I think you both missed the boat. Am I alone in this?
@ Dave. A man must always value his end more than he values the means he needs to attain his ends.
From Mises’ definition of labor (“Labor is the expenditure of human energy for the sake of production.”), it is clear that he is defining labor as a means to attaining an end. I like my job. But if someone paid me the same money* to sit on my ass, I would take this option. This shows that I would rather sit on my ass, so I must consider my labor disutilitous. If, on the other hand, I would work even given the option to not work and still get paid, then it is technically no longer a job and no longer labor. It would not be “for the sake production”, but for its own sake, an end rather than a means.
So the disutility of labor is not an empirical assumption, but is contained in the very definition of the word labor. This is what I mean by it being part of the formal construct of praxeology.
*All the other benefits of having a job would have to be equal as well, e.g. prospects for promotion, skills learned, job perks, etc. To be precise, I should say “If I got all the same benefits/products from sitting on my ass…”
I don’t know… sitting on your ass may be laborious 
anyhow, I agree with you and Adam on this
Hey Nir, what about me, the OP?
I just wanted some attention from you Lil’, so I cunningly crafted a plan…
but it was a pleasure in itself and not at al laborious
(Excellent work as ever Grayson)
First thing trulib, thank you for the explanation in simple English. I am impressed by the clarity of your exposition.
But I disagree. I think that disutility of labor means that people will LOSE MONEY WILLINGLY [sometimes] for the joy of idleness. That, I think we can agree, doesn’t follow from your analysis. It is an empirical obseravtion that cannot be deduced. There may well be a bizzaro world where the action axiom [and all others, as well as all consequences] are true, but those bizzaro people won’t willingly lose money just to have a day off.
Thank you Trulib. I added comments to those two threads.
“Hulsmann points out that an actor must always value his end higher than he values the means to achieve that end.”
I haven’t read where Hulsmann argues this, but I believe Hulsmann is one of the most perceptive among current Austrian theorists.
Just based on the sentence you have provided, I might argue that Hulsmann has partially himself adopted conceptions not warranted by, or not fully consistent with, the subject matter. The way I would approach this in a discussion would be to ask for a precise definition of “higher” that did not refer to relative position in space. This would, in my opinion, if the discussant were willing to continue, bring forth a problem contained in the theory that remains hidden when natural-scientific concepts are left unquestioned in the midst of a social-theoretical construct.
The same principle is involved when one tries to use the concepts “internal” and “external”. When these concepts form the basis of a social theory, we need only ask whether they are meant to refer to “internal” and “external” in the spatial sense. If the answer is yes, this creates theoretical problems of a given sort. If the answer is no, then we can request a definition of those terms that does not refer to spatial position. And this will bring to light a hitherto unrealized problem.
As I have argued, if praxeological social theory will be consistent, it cannot be founded on the concept of the spatial position or relation of two objects.
Praxeological social science is founded on the notion of an object or state of affairs present for an actor, relative to his want or desire for an object or state of affairs different from the one that is present to him.
“He explains this mistake as a case of intellectual path-dependency from Bohm-Bawerk. I think we are looking at the same thing here.”
Yes. : - )
why doesn’t it follow from the analysis? people want to consume some things that are not mere leisure and hence require production. so they will produce. there is a disutility to labouring, so at the margin they will forego producing some additional stuff (making more money) in order to enjoy some leisure
This reply is going to be in stages. Each stage will have a number in front of it.
- Let’s begin with an extreme example so that things will be clear.
Imagine a bizzaro world where everytime someone took a day off from work, he lost a million dollars. Is it obvious that people are willing to lose a million dollars for one day off? Does it follow from the action axiom that this is the case? I don’t think so.
And if we still have any doubts, just up the ante to a billion or a zillion until it becomes obvious that people will not value a day off in exchange for losing all their wealth and being imprisoned forever in a torture chamber. I think we can agree that such is the reality here on planet Earth.
-
Ok then. Now it’s just a question of price. If it does not follow from the action axiom that people will lose their all in order to have a day off, it also cannot possibly follow that they are willing to lose a single penny of their previous earnings to enjoy a day off.
-
Your post is talking about not making more money. I’ve been talking until now about losing previous wealth.
But once we have established that it cannot be proven from the axioms that people are willing to lose previous earnings in order to enjoy idleness, how can it follow that they are willing to forgo profits in order to enjoy idleness.
- And don’t tell me that people work to get things, and how can they enjoy things if they are working 24/7? Firstly, how does it follow from the action axiom that people work for things that they cannot enjoy chained to their workplace? That is a mere empirical observation. Second, just because people work to be able to afford things that releive pain and give pleasurable sensations, it does not follow that they will work just to able to be idle later. That is an empirical observation.
