Nirgraham, I would think that if we couldn’t come up with any conception of “normalcy,” such that we could arrive at some notion of what would be normally right or normally wrong to do to people, then it would be pretty hard to come up with any notion of what “rights” people have (using my definition). We’d always be asking what would be right in this or that particular situation, and we’d have no rules of thumb to refer to. We’d have to directly compare morally relevant values and deliberate from the ground up. Klemm would think, “Oh, well I imagine that Tom is very much invested in his cabin, and that seems relevant. And we do live in a society where certain legal doctrines guarantee a broadly-understood right of way to people over certain things, and this cabin is related to Tom in that way, which means that Tom may be even more invested in the cabin. But I wouldn’t really be doing much harm to the cabin, and it could be fixed later. And if I stay out here, I imagine I’ll almost certainly die, and that seems really awful. All things considered, I don’t think I’d be doing any real disrespect to Tom if I broke into his cabin, considering that the alternative would be dying and it would seem pretty odd of him to expect me to choose to die in this situation – even downright despicable. Oh well; here I go!”
With a conception of normalcy, though, we can ground the notion of a “right” to the cabin. We take it that normally, it wouldn’t be right to break into the cabin; normally, the considerations going against breaking in would win out. So we say, normally it would be wrong, but in extreme situations, that might not be the case. Klemm’s is an example of that sort of thing going on.
Zefreak, I’ve already offered an extended critique of Rothbard’s position over the course of this thread. Again, when you come into a conversation many, many pages in, it’s sometimes not polite to assume that only the things said over the last few pages are relevant to the positions that the participants are defending. No?
Forget for one second his attempt to formulate a secular justification for the NAP, and instead read what he says about rights as property rights. Call it property rights or don’t, but a system of ethics without a system of legitimate property use is not functional.
As for your problem regarding starting from the base of a value judgement, you are missing something obvious. Namely, the value that most people approach NAP, property rights, and libertarianism from! Self-ownership! That is the value that is at the foundation of libertarian ethics.
Charles, I agree that actions involve physical matter, but it seems like if we’re going to talk about people’s actions, we’re already adopting a sort of Misesian methodological dualism, no? I mean, granted it’s shorthand, but so is the concept of a “right.” And strictly speaking, all this stuff is not literally true – if you really want to get into materialism, that is.
I have since read the majority of the thread. You have critiqued Rothbard on his attempt to justify the axioms of self-ownership and the NAP, but you have not been able to critique Rothbard (other than that previously stated) without resorting to arguments based on an outside ethic, which, like Rothbard’s, cannot be justified in the sense of meta-ethics.
My question to you, to which you have not responded, is in what way can you critique Rothbard’s philosophy which does not apply to ethics in general, including your own?
If (as I suspect) when you say “right” you mean it in the absolute sense, then yes, you’re right. All those things are true if there are absolute negative property rights and if Tom has them over his cabin. If you aren’t interested in attempting to justify your belief that there are absolute rights of this kind, then I guess we’ll have to agree to disagree, but I’m not sure what you thought this conversation was about…
Danny, clearly rights are conflated morals values (from a moralist perspective surely an amoralist has another perspective). And your scheme biases Klemm, while what I’ve put forth doesn’t bias anyone. Klemm and Tom’s liberty are kept intact. A moral system is kept intact. And I don’t violate rights, and perplex the situation as you unfortunately do - and all top of all this - I can come to the same conclusion. Simplicity and liberty are glorious indeed.
Doing damage to someone’s body to the point that they die makes them no longer exist as people – irreparably. That’s different from doing irreparable damage to their arm, which simply deprives them of the capacity to function in certain ways. And that, in turn, is different from doing damage to someone’s arm that can be completely fixed. And that, in turn, is different from doing damage to someone’s window in their cabin so when they get back in the summer, they have to call the handyman. The idea that these things are all necessarily morally equivalent is absurd. And you haven’t argued that they are equivalent; you’ve simply tried to win the debate by defining terms so that you win. That’s not how it works.
Wilderness, my theory does not bias things in favor of Klemm. If I were Tom, I would agree that Klemm would be morally justified in smashing my window, and would gladly tell Klemm that I would have done the exact same thing if I were in his position. Simplicity, in your case, is glorious but wrong. My view is more complex, but doesn’t lead me to talking nonsense.
I am asking you to critique Rothbard’s consistent application of his fundamental axioms, and not his meta-ethical justification of the axioms themselves. If all you are arguing is that Rothbard has failed to adequately justify the NAP and self-ownership axioms, then you could have been clearer. The aforementioned is-ought divide is nothing new. Although if that is truly your arguement, how do you justify proposing an alternative ethic, yours, which is susceptable to the same problems?
The only conclusion to be reached is that you are trying to critique Rothbard’s application of his axioms, given that no system of ethics can be objectively justified.
Danny, I think I can sum up my position, and I’ll ask you where the flaw (if any) in my logic is:
It is morally wrong to purposefully harm someone, aside from self-defence. seeking restitution, etc.. Do you agree?
There are severity of that wrong depends upon a variety of factors, not the least of which is the amount of harm done. Do you agree?
By breaking the window of Tom’s cabin, Klemm has harmed Tom in some way, though most likely an extremely small way. Even if it is just the burden of cleaning the glass and paying a handyman, Klemm’s actions have in a slight way harmed Tom. Do you agree?
All you are saying is that your ethical system and all legitimate action within it is founded on human sustenance and alleviating “suffering” or “need”. I’m interesting to see how your system of ethics deals with so-called lifeboat situations, where a given scarcity exists where only one of a number of individuals can survive. It seems to me that if each individual acts on the principle of alleviating his suffering or need, every person would have a right to that scarce good or service. How is that a functional ethic?
Intellectually argue your position instead of simply saying “nonsense”, but as usual in this thread you have difficulty with reasoning.
Your theory has a bias on Klemm due to coercing Tom into accepting Klemm into the cabin. My approach does not coerce Tom and yet reaches the same conclusion. Organically your theory if implemented would breed and propagandize Klemm’s arguing for coercion socially regressing away from liberty and towards your bias process that inclines coercion. Mine on the other hand keeps Klemm’s and Tom’s liberty intact and reaches the same conclusion without coercion.
Simple:
Your’s violates liberty to achieve no wrong doing on the part of Klemm.
Mine doesn’t violate liberty to achieve no wrong doing on the part of Klemm.
And thus you stumble, fumble, and lose liberty regressively along the way in your system. Thus your system loses it’s rational, though the rational is available but chooses to disregard it, to incline upon animalistic coercion policies.
