The Distinction between Objective and Subjective in Pareto's Theory of Action

Economics Political Theory
1

Since subjectivism seems to be controversial and contentious among those who favor more of an objective approach to ethics, a precise definition of what constitutes something objective would be extremely helpful.

One of the most enlightening descriptions of how the terms “objective” and “subjective” came to mean what they do is provided by Talcott Parsons who explains Pareto’s conceptions of these terms. Reading this description, one gains important insight into how these concepts have developed. In what follows, Parsons is explaining Pareto’s concepts of “logical” and “nonlogical” action.

“In his second definition of logical action Pareto used a distinction between the objective and the subjective end, making their coincidence the criterion of logicality. It is not easy to discover what he means, but the following seems to be the most reasonable interpretation: The subjective end is quite clearly that anticipated (concrete) state of affairs which the actor himself subjectively desires and supposes to be the object of his action. In the course of action, however, he chooses and employs certain means, in Pareto’s term performs certain operations, which he thinks contribute to the realization of the subjective end. But this supposition will be correct only in so far as the actor’s judgment of the relation of the means that he proposes to employ to the end is sound. Such a judgment involves prediction, on the basis of verifiable knowledge, of the probable effects of the alterations in the initial situation and their “automatic” consequences, referred to as means. But knowing the subjective end and knowing the means it is proposed actually to employ, it is possible for an observer with a “more extended knowledge of the circumstances” to judge whether the particular operations carried out actually will contribute to the end. This predicted effect of the employment of the proposed means on the basis of the best available knowledge is apparently what Pareto means by the objective end of action.” (Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Action, Vol. 1, p.188-189)(quotation marks are by Parsons)(my underline, my bold)

Thus, what is objective in this conception, is the judgment of the observer—as opposed to the actor—as to whether the means the actor proposes to employ will bring about the actor’s intended effect. The observer’s judgment is aligned with “objective reality” while the actor’s judgment is considered a subjective anticipation. The observer’s judgment has superior ontological status.

“These considerations yield an interpretation of an important statement of Pareto, that the objective end must be “a real end, entering the domain of observation and experience, and not an imaginary end, foreign to that domain which may, however, serve as a subjective end.” The objective end is always arrived at by a process of empirically valid prediction of the probable effects of certain operations in a situation. For such a prediction to be possible and to be verified by the outcome, it must lie “within the domain of observation.” But for the actor, it would beg the question of the logicality of action to require that his subjective end should always be of this character. For the relation of means to end in his subjective belief may very well deviate from the scientifically objective standard which is the criterion. In so far as it does deviate because it has an end which falls outside the domain of observation the action is, of course, by definition nonlogical.”(p.189-190)(my underline)

An example may be helpful. A friend recently e-mailed me. He had recently moved from a large city to a small town where the cost of living is very low. By working a few part-time jobs, he was able to pay his monthly rent, and he remarked that he had been experiencing a peace of mind he hadn’t experienced in a long time. To the extent that “peace of mind” is not something observable by others, then an action with a goal of “peace of mind” is a nonlogical action by Pareto’s conception. As Parson’s writes above, such an end may be a subjective end, but it is not an objective end. So here, we have a conception where ends aren’t considered uniformly together simply as ends of the individual (as with Mises), but we have begun classifying ends, and now one class of ends depends on the observer’s judgment of the actor. The scientific character of the individual’s ends now hinges on the judgment of a person “with more extended knowledge.”

Parsons continues with Pareto’s conception of logical and nonlogical action:

“It is important to note that the differentiating criterion of logical and nonlogical action is a matter of the comparison of the results of observation from the objective and subjective points of view. The means-end relationship must be seen first as it is to the actor—what he thinks the efficacy of his means will be—and then “as it is in reality”—as the observer’s more extended knowledge leads him to believe it will, or would be.”(my underline)

Note how “the way things are in reality” in this conception is essentially identical to “the observer’s more extended knowledge.” That is, ontological reality resides with the observer, not with the actor in this conception. This means that, a priori and as a theoretical construct, whenever we refer to action, the actor’s subjective point of view is considered ontologically inferior to the objective point of view, which is that of the “observer with extended knowledge.”

This point is worth repeating: In this conception of things, the actor’s own view of things, by definition, is considered ontologically inferior to the observer’s point of view, which is conceived as representing “things as they really are.”

