Sterba libertarian critique

Sage why must you coerce Tom? Why can’t Tom help Klemm using his own free-will? Why do you have to force morals on Tom? Sage you are not for liberty if you coerce Tom and yet Tom could have easily agreed with you freely without you having to violate his liberty to do so. To violate Tom’s liberty is a statist position. To protect Tom’s liberty is a libertarian position.

You actually might not be far off.

With all this “save the intuition” and “save the emotions” coming from Giles, Sage, and Brainpolice. I never knew emotions and intuition were in such dire straits and needed saving to begin with. But then again my emotions and intuition are in excellent condition so conclusion - theirs must not be. For emotions and intuition are a personal issue.

So maybe Laughing Man. You might not be too far off.

Or perhaps they are Hobbesians…THE PASSIONS WILDERNESS!!! THE PASSSSIONNS!

I don’t know what you mean.

No. I think our disagreement is about positive and negative rights.

It’s a lifeboat, which are usually as ridiculous as possible, intended to wear down a rational position by appeals to emotion. I have emotions, strong ones. But I am not going to succumb to a lifeboat scenario when I have time to think about it. People who act without thinking, or don’t critically think will be susceptible to the guilt and compassion trip.

Are we able to justify positive rights?

I don’t understand this fascination with intuition. Is it because you think that negative rights lead to a cold society with no compassion?

I don’t think so.

What do you mean by what you said? You can private message me on this if you want. I don’t have the time to read that link. I started to skim it, but…

Just that human passions conflict with human reason. I believe Hobbes argued that passion makes reason subservent to it.

What the heck are you talking about? I’m talking about property rights, which is inherently an ethical question. Why are you avoiding the content of my arguments while trying to shift this towards a meta-debate?

The whole point of the hypothetical cabin scenario is that Klemm is in a position where his only options are (1) break into the cabin to save his life, or (2) resign himself to an all-but-certain death. There are no other options. And you can’t change the scenario to add other options.

If you’re still having trouble understanding this, check out Section II of this paper.

From my perspective, this is a false dichotomy. What I said to LS applies here as well: if rights are absolute, this is a black and white issue. If rights are not absolute, then it is much more complicated than that.

I’m refering to Walter Block’s “voluntary slavery” argument, which is what happens when one takes an axoimatic “self-ownership” position too far. My point is that such an alienability issue inevitably results as a consequence of the axoimatic “self-ownership” position.

I would have to disagree with nir, in that case. It would be immoral for a father to allow his children to starve. However, that does not make stealing bread moral, it simply illustrates that sometimes humans find themselves in situations where there is no moral choice – literally the choice of the lesser of two evils. That feeding ones children is moral in no way makes stealing less immoral.

Well, I don’t pretend I know what BP meant, but here’s a guess.

When you your-self own your body, then you are certainly not a slave, but free.

But literally “self-ownership” can also mean that “selfs” (i.e. persons) can be owned, as in Person A owns Person B…which is also called slavery.

And one can argue that this is self-refuting for one does not consent to go into or stay in slavery.

how about It would be immoral for a father to allow his children to starve if he could sustain them without violating other peoples property…

No, what I’m saying is that an alienable and axoimatic concept of “self-ownership” justifies slavery.

You’re conflating two separate although partially related issues: whether or not it is permissible for people to opt out of contracts, and whether or not there are possible reprecussions for doing so. The fact that there may be consequences for opting out of contracts does not mean that it is impermissible to do so. A labor wage contract, for example, I can opt out of it at any time. The moment that you use force to make me keep working and stop me from opting out of the contract, it becomes slavery - and the enforcement of unchosen positive obligatios. No contract can bind someone’s future will in a sense; they should always have the option to opt out of the contract, even if this means that there will be some renumeration that follows from doing so.

Renumeration as a consequence of opting out of a contract is not the same thing as forcing someone to continue being a party of the contract. It does not mean that it is “illegitimate” or impermissible for you to do so, and renumeration only comes into play in situations in which there is some sort of meaningful debt withstanding or when opting out of the contract entails an act of theft or fraud. If this isn’t the case, in situations in which there is no genuine debt withstanding and there is no implied theft or fraud, then renumeration and restitution isn’t even an issue and the only real consequence of opting out of the contract is to willingly give up the future benefits of continueing being a party of the contract (in the case of a labor contract, that would be future wages) - and this is in exchange for being absolved of future contractual obligations. Both parties are absolved of their obligations at the termination of the contract on the understanding that there is no debt withstanding or implied fraud.

question: does an alienable and axiomatic concept of ‘apple ownership’ justify the theft of apples?

I favor property rights. What I do not favor is a theory of property rights that treats property rights as axoimatic and acts as if the principle of personal liberty follows from property rights, when from my perspective the entire function of property rights is as an entailment of personal liberty. I think that this tendency leads some libertarians to actually oppose personal liberty sometimes by subordinating it to the will of a property owner (for an absurd example, what Rothbard called “maximalism” in TEOL - shooting the kid who steals a gumball from your gumball machine in the name of “property rights”).

From my perspective, property rights does not give one the right to enslave or murder people just because they are on your property, and in this sense property rights are inherently constrained by the right to life and liberty, which are also intertwined with it. The entire point is to uphold all of them at once, similar to “the unity of virtue”. It doesn’t mean that property rights are devalued, it simply means that they are placed in their proper context (as entailments of personal liberty, not the source of it).

This seems to be a stretch. How long does it take before disuse makes my property unowned? From this example, it looks like less time than it takes for a loaf of bread to go moldy or stale. If I’m on vacation, can you homestead my house? If I’m carpooling to work one day, can you homestead my car? Can you homestead my heavy winter coat simply because it’s summer? Can you homestead my umbrella because it’s sunny?