This post continues a line of thought introduced by ToxicAssets on another thread (Two versions of anarcho-capitalism: David Friedman vs. Murray Rothbard - #40 by ToxicAssets)
The idea introduced was that of approaching interpersonal or political relationships with an “economic” or praxeological or “cost/benefits” analysis. TA wrote (emphasis added by AK):
I think the major mistake both Friedman and Rothbard incur is that they downplay the costs of creating the whole framework of contracts that would be necessary in order to achieve their visions of anarchism.
The reason why (political) violence exists is that it is an economic resource. Sometimes it is cheaper for one of the parts involved in a bargain to resort to violent methods than to seek a contract-based solution. All costs considered, included any reputation loss and ethical issues. And when that’s the case, there will be aggression.
I’m not saying they ignore this fact. They both discuss it when they introduce the problem of social order. But they both rush to their conclusions that a contract based society is more ethical (Rothbard) or efficient (Friedman), and therefore the way of the future, and start to describe what they see as the ideal version of it.
The problem is that their notions of ethics and efficiency when applied to society as a whole are nonsensical. None of them seem to fully realize that insofar as contractual costs are higher than ammunition costs within certain contexts, political violence will be used as means to achieve ends by those who are able to mobilize enough of it.
Because what govern the decisions people take are the real world technological and institutional environments they are embedded in, and the concrete costs these frameworks impose on their decisions. A good book on this subject is Knowledge and Decisions, by Thomas Sowell, a scholar whose economics is more grounded on reality than ideals.
Friedman and Rothbard may look dissimilar in the surface of their language, but they are actually very similar in their thought process, and very close to other popular fantasyland social scientists that existed in the past.
To which I replied:
This is an excellent point. In other words, a failure to pursue a serious “economics” of the social order as distinct from an economic analysis of market transactions. This suggestion was made by Lionel Robbins who was influenced by Mises:
“There is an important sense in which the subject-matter of political science can be conceived to come within the scope of our definition of the economic. Systems of government, property relationships, and the like, can be conceived as the result of choice. It is desirable that this conception should be further explored on lines analogous to better known analysis.” (An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science)
This quote is taken from the second edition, published in 1935. I’m not sure whether it appeared in the first edition of 1932. The clear suggestion is to treat the choices people make regarding social relations by the same analytical method we use to treat the choices they make in market transactions.
As late as 1962, Mises was aware that while there existed an elaborated body of formal analysis that applied to market phenomena, the same type of analysis had yet to be applied to political phenomena.
“Economics or catallactics, the only branch of the theoretical sciences of human action that has up to now been elaborated…”
“It would be preposterous to assert apodictically that science will never succeed in developing a praxeological aprioristic doctrine of political organization that would place a theoretical science by the side of the purely historical discipline of political science. All we can say today is that no living man knows how such a science could be constructed.”
(both passages from The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, 1962)
Thus, it was clear to Mises that what was lacking was an economic (i.e., a praxeological) approach to political and interpersonal social relationships, that would extend the kind of analysis that up to then, had only been applied to market phenomena.
TA then replied:
I believe the reason for this lies in accounting.
Purely economic exchanges are somewhat easy to measure and assess with objectivity. It usually boils down to “somebody gave away A in exchange for B (and, of course, his counterpart gave away B in exchange for A)”
So the science of economics can readily identify many patterns on the data that can be collected through such observations. Say, for instance, the law of diminishing returns or the dynamical relationships between supply and demand. These and many other market patterns are percetible and explainable because we can observe and measure many of the variables involved in their occurence, like prices, costs, stocks, production and transaction volumes and so on. Of course many strategical variables remain concealed and introduce uncertainty, but still much of the action takes place on the open field, therefore allowing for a class of general forecasts which bear some similarities to the predictions of natural sciences (sometimes these similarites are greately overrated, though).
Political bargains are harder to quantify. They are most of the time implicit bargains that do not take place, because one of the “traders” doesn’t want to play chicken and get hurt. But nonetheless his behavior is shaped by the likely outcome he perceives from such a situation taking place.
The chief use of power is the (partial) canceling out of other, potentially threatening, sources of power. This cancelling might take place by domination or destruction, which would allow for objective measures with hard data, but most of the time it takes place by insinuation and demonstration and readiness and other forms of non-transactions hard to evaluate.
This kind of situation is very hard to measure since there is little direct data to be observed. Most of the action is not happening. Most of it consists of self-defeating profecies. Anticipation is the name of the game.
Of course the political strategies can be inferred from reveled decisions taken and not taken by each player, but such analysis cannot be carry on too far without getting too complex.
And you cannot generally engage in large scale political accounting because most of the consequential information is private.
And without objective accounting procedures it is difficult to agree on what’s really going on, much less on what are the scientific reasons and explanations for what we’re not even sure to be happening.
That’s why political science is a much more vague and “unscientific” than economics.
This again is an excellent insight. What allowed economics to develop as a formal science and what has prevented political science from attaining the same degree of development, is that in the realm of market phenomena there appear to be objectively measurable or objectively observable phenomena (i.e, prices) that exhibit regular fluctuations. The actions that we take in this realm (purchases, sales, etc.), it appears, are followed by predictable, measurable, and observable price fluctuations. Cause and effect, and regular patterns, appear to be measurable as prices appear to be objective.
In the interpersonal and political spheres, there is no corresponding objective referent that exhibits observable or measurable fluctuations as the result of actions we perform in these realms. For example, if I coerce someone or lie to someone (examples of interpersonal or political actions), there are no known observable effects that exhibit regular or predictable fluctuations as the result of these actions. There are innumerable charts that list purchases made and the resultant prices that fluctuate in response. But there are no corresponding charts that list lies told or acts of coercion, and any observable referent X that exhibits regular fluctuations in response to these acts of dishonesty or coercion.
This lack of an objective referent, analogous to prices in the realm of economics, is what seems to have prevented or inhibited formal analysis in the interpersonal and political realms of human action. As TA writes, this is why political science is more vague and “unscientific” than economics.