Rothbards “Ethics of Liberty” covers this. Here’s a link I gave to you before.
It’s called property. I thought you said it was Tom’s cabin. Who’s it now? Are you going to change the scenario? Is it now Betty’s? Or Bob’s?
Estoppel addresses this.
Just realized this is out of sequence. Response to an old post, it has value to the discussion.
I’ve hinted at what i think rights are, but you’ve ignored my comments. Personally, I believe in the NAP, and not much else as far as rights go. I believe that one has the negative right to exclusively and absolutely control his or her property, free from the interference of others. I can see some room for grey areas, though they stem from imperfect knowledge, or degrees of severity of violations, rather than non-absolutes of the rights themselves.
I can offer no reason why Klemm should care about the rights of others when is life is on the line, other than the potential “wrath of Tom”. I believe I said I would break into the cabin were I in the same situation. But that is not what you asked. You asked if it the break-in would be “justified” and at other times “wrong”. These cannot be answered without Tom’s input. The reason for this is quite simple. Though the violation and/or infringement of another’s property rights is wrong in all cases, whether Klemm’s actions constitute a violation or infringement depends solely on if Tom says so.
hmmm Estoppel - Argumentation Ethics - Aggression etc…
[:D][Y]
I’m not concerned right now with the problem of repercussions. It is an important question, but right now I’m just trying to figure out whether Klemm’s actions are a rights violation or a rights infringement.
OK, I think the problem here is that you’re assuming that rights are absolute, whereas I’m arguing that they are not absolute. In my view, the cabin example is a reductio ad absurdum of an absolutist conception of rights, and hence is a strong argument iin favor of non-absolute rights. What are your arguments for why rights are absolute, and how do you respond to the reductio?
Yeah, I think this gets to the bottom of the issue. If rights are absolute then there is no such thing as rights infringements, hence Klemm’s actions are a rights violation and the only remaining question is repercussions. On the other hand, if rights are not absolute, then Klemm’s actions are a rights infringement, and we need to revisit libertarian rights theory.
The distinction is explained in this post.
Right. And my position is that, given reductiones like the cabin example, we must conclude that property rights are not absolute.
How else can we answer the cabin reductio?
Thank you. I think that represents a good many of us.
What reductio? I think you need to check your premises.
Hahaha I think you need to check the definition of a reductio!
Wilderness, telling me to read what Rothbard said is not a theory (nor is telling me to read Rasmussen). If your argument is that we should respect property rights because Rothbard thinks we should, then I will simply point to your fallacy. If you think that we should respect property rights because of the reasons Rothbard offers, then you should be able to summarize them here, just as I have at every juncture without asking you guys to go read a laundry list of liberal thinkers from Berlin to Gaus. It’s important that you do this because if I respond with what would be a good critique of Rothbard (e.g.), it will be just as pointless as the rest of the reasons I’ve offered if you don’t understand how Rothbard’s argument actually works.
I understand that we have a person named Tom who claims to “own” a cabin. I’m asking what you think Tom claim to “owning” his cabin amounts to, and why we should care about it.
Jack, if you think that Klemm’s only reason for caring about Tom’s rights is the potential that he will be punished, then you are arguing on the basis of moral nihilism and pure egoistic self-interest. To speak of Klemm being “justified” or “immoral” for breaking into Tom’s cabin is irrelevant by that paradigm; the only thing that matters is what strategy will likely produce the best outcomes for Klemm. In that case, it seems extremely clear to me that Klemm should break into the cabin and risk whatever Tom sends his way, since his alternative is near-certain death. Unless he thinks that Tom will capture him and torture him, it’s hard to imagine that Klemm’s self-regarding ends would be more effectively promoted by consigning himself to death by freezing than to break into Tom’s cabin, regardless of whether Tom is there. Let the consequences fall as they will!
Man…I know that in posting that link I’m going to get a reply defending Hoppe…so here.
To which I will reply, you have never clearly laid out your premises. You have consistently failed to do so when I, Wilderness and Jack have all asked you direct questions which you continue to evade. When you did choose to respond, it was with insults, calling us lunatics.
