Not right. Who said it was wrong? The inquiry of repercussions is open-ended.
If you have answered your inquiry of repercussions to be “punish” cause it’s “wrong”. But an inquiry of repercussions involves also the free choice of no punishment cause it has been concluded it’s not wrong. Mercy is a just virtue.
Nope cause mercy acts as if no wrongness ever happened so “wrongness” is not primary and not absolute.
You assume it’s wrong. I consistently have said it is an inquiry of repercussions, which leaves free choice intact. No violation of liberty. On the other hand you are caught up in a conundrum that has to violate Tom’s rights in order to save Klemm’s. I haven’t violated anybody’s rights when liberty is kept intact - Tom’s liberty to freely choose in an inquiry of repercussions.
Nope again. I also leave moral considerations intact. I leave rights intact. You violate rights along your scheme. I don’t and I arrive at a solution that matches yours in which Klemm’s life is saved. I leave open reasoned discourse to inquire into Klemm’s situation. I leave open a diversity of options. Yours leads to a bias of conclusions and therefore violates rights into a “class warfare” scenario. Your scheme cultivating a bias produces unwarranted conundrums leaving a narrower way of living for humans. And I don’t, yet, I arrive at a compassionate solution similar to yours without violating anybody’s liberty along the way. I’ve been able to keep liberty intact and you don’t, meanwhile, I arrive at the same solution. So therefore I would recheck your premise cause you cultivate misguidance, befuddlement, and unnecessary results along the way. I have been able to avoid such complications.
I’m using the term the way it always has, as an ethical concept denoting desireability, or “legitimacy” of conduct among its members. I am unaware of there being any other cogent definition of the term. It’s simple, something being “right” is the same as it being “morally legitimate” or preferable within a system of ethics. To say that something is both morally legitimate and that its inverse, or something that violates that morally legitimate conduct, is also morally legitimate within the same system of ethics is contradictory. It’s not difficult.
If you wish to continue this discussion, you should clarify the meaning of the words you are using.
Zefreak, remember, you’re the one who’s coming here late. I defined my terms pages ago
From Judith Thomson’s Rights, Restitution and Risk:
Suppose a man has a right that something or other shall be the case; let us say he has a right that p, where p is some statement or other, and now suppose that we make p false. So, for example, if his right is the right that he is not punched in the nose, we make that false, that is, we bring it about that he is punched in the nose. Then, as I shall say, we infringe his right. But I shall say that we violate his right if and only if we do not merely infringe his right, but more, are acting wrongly, unjustly in doing so.
From Gerald Gaus’ “Liberal Neutrality: A Compelling and Radical Principle”:
(a) It is prima facie morally wrong for Alf to coerce Betty, or to employ force against her. (b) With sufficient justification, the use of coercion or force by Alf against Betty may be morally justified.
My conception of rights is built on the idea that Betty has a right not to be coerced, and that the nature of this right is captured in Gaus’ statement. So a rights infringement takes place when Betty is coerced (not-p is brought about); it is a rights violation if the conditions described in (b) are not satisfied.
Not true. Thedesolateone, Jon, and Jack are not lunatics. I don’t know Jack very well, so I’m not sure yet why he thinks what he does; I’m still trying to get him to explain his position. I know that Thedesolateone is working very earnestly with these issues, and that he’s at least committed to taking other views into account even if he’s not going to immediately agree. And Jon’s about the opposite of a lunatic; we just disagree here. Disagreement isn’t a necessary or sufficient feature for lunacy. Publicly calling me names and questioning my credibility and intellectual honesty, and then getting upset for multiple days when I point out that you guys are nuts is a pretty good sign of lunacy. So is declaring me to be refuted about every hour when you guys are the ones biting the bullet on multiple reductios.
Don’t be concerned Danny. I’ve thought this through already.
Definition of mercy from my dictionary:
mercy
|ˈmərsē|noun ( pl. -cies)
compassion or forgiveness shown toward someone whom it is within one’s power to punish or harm
You see. It is within Tom’s power, free-will to punish Klemm. With mercy the forces of compassion and forgiveness resolve justice and bring harmony to society even if Tom does not choose to punish Klemm.