“Confining attention behavioristically to the observation of the external course of events is not sufficient. Then it is impossible to know the subjective end of the action at all, which is by definition in the strict sense a subjective anticipation on the part of the actor. All that it is possible to know is the objective end or the outcome of the action. But this must, in the nature of the case, always be the “logical” outcome of the operations actually performed. For in so far as a course of events is scientifically understandable in any sense its later phases must always be, in the sense in which Pareto means it, “logically united” to the earlier. Then, in terms of the objective point of view alone all action is logical.”(p.190)

“The differentiating criterion therefore involves the subjective point of view and can be stated in two ways: (a) Action is logical in so far as the operations are logically united to their end from a subjective as well as an objective point of view. That is, in so far as the relations of means and end are concerned, they must be established in the mind of the actor by a scientifically verifiable theory, or if the actor does not know the theory, the effectiveness of the combination must be verifiable in terms of it. (b) The subjective end must coincide with the objective end. Subjective end here can mean only the state of affairs that the actor desires or attempts to bring about. It can serve as an end only in so far as it anticipates the actual outcome before the “operations” in question; it is a “subjective anticipation.” To say that subjective and objective end correspond is, then, to say that the subjective end is the state of affairs which can be scientifically demonstrated actually to come about as a result of the actor’s proposed action.”(190-191)

“Action is, according to Pareto, logical in so far as it conforms with a certain type of norm…His definition covers only the norm, however…”(p.191)(my underline)

There are several interesting things that are entailed in Pareto’s conceptions as described by Parsons. What is objective resides with the person with “more extended knowledge.” And this is the person who apparently has more cause and effect theoretical knowledge.

“…Pareto immediately lays down the possibility of studying social phenomena from two different points of view which he calls the objective and the subjective, respectively. The objective is first characterized as what the phenomenon “is in reality” and opposed to the way it appears “in the mind of certain persons.” The further development of the distinction, however, especially linking the objective aspect with the way in which action appears “for those who have more extended knowledge” makes it legitimate to infer that the objective point of view is that of the scientific observer, while the subjective is that of the actor.”(p.187)

"Indeed this is explicitly included in his definition of logical action: “We designate as ‘logical actions’ those operations which are logically united to their end, not only from the point of view of the subject who performs the operations, but also for those who have a more extended knowledge.”

“…what Pareto is seeking to do is to take as his criterion of the logicality of action the demonstrable, intrinsic “appropriateness of means to end” according to the most extensive knowledge of the relations between means and the end that the given scientific observer can command.”(p.187)

What I find most important about this approach from a libertarian standpoint is how politicized this conception of action is or can be. Because, as we can clearly see today, who the scientific observers are, and which theories are considered verified scientific theories and which not, is hugely influenced by the state. The “norm” of logical action in this conception is to a large degree determined by scientific opinion. But scientific opinion is not only open to manipulation by the prevailing political system, but in and of itself, can be wrong or misguided. To give a simple example, today’s mainstream economists would be considered, in this conception, the scientific observers, and thus the ones who determine what is logical action in their realm of expertise. By contrast, in regard to economic questions, all other become “actors” with “subjective points of view.” The latter become “the certain persons” who have subjective views, as compared to “those with more extended knowledge” whose views reflect “things as they really are.”

Thus, Pareto’s conception of the objective point of view has important bearing on libertarianism and Austrian economics. In fact, Austrian economics, in so far as it deals with the individual’s subjective preferences, deals with a realm that does not lie “within the domain of observation,” and thus is not observable by “those with more extended knowledge.” In an important sense, since the individual’s subjective preferences do not lie in the domain of the observable, and since “those with more extended knowledge” judge only action that enters the domain of the observable, it follows that those who systematically study the domain of individual subjective preferences are those with less extended knowledge !!

Thus, there is possibly an unrealized problem in the theoretical attempt to align “objective reality” with the “observer” as distinct from the “actor.” This makes the question of who is to be considered the observer with more extended knowledge all important, since he represents “things as they really are” while the actor merely represents his own “subjective point of view.”

2

Very interesting, Adam, thanks.

A question: if extended knowledge is held by the agent himself, would it be subjective or objective?

3

Very interesting post. However, since praxeology deals with demonstrated preference, wouldn’t those preferences then be within the “domain of observation”? Praxeology can’t say anything about preferences that aren’t acted upon (to the extent that such a thing is possible, I would think that it would the realm of psychology), but I’m not sure what bearing this has on the differing uses of the words “objective” and “subjective” in the current context.

