Labor: A value neutral, voluntary transaction where an individual subjectively values a transfer of owned energy equal to less than that which is received.
Maybe a combined response between you and I is correct.
Labor: A value neutral, voluntary transaction where an individual subjectively values a transfer of owned energy equal to or less than that which is received
To say the utility of A is equal to the utility of B requires a cardinal measure of utility, which is of course impossible.
Live_Free_Or_Die wrote: I do not understand this point.
As indicated in the OP, Mises refers to a phenomenon called the distutility of labor:
“Experience teaches that there is disutility of labor…We see that men renounce advantages which they could get by working more—that is, that they are ready to make sacrifices for the attainment of leisure. We infer from this fact that leisure is valued as a good and that labor is regarded as a burden.”
(Human Action, 3rd rev. ed., p.65)
What Mises seems to mean is that some activities such as working on a road crew or brick laying are labor, while other activities such as eating an ice cream cone or watching a movie are leisure.
Once we begin speaking about brick laying versus watching a movie, we introduce specific content into the analysis, and we are no longer talking about the categorial form of action.
“Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure.”
(HA, 3rd rev. 47)
I was referring to the introduction of such specific content as an “objective” conception of labor, “objective” conception of leisure, “objective” conception of consumption, etc…
Maybe this would be better expressed as a “contentual” conception of labor, leisure, consumption, etc.
In my mind, “contentual” and “objective” are linked, and are associated with the non-praxeological, “objective” approach to social phenomena.
Consider Rothbard:
"For in natural-law ethics, ends are demonstrated to be good or bad for man in varying degrees; value here is objective–determined by the natural law of man’s being, and here “happiness” for man is considered in the commonsensical, contentual sense. (TEOL, p.12)(italics by Rothbard)(bold added)
I would argue that Mises’s use of the notion disutility of labor is a theoretical error on his part. I believe it is based on a contentual or objective conceptions.
A simple way to see this is to conceive that the utility of any object (or process, state, situation, etc.), to the individual concerned, is the usefulness of that object, in his estimation, to bring about the results (end) he is aiming at.
In this conception, the utility of labor, to the individual concerned, is the state of affairs he hopes to bring about by the utilization of his labor.
In this conception labor is a means, as JackCuyler wrote previously:
“Labor is simply means to an end, means that would not otherwise be employed if the laborer did not have that end or could conceive of a more tolerable means to the same end.”
As far as I know, in Misesian praxeology, there are no distinctions made between “easy” means and “difficult” means, or “strenuous” means and “effortless” means. There is only the category of means, whatever the particular, objective, or contentual features any given means may have.
Another simple way to see the problem is to realize that working on a road, laying bricks, eating ice cream, and watching a show, are all actions.
According to Mises, every action will be constituted of the same formal elements or components such as means, ends, cost, profit, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, etc…
In such a scheme, as far as I can see, a given phenomenon such as labor, consumption, production, leisure, etc., must be either:
- A formal cateogry of action (in which case it will be part of every action)
This means that when we consider eating ice cream or watching a movie as actions, or when we consider any action whatever, each of them will have (for example) a “labor” component. E.g., the “labor” involved in eating ice cream, the “labor” involved in watching a movie, etc…
If labor (production, consumption, leisure, etc.) are categories of action, then these things (aspects) will be present in each and every action.
Or:
- A particular content of action. (in which case it is not, strictly speaking, the object of praxeological study)
“Praxeology is not concerned with the changing content of acting, but with its pure form and its categorial structure.”
(HA, 3rd rev. 47)
If for example, labor or leisure are considered in the contentual sense, then they become particular instances (particular “instantiations”) of the formal categories of praxeology.
Example:
I intend to attain X by labor. I intend to attain X by persuassion. I intend to attain X by excercise. Etc..
Here, labor is considered a particular means, as are persuassion and excercise.
Example:
I intend to get some leisure. I intend to begin production. Etc.
Here, leisure and production are considered as ends.
Further, consider Mises’s assertion:
“There are only data of experience which are interpreted, on the ground of aprioristic knowledge, to mean that men consider leisure—i.e., the absence of labor—other things being equal, as a more desirable condition than the expenditure of labor.” (HA, 3rd rev. ed. p.65)
Here, I believe we can only interpret this as meaning that men can and do choose, among other things, the condition of labor and the condition of leisure. Of the many things man can choose, he can also choose whether to engage in labor or in leisure. Simply put, these are two of the things that man can and does choose.
But if a person chooses to work in a given situation (action #1), and chooses not to work in another situation (action #2), how do we derive from this, non-arbitrarily, that there is a “disutility” of labor ? Why isn’t there a “disutility of leisure” when a person chooses to work rather than relax ?
When we renounce X in favor of Y, there is a disutility of X.
