At a fundamental level, we’re forced to choose among a few choices. Either “moral dillemas” are “extra-moral” in that there is no straight answer to them pro or con, the agent in “moral dillemas” has a moral obligation of inaction or to die when they could have otherwise saved their life (which is the implication of a strict deontological view of the matter) or the agent in “moral dillemas” is justified in doing that which is necessary to save their life (I.E. it is morally permissible default to the defense of life in such rare circumstances). I’m essentially argueing for the 3rd view as against the dominant 2nd view, and it has nothing to do with communism - it has to do with how one treats “lifeboat situations”.
To an-cap ‘austro-libertarians’ there is no debate, they aren’t remotely interested in what actual morality is, nor the facts of reality, nor people’s actual interests; they work by defintionional reasoning; also known as essentialism.
Which is why I asked, “What is aggression?” Personally, I think smashing Tom’s window is aggression against Tom. I’m not saying it’s a large amount of aggression, but aggression nonetheless. Is it your contention that smashing another person’s window is never aggression, or that smashing another person’s window is not aggression given Klemm’s circumstances?
Uh, not really. I explained that you are throwing out the word “aggression” without sufficient reason. For example, if one’s child is running into the street and one yanks them back to stop them from being hit by cars, would one call this “aggression”? That’s kind of a semantic circle-jerk. On one hand, in the sense that one is physically controlling the child’s body, it could be called “aggression”. On the other hand, it doesn’t make sense to use the term “aggression”, which usually has negative connotations, for morally permissible behaviors that (1) lack the intent of harm (2) are precisely for the purpose of negating harm and preserving life and (3) are things that most people would consider to not be immoral in the first place (saving your child is immoral? ha!).
Given Klemm’s circumstances, it doesn’t make sense to me to lump it in the same category as what would otherwise be considered a crime and a morally impermissible behavior. My contention is that it is morally permissible for Klemm to do that which is necessary to save his life, and that the circumstances distinguish the scenario from what would otherwise be considered breaking and entering (with malicious intent, an element entirely missing from Klemm’s scenario). I don’t think that it’s tenable to propose that Klemm is morally obligated to die in the name of comparatively negligible property damages or infringements; at best, it seems reasonable to propose that Klemm can nonetheless potentially be held liable for damages by Tom, but I categorically distinguish that from the moral permissibility of Klemm’s actions in the given circumstances.
Technically, if one uses a broad sense of the term “aggression”, self-defense is a form of “aggression” (it just happens to be in reaction to an initiation, but it is “aggression” if by “aggression” we generally refer to something along the lines of “the use of physical force”). One could also concievably define “aggression” in a way that strictly applies to persons but not property, and one could concievably categorically distinguish “aggression” against persons from “aggression” against property. I wouldn’t consider Klemm’s actions to be a literal “aggression” against Tom in the sense of his person, and if one wants to call his actions “aggression” against Tom’s property, I think that such “aggression” is morally permissible in the scenario (only because it is necessary for Klemm to save his life). This is precisely part of why I don’t think that the NAP is an axoim, since it begs all sorts of questions in this vein - it is incredibly vague if such matters are not specified.
It is important to note that such a circumstantial qualifier does not mean that this is normal - that is, in most cases, such scenarios aren’t likely to occur and consequentially there is no dillema in the first place. It does not negate the normative functionality of “property rights”, since it only apples to rare circumstances in which doing that which is necessary to save lives in dire situations requires an extremely temporary and nominal loosening of “property rights”. But half my point is that if you more coherantly define “property rights” in the first place, such an internal conflict wouldn’t be as likely to arise. That is, if property rights are concieved of more as one part of a unified whole rather than as an axoimatic “thing in itself” that overrides everything else, then these particular philosophical problems do not occur (partially precisely because the traditional dichotomy between “self-interest” and “morality” is blurred and falsified; I think that the general paradigm of ethical egoism is definitely superior to deontology by default for this reason).
I don’t think you will get a serious response here Jack, so I wouldn’t stress out too much about it. There are a couple parties in this debate who previously had or have now established a habit of sloppy debate. I don’t think you are going to get far because two of them have made clear that they have no respect for the discussion and/or the people involved.