4

I found Pareto’s conceptions relevant to the idea of “objectivity” as that idea seems to have been promoted by various objective ethicists. I see parallels between this conception and what is implied by the concept of objectivity in some of those theories.

I think your question poses a possible problem for Pareto’s conception, at least as it is laid out in the post above. Because “objectivity” refers to what is in the realm of observation, which requires an observer. The observer with extended knowledge observes that which is within the domain of observation in order to judge whether action is logical or not. If the actor himself could, in the theory, be the observer with extended knowledge, he would be both the “judge and the jury” of action, and defeat the concept of objectivity. In Pareto’s concept, objectivity has to be something outside the individual actor’s subjective point of view, and represents “things as they really are.” But there needs to be an arbiter to decide “how things really are”. As that cannot be the actor himself, it has to be the person with “more extended knowledge.” Thus, in this theory, one person’s views are considered objective, and the other person’s views are considered subjective.

In the theory of action as it is developed by Mises, individuals do have different attributes, but as regards action, all actors are considered theoretically identical. When “reality” enters the theory, it is in contradistinction to the individual actor as an aspect of his environment he must deal with.

In Pareto’s conception, there are in a sense, two “ideal types” of actors. One of those ideal types is an actor who has subjective preferences, and the other actor is one who knows “reality as it really is.” In some important sense, the theory is conceiving the interaction of individuals on the assumption not that both have subjective preferences or points of view, and not on the assumption that both know objective reality, but rather on the assumption that one of them knows the “real situation,” while the other doesn’t.

You can see which one a person or a group would rather be, and you can see parallels to some past or current libertarian theories of ethics.

My point was that this type of theorizing has hidden dangers, and it may backfire on those who promote this kind of theory.

For Austrians, this is particularly significant as I wrote, because the individual’s subjective values or preferences are not in the domain of observation, while in Pareto’s conceptions, a norm of ontological superiority is granted to those things that enter the realm of observation and which those with extended knowledge may observe.

If you can follow this reasoning, you can glimpse why the Austrian approach must appear as “unscientific” to the extent one accepts a view similar to Pareto’s. For example, you can see this in the claims that economic theories must be “testable.” Anyone who denies this, by Pareto’s conceptions, then becomes aligned with a person with a subjective point of view, while the person who demands empirical testable results in the realm of observation, becomes designated in his theory as the one “with more extended knowledge.”

5

If you re-read your post, I believe you may answer your own question. If a preference is demonstrated, it is demonstrated to someone.

If it is demonstrated to an observer, then we are conceiving action as something in the realm of observation, and thus “objective” in Pareto’s terms.

If it is demonstrated to the actor himself, then we need not be speaking about something in the realm of observation.

As John Searle writes:

“If I am going for a walk to Hyde Park, there are any number of things that are happening in the course of my walk, but their descriptions do not describe my intentional actions, because in acting, what I am doing depends in large part on what I think I am doing. So for example, I am also moving in the general direction of Patagonia, shaking the hair on my head up and down, wearing out my shoes, and moving a lot of air molecules. However, none of these other descriptions seems to get at what is essential about the action, as the action it is.”(Minds, Brains and Science, p.58)(my underline)

“A third related feature of action is that a person is in a special position to know what he is doing. He doesn’t have to observe himself or conduct an investigation to see which action he is performing, or at least trying to perform. So, if you say to me: ‘Are you trying to walk to Hyde Park or trying to get closer to Patagonia?’ I have no hesitation in giving an answer even though the physical movements that I make might be appropriate for either answer.”(p.58)(my underline)

“There is more to types of actions than types of physical movements, actions have preferred descriptions, people know what they are doing without observation.”(p.59)(my underline)

(note: one of the best essays explaining why actions cannot be conceived in terms of physical movements is Hayek’s 1942/1943 essay “The Facts of the Social Sciences.” Searle’s Minds, Brains and Science is an excellent short classic on the subject of human action, and explains why actions can’t be conceived in terms of physical movements, but must be defined in terms of the actor’s intentions or ends.)

Thus, the bearing on the use of the terms “objective” and “subjective” is related to the question of whether one chooses to define action in terms of an outside observer B, or in terms of the intentions of actor A. My post is showing some of the historical origins of the concept of “objective” as this concept is used in social science and social philosophy. The concept of “objective” is closely related to a a theoretical approach that defines action as that which is observable by another person, B. When we see the concept “objective reality” in social science, this may bring in the idea that the observer is assumed to know the “real situation” while the observed person only has a subjective point of view.