But when we renounce Y in favor of X, there is no disutility of Y ???
Mises is very clear that praxeology is concerned with the categorial form of action and choosing as such:
“Praxeology… [deals with]… the categorial essence of choice and action as such, with the pure elements of setting aims and applying means.” (Money, Method, and the Market Process, chapter 2, p.21)
“Not what a man chooses, but that he chooses counts for praxeology.” (Money, Method, and the Market Process, chapter 2, p.21)(emphasis added)
Thus, if in one instance a person chooses to work, and in another instance a person chooses to relax, praxeology is only concerned with the categorial form or structure of the choosing as such. Praxeology is concerned with that which is common to both instances, not that which differentiates them. Each instance of choice is considered without respect to what is chosen, and only the formal or categorial structure of action is of concern.
To try to say that man prefers leisure to labor (as two particular things among many things open to his choosing) is to go beyond the sphere of praxeology (the formal structure of action) and to try to say something universally true about the various classes of content of action. E.g. man prefers fruit to vegetables; man prefers animal-based food to plant-based food, etc…
Here are a few notions that are similar to the notion of the disutility of labor, and which could possibly be present in Mises’s thinking on the matter:
- We generally believe that the “cost” of doing labor (the dissatisfactory element of performing an act of labor) is more painful than the “cost” of leisurely actions such as eating ice cream or watching a movie. The dissatisfactory aspect of the act of working for someone, for example, I may generally consider as greater in magnitude than the dissatisfactory aspect of an action such as walking along the Riviera.
I don’t think we can say universally that the dissatisfaction involved in working for someone is always greater than the dissatisfaction of taking a walk along the water.
As Hulsmann has written:
“In particular, nobody has solved the problem of comparing non-extended entities like value, utility, preference ranks, etc.”
(The Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics, Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 1999)
- Another possibility runs something like this:
We generally prefer benefis to costs, profits to losses, satisfaction to dissatisfaction, ease to unease, happiness to unhappiness, etc.
In this context, it makes sense to say to say that we generally prefer leisure to labor.
But here, we are referring to general categories of action. Now we are essentially saying that of the two widely acknowledged categories of action—one referring to the pleasing and agreeable in action, and one referring to the displeasing and unagreeable in action—that we “prefer” that which is agreeable.
I.e., we “prefer” that aspect of action (that category of action) that is the preferrable. We are satisfied with satisfactory things, and dissatisfied with dissatisfactory things, etc…
Here we do something similar to that captured by Jacobi’s dictum and which Mises provides in Epistemological Problems of Economics:
“We originally want or desire an object not because it is agreeable or good, but we call it agreeable or good because we want or desire it; and we do this because our sensuous or supersensuous nature so requires.” (Chapter 4, p.151)
In other words, if we implicitly transform labor and leisure into categories of action, then it becomes tautologically true that we consider labor “laborious.”
In my opinion, these concepts (labor, consumption, production, leisure, etc.) are concepts which still survive from the older objective or contentual conceptual framework of economics, and/or concepts which were constructed as a framework for studying exclusively the logic of the market-centered actions of man. These concepts are of little use for studying forms of action outside of the market. (e.g., mental actions, interpersonal actions, and physical actions) These concepts are not suitable for conceiving human action generally, which means they are not suitable for praxeology as a general science.
“Economic theory has traditionally dealt with the phenomena of the market, prices, production, and monetary calculation. In these spheres of human activity, theorists have developed constructions that help to explain the regularities these phenomena evince and to bring into clear focus the tendencies for change in these phenomena consequent upon given autonomous changes in the data…From the point of view of praxeology, the eariler attempts suffered from their tendency to seek for the defining criteria in the nature of the specific affairs with which market phenomena are concerned…The subject matter of economics came to be connected with the material things that are the objects of traffic in the market; it came to be linked peculiarly with the use of money in market transactions or with the specific social relationships that characterize the market system. Where writers came closest to the recognition that these criteria were only accidental characteristics of the affairs upon which economic analysis could be brought to bear, where they were able to glimpse the congenerousness of the specifically economic type of analysis with the underlying actions of men, they were unable to follow this clue to the conclusion to which it pointed.”
(Kirzner, The Economic Point of View, p.182/183)
Thus, concepts such as production, labor, leisure, consumption, remain from the period of economic thought that identifies economic analysis exclusively or primarily with the study of the market-centered activity of man. Mises argued that praxeology (economics in the wider sense) was the formal analysis of action in all its forms, including those forms of action not linked to market transactions and monetary calculation.