I might start a new thread next week on this topic and we can pick up the discussion without the baggage of the name calling and so forth. Plus, if I start it, I will make sure the thread stays clean of the astro-turfing that provides no value but to lower the overall quality of the discussion.
If anyone is interested in that, you can reply to this post or PM me. If you’re not on my friend list, you can’t PM, so shoot me an add request and I will fix that.
If folks want to continue with this discussion, by all means, feel free to do so. I just can’t see much progress coming out of the current direction. But then maybe we have exhausted the need to continue anyway.
I agree that he is not morally obligated to die. In fact, you have basically summed up the poition I’ve held all along. I still don’t think breaking the window is moral, though; it’s simply less immoral than the alternative.
That’s not the standard (dictionary) definition, though, and we don’t generally refer to it that way. Wikipedia, Mirriam Webster and dictionary.com all include in the definition the initiation of violence, or unprovoked violence, or an attack. An aggressor is one who attacks.
Honestly, whenever I’ve seen the NAP spelled out, it includes both “person” and “property”. Even if these are separate negative rights, the NAP nonetheless denies the right to aggress upon either. Again, I don’t see which questions are begging, other than those I mentioned earlier.
Well even as a maxim reduced to something like “No person may legitimately initiate aggression against the person or property of anyone else”, this still begs the question of the criteria for defining the “just aquisition” of property, the scope of decision-making power that possession “legitimately grants”, what the specific relationship is between property and liberty and power and so on. Related to this are the highly contentious issues of “abandonment” (to use more Lockean terminology) and “absentee ownership” (to use more classical anarchist terminology). There is also the question of the extent to which the defense of property can be categorically distinguished on some level from the defense of persons. This consequentially forces us to turn to an investigation into political theory about property - and thus in some sense away from the NAP as a vague maxim meant to summarize something more complicated than it suggests at face value.
There are also conflicting “defense” claims. Some make “defense” arguments for both wars and more small-scale uses of force that others would consider “aggresion” (apparently in Leonard Piekoff’s bizarre interpretation of the NAP, for example, leveling the middle east and central america an taking out what would normally be considered mostly innocent civilians would be an act of “defense” or “justified retaliation” in reaction to their governments nationalizing oil). Where exactly the line is between defense and “aggression”, defense and “punishment”, and so on, is a question that is inevitably begged. None of this can be clarified by the NAP alone, taken as a maxim - the libertarian intellectuals have conflicting views among themselves on some of this.
And you just listed the questions I listed earlier. Are you interested in a discussion? As I said, I’d much rather start with one, rather than taking the whole thing on all at once.
BTW, just out of curiosity, where do you fall on the idea of positive rights? I’m trying to understand how one can call breaking Tom’s window “moral” without bringing positive rights into the mix.
[EDIT: fixed a typo, grammatical, but not content related]
I reject positive rights in the sense of any sort of absolute unchosen positive obligation or duty, as well as any notion of a positive obligation or duty by mere virtue of any group identity or line of ancestry. However, I support “positive liberty” in the sense of voluntary contractual relationships for the purpose of fostering various demands (this is essentially what the classical anarchists called “mutual aid”). My view would be that positive obligations have to be contractual (and consequentially opt-outable on the understanding of possible reprecussions in the case of debt withstanding or implied fraud), otherwise they inherently devolve into a form of slavery (sometimes subtle, sometimes not so subtle). My view probably differs somewhat with that of Danny Shahar on this point, since he has critisized methodological individualists on the issue of “collective responsibility”.
However, in the context of “positive” and “negative” liberty, I see it as generally being used as a false dillema. I think that the freedom from and the freedom to are intertwined in some sense. The concept of a “right” serves a dual purpose: that of a constraint on others and both simultaneously and consequentially the provision of a scope of one’s decision-making power or the empowerment of one’s sphere of action. In this sense, “positive liberty” is merely an application of “negative liberty”. “Positive liberty” in this sense refers to the benefits that people get from the various ways in which they can make use of the oppurtunities presented to them by their “negative liberty”. While “negative liberty” does not absolutely gaurantee “positive liberty”, it is in some sense necessary for “positive liberty” in that it provides the sphere of action out of which it can be manifested.
