The main goal of libertarianism

The main goal of libertarianism as I see it is to provide a just way in which to solve conflicts between individuals in a way that maximizes personal freedom.

Now I’ll explain this definition.

What makes libertarianism different from other political systems? I think the difference is the that other systems create a lot of dependency between individuals. If you acquire/work for something valuable, you have to share it with others. In socialism, because of high taxes, you can’t open a business without the help of government, and in this way every decision in your life has to be decided by the collective. In democracy in general there are lots of laws that are obligatory for everyone, even though they might not be suitable for some people or some groups of people.

Perhaps to better see it let’s take Crusoe as example. Crusoe is completely free, but now Friday comes along. If Crusoe and Friday agree to live in a libertarian society, the life of Crusoe will not change very much. However if they decided to live in a democracy or Anarcho-Socialism Cruseo’s life would completely change because everything Friday does will immediately affect him.

So we’ve covered the question of maximizing freedom. Now why is the system just? You can define property differently, for example you can define that women are property, now this is definitely unjust. However there are other systems that might be just, mutualism and geolibertariansm are two examples I know of, but there are probably others.

So what do you think about my definition, which parts you agree and which you don’t agree with? What is your definition? And what about alternatives, maybe there are other political systems which I didn’t mention? Perhaps some political systems without definition for property at all, or perhaps something entirely different?

For some reason I couldn’t insert empty lines between paragraphs. Anyone knows why?
Thanks.

Quite simply, the goal of libertarianism is a society where all human relations are voluntary.

There is no “goal” of libertarianism, aka liberalism. The reason is simple… goals are ends and only individuals have ends, not groups or society. Every political philosophy has a goal because it is the shared vision of many individuals who are willing to employ violence in the attempt to make society conform to a specific sort of outcome. Liberalism eschews the imposition of individual ends or goals on society. Therefore, liberalism is not a political philosophy at all. To the liberal, philosophical discussion of “the best political system” falls as hard on the ears as a philosophical discussion of “the best system of organized crime.” The best political system is no political system for exactly the same reason that the best system of organized crime is no system of organized crime.

One person’s maximal freedom can mean another person’s enslavement. There is no simple set of rules that “maximizes personal freedom.”

I like to think of the political problem like an onion which you peel back layer by layer to get to the core. Politics and legitimized corruption have been around for thousands of years and have accreted layer upon layer of sophistry and propaganda to justify the Grand Grift.

On the outermost layer, we perceive an uneasiness with the constant internal conflict and external war that appears to be generated by political systems and we wonder if perhaps there might be a better way to do things. Nobody likes to pay taxes, yet we all do. Peeling back this first layer of the onion, we find that underneath it is the problem of subsidized aggression where decision-makers regarding domestic and foreign policy do not bear the costs of their decisions, while they reap the benefits (spoils of war). But then, the question immediately arises, why is there a class of people (the government) who are permitted to engage in subsidized aggression? Peeling back the next layer of the onion, we find that the church (historically) and the courts (today) play the role of legitimizing the subsidized aggression practiced by the government. The legitimacy used to derived from appeals to God and the divine right of Kings supposedly granted by God. Today, we see that this is all a silly fairy tale but the most intelligent people of the day all bought into it, so englightenment and education are not sufficient to avoid collective silliness. But why do people accept the authority of a church or a court to say, “These men may make war and not bear the negative consequences of their decisions, while they may keep the spoils captured in war”? Peeling back what I believe is the final layer of the onion exposes the heart of the matter - the (inexplicable, as far as I know) propensity of human beings to accept moral double-standard under certain conditions. People generally will not tolerate double-standards. In fact, people are extremely sensitive to the social situation where one person breaks the rules that everyone else has to follow. But if that person is wearing a crown or a robe given to him by someone wearing a crown, then the exact opposite happens… people eagerly accept double-standards! To point out that the King is a hypocrite by denying to others the very same moral privileges he arrogates to himself generally results in public outcry. As long as people perceive the individual acting according to a double-standard as somehow empowered, separate or above the general population, they eagerly accept his hypocritical behavior.

So, the most important project for liberals to embark upon is to challenge this tolerance for moral double-standards of properly adorned individuals. Just becuase you’re wearing a crown, or a robe, or a ring, or a badge, or have a seal affixed under your signature does not give you any additional moral rights than anyone else has. Every human is just human, kings and presidents alike.

We need to lead a revival in moral philosophy. The first prong of this revival is to challenge the toleration of double-standards. It is impossible to have a healthy society where the King and his agents may impose double-standards in the defense of patently wrong behavior. “We seized your house under the rules of eminent domain, so that makes it OK.” The second prong is to put moral philosophy back on a proper foundation, that is, to individualize moral philosophy. Morality can be thought of as the art of choosing right ends. Today, ends are chosen mostly haphazardly and without reflection but among those who do opine on morality, there is almost universal agreement that the choice of right ends cannot be based solely or even primarily on one’s own desires irrespective of social well-being. This is the central tenet of collectivism, which is the prevailing moral sentiment today and has been for a very long time in the West.

But this is exactly wrong. The only right ends are those ends which themselves act as means (also termed “means-ends”) to the ultimate end which every acting being has - satisfaction of wants. Bastiat says of satisfaction