Rothbards Critique of Hume: (Seek clarification)

Economics Political Theory
121

NirgrahamUK:

One of the impediments to progress in the discussion and debate over natural-rights related ethics theories, is that those who support these types of theories in principle, but clearly recognize the shortcomings of the prominent natural-rights theories, generally refrain from offering a coherent critique that outlines precisely what they believe the problems with those theories are.

The opponents of natural-rights type theories offer the strongest critique they can. The authors of the natural-rights theories in question, for obvious reasons, do not offer a critique of their own theory. But there are many social thinkers who support the goals and overall approach of natural-rights, and yet can clearly see the problems in the major and influential natural-rights theories. Unfortunately, many of these social thinkers choose not to state in writing and publicly, the problems they see with particular natural-rights theories. These thinkers choose to adopt alternative approaches, and thus seem to imply that they do not believe the former natural-rights approach is feasible. Yet they offer no public or written critique of the former approach, or the reasons they have abandoned it in favor of another approach.

Both Hoppe and Long fall into this category. Both of these thinkers are capable enough to realize the inherent problems in Rothbard’s natural-rights ethical theories. And both of these thinkers have chosen alternative approaches to the problem of the basis of libertarian ethics. They have chosen not to adopt and extent Rothbard’s own theory and program as outlined in The Ethics of Liberty. But yet, as far as I’m aware, neither thinker has produced an essay that outlines the problems with Rothbard’s natural-rights approach. They simply have chosen another approach and remained silent with regard to Rothbard’s natural-rights theory.

Of course, if they were to frankly offer their views on the problems with Rothbard’s theory, this would be of immeasurable value in moving the discussion forward. The possibility would then exist of a greater consensus in the libertarian theoretical community. We could move beyond certain debates, and take up new issues.

There is a secondary effect that results from natural-rights supporters deciding not to offer a public critique of the problems they see with specific natural-rights theories. If they were to offer a critique of Rotbard’s natural-rights or Rand’s Objectivism, for example, this critique would possibly establish a benchmark which they would be claiming future ethics theories need to meet. A critique offered by John (a natural-rights supporter) would essentially state that natural-rights theory A ultimately fails, because it fails to achieve xyz. Then, of course, this means that in John’s eyes, future ethics theories must achieve xyz to be considered non-failing ethics theories. A benchmark is thus established for future ethics theories, including those offered by John and other natural-rights supporters.

The problem is, the natural-rights supporters who clearly see problems with particular natural-rights theories, generally abstain from offering such a critique publicly and in writing. Regarding Hoppe and Long specifically, there are brief passages perhaps, hinting that they see problems. And there is the fact that they choose not to adopt and extend Rothbard’s and Rand’s systems. These things amount to an implied critique of those systems, but they fall short of an actual critique. The actual critique by these capable thinkers is what is needed to move the debate forward, since other natural-rights supporters would lend great weight to what these thinkers have to say.

A critique of natural-rights theory by a natural-rights or natural-law supporter is definitely possible. Here is what Patrick M. O’Neil writes in his critique of the natural-law, natural-rights theories of Rand and Rothbard:

“I am, by conviction, an adherent of the Thomistic natural law school of thought in ethics, but I believe that some special modifications must be performed to overcome the is-ought gap, even in that tradition. One of the central difficulties seems to have been that scholars in that tradition have failed, in general, to recognize in what way and to what degree the problem of the is-ought gap applies to them.” (footnote #53)

Thus, just because one is a natural-law supporter, doesn’t necessarily mean one must abstain from offering a clear and frank statement outlining where one sees problems with the natural-law approach. However, many natural-law supporters seem to act as if the fact that they support this approach generally, means they must not offer strong critiques of particular versions of this approach. This means that by and large, the only strong critiques being leveled against failed natural-law theories, are coming from those who oppose the natural law approach generally. Those who support the natural law approach, but believe there are serious problems with particular theories, generally do not offer a coherent critique such as the one O’Neil offers. Thus, the debate is mired in the past. We can’t move beyond debating theories that even many supporters know are faulty.

Your statement above, nirgrahamUK, is an example of this. You write:

“In my opinion Rothbard is awesome on the content, history and practical implications of libertarianism, but his justifications for it where he sets it up as the correct theory lacks the necessary ooooomph…” (my underline)

Here, you are advancing a position that is probably largely the same as most opponents of natural-rights and natural law theory. It’s not that Rothbard made no contributions to libertarianism and/or libertarian social theory. The question is whether, aside from his work in value-free economics and in economic history, and aside from his work as a political figure in the libertarian movement (agitator, organizer, etc…), whether his particular theory of the basis for libertarian ethics ultimately stands or fails. What you write implies that it fails. You write that you favor the argumentation ethics, I assume, as superior justification for ethics and libertarian ethics. This would seem to mean that Hoppe’s AE meets certain criteria, or achieves certain objectives, that Rothbard’s natural-rights fails to achieve. But what is generally missing from natural-rights supporters such as yourself, is a clear expression of why Rothbard’s “justifications for it where he sets it up as the correct theory lacks the necessary ooooomph.” That is, what are the particulars here? What specifically does Rothbard say, and where and why does it fall short?

You imply it, but what is needed for the debate to move forward is for people to explicitly write what they know or believe to be the case.