Btw, the irony here is that you accuse others of ethical nihilism, but that is what collectivism, your Respectarianism resolves to. Klemm’s morality is non-existent, he is strictly a consequentialist driven by his own ends with no moral boundaries. Tom has no claim to morality or justice, because you do not believe any exists for him. Any system which resolves to one party having all of the moral authority in every situation, is a system where that one party has no morality, only authority.
In order for a rational rights system to work, both parties must maintain checks on each other, such that both parties have rights, and both parties can act without infringing the rights of the other. The very notion of infringements being different from violations is a meelie mouthed word game played out over and over by people who claim to be libertarians, but really do not believe that anyone has any rights except what is decided by the mob, or by emotion, or by need, and certainly none of those rights can be consistent, enduring and inalienable.
There is NOTHING which separates your position from that of a progressive liberal statist, except they want the state, and you demand emotion and need. There is nothing different about Klemm violating Tom’s property, than taxation for welfare wealth redistribution. Instead of the state doing the redistributing, you propose that anyone who feels poor, or threatened, or needy or cold should take what he needs, and because you allow that party to create their own need, it eventually becomes only about taking what one wants (skewed incentives).
Ultimately, your system has to necessarily lead to the end of private property rights, if you even had a conception of private property rights to begin with. And without which, I cannot fathom how you expect to have a market system of free exchange, commercial or social because again, you have distorted the incentives.
It’s an irrational semantic game in the manic style of a James Taggart. It is collectivism.
Your premise is flawed because when you were trying to find answers that make you feel good, you should have been asking yourself why the right answers make you feel bad.
Sorry in advance for all the quotes - it helps me structure a reply.
Never heard the name Klemm, or any variants, applied to a boy.
On what basis?
Well, wouldn’t you say that he had a possibly more important right to the cabin’s protection and supplies if he was also starving?
Crude utilitarianism. Maybe Bill Gates does value it higher than a terminally ill patient. You can’t say for certain whether or not he will value it higher, and anyway, against what scale do we measure personal appreciation of value? How do we know different people’s valuations can be compared? Surely value is ordinal rather than cardinal anyway?
See, this is the part I just don’t understand. It’s not your aspirin. It’s Bill Gates’ aspirin. Your position commits you to an all-powerful decider, rampant legitimised theft, and possible statism. Surely a government can tax in order to provide welfare for those who may otherwise die?
Charity (e.g. this situation) is always an amoral issue. People are dying in Africa. Should they be able to steal our property in order to survive? No. Will I give to charity in order that they might survive? Yes. Do I think this should be violently enforced on others? No.
Trespass is aggression; it is the unconsensual invasion of a person’s property, an extension of themselves. If Tom wasn’t in, but came home, he would be justified in using whatever force necessary to remove Klemm from his property (in all likeliness, he would not, but he retains the right of self-defence).
If this is true, you have not provided us with a situation yet.
Do something for him? Perhaps like work 12 hour days at a rubbish job just so he could afford the cabin in the mountains that he had always wanted? Tom is not only doing something for Klemm, he is doing it completely unconsensually - he is having his services stolen from him.
How would we know they were abandoned from the outside? How does Klemm know the cabin is abandoned? How do we know that Klemm will die? How do we know that the cabin will sustain Klemm?
Untrue. We are taking into account both Klemm’s and Tom’s rights over the cabin. Klemm has none, Tom has some.
Again, no it isn’t. We recognise Klemm’s right to not be aggressed upon, and indeed Tom is doing no such thing. We recognise Klemm’s right to property and liberty, and indeed these are not being aggressed upon. We recognised Tom’s right to property, and this cannot be violated. If Tom has put up a sign stating “if you are dying in the mountains, please feel free to use my cabin to survive” then Klemm’s invasion is no such thing. But as it stands Klemm is violating rights, while having none of his/hers violated in turn.
How could you possibly say yes? The justification for violence can never be pre-emption or expectation. By that position you are committed to accepting aggressive violence in any instance when it is based on a “genuine” apprehension of attack (and because you can never determine, quantify or compare these apprehensions and expectations, you must legitimise every murder in the real world).
Reasonable people disagree! Well that’s over and done with then. Why didn’t you tell us? Now it’s decided!
They were wrong in defending this. This is a very problematic conclusion. Why should there be legal repercussions for amoral acts? And should we not abhor all immoral acts, rather than condoning some if restitution is paid (etc.) Surely this goes against the idea of morality?