“In finding the economic aspect of activities in general to consist in concern with the ends-means relationship, this conception too includes within its scope kinds of actions with which economics has had traditionally little to do.” (Kirzner, p.183)
Regarding the possibility that Mises may simply be mistaken in advancing a notion such as the disutility of labor, I think there is a simple explanation. As Mises explains:
“We have already pointed out that Menger and Boehm-Bawerk made statements in various passages of their writings that are utterly incompatible with the basic principles they advanced. It should not be forgotten that the two masters, like all pioneers and trail blazers, had first assimilated the old concepts and ideas that had come down from earlier days and only later substituted more satisfactory concepts and ideas for them. It is humanly excusable, even if it is not objectively justifiable, that occassionally they were not consistent in the elaboration of their great fundamental ideas and that in details they clung to assertions stemming from the conceptual structure of the old, objective theory of value.”
(Epistemological Problems of Economics, chapter 5, p. 171)
Re: JackCuyler
Cardinal measure of utility… could you please reiterate your point by elaborating or using different verbiage. If something is subjective what is the role of a “cardinal measure of utility?” I believe one day man may achieve a state of self awareness regarding the economics of the human body to produce individual energy. If there was a widespread understanding of the economics of the human body and an easy way to calculate the cost of your own human energy would you still assert a “cardinal measure of utility” was impossible?
Re: Adam Knott
If Praxeology defines Human action as purposeful behavior…
Then Human action is a relationship of Time, Distance, Mass, Energy, Choice, and Purpose.
Labor is a relationship of Time, Distance, Mass, and Energy coordinated to achieve a specific Purpose (satisfaction) perceived by Choice (self awareness Labor is satisfactory).
Leisure is a relationship of Time, Distance, Mass, and Energy coordinated to achieve a specific Purpose (satisfaction) perceived by Choice (self awareness Leisure is satisfactory).
I am in agreement with an economic proposition that “action in all its forms, including those forms of action not linked to market transactions and monetary calculation” such Labor and Leisure is proper.
If the purpose of the market is to help other people without using violence and money is a measure of how many people one has helped…
I can objectively say that Labor or Leisure people purchase is more economically valuable than labor or leisure which is unpurchased.
As I sit here typing away at my Leisure (or is it Labor :), the cable company is most assuredly benefitting providing internet services.
In any event whether it is Labor or Leisure… does this post have economic value? Does Mises benefit from having a vibrant community of intelligent people who Labor or Leisure on their internet forum at no cost? Of course Mises benefits. Search engine companies that make this thread available to the right people benefit.
Despite any economic benefit being spread around from this post the facts remain that 1) there is no one calling me up wanting to invest in the Labor or Leisure represented in this post and 2) I chose to post.
For purposes of categorizing Labor or Leisure the part of the relationship that is most important to economics is Labor or Leisure that is purchased and calculating the risk of Labor or Leisure that is unpurchased. The problem Praxeology introduces trying to define Labor or specific action is that it turns the variables above that change… “Purpose” & “Choice” into constants (Satisfaction). This is what creates all of the semantics BS about defining Labor.
If we jump into the real world for a moment… what does finishing college to obtain a degree or a stable employment history have to say about the risk of unpurchased labor? Could these be indicators of labor that is cheaper than say… someone who has bounced around a lot of jobs?
In summation the proper definition of Labor, Leisure, or any other subset of Human action must be:
Labor is a relationship of Time, Distance, Mass, Energy, and Money coordinated to achieve a specific Purpose (satisfaction) perceived by Choice (self awareness Labor is satisfactory) .
The only way around this problem is to introduce another variable:
Slave Labor
Industrial Labor
(variable) Labor or define Labor with more variables than the alleged unobjective definition I just provided.
Or… account for the difference in subsets of action categorizing subsets of action by the unique list of reasons that make a thing satisfactory…
Labor, indexed on types of indivdual Satisfaction, is a relationship of Time, Distance, Mass, Energy, and Money coordinated to achieve a specific Purpose (satisfaction) perceived by Choice (self awareness Labor is satisfactory) .
Yes, it would still be impossible. How I value the units of my “own human energy” would still be subjective, and therefore subject to change from moment to moment. Marginal utility would still apply, as well.
Fair enough. I think my point was can you envision circumstances where it might not be subjective? Like with Star Trek kind of technology to create food, advanced medical science, etc. I have little subjective value on this devils advocate line of thought and it not something I intend to pursue. Was just curious what your crystal ball looked like.
However, upon further reflection, my definition above is in need of a revision to add knowledge/education/skill/ability… however you want to word it…
Labor, indexed on types of indivdual Satisfaction, is a relationship of Time, Distance, Mass, Energy, Proficiency, and Money coordinated to achieve a specific Purpose (satisfaction) perceived by Choice (self awareness Labor is satisfactory) .
Rephrased: Can you envision a reality where you can never change your mind, where your whims disappear, your priorities never change, and what was important to you yesterday is exactly as important to you today?