Juan, could you please define your unique usage of “materialism”? Why do you oppose “materialism”? Does your opposition to “materialism” have anything to do with your opposition to “science”?
What aspect of “science” do you oppose? Do you oppose historical analysis, statistical research, induction, or the scientific method? Well, looking at some of your older posts, you conflated all of them under the label “empirical science.” Not only you, but lot of posters here also conflate the scientific method with historical/statistical/inductive research. Consequently, they flatter their over-simplified “a priori,” and “axiomatic” logic, and reject more complicated stuff as “empirical questions.”
Why should we start ethics from the oversimplified “axioms” or “a priori assumptions”? Why shouldn’t we incorporate biology with ethics? Does this have anything to do with your opposition to “science”?
Rothbardian ethics and argumentation ethics does not discern the human body with his or her material possessions. They do not see life as more important than property. They cling to the motto “all rights are property rights.” In my perspective, this over-simplifies human biology.
Libertarians derive “property rights” from the non-aggression principle. Let us first define the “non-aggression principle.” Speaking broadly, the aggression may have the following meanings:
- In politics, the term “aggression” refers to the application of illegitimate physical force, for example, physical force outside the boundaries established by international treaties.
- In libertarianism, the term “aggression” refers to “the initiation of physical violence,” which includes theft, fraud, economic regulation, and taxation.
- In biology, “aggression” refers to any behavior intended to cause harm to others.
Below, we will focus on the libertarian usage of “aggression.” Let us specify which actions constitute as “aggression.”
Does does the “non-aggression principle” allow “right to self-defense” or the “right to violently punish others”? Does the “non-aggression principle” allow trespassing or hate speech? We will show that the term “aggression” is highly vague.
Some will define “aggression” as “the initiation of physical violence.” However, the term physical violence is also vague. Does “physical violence” include noise pollution? Does it include perceived threats of violence? Does “physical violence” include fraud? Whether noise pollution, threats of violence, and fraud are “physical violence” still begs the question.
Libertarians usually defend the right for broadcasters to homestead radio frequencies. However, if a malicious broadcaster “trespasses” another broadcaster’s radio frequency, can we label this as “physical violence”? Obviously, the criminal changed nothing physical or tangible. This, also, begs the question whether if we should consider it as “physical violence.” This same argument applies with the ownership of domain names.
Consequentially, it begs the question to ask whether anti-defamation laws violate the non-aggression principle. It also begs the question to ask whether the prohibition of nuclear weapons violate the non-aggression principle. In addition, it begs the question to ask whether ordering carbon dioxide polluters to pay restitution violates the non-aggression principle.
Let us perform a thought experiment. Suppose that we live in a libertarian-anarchist society. However, its citizens knew that a citizen, called Bob, possesses an atomic bomb. In addition, assume that libertarian ethics dictates that Bob should have the right to keep his atomic bomb.
However, can that society legally enforce Bob’s right to keep his atomic bomb? We will argue no. By the threat of the bombs, I predict that the majority of the citizens will attempt to assassinate Bob, poison his food, and do what ever they could to get rid of his weapon, even resorting to violence. Why will they behave that way? Partly from their biological instinct to minimize perceived threats. Partly from other reasons, as we will explain below.
Even the majority of its citizens, who follow the libertarian ethic, believes that Bob should have a right to keep his atomic bomb, they will however think otherwise. Because they cannot think of any good consequences of Bob keeping his atomic bombs, they will forbid atomic bombs.
Therefore, we can conclude that rights are unenforceable unless we justify that the enforcement of these rights leads to good consequences.
Now let us analyze “lifeboat situations.” Assume that Tom owns a cabin, and he currently does not occupy it. Klemm, thinks that he would only survive if he broke into Tom’s cabin.
Before we analyze this scenario, we must first focus on some potential problems of this situation. We will list some initial objections below:
- Preventable - Klemm should have his personal responsibility to prevent this situation from happening. Klemm can prevent this scenario by carrying a cell phone, thus mitigating this situation altogether.
- Knowledge problem of the victim - Klemm could actually survive outside, and he had mistakenly concluded that he would die if he did not come in.
- Knowledge problem of Tom’s cabin - Klemm has no knowledge that the cabin will have a furnace to keep him warm.
