assertion is to be seen in the specific or concrete attempts to lift oneself up in the way indicated, not in the fact that someone may simply assert the contrary.
We have concluded a fact from a fact, because that is the only legitimate conclusion possible without introducing an ought premise. You have demonstrated yourself that all Rothbard can deduce from free will is that man will act according to his perceived benefit. Of course, this does not accomplish Rothbard’s goal of deriving a libertarian ethical system (a systemization of ought statements) from a factual statement.
He responds by asserting that it is in fact possible, that it is what he did, and does not explain how, or why. While I enjoy Rothbard’s writings and agree with much that he has to say, I must conclude that he was either being intentionally dishonest for the purpose of persuasion or just a poor logician.
To Adam Knott,
Thanks for the link to O’Neil. Off to inspect what he has to say.
Ugh, Rand’s misunderstanding of consciousness and evolutionary biology makes her entire ethical system untenable. Her avoidance of the is/ought fallacy is contingent on there being a fundamental difference between “nonliving”, purely mechanical entities and “living”, apparently non-mechanical, entities.
edit: Even then it is bald assertion that, because “living entities” are the only ones with which value is a valid concept, life is inherently valuable.
Her ethics hinges on a dualistic conceptualization of mind. Quite a shaky foundation, in my opinion.
I go with Hoppe, argumentation is only tenable given particular norms. these norms cannot be rationally argued against. i.e. there are oughts that you cannot argue against. take it from there. oh and it is a fact that there are these oughts .
I think argumentation ethics has been soundly refuted by AJ (and perhaps BP and Lilburne), but as it somewhat applies to the thread, any many people here have perhaps not come across the arguements for or against AE, could you provide an example of an ought that an individual cannot argue against? I don’t think one exists, so it will be interesting to see if it is conceivable to argue against.
you ought not initiate violence against me.
“I do not recognize an obligation towards initiating or refraining from violence towards you. I merely act according to my preference, which for one reason or another is nonviolent communication”
How is that contradictory?
the fact that you do not recognize your obligation to not initiate violence against me does not demonstrate that you have not that obligation. no more than you not recognizing that what is in front of you is a tree will stop you from walking into it.
demonstrate that it is permissable to initiate violence against me. demonstrate that there is, in fact, no obligation on you to refrain from coercing me…
preferrably do this in rational argument without contradicting yourself.
(good luck amigo [:P])
Sorry, the burden of proof is on the one asserting a moral obligation. Otherwise, prove to me that you don’t have a moral obligation to be my sex slave? (The universability test is no help, as any moral statement can be phrased in such a way as to make it universal)
To reiterate, you are merely asserting the existence of a moral obligation that you are unable to provide evidence of, after asserting that it would be a contradiction to argue against it (which it obviously isn’t) and then hoping that others reading will not be intelligent enough to understand that lack of proof against a clueless assertion does not equal proof for said clueless assertion.
I’ll be honest, I expected more.
Isn’t up to you to demonstrate your assertion? You state a certain principle that you claim morally binds everyone. I would say you have to demonstrate that .
BTW let’s talk about this scenario. Mr A walks down the street. He sees Mr B in the middle of raping and murdering Ms C. Ought he not to initiate violence against B?
From Antony de Jasay, we know that freedom must be presumed. hence the presumption is that i must not be coerced by you. to be your sex slave or whatever.
so, the ball is really in your court. the burden of proof is on you. for technical reasons.
enjoy!
Only if the premise exists that Mr. A ought to prevent rape and murder with violence, and even then it is contingent on the soundness of the premise. The premise must be justified via its derivation from a more fundamental value, which in turn must be validated ad infinitum. Hence why values ultimately are axiomatic, or unjustified. They are basic premises, fundamentals not subject to justification by further values. This is why Hume states that morality arises from the passions, and not reason.
From Paul Krugman, we know that aggressive fiscal policy is important. See how easy that is?
Do you really think that appealing to Jasay is enough of an argument?
Whatever. Your position is contingent on the soundness of Jasay’s argument, which, if it is what I predict it to be, is invalid.