<<1. From Russell:
Nietzsche’s criticism of religions and philosophies is dominated entirely by ethical motives. …the majority, in his opinion, should be only means to the excellence of thefew, and should not be regarded as having any independent claim to happiness or well-being... Almost all of the higher hopes of this century, he says, are
due to Napoleon.
Is he misstating N’s position? If yes, evidence that it is a misstatement?>>
First off, I don’t believe that Nietzsche’s criticism is “dominated by ethical motives.” I think this is a major aspect to what he was criticizing in the first place: that our valuations are ontological, that is, metaphysical, realities in and of themselves, apart from our language and knowledge, apart from our world, apart and over, life itself. It is the total affirmation of life, of reality, that begins any honest speculation at all. Besides, he never criticized “ethics,” but “morality” between which there is an etymological difference that’s become ever more confused since Cicero translated “ethos” for “morality.”
I don’t think it’s that difficult to present evidence to the contrary at all. Again, in light of what I stated about Nietzsche’s affirmation of life, it will only be a few that can and will attain this in a world where the majority finds “hope,” “redemption” and escape in otherworldy fictions. This complete affirmation is simply beyond most people to comprehend muchless undertake. Most simply don’t have the wherewithall to attain it. His “aristocracy” is not that of the “blonde beast” which he explicity critiques in GM 1:11.
You do realize that you are taking Russell’s interpretation as a matter of fact.Nowhere can I find Nietzsche stating anything like ” the majority should be only means to the excellence of the few, and should not be regarded as having any independent claim to happiness or well-being.” Nowhere…and I’ve read a lot of Nietzsche. That is Russell’s erroneous hermeneutic…and hermeneutic it is, but not fact.
You (and Russell) seem to negate the fact that later in the work which Russell quotes entitled The Will to Power, Nietzsche also criticizes Napoleon (section 1026). You also seem to forget Napoleon’s own context within the very leveling ideological and totalitarian sentiment left in the wake of the Revelution and its Terror. Simply because Nietzsche may have admired Napoleon’s individual initiative within the latter’s context does not entail N embraces Napoleon in toto (see GM 1:16). Aspects to many men can be admirable even while the man as a whole may not be so.
Yes, I think Russell wholly missed the point and as such his thesis is skewed.
It may be of note, too, that WP is not held to be the most reputable source in Nietzsche scholarship, even while it may be quite interesting. Some of it is indeed so, but given the stature of N’s sister in his own eyes it should behoove you to be wary of a book she compiled of his notes after his death.
<<2. How about this quote from N:
"I abhor the man’s vulgarity when he says ‘What is right for one man is right for another’; 'Do
not to others that which you would not that they should do unto you.’ * Such principles would
fain establish the whole of human traffic upon mutual services, so that every action would
appear to be a cash payment for something done to us. The hypothesis here is ignoble to the last
*degree: it is taken for granted that there is some sort of equivalence in value between my actions and thine."*You agree with the above?>>
Well, it seems as if Russell, Heidegger and yourself are in good company in your shared reliance upon the “Will to Power” as the authoritative document Nietzsche never published and which remains under some scholarly scrutiny for authenticity. But anyhow…
How can I agree with such a cherry-picked quote (from WP 926)? It wholly ignores the context of Nietzsche’s thoughts (which include WP 925) on actions and consequences, and that the idea “do nothing that ought not be done to you” may result in no action at all since it presumes one must hold the certainty that one’s own action will not harm another in any way, prior to that action. I don’t know about you, but, I’m neither disembodied or somehow ahead of myself in some occult manner
<<3. More Russell, summarizing N’s view of life. Take note, women and blacks… Is he misstating N’s position? If yes, evidence that it is a misstatement? >>
Yep. Russellis misstating again.
Rather than spending time looking at Nietzsche as a man, Russell seems to see Nietzsche as “ideas” on paper. What do I mean? Nietzsche was a classical philologist by profession, which is important to consider when reading him. Am I digressing? Not in the least.
Again, you bring up “aristocracy,” and since I’ve already cited where Nietzsche explicity critiques “the blonde beast” (ye olde tyme authoritarianism) let’s look at the term as a classical philologist might: that is, etymologically. “Aristos” means excellence, and in light of Nietzsche’s published work and its main and constant theme of joyful affirmation of the real (and my comments above regarding its difficulty in terms of living amongst “serious” philosophies and beliefs) living a life of Nietzschean “excellence” has no real connection to authoritarianism at all, Russell’s silly hermeneutics notwithstanding.