On the other hand, it could be argued that there is a sense in which “postive liberty” is necessary for “negative liberty” in that without the basic things that are necessary to live, there is ultimately noone to enjoy their negative liberty. Of course, I reject any notion that anyone has an abstract “positive right” to the means of survival. But the point still makes sense even if we reject the strict “positive rights” position. A society that struggles intensely with the means of survival (primitivism comes to mind) isn’t likely to have a very consistent “regime of negative liberty”; it breeds conditions that incentivize breaches of negative liberty. So in general I think that the positive liberty and negative liberty issue is a false dillema.
How does that mesh with Klemm’s right to break Tom’s window? I mean, if it is moral that Klemm break Tom’s window, then logically, it would be immoral for Tom to prevent it, had he the physical ability. This implies that Tom has an “unchosen obligation” to sacrifice his window to protect Klemm’s life.
Can you give an example where negative liberty does not guarantee positive liberty in the sense you are using the term? It seems like nothing is new is established by accepting your premise. Negative liberty implies positive liberty, and vice versa. Either way, I agree with the above statement, although I don’t consider it a meaningful digression from the main body of libertarian theory, at least espoused by those on this forum.
I dont think that the idea that it is permissible for Klemm to break the window means that there is a positive obligation for Tom to do anything. A positive obligation is generally understood to mean a duty to do something in particular, directed towards someone else. Tom is not obligated to do anything in particular (and he’s not even present or aware of the situation), and he furthermore is theoretically within his rights to demand restitution (which could be construed as a sort of “positive obligation” on Klemm). The window is going to be broken no matter what. Tom has no duty to “sacrifice the window”, the window simply is sacrificed as a consequence of the situation, which Tom can potentially demand restitution for ex-post-facto.
Agreed, and the act of restitution implies wrongdoing. If Klemm broke into the cabin as a moral agent and was justified, wouldn’t any forceful reimbursement be itself immoral? For example, tax evasion.
Furthermore, what is this nonsense about death being immoral? It is absurd that death, whether natural or chosen, is immoral.
The sense in which I’m claiming that "negative liberty does not absolutely gaurantee positive liberty* is the fact that liberty does not shield one from the unpredictable factors of life - it does not absolutely gaurantee that you will survive or be happy (it’s necessary but not sufficient). One could have negative liberty and concievably still have an unhappy life or a short life. In short, liberty does not mean immunity from laws of nature or “freedom” in the sense of the power to transcend the limits of reality itself.
It really isn’t much of a digression, mostly just a re-conceptualization.
Okay, I’m changing the situation. Danny did it at least a half a dozen times; now it’s my turn. Tom is now in the cabin. Klemm knocks on the door, explains his situation, and is told in no uncertain terms, “No.” Is Klemm still justified in breaking in?
Fair enough. I truly am interested in the structure and scope of property rights, as it is, I think, the central question of ethics in a world of scarcity. Don’t think I mean to argue for the sake of it.
Despite the fact that his actions would seem unreasonable and mean-spirited and that such behavior is not likely, Tom is still not obligated to take any action in particular, but it is also still permissible for Klemm to do what seems reasonable in order to save his life. The way that I’m approaching this, neither Tom or Klemm have positive obligations; it’s strictly a question of permissibility. It would be reasonable for Tom to simply call an ambulance or something. That’s what I would do if I was Tom. But apparently Tom isn’t a reasonable person, since he is willing to let people die in the name of keeping them out of his home, even if it doesn’t cause much of a disturbance. The question reaches an impasse in the sense that the only way to avoid such situations is for there to be more reasonable Toms in the world.
While I disagree with your analysis based on the assumption that each persons life objectively holds value, and that any “reasonable” person would value it higher than, say, the insulated border that they have built for themselves (Tom’s cabin), that isn’t really the point. It just seems to be an inconsistent lapse of the subjective theory of value.
More importantly, why, and in what ways, does Tom’s presence affect the moral legitimacy of Klemm’s action?