- Knowledge problem of value - Tom may value his cabin highly. The cabin may contain very delicate antiques, which would break if Klemm trespasses.
- Knowledge prbolem of unforeseen aggression - Klemm will break his ramshackle cabin if he went in, thus collapsing the entire house and killing its occupants.
- Alternative options - Klemm can find other ways to stay warm and not freeze to death. Klemm could build his own cabin, for example.
Let us examine the first objection. The “preventable” nature says that one could prevent this situation from ever happening. Some would label this argument as invalid, but we will defend this argument.
If the situation never happens, then it is unnecessary to examine this situation. For example, it would be ridiculous to replace the above lifeboat situation with this question: “Should Klemm have the right to break into Tom’s cabin to prevent extraterrestrials from abducting him?” Assuming that it is impossible for extraterrestrials to exist, it is useless to analyze this lifeboat scenario in the first place, thus we can avoid this question altogether.
But let us assume that these things do happen. What should we do about it? If knowledge problems will likely exist in this situation, then Klemm has the responsibly to minimize the uncertainty by observing Tom’s property. If Klemm does not, then he should be responsible for the damages that he has caused. But that is a post hoc thing to do.
But we can all agree that Klemm should be cautious of the possible problems of uncertain information.
However, I disagree with Liberty Student and Wilderness with their slippery slope fallacy from lifeboat situations. Just because one may legitimately violate another’s property in extreme scenarios, this does not imply that one may legitimately violate all property in all scenarios. As shown above, that rights can only be enforced if one realizes that there are good consequences in enforcing them, one would not enforce this situation on all property in all scenarios, as in full-blown communism.
Suppose Klemm is a libertarian. He knows the consequences of the collectivization of property, such as general decline of prosperity. Klemm would still violate property in extreme life-threatening scenarios, because he does not know the good consequences in enforcing property rights in this extreme situation. However, Klemm would not use the slippery slope fallacy to expand his infringement of Tom’s property in this lifeboat situation, to non-lifeboat situations. He would not advocate property infringement in non-lifeboat situations because he knows the good consequences of respecting property rights in non-lifeboat situations, such as general prosperity.
Liberty Student and Wilderness claim that there exist a certain degree of “vagueness” in the application of rights. Examples include the disputes in property boundaries, gray areas in the application of rights, and uncertainty whether if property damage actually occurred.
However, I see the conception of “rights” as very vague in itself. Lots of degrees of interpretation exist. Some, such as Rothbard, interpret that the non-aggression principle forbids nuclear weapons because they have no useful application besides threatening innocents. Some others would interpret that nuclear weapons do not do harm because they did not cause actual aggression to innocents.
The Austrian interpretation of “property rights” differs from the mutualists’ interpretation of “property rights.” The Austrians, who understand the necessity of the ownership of land and capital for economic calculation, interpret “property rights” to include the Lockean ownership of capital and land. Contrastingly, the mutualists, who oppose “absentee ownership,” interpret “property rights” to include the “use-and-occupancy” of capital and land.
Indeed, the Austrians see good consequences in enforcing Lockean capital and land, thus would interpret “property rights” in the Lockean fashion. The mutualists, who predict good consequences in forbidding absentee ownership, would interpret “property rights” as a “use-and-occupancy” thing.
The question is, would the Austro-libertarian use the slippery slope fallacy from the lifeboat situation to justify the infringement of property rights in non-lifeboat situations? Clearly no. If Klemm understands the benefits of Lockean property, then he would not advocate full-blown communism, even though Klemm does indeed justify property violations in lifeboat scenarios.
Therefore, it is a slippery slope to label Brainpolice and Danny as communists.
Another cause in this controversey may stem from the justification of shooting intruders. Liberty Student and Wilderness may indeed advocate shooting intruders, while Brainpolice and Donny may oppose it.
Suppose that we know that Tom is in his cabin. We all should agree that if Tom clearly knows that Klemm does not present any danger to Tom’s life, then Tom cannot legitimately shoot Klemm. However, if Tom thinks that Klemm poses a threat to his life, then Tom may legitimately shoot.
The question is whether if we should prescribe a law that grants Tom the right to shoot any intruder.
I also have a problem with treating trespassing, murder, and theft as “equally immoral.” The motto “all rights are property rights” treats them that way. This is an over-simplification, just like how psychological egoism and argumentation ethics are over-simplifications.