Good grief, I’m inclined to put some of Russell’s remarks on par with Heidegger’s belief that we could understand more about Nietzsche in Nietzsche’s absense, than Nietzsche understood of himself!
OK, now for the “woman” issue. If you have read any Nietzsche at all, particularly Beyond Good and Evil you would see that Nietzsche’s use of the term “woman” most often corresponds to the “truths” of philosophers (BGE Preface). You might also know that the term for “truth” in German (Die Wahrheit) is feminine in that language, as well as the “idea” of “Truth” in classical philosophy (“Sophia”). Not a big stretch there…I know it’s more fun for him to be considered a misogynist regardless of what women who actually knew the man said to the contrary.
And, yes, Nietzsche disliked the continued upholding of what he termed “slave morality,” but never really says anything negative regarding blacks (he actually praises “African” exuberance in comparison to Northern European moral solemnity…I know though, joy just can’t be taken “seriously” as philosophy). This does not mean that he thought slavery was therefore a good idea or practice. He thought that slave morality was faulty on at least two counts:
-
It created an escapist metaphisics, a dual ontology, between this world of “appearance,” ephemerality, and tragedy, and that of a fictitious world that was held to be “better,” more “true” and more “real.”
-
It upheld weakness, sorrow, world-hatred, renunciation, etc., as “virtues” for which to strive, as a “way” to get to the “better” world. It created a static sense of being that was wholly false and opposed to the possibility of becoming…which is precisely what I thought free-market capitalism was to engender, you know, to allow people to raise themselves up out of poverty.
Nietzsche was proposing a way of raising oneself out of nihilistic “spiritual” poverty. His philosophy denied nihilistic fictions pertaining to “truer,” “better,” worlds as well as the neurotic perpetual sorrow, which Christianity and socialism share in their pity/compassion. He thought people might be better off embracing reality as it is as a first step in alleviating sorrow, rather than inflating an egotistical vision to universal levels through universal “oughts” meant to denigrate the world and continue sorrow’s reign.
To reiterate: I see no good reason to give a perpetual status to former “victims,” do you? Isn’t this part of the idea and logic behind the Welfare State at present, in that the “victim” is nearly everywhere held to be an eternal ontological reality for which we should care forever and always? Why not encourage them in every way possible to become different than a perpetual wretch as well as make the climb out of poverty? I think these may go hand in hand quite well, don’t you?
<<4. Russell, summarizing N on compassion:..>>
Again. Yes, Russell is wrong.
Nietzsche believed that “compassion” is exactly that: “the same passion with.” In other words, one who takes the “passion” of sorrow along with the one who sorrows, has thereby only increased sorrow in the world, not lessened it. While we will never eradicate the sorrowful and tragic character of the real (such a desire constitutes the “progressive” neurosis in my opinion), we can lessen it, quantitatively and qualitatively. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Of the Compassionate) Nietzsche admonishes us to be a resting place for another’s suffering, “but a resting place like a hard bed, a camp-bed” so as to not encourage them to think of their suffering in terms of being, but of change and becoming.
Again, what in this is so abominable? I tend to think it is a great philosophy to encourage people to continuously encourage themselves creatively and “spiritually” as well as economically . Hence, my draw toward capitalism.
<<5. Here’s where I see a path to free market capitalism,… By which I mean cooperation…“The misfortunes of all these small folk do not together**constitute a sum-total, except in the feelings of mighty men.”>>
Is he misstating N’s position? If yes, evidence that it is a misstatement?>>
Once again, using the questionable “source” of WP ( here WP 965) and the questionable tactic of relying solely Russell’s hermeneutic cherry-picking…itself unreliable.
Nietzsche is speaking of an “ideal,” or more, a thought experiment, not a thing in this chapter (Der Grosse Mensch). “Mensch” equates roughly to “human being” rather than a singular man (Mann). Again, keep in mind my comments regarding Nietzschean “aristocracy,” courage, and the overall affirmation of life. People tend to distract themselves with every kind of political intrigue, with propoganda, with doling out their “compassion” to near meaninglessness (“universal” compassion), rather than concentrating their energies on the immediate, relevant and tactile. Again, I can see nothing amiss here, in postulating a notion that inspires one to life rather than retreating from it according to fictions of a “beyond” or “true reality” always with a concomitant moral conviction that this world is somehow inferior to that fiction.