Though Mises was slightly ambiguous and contradictory in some passages of human action, where he uses the term “observe” in conjunction with “action,” the idea of “demonstrated preference” as it has developed is primarily due to Rothbard and Hoppe. For Mises, action is “consciously striving after ends,” and does not refer to physical content. For Hoppe, action is "a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality,"and thus for Hoppe, following Pareto, action must have a component that is observable to an observer B. (Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p.70)

(Incidentally, therefore Hoppe would tend not to conceive things such as thinking, praying, deliberating, etc. as actions, as they do not necessarily entail “a cognitively guided adjustment of a physical body in physical reality.” He fails to conceive action in terms of an actor striving after ends, and like Pareto, by classification, exempts or disqualifies some actions from being actions, apparently on the basis that they are not observable to an observer. This in essence says: “you are acting when I say you are acting!”)

The social theorists who try to conceive action in terms of “objectivity” or observability generally fail to consider another approach which Alfred Schutz at least addresses in this passage:

“For it is obvious that an action has only one subjective meaning: that of the actor himself. It is A who gives subjective meaning to his action, and the only subjective meaning being given by B and C in this situation are the subjective meanings they are giving to their own actions, namely, their actions of observing A.” (The Phenomenology of the Social World, p.32)(I changed the letters Schutz uses to “A, B, and C” for simplicity)(my underline)

Here, Schutz glimpses another approach that is generally overlooked. The observer is acting. In observing person A, person B is acting. In “theorizing” about actor A, person B is acting. So we don’t have to approach the theory of action on the assumption that one actor is privy to objective reality while the other actor is ignorant of it. We can approach the theory of action on the assumption that both A and B act. We don’t have to follow Pareto and divide society into two ideal types: those with subjective points of view, and those with knowledge of the way things really are.

6

Below is a recent reformulation of the same general argument made in the original post, referring to the same set of passages in Parson’s analysis of Pareto’s conceptions.

Whenever we refer to an idea such as “the actually existing situation” or “the situation as it really is” or “the objective state of affairs” or similar concepts, we imply that a “real” or “objective” state of affairs exists that is independent of the point of view of particular actors. The question is whether such a so-called objective state of affairs always reduces to the subjective point of view of some person or group, but theoretically modified in such a way to make their subjective point of view appear “objective.”

The book is:

The Structure of Social Action, by Talcott Parsons, Volume I: Marshall, Pareto, Durkheim.

The most important passages I have found are those where Parsons discusses Pareto’s concepts of logical and nonlogical action:

“As a preliminary it is important to note that Pareto immediately lays down the possibility of studying social phenomena from two different points of view which he calls the objective and the subjective, respectively. The objective is first characterized as what the phenomenon “is in reality” and opposed to the way it appears “in the mind of certain persons.” The further development of the distinction, however, especially linking the objective aspect with the way in which action appears “for those who have more extended knowledge” makes it legitimate to infer that the objective point of view is that of the scientific observer, while the subjective is that of the actor.”(p.187)

"Indeed this is explicitly included in his definition of logical action: “We designate as ‘logical actions’ those operations which are logically united to their end, not only from the point of view of the subject who performs the operations, but also for those who have a more extended knowledge.”(p.187)

“The phrase “as it really is” in its context implies that the connection between the “operations,” i.e., means, and the end can be established by a scientific theory on an intrinsic basis. That is, what Pareto is seeking to do is to take as his criterion of the logicality of action the demonstrable, intrinsic “appropriateness of means to an end” according to the most extensive knowledge of the relations between means and the end that the given scientific observer can command.”(p.187)(bold added by AK)

“In his second definition of logical action Pareto used a distinction between the objective and the subjective end, making their coincidence the criterion of logicality. It is not easy to discover what he means, but the following seems to be the most reasonable interpretation: The subjective end is quite clearly that anticipated (concrete) state of affairs which the actor himself subjectively desires and supposes to be the objective of his action. In the course of action, however, he chooses and employs certain means, in Pareto’s term performs certain operations, which he thinks contribute to the realization of the subjective end. But this supposition will be correct only in so far as the actor’s judgment of the relation of the means that he proposes to employ is sound. Such a judgment involves prediction, on the basis of verifiable knowledge, of the probable effects of the alterations in the initial situation and their “automatic” consequences, referred to as means. But knowing the subjective end and knowing the means it is proposed actually to employ, it is possible for an observer with a “more extended knowledge of the circumstances” to judge whether the particular operations carried out actually will contribute to the end. This predicted effect of the employment of proposed means on the basis of the best available knowledge [of the observer] is apparently what Pareto means by the objective end of action.”(p.188-189)(bracketed/bolded added by AK)

