Okay, let me see if I’m reading your attempted analogy right…
Assume there is some ideal economic system, and we aren’t there. Assume that the changes to reach the ideal are known, and the costs of those changes are calculable. Is it possible that the costs of reaching the ideal system outweigh the gains of the transition?
Is that what you’re saying?
Or, paraphrased: We’re too far down the road to total statism to go back. We need to just accept that we will always be ruled by corrupt governments, and we need to get used to the idea, and make the best of things in this state.
Doesn’t sound as good paraphrased, does it?
But your analogy doesn’t really work very well, because there aren’t any such “shoot off into infinity” points. As stated by Azure, utility is not a numerical quantity in the Austrian view.
Ignoring your post and focusing on your thread title, I’ll try to contribute a possible argument against Austrian economic theory, just for the hell of it.
So, one of the main points of the Austrian school seems to be that preferences can’t be aggregated or calculated, and so they may gloss over the possibility that, via empirical methods, they can come up with some aggregations or calculations based on measureable data which have functional utility for determining the directions of economic activity.
Basically, I’m saying that the Austrians’ reluctance to equate different individuals’ value scales in certain places, coupled with their reluctance to (as a temporary measure) numerically measure utilities makes it impossible for them to create certain types of economic models which, despite the (possibly bad) assumptions going into them, may have some usefulness.
Now, I haven’t thought this counterargument through completely, so I’m sure somebody will tear it to shreds, but hopefully that’s good enough for a first try.