good post I’d thought I’d share
That is a good post because it points out how eristic Kinsella is. Of course, GAP plays too much dungeons and dragons so he’s not exactly the right guy to be pointing fingers.
Yeah I thought it was a good post with curious references to numerous writings on the topic
(too much “dungeons and dragons”?)
Theres no such thing as too much dungeons and dragons
But there is such a thing as too much 4e.
Hahaha, yeah I prefer 1e or 3.5.
False assertion is false.
Veatch, as quoted by GAP, is strawmanning Hume.
Veatch quotes the following passage by Hume:
But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact,. . . Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object.
He uses this quote to characterize Hume, as being, due to an intellectual bias, curiously unable to see virtue, vice and value which others can see so plainly; it’s as if to say, “Silly Hume, the vice in willful murder may entirely escape him, because he’s trained himself not to see it.” Veatch even characterizes Hume as someone who wouldn’t find any virtue in the character of Socrates. This strawman is made possible by the fact that Veatch doesn’t quote Hume’s full argument on the matter. Here’s the last sentence Veatch quoted following by the rest of the argument (emphasis added).
The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but `tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.
Hume DOES recognize virtue, vice, and value. And presumably he WOULD be disgusted by a willful murder and be inspired by the courage of Socrates. He is simply saying that the value implied by the respective disgust and inspiration would reside in his heart’s response to the objective qualities of the murder and of Socrates and not within the objective qualities themselves.
But Veatch’s selective quoting makes Hume out to be some Dr. Manhattan-type figure who looks upon his fellow man with a heart of stone (or silicon).
LS underestimates the intersection of libertarians and nerds [:P]
Perhaps, but I could be argued that it is at least possible for a Humean to not be disgusted by murder or impressed by Socrates, given that the events themselves have no necessary connection to his emotional response.
One could argue that it is impossible to prove that anyone might not be disgusted by murder, no matter what their asserted philosophical persuasion.
Yes, of course. He could have Aspberger’s or some other mental condition that debilitates his sense of empathy. According to the Humean conception of morality (or the common man’s conception for that matter), to the extent that a person is devoid of empathy, he is incapable of morality. He might abstain from monstrous acts for purely selfish reasons. But if he finds himself tempted to act monstrously with full assurance of impunity, no feelings of conscience will stop him. But I seriously doubt some convoluted ethical theory would stop him either.
This is true. But what I am getting at is that someone should be disgusted by murder, whereas for a Humean it is apparently possible to be “ethical” and not be (or at least ethics doesn’t come into the issue).
It seems the vast majority of people have “Aspberger’s or some other mental condition” - or maybe this confusion of medicine and morals is pure scientism.
And anyway my point is that Veatch’s characterization of Hume as suffering from “proofreader’s mentality” is entirely off the mark, because his basis for doing so is a quotation taken completely out of context and totally misconstrued.
No, the vast majority of people would be disgusted at the sight of willful murder.
yeah - that’s why militarism is so unpopular - especially in the US.
I believe I understand what you are saying.
My take is that you say person B should be disgusted by murder today, and the normative theory that B subscribes to today holds that B should be disgusted by murder. But tomorrow, B might not be disgusted by murder. So he is the same as the disparaged Humean, except for the two “shoulds” that happened yesterday.
Person A: “B, you subscribe to normative theory X, which holds that you should be disgusted by murder, and that not being disgusted by murder will diminish your flourishing, eudaimonia, and happiness?”
Person B: Yes
Person A: I saw you just now, and you seemed not to be disgusted by the murder that just occurred.
Person B: Oh, well yes. In this case, I chose to diminish my own flourishing, eudaimonia, and happiness.
What is lacking is a proof or demonstration of how subscribing to a particular ethical doctrine prevents or diminishes the immoral act that the ethical doctrine and its supporters imply it prevents or diminishes. If the doctrine doesn’t prevent the immoral act any more so than another doctrine, why should someone change from their current doctrine?
Wombatron, by the way, could you comment on the following post?
You might think about an Aspberger’s sufferer that he should be disgusted by a murder. But that would be a statement of your own sentiment of disapprobation, not a recognition of some objective law that a human being who is physically incapable of disgust at murder somehow ought to feel such disgust.
Yes, because we recognize values as agent-relative. The same act can be wrong or ethically neutral, depending on whether the evaluator has empathy or not. So if there are two evaluators, one with empathy and one without, the act could very well be wrong and ethically neutral at the same time, in the same way that the same man could be admirable and deplorable at the same time, and the same gothic cathedral could be beautiful and grotesque at the same time, and the same economic good could be treasure and trash at the same time.
Were the average American to actually see an innocent Iraqi murdered, they would be disgusted. If the average American were to even visualize in their head an innocent Iraqi being murdered, and reflect upon how that image is reality somewhere, they would be disgusted.