“These considerations yield an interpretation of an important statement of Pareto, that the objective end must be “a real end, entering into the domain of observation and experience, and not an imaginary end, foreign to that domain which may, however, serve as a subjective end.” The objective end is always arrived at by a process of empirically valid prediction of the probable effects of certain operations in a situation [according to an observer with more extended knowledge]. For such a prediction to be possible and to be verified by the outcome, it must lie “within the domain of observation.” But for the actor, it would beg the question of the logicality of action to require that his subjective end should always be of this character. For the relation of means to end in his subjective belief may very well deviate from the scientifically objective standard [the standard the observer is using to judge the observed’s action] which is the criterion. In so far as it does deviate because it has an end which falls outside the domain of observation the action is, of course, by definition nonlogical.”(p.189-190)(bold bracketed added by AK)

"It is important to note that the differentiating criterion of logical and nonlogical action is a matter of the comparison of the results of observation from the objective and the subjective points of view. The means-end relationship must be seen first as it is to the actor—what he thinks the efficacy of his means will be—and then “as it is in reality”—as the observer’s more extended knowledge leads him to believe it will, or would be. Confining attention behavioristically to the observation of the external course of events is not sufficient. Then it is impossible to know the subjective end of the action at all, which is by definition in the strict sense a subjective anticipation on the part of the actor. All that it is possible to know is the objective end or the outcome of action. But this must, in the nature of the case, always be the “logical” outcome of the operations actually performed. For in so far as a course of events is scientifically understandable in any sense its later phases must always be, in the sense in which Pareto means it, “logically united” to the earlier. Then, in terms of the objective point of view alone all action is logical.(p.190)(bold, underlined, added by AK)

These passages by Parsons outlining Pareto’s conceptions are crucially important to understand what is meant when we contrast the merely “subjective point of view” of the individual actor to the “situation as it is in reality.”

I will argue that whenever we come across a social theory that makes a distinction between the “subjective” point view of the actor, and the “objective” situation, what we are really doing is calling the point of view of an observer who observes another actor the “objective” point of view. We are merely designating the subjective point of view of observer O, as “objective reality,” and designating the subjective point of view of the observed person P as his own private “subjective” point of view. In other words, we are simply granting a categorically different status to the subjective point of view of the observer O.

This conception of things is briefly touched on by Schutz in The Phenomenology of the Social World:

“For it is obvious that an action has only one subjective meaning: that of the actor himself. It is P who gives subjective meaning to his action, and the only subjective meaning being given by O-1 and O-2 in this situation are the subjective meanings they are giving to their own actions, namely, their actions of observing P.”(p.32)

Note how Schutz explicitly refers to the fact that in observing another person, O-1 and O-2 are performing actions (in Pareto’s terms, “performing operations”). In Pareto’s conception, the fact that observer O is performing an action in observing P is omitted, leaving the impression that O’s observations somehow represent “what things are in reality” as distinct from “what things are in the mind of certain persons P.”

The subjective point of view of O is simply designated as “things as they really are” with no mention of O having a subjective point of view.

Parsons analysis provides another way to see the problem with conceptions such as Pareto’s, which attempt to arrive at a conception of an objective state of things by only implicitly referring to the subjective point of view of the observer, not making explicit, reference to the subjective point of view of the observer.

If we re-read where Parsons writes the following:

“It is important to note that the differentiating criterion of logical and nonlogical action is a matter of the comparison of the results of observation from the objective and the subjective points of view. The means-end relationship must be seen first as it is to the actor—what he thinks the efficacy of his means will be—and then “as it is in reality”—as the observer’s more extended knowledge leads him to believe it will, or would be. Confining attention behavioristically to the observation of the external course of events is not sufficient. Then it is impossible to know the subjective end of the action at all, which is by definition in the strict sense a subjective anticipation on the part of the actor. All that it is possible to know is the objective end or the outcome of action. But this must, in the nature of the case, always be the “logical” outcome of the operations actually performed. For in so far as a course of events is scientifically understandable in any sense its later phases must always be, in the sense in which Pareto means it, “logically united” to the earlier. Then, in terms of the objective point of view alone all action is logical.”(bold, underlined, added by AK)

…we will realize that there are three things going on. First, there is the subjective point of view of the actor concerning the efficacy of his means to attain his end. Second, there is the behavioristic course of external events which must always be “logical” by definition. That is, when we confine our attention to the physical course of events only, without respect to any subjective point of view (actor or observer), we are now in the domain of physical events, a domain in which we, by definition, always define the later phase of the course of events as “logically united” to the earlier phase.