Inquiry of repercussion: This is what Tom (or whomever; I say this due to I understand the debate on who decides repercussions is up in the air but I incline that the victim be involved) does. Tom inquiries, in other words, Tom is deciding, going through the mental exercise, and questioning what, if any, repercussions are to be involved in the event. It is reasonable, moral, and Klemm still is provided with understanding by others. It is virtuous indeed.
And I don’t violate rights, befuddle the situation, and interject unnecessary complications as you are.
Wilderness: I’ve come around to your way of thinking. When I first posted in this thread, I was going along the line that Tom could retroactively give permission to the use. I realize now that this is in fact just a waiving of repercussions. It’s a subtle difference.
Danny, I believe I have. I’m quite sure I said believe in the absolute negative right to life and the absolute negative right to property. I’m also sure I’ve said I believe that all violations of these rights are illegitimate, no matter the circumstances. I reject the (what I see as contradictory) supposition that there are legitimate reasons for illegitimate behavior. I disagree that there are “moral reasons that should also play into our reasoning” in determining if there has been a wrong committed. As I stated in my last post, Klemm must choose between violating Tom’s property rights and dying. Klemm makes his decision to violate Tom’s property rights based on his supposition that the repercussions for the rights violations will be less severe then dying. He’s almost certainly correct.
But the circumstances do not change the cold hard fact that Klemm negated Tom’s property rights. Klemm can plead his case to Tom, asking for mercy or even forgiveness, but that does not change the fact that Tom’s rights were violated. That’s where the “moral reasons” should come into play - in the determination of reprecussions.
Neither quote implies that the term “right” you are using differs from mine. The contradiction is still there. Let us examine your first quote..
So the man has a “right” P, which, seeing as you have not altered your definition of “right” from mine, is a morally legitimate action or entitlement. If P is infringed, or made false, it is by definition illegitimate, as it has been stated that P is a legitimate right. The quoted distinction between infringement and violation is nonexistent, as it is referring to the infringement of P being subject to an ethical standard other than its own, which involves P being just.
Wilderness, the concept of “punishment” implies wrongdoing. You can’t “punish” an innocent man; you can only “assault” an innocent man. If Klemm has done nothing wrong, then Tom can’t decide whether or not to punish him; he can only decide whether or not he’s going to initiate some sort of force against him.
I’m quite sure I said believe in the absolute negative right to life and the absolute negative right to property. I’m also sure I’ve said I believe that all violations of these rights are illegitimate, no matter the circumstances. I reject the (what I see as contradictory) supposition that there are legitimate reasons for illegitimate behavior. I disagree that there are “moral reasons that should also play into our reasoning” in determining if there has been a wrong committed.
But you don’t explain why you believe in those things, or why anyone should care about what you believe. You need to offer a reason that we should believe that all infringments of property rights are illegitimate (and not because Tom will attack me if I infringe them; that has no bearing). Obviously if all infringments of property rights are illegitimate, then Klemm’s actions would be illegitimate if he broke into the cabin. But you’ve offered no reason that we should believe that all infringments of property rights are illegitimate.
Zefreak, if it is a necessary feature of “having a right to something” that all infringments of that right are rights-violations, then I deny that Tom has a right to his cabin.
if you can bring enough ‘justification’ to the table, anything that might have been classified as morally wrong, might be reclassified as morally permissable.
e.g. if i have good justifications, it might be morally permissable for me to kill everyone i ever meet.
etc.
your argument boils down to … ‘if I can justify a wrong action, then it becomes right’, but obviously wrong actions cant be right actions. no matter what blathering reasons/excuses might be made
The denial that Tom’s property claim is an absolute right does not commit me to the idea that he doesn’t have an absolute right to his own person. Nor would the denial that Tom’s claim to his own person is an absolute right commit me to nihilism.
Why must he offer a reason for his belief? I think you are making an unreasonable request. It is sufficient that he simply states his belief clearly. You are expecting the impossible from libertarianism.
Even if he offered a reason for his belief, you would never know he actually believes it. All you can do is observe his actions and draw conclusions based on whether he follows his belief. Ultimately, you can never know his motives nor may he.
