I was thinking of compatible in terms of harmonization. In other words, no praxeologic when no individual; and no individual when no praxeologic. One can’t be without the other, neither subservient nor detached from the other. Humans are praxelogic by their very nature, not detach nor separate in any way.
Once again, praxeology is analytical not normative. The ego’s action is not subservient to praxeology, but explicated by it.
Well I think Stirner would just consider praxeology as a representation of alienation. Praxeology defines the parameters by which individuals act and thus constrains the individual to laws outside of himself. Would you be able to have a fully established ego which is itself supposedly its own law if that ego is bound to the laws of something else?
Although paraphrased, Kowalski’s analysis seems fair.
But your ego cannot work by its own accord. It is bound by general principles. The ego is impotent to the extent that it cannot realize its will due to such general principles.
It’s a chicken and egg issue. Without action first, praxeology wouldn’t exist. It strives to explain the reason for action, the Why. It can then be implemented to determine what future action would be most advantageous. People act “un-praxeologically” all the time. Ever hear of the lotto?
Like what?
You are talking about thymology. The lotto isn’t ‘un-praxeological.’ It is a means by which people hope to achieve the end of prosperity. They value the uncertainty of money now over the certainty of money much later.
That quote mentions Stirner is against logic, and somebody that gets caught up in “anything they can get their hands on” as their mantra and is against logic leaves a lot of room for interpretation but then that interpretation would be considered fixed in time. It does go to nothingness, but this world is something. It sounds like a philosophy that is inherently in turmoil and is concerned with the unfixing of the world and doesn’t concern itself with any allowance of static fixings. That’s how I interpret it.
I think, if that’s Stirner’s take, then that path is inherently in turmoil. I was saying something above about “compatibility” that bridges the gap, instead of what Stirner might be doing which is making a gap. It’s another ‘us versus them’ based on what? Not on logic cause Stirner rejects that.
Like always applying goods to your highest value. Say if you have an orange and you have a value scale of three things you would like.
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Orange juice
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Eat the orange raw
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Smash the orange.
You cannot apply that orange to your second or third value and still have it remain the second or third. I cannot eat the orange yet still value orange juice higher. I would value eating the orange higher then the orange juice.
Until you achieve the Dzogchen, that is.
Isn’t it a praxeologically unsound (not optimal) method of increasing wealth?
But you could still believe that, right?
But I would have to be already of the Dzogchen wouldn’t you say? There are no fixed forms. No ideologies. To say there are. To draw that line. Is to misrepresent or misinterpret the very thing being espoused. agreed?
There aren’t praxeologically sound methods of wealth accumulation.
No, action expresses preference.
I read this as going back to O’Neil’s point about the obligatory nature of moral laws:
“The law of gravity operates no matter which course of action you
pursue-if you accept the existence of the operation of the law and hold yourself
back from the edge of the cliff, or if you reject the truth of the law of gravity
and step over the ledge, or if you accept the truth of the law, but wish to fall (let
us say as a means of suicide), in all three cases the operation of the law of gravity
is unaffected.”
“Moral law does not work in this way, however. One can admit the intellectual
correctness of a proposition of moral law (even of its ultimate value), and yet
deliberately defy it. This being the case, we must question what moral law means:
If one could not, by any means whatsoever, defy moral law, great difficulty would
arise over the appropriateness of the use of “ought”-for we do not normally use
that word to command actions which in any event cannot be avoided. If, on the
other hand, one can and does defy the imperative of a moral law, how is one still
seen as bound by it? Punishment or other ill consequences do not suffice to make
moral law objective, for if the person committing the violation of the maxim(s)
prefers the object of his illicit action, even when coupled with punitive or other
unfortunate consequences, that seems to mean that there is no apparent reason why
he should not act contrary to that moral law.”
I read the above out-takes from Laughing Man’s highlighted sections as referring primarily to the moral laws that religions, philosophies, and political doctrines are espousing. These moral laws, often held to be universally binding by those who espouse them, are not the same as physical laws or praxeological laws. This is partially explained by O’Neil with respect to physical laws but not praxeological laws.
The question of how the sentiments attributed to Stirner would apply in the context of a discussion of praxeological laws (as opposed to physical laws, and as opposed to traditionally conceived moral laws) is more complicated. Because praxeological laws, if they were acknowledged at all, were considered merely laws of market phenomena:
“For more than a hundred years, however, the effects of this radical change in the methods of reasoning [praxeology] were greatly restricted because people believed that they referred only to a narrow segment of the total field of human action, namely, to market phenomena.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.2)
I assume this applies to Stirner’s time. To the extent any praxeological laws of human action were acknowledged, it was primarily in the realm of market phenomena.
The idea that regularity (laws in the sense of sucession or co-presence of phenomena) prevails also in non-market-related fields of human action is an idea that wasn’t and hasn’t been fully grasped:
“Long before the Classical economists discovered that a regularity in the sequence of phenomena prevails in the field of human action, the champions of natural law were dimly aware of this inescapable fact.” (Theory and History, p.44-45)(emphasis added)
The same applies today in the field of human action outside of market phenomena. Many people believe that praxeological law is restricted to market phenomena.
Then it will be difficult to try to contrast the kind of sentiments attributed to Stirner with praxeological laws assumed to exist in the moral or ethical realm of human action. Because not only were such laws not clearly comprehended in his time, but this notion is still controversial and misunderstood today.
I would agree if I was able to fully realize the illusory nature of the subject/observer duality. I haven’t gotten there yet.
So, it’s not really a rule then. It’s just deducing preference based on action.
No it’s a rule that you cannot apply your good to something on your value scale that is not the highest valued. What you value the highest is expressed through action.