A final point
Phrases like “moral monster” don’t mean anything solid, and moreover, it is Klemm who is violating morals. We may exhort Tom to help Klemm, but he has no obligation to do so (unless of course they had previously signed a contract along these lines, and even in that case a punishment for violation of the contract should not be fulfilment of the contract). It is an opinion-based/taste-based issue whether he actually does help Klemm survive, and has got nothing to do with morality (if Tom or Klemm were to aggress, like you would have Klemm do, it becomes a moral issue, but the bare bones: should Tom help Klemm, is an amoral question).
That is one harsh intellectual critique. I was going to get in on this after he presented that ‘Strike the Root’ article but I can’t follow this piece.
Well, it seems reasonable to me that restitution should be used to “restore” the rights of the individual that was “aggressed” against, but I’m not really in a position to comment. Either way, it seems like one could justify breaking into the cabin as long as one was prepared to compensate the victim (or not in the case of duty-of-care standard), whereas LS et al seem to be taking the somewhat absurd view the correct course of action would be to sit outside the cabin and die. An even more absurd circumstance would be the case of a father with three young children who, for whatever reason (say, a hurricane hit their town) couldn’t feed them. By the standards put foward by some in this thread it would me immoral for the father to steal a loaf of bread to feed them. Which seems problematic because if morality is supposed to tell one how to live their life, then a system of ethics that nobody will, and have no reason to, abide is somewhat useless. But then again, I suppose when people mistake Objectivism for serious philosophy, we’re bound to get such views.
As for your metaethical views, would I be correct in thinking that rights can only be possible (for lack of a better word) if everybody (or at least the vast majority) shares the same perspective with regard to the value of people? Would it be possible to offer any sort of rational critique of any individuals “attitudes” according to your view, or at least to make some rational comparison? I’m just wondering because from what I can see your position looks like that of Simon Blackburn’s quasi-realism.
I don’t think Sage, or myself for that matter, believes that educational credentials have “weight in debate”, however, Danny’s credentials are a good indication that he’s more familiar with the relevant literature than you are, and if you don’t believe that to be true I suggest you go check his blog. The fact of the matter is that I wouldn’t go challenging Professor Salerno on monetary theory simply because I’ve read Economics for Real People, if I had any questions and thought he was wrong perhaps I may voice the concern, but I wouldn’t be showing the same condescending attitude you are now. To say that you’ve “refuted” Danny is silly, especially so since I imagine there’s some discussion regarding such issues amongst philosophers themselves. I think you need to remember who is the philosopher and who is the interest layman, and stop attempting to refute Danny’s arguments and perhaps try reaching some agreement. Otherwise, this is merely going to hit a brick wall, as it has now.
As I see it, if you’d understood Danny’s metaethical views you’d understand why appeals to emotion make sense to him, but you haven’t. Which brings me back to my ealier point, that you’re not really interest in discussing the issue.
Nobody has said value is cardinal. Mises, Yeager and Hazlitt (all utilitarians) have addressed this in the past, none of them have ever claimed that utility can be measured, and all of them accept the difficult of interpersonal comparisons. You’re attacking a strawman. In any case, I think it’s quite obvious that a cup of water is valued more highly by a thirsty child in Africa than it is by your average American.
Quite obvious doesn’t quite cut it, sadly
For various reasons, you have no way of comparing their valuations of this cup of water, and as such you cannot make such a bold statement
Once again, I never said I could prove it. Once more you seem to be attacking a strawman, the fact of the matter is to most people it would seem obvious.
In any case, the interpersonal comparions has been addressed by Mises, Yeager and Hazlitt as Yeager explains:
To give you a quick overview of their argument, here’s Bob Murphy,
And as for interpersonal comparison of utility, look where we end up again.
You never answered if the cabin’s is Tom’s. A simple yes or no would suffice.
So now you say it’s not Tom’s cabin. Who’s cabin is it then? Betty’s? Bob’s?
Tom owns the cabin due to what’s called property. This is libertarianism 101. More precisely it’s Tom’s cabin cause, Danny, you said it was Tom’s cabin when you originally came up with this intellectual exercise or did you forget so easily? Now I’ll give you the A, B, C… 1, 2, 3… answer the question: Is it Tom’s cabin?