As to the implication that Nietzsche was somehow “uncooperative,” see GM 3:12 where he states explicitly his rejection of the view that “objectivity” consists of fictions such as “pure reason,” disinterested comtemplation,” “knowledge as such” and other such absurdities. This is patently false. “Objective” knowledge only comes by way of the plurality of “eyes” constituting varying perspectives and completely interwoven in language. As such, any knowledge upheld as “objective” is inherently cooperative. The philosophy of science, particularly in view of theories of complexity and emergence, is dealing with precisely this currently in order for biologists and physists to speak to one another in a meaningful and coherent way. (See William Wimsatt’s work, for example.)
<<6. Another blow for liberty by N. He is not a nationalist:
Nietzsche is not a nationalist, and shows no excessive admiration for Germany. He wants an
international ruling race, who are to be the lords of the earth: "a new vast aristocracy based upon
the most severe self-discipline, in which the will of philosophical men of power and artist-tyrants
will be stamped upon thousands of years.">>
The contention that N wants a ruling race in the authoritarian sense is baseless and rather puerile. In fact, I’ll go so far as to say it is patently ridiculous, in light of what I’ve already stated. Yes, he desires a new view of reality which is joyful, affirmative, and which negates, in its very appearance, nihilism in all its forms, including Christianity and socialism. If that is Nietzsche’s “race” of “aristocrats,” the more the better in my eyes.
<<7. Here’s one for the girls reading this:>>
Are we going for an appeal to emotions, now? I’ve already given you the reason why N used “feminine” terminology. But what of N’s “warrior” terminology? Maybe it could have something to do with the etymological roots and the concomitant cultural ties alive within the word “virtue” itself…just maybe…those “virtuous” philosophers were indeed inept at charming Lady Truth, after all. (BGE P)
<<8. Of course, if you did something wrong, don’t feel bad or try to correct it:
Nietzsche is nauseated by repentance and redemption, which he
calls a folie circulaire.>>
Again, another bit of hermeneutical autoeroticism. But, I hardly think I have to point out the impossibilities of going back in time to “pay” for an act done, tit-for-tat, or that monetary compensation isn’t a completly reliable manner of restitution, particularly within the context of theories of subjective valuations. For most, I’m sure, given the “human, all too human” propensities of “ressentiment” at play today, any elapse in time will accumulate a great deal of unaccountable interest…
Yet, the folie circulare (Antichristian 51) that Nietzsche uses isn’t simply based upon the “blessed ideas” of repentance and redemption, so much as that these latter are held as matters of certainty, to be absolutely necessary and true. In addition, these are fictions built upon the ground of that “ressentiment” toward ephemerality and uncertainty so prevalent in Nietzsche’s day (and which continue in our own) in the form of “slave moralities”: Christianity and socialism. Nietzsche believes this is a sickly teaching of death…and yet those darn priests and philosophers who teach such nihilistic world-denigration just can’t seem to bring themselves to quit the world they hate and denigrate… and go on spewing their hatred.
<<9. In praise of cruelty:… "almost everything that we call ‘higher culture’ is based upon the spiritualizing and intensifying of cruelty." The “noble” man is essentially the incarnate will to power.>>
Russell’s paragraph, here, is as ludicris it is disenginuous. For one thing, the quote, “__almost everything that we call ‘higher culture’ is based upon thespiritualizing and intensifying of cruelty”__is taken from a section of BGE (229) where Nietzsche is explicitly speaking about cruelty’s omnipresent dimension in all things culture calls “great,” whether they be the Roman arena, the Crucifixion, bullfighting, arts such as many operas, mythology, and finally, even in the search for truth.
Russell is being dishonest (unless he was simply a poor reader) when stating Nietzsche simply relegated this to “aristocratic excellence” (particularly in the form of “the blonde beast”) and even more dishonest in trying to make it sound that Nietzsche releshed it. Nietzsche only approbated cruelty only in so far as that the real itself is irredeemably tragic, but this does not equate to any love of violence on Nietzsche’s part. Such a conflation is a non-sequitur at best.
<<9. A word or two about N in general, and his contribution to our understanding of the world. Russell pseaking about waht is important in N’s works:..Do you agree?>>
No.
<<: “I omit Russell’s solid refutations of N’s absurdities.”>>
…based as they are on Russell’s absurd but “solid” certainties, of course…
<<: “In sum, I stand by my assertion about N.>>
Fantastic! I wouldn’t try to stop you even if I could.