If you, Hoppe, Long, and many others are operating under the assumption that Rothbard’s natural-rights theory ultimately fails, why can’t we have some essays written from the natural-rights “side,” explaining in detail what some of the fundamental problems are? This would not only help move the debate forward, but it would begin to create a benchmark for future theories that are offered.

What we have now is no clear critique of theories people no longer believe in, and thus no standard created for theories offered in the future. How can anything but fruitless and acrimonious exchanges be expected to result ?

122

Rothbards natural rights theory is sound, it is essentially the same in content as Hoppe’s from my perspective. Hoppes preface of TEOL is glowing with admiration for Rothbard. Hoppe is a disciple of Rothbard writing in the tradition.

Rothbard only fails in his defence of ‘natural rights’, not in his expositions of them, of what they entail, of how they are to be understood. he provides a tour de force in these areas.

Rothbard falls short by relying on the aristotlean teleology, and appeal to the ‘objective’ value of ‘life’ which he said could not be contradicted. He comes close to, without reaching the Hoppean stance… From my perspective he is groping in the direction of it without seeing what it is. naturally without it, he flails and seems weak to his critics.

Hoppes approach appeared novel to Rothbard, and excited him .Hoppe provides the superior defence.

123

Fantastic post Adam. Instead of arguing the zero sum approach, a win-win is possible from

if they will pick up the ball and run with it.

124

With respect to what you have written above in one or two sentences, were these ideas to be explored in essay form by those who are capable of doing so, but simply choose not to, the debate might be able to move beyond for example, the aristotlean teleology and the appeal to the ‘objective’ value of ‘life’ which Rothbard said could not be contradicted. If able scholars who know these same problems and flaws exist—whoever they may be (Long, Hoppe, Machan, Hulsmann, Kinsella, etc…)—were to bring these views and critiques out into the open, then this would possibly move the libertarian debate forward while simultaneously creating a benchmark standard for libertarian ethics theory. Their failure to do so is at least part of the reason the same debates have to be repeated over and over.

Based on the information you are privy to, you have moved on from strict adherence to the tenets of Rothbardian natural-rights theory, and have chosen to adopt instead Hoppean argumentation ethics as your chosen framework for justifying libertarian ethics. As you write, “Rothbard falls short.”

Other capable libertarian social thinkers and scholars have done the same–moved on from Randian and Rothbardian ethics–without explicitly articulating the reasons why. As the more perceptive among natural-rights proponents gradually move away from these older and ultimately failed theories, they do so leaving behind few published works explaining clearly to the younger generation of upcoming scholars why the older theories ultimately fail, and by implication, what standard newly proposed ethics theories need to meet.

125

You have just thrown a lot of positivism at me havent you? you have made all sorts of claim about true statements, are the claims you made falsifiable?

126

You really don’t know when to admit you’ve been defeated, can’t you?

127

i guess not.

tell me when and how it happend. dont commit any fallacies when you do.

go!

128

What he said, it completely destroys everything you said, and you do not even have a reply to it other than “its positivist”.

129

haha, nice.

you are telling me how i am beaten. the story is that someone said something that ‘destroyed me’.

well then.

seems you have no idea, and are hoping that other people will do your work for you.

130

If Lee and Laminastacitus wish to claim that the a priori of argumentation, is not true, since it is necessarily true, and is therefore “unscientific” (because unfalsifiable), this is merely an irrelevant matter of definition.

131

Don’t have time to stay and chat, but you obviously didn’t understand his argument. (hint: it doesn’t rely on being falsifiable!)

132

does what he said allow for necessary truths, things that could not be false on pain of contradiction?

133

Yes, his argument doesn’t have to do with the validity of apriori reasoning, so much as the applicability in determining the truth apriori of normative assertions.

134

the process of arguing about the truth of normative assertions relies on some particular normative assertions that can’t be jettisoned on pain of contradiction.

135

I meant his latter post when he totally destroyed Casey.

136

I spent sometime re-reading what he wrote, it is pure logical positivism right out of A J Ayer.

so maybe you’ll grant me that I did understand his argument?

137

nirgrahamUK,

The picture in my avatar is of Karl Popper. He was a friend of Hayek, an Austrian (national), and one of my favourite philosophers. If you know something about Popper, then you will know that he is no positivist. Since my views on philosophy accord more closely with Popper’s than almost anyone elses, accusing me of being a positivist could hardly be further from the truth.

I’ll even argue that there is no such thing as inductive logic should someone bring up the topic.

138

Oh, in that case - please point me in the direction of Fesers potent refutation of Hoppe.

139

And yet didn’t you retreat from that position when you gave an example of a normative statement that couldn’t be rejected without contradiction and I proceeded to reject it without committing a contradiction? That is precisely why you were forced to dig up Jasay, in order that, although my response to your statement wasn’t contradictory, it was supposedly less epistemically justifiable?

If you are wondering why I don’t keep my word and respond to your interpretation (or Jasay’s interpretation) of Jasay’s argument, I have been extremely busy at work and unwilling to devote the time needed to develop an argument strong enough to actually move the argument forward and not quibble over semantics. I am planning to start a blog which should allow much greater nuance in this debate.

140

you did face a contradiction.

I used De Jasay to make that plain to you.

without De Jasay you would never be stirred to make your case. De Jasay puts the burden on you to justify restricting my freedom by your aggressive act. and when you try it you find that the performative contradiction will happen… you haven’t tried it yet, even though its on you. I am waiting patiently.