In other words, all the actions of an observed person considered from the behavioristic/scientific point of view, will conform to the known physical laws. As we observe a person in this sense, the “end” will always be produced by the “means” because the earlier observed situation will always result in a later observed situation.

And thus, as Parsons writes:

“Then, in terms of the objective point of view alone all action is logical.”

So what we have are the following elements:

  1. When the actor performs his action, he believes his means will produce the end sought.

  2. From the strictly physical point of view, as we may observe his actions as physical events, his “means” will always produce a “logical” end, since the earlier situation of the observed actor will always be followed by a later situation of the observed actor.

  3. This means the “nonlogical” aspect of the observed person’s action is not an aspect of his action as he himself understands it (he believes his means will produce his end). And the nonlogical aspect of the observed person’s action is not the strictly physical aspect of his action seen from an observer’s point of view (since physically, the earlier situation (means) will always be followed “logically” by a later situation (end)).

The “nonlogical” aspect of the observed person’s action (in this particular conception of Pareto) refers to the deviation of observed person P’s belief about the effectiveness of his means, from the observer O’s belief about the effectiveness of P’s means.

In other words, P’s action is conceived as nonlogical, or his end not objective, or he acts not knowing the “real situation” according to whether or not O believes P’s means will or will not attain the ends sought by P.

As Parsons writes:

"It is important to note that the differentiating criterion of logical and nonlogical action is a matter of the comparison of the results of observation from the objective and the subjective points of view. The means-end relationship must be seen first as it is to the actor—what he thinks the efficacy of his means will be—and then “as it is in reality”—as the observer’s more extended knowledge leads him to believe it will, or would be." (bold and underline added by AK)

A few points that may be worth mentioning:

  1. In this conception, actor P’s belief about the effectiveness of his means at the time his action is performed, is not compared to P’s belief about the effectiveness of these means once the action has been completed. So this is not a theory of/by methodological individualism, whereby P considers the effectiveness of various means before and after his own action.

  2. In this conception, the precise concept of “logical” action, as far as I can tell, does not refer to action that by its very nature, must necessarily attain its end. For example, we could conceivably designate as “logical actions” all those actions which must necessarily succeed, because by the presuppositions we make, the means utilized must produce also the end(s) sought. For example, by “means” of walking toward one location, the “end” of walking away from another location must necessarily be attained. So that if actor P is successful in performing or attaining the “means,” he must, in cases like this, also attain the “end.”

This is not, as far as I can tell, the kind of “logical action” that Pareto is talking about.

  1. What Pareto is conceiving, by Parson’s account, is that “logical action,” or the situation “as it is in reality,” or the end which is “objective,” is the probability that a means will bring about an end, not as the actor P believes, but as the observer O believes.

The crux of the situation in this kind of analysis, is that terms such as “logical action” or “things as they really are” or “the objective end” are identified with the point of view of the observer, while at the same time, the observer is not explicitly designated as a subject who himself is performing actions in observing another person.

In failing to make explicit that one who observes “reality as it really is” or who knows the “objective end” or who can tell or decide what actions are “logical” is an actor performing actions, the appearance is created theoretically that the observer’s point of view is ontologically of a different categorical status than the point of view of the subject he observes. The observer’s point of view becomes “valid,” “objective,” “logical,” and reflects the situation “as it really is.” The observed actor’s point of view becomes “subjective,” “nonlogical,” and only reflects the situation as he subjectively sees it.

What happens essentially is that a theoretical attempt is made to transcend the first person perspective of the scientific observer, by attempting to transform his subjective point of view into a third person or “objective” perspective. This is done by de-emphasizing those aspects of the observer’s actions that are emphasized in the actions of the observed person: that action is conducted under the actor’s own understanding of the situation, that his action may not attain the end sought, that the actor may be mistaken, etc…

In short, the “objective” point of view is essentially the observer’s point of view, but with the fallibility that is a necessary part of action removed from the conception of the observer, while it is maintained, emphasized, and explicitly referred to in the conception of the observed.