Sorry Dave, I’m puzzled about what this disagreement stems from… perhaps its the ceteris parabis analysis…
1)ok,
2)no.it follows that people are willing to lose that definite something that they are willing to lose, which to them represents the spread between the marignal utility of labouring for some benefits (this has disutility of labour factored in) they are considering doing marginally less of in favour of reaping a gain from the leisure they can get a marginal increase of for so doing
It seems you have set up a strawman whereby disutility of labour implies that you will pay any price, however large up and over infinity, only so that you can just stop working and start getting in some leisure. That has not been asserted…so it does not require a disproof on your part.
3).so you are making it impossible to do ceteris parabis analysis…
4). don’t tell me people work even though they do not get benefits from working. yes, i agree it is an empirical observation that it is a contingent possibility for people to not labour, and therefore to gain a spread between the disutility of labouring for a return smaller than the marginal utility of simply ceasing to labour. it is apriori true that the tradeoff would be a formal possibility even if humans contingently were not able to express it, by some really bizarro world.
Thanks for this topic, Grayson. It’s been stuck in my mind today, and I was able to reach an epiphany because of it.
I have been lazy with respect to getting a job recently. This, combined with the notion of demonstrated preference would mean that I prefer not working to working. I know that I should be working though. So why aren’t I? It’s because the disutility of labor I would experience would be greater than the satisfaction I would experience. (the removal of some uneasiness) Now if I move out of the house and stop living by the consumption of my parent’s capital (they are very gracious) I will soon come to a point where I must labor to meet some “necessities” like food and rent. I will be pressured to get a job, as there is no capital to consume, and I’ll start being useful again.
So today I decided to move out, and it’s happening.
Thanks, Grayson! Thanks, praxeology!
P.S. I just realized that this demonstrates the effect of employment insurance wrt subsidizing idleization of labor.
Rothbard, in MES, goes on to write, "It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing.
There could be a world in which play is productive, ‘new socialist man’ loves to work he thinks its fun. he would feel bad if left off to do ‘leisure’. only his productive play, is not labour, its is not a means to an end and only a means to an end (this is a narrow definition of labour which necessitates disutility of labour) but and end in itself, which just happens to also be a means to further ends. perhaps it can be decomposed into elements? perhaps not. The ‘leisure’ that such a weird person would shy away from would in fact be an absence of his play, it would be a non-pleasurable timeout, but whereas ‘labour’ in our world is at least productive, this persons disutility of ‘leisure’ is not even that. such a person would surely never engage in ‘unproductive leisure’, and would also never engage in ‘productive work, indirectly striving at his ends’ (because he simply finds great intrinsic pleasure in the act of production, remember we chose that for his psycohlogy); he would only ‘play-and-produce, directly attaining his ends and getting spill over positive effects into the future’
the thymology/contingency is about the psychology of whether some productive task (it would serve further ends) is decomposable into purely forward looking activity as one part and present satiation another part. Another way of saying this is that some productive tasks only bear fruit in the future, whilst others provide benefits presently throughout the act of producing future goods.
Of course we could adopt a wider definition of labour, as simply that human action which is productive, regardless of whatever else could be said about it(i.e. does it give present benefits?), if we do as such, disutility of labour would indeed by contingent and empirical question. You can argue from some of what Mises wrote to such a position. But so too I think you can argue the other way.
in this way, i see both sides of the argument; taking the apriori categorical road seems to me to be a greater tool for clarity, and also has the benefit of jibing with my personal notion of labour (i.e. i dont associate the term to the wider notion for whatever reason of my psychology and cultural upbringing)
Ya know, I think you got me. I stand corrected.
However, I still have an arrow or two in the quiver.
Let’s take an example from geometry. Geometry can tell us that IF something is a triangle, it has such and such properties. But the axioms of geometry cannot tell us that the walls of the pyramids are triangles. One would need to go out and inspect them to find that out.
Similarly, the other axioms of set theory tell us that IF something is a set, it has such and such properties. But an addtional axiom is needed to assert the existence of a set.
OK then.
The action axiom asserts that IF people experience “discomfort”, then [under certain conditions] they will do something about it, in fact will pay a price to get rid of that discomfort. But it cannot prove that any particular thing is a discomfort. And it is certainly cannot prove that “lack of idleness” is a discomfort.
I think you’re absolutely right, and the connection is this:
Labour and leisure are both alternative uses of our own physical bodies. However, leisure is always consumption, while labour is always a factor of production, or roundabout consumption. So the disutility is a disutility of waiting, just as in production in general.
Further thoughts on the concept ‘disutility of labor.’
If we conceive of something called the ‘disutility of labor,’ this implies that there is also something called the ‘utility of labor.’
The ‘utility’ of labor seems obviously to be that it is a means to the individual’s end.
The opposite of this, the ‘disutility of labor,’ would seem to indicate that labor is a non-means towards the individual’s end. On the face of it at least, it doesn’t make sense to conceive that an individual chooses a ‘non-means’ toward his end.
I don’t think we can say (as an example) that labor undertaken for the sake of leisure (or any other end) has, for this reason, ‘disutility.’ Rather, we would simply conceive in this case that the utility of labor is that it produces leisure (or some other end).
The disutility of labor seems to have some other meaning.
The notion that comes to mind and which seems to be meant by this term is that labor has ‘disutility’ because the individual is forced by the nature of things to resort to labor to attain his ends, when he would rather not have to.
Here, the plain meaning is not that an actor is forced absolutely to resort to labor (he could instead resort to coercion, intimidation, deceit, persuasion, etc.), but that as a practical matter, by the nature of life and society, he is often forced to resort to labor. At the same time, if he could achieve his end by some other means more agreeable to him, he would choose these means instead.
But now we have put forth a general definition that applies not only to the means labor, but to other means as well. For example, a person is often forced by the nature of things to attend a social event he would rather not attend (not forced to absolutely, but as a practical matter). If he could attain the same end without having to attend the social event he would. Thus, we would have to conceive of something called the ‘disutility of social events.’
If we continue on like this, it will eventually become apparent that for every means posited, we can say of that means, that if the actor knew of a more agreeable means, he would choose it.
But now we can see the formal and tautological nature of the praxeological reasoning Mises was involved in.
Another way to see this issue. Here is an important quote from Mises:
“There is no action in which the praxeological categories do not appear fully and perfectly. There is no mode of action thinkable in which means and ends or costs and proceeds cannot be clearly distinguished and precisely separated.”
(Human Action, Chapter II. The Epistemological Problems of the Sciences of Human Action. 3. The A Priori and Reality)
If we accept Mises’s conception, and we argue that the disutility of labor is a category of action, then we must hold that the disutility of labor is present in each and every action.
If we hold that every action entails labor, and a disutility of such labor, then we have changed the plain meaning of the term labor, which generally refers to a certain kind of action, and generally does not refer to actions such as thinking, talking, viewing, relaxing, etc…
If the term labor is interpreted as denoting something this general—if it refers to something disagreeable in each and every action—it seems to mean something like “dissatisfaction.” But in keeping with traditional usage, the term ‘labor’ would seem to be more suited to denote a specific concrete example of action, while the term ‘dissatisfaction’ would seem to be more suited to denote a general phenomenon present in each and every action.
As Mises writes, “Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure.” (HA, 3rd rev. p.47)
Labor, as a specific means, can thus be viewed as a specific content of action. Disutility, can be viewed as dissatisfaction, which is a categorial component of each and every action.
At least this is how I might approach the problem as consistent with the Misesian conception of praxeology.
A Theory of Interest by Joug Guido Hulsmann.
I don’t know what you’re talking about with the rest of that post. Higher means higher on one’s (ordinal) value scale, i.e. nearer the top. This is not a controversial use of the word, as far as I know. Nothing to do with relations in space, merely rankings in mind.
Trulib:
I read part of the article, and he clarifies use of the term. Here it is:
“Human choice by its very nature involves preference for the things that the acting person does—more precisely, it involves preference for certain things over other things that the person also could have done, but did not do because of the very choice he made. We express the same fact in different words when we say that the things he does have a higher value for him than the things he does not do.” p.88
My criticism wouldn’t apply to this.
But it would apply to your use of the term “top.”
It is the same principle as was discussed in this thread with I.Ryan:
The notion that someone had a value that was “on top” and another value that was “beneath” it.
In Hulsmann’s article, if we wanted to press the point, we could try to press it w/r/t his repeated use of the notion of “value spread,” and ask in what sense the two values are “spread apart.”?
Probably best discussed in another thread.
Adam
http://www.libertarianmonarchy.com/
The Disutility of Labour
Mises in Human Action: “The disutility of labor is not of a categorial and aprioristic character. We can without contradiction think of a world in which labor does not cause uneasiness, and we can depict the state of affairs prevailing in such a world. But the real world is conditioned by the disutility of labor. Only theorems based on the assumption that labor is a source of uneasiness are applicable for the comprehension of what is going on in this world. Experience teaches that there is disutility of labor. But it does not teach it directly. There is no phenomenon that introduces itself as disutility of labor. There are only data of experience which are interpreted, on the ground of aprioristic knowledge, to mean that men consider leisure—i.e., the absence of labor—other things being equal, as a more desirable condition than the expenditure of labor. We see that men renounce advantages which they could get by working more—that is, that they are ready to make sacrifices for the attainment of leisure. We infer from this fact that leisure is valued as a good and that labor is regarded as a burden. But for previous praxeological insight, we would never be in a position to reach this conclusion.”(p.65)
Rothbard in Man, Economy and State: “It is a subsidiary assumption, based on empirical observation of actual human behavior. It is not deducible from human action because its contrary is conceivable, although not generally existing.”(p.43)
Both Mises and Rothbard are clearly mistaken in this case. The disutility of labour can be proven aprioristically and can be deduced from praxeology. It is not a “subsidiary assumption” because of some physiological aversion towards labour.
Traditionally, leisure is considered a good while labour is considered a burden. This statement is misleading. Correctly defined, leisure is your body. You own your own body. It is your private property. You will use your private property, your body, in any such way that maximizes utility. Leisure is constantly consumed, often in different ways. Labour, on the other hand, is just the giving away of leisure. Labour is when your privately owned body is temporarily exchanged, commonly, for a salary.
Basically, it can be deduced through praxeology that humans never want to give up private property (unless they have so much that marginal utility has gone negative). Humans act to remove uneasiness and the more property you own, presumably, the less constraints on physical reality there will be which better allows you to maximize utility. Put simply, most people want as much private property as possible. Giving up private property brings disutility just like receiving private property brings utility.
When humans engage in labour they are making an exchange. The individual is giving up his privately owned body(leisure) for a salary. The leisure brings utility but it is valued less than the salary so the exchange takes place. By engaging in labour you must do what your employer wants you to do instead of what you want to do. Considering that your action will maximize utility doing anything else will lower utility, hence disutility.
In a normal transaction where someone purchases a good with money it always(except when marginal utility has gone negative because too much money is owned) brings disutility to give up the money. The transaction only occurs because something of higher value is exchanged in return.
Only in the case where you have too much of a certain unit of private property will you choose to give it up without anything in return. For example, if you eat too many hamburgers you eventually get sick and choose to throw the rest out or if you have too much clothing in your dresser it could be an inconvenience so you throw out clothing.
This can also occur with labour. A popular expression goes “I’m bored, I have too much time on my hands”. Although, time is constant, it is impossible to have “too much time”. The clock does not tick any slower just because you’re bored. The problem is not too much time, rather, it is too much leisure. Boredom comes from having so much excess leisure that marginal utility reaches negative territory. It is perfectly feasible that someone who is stuck at home with nothing to do would accept a job even if there was no compensation. However, this is rare and it would likely take a while before this was the case because leisure can be consumed in many different ways.
A good such as wood can be burned to make a fire or used to build a house. The same good can be used as a means to attain different ends. Similarly, leisure can be consumed through many different activities which is why it is rare to have too much of this good.
An easy way to illustrate the main concept of this article is through the example of apple-picking. Apple-picking is sometimes associated with leisure. People pick apples as an activity because it brings utility. However, apple-picking from a different perspective can be taken as employment and therefore brings disutility. How can the same activity be considered leisure and labour? The answer is clear. It is considered leisure when the individual owns their own body and is choosing to maximize utility through such means. It is considered labour when the individual has exchanged his body for a salary. The individual’s employer can now tell the individual what he must do. Human action is the link between the mind and reality(private property). If you have temporarily exchanged your body for a salary then you do not own it. Your mind cannot link with your body(private property) and so human action does not occur, which means you cannot act to maximize utility.
My explanation of how labour is giving up your body may sound like slavery. However, it is not. It is merely a voluntary exchange. What differentiates it from slavery is that there is no coercion involved. The loss of one’s body(leisure) is contingent on the salary received.
Lawrence,
I think you may be focused on wage labor to the exclusion of all other forms. In the apple picking example, if one does not enjoy being outside, up a ladder, avoiding bees, on a hot afternoon, but does want an apple pie later in the evening, apple picking is labor, despite the fact that there is no salary, and in fact, no other person involved at all. Labor is simply means to an end, means that would not otherwise be employed if the laborer did no have that end or could conceive of a more tolerable means to the same end.
I do not understand this point:
Labor: A value neutral, voluntary transaction where an individual subjectively values a transfer of owned energy equal to that which is received.
Production: The process of transferring energy from labor to goods.
Consumption: The process of transferring energy from goods to individuals. (For instance, TV components deteriorate from use. When an individual uses a TV, energy is trasnferred from the lifespan of the TV via human senses to knowledge)
The only part of the above defintions that can not be accurately or reliably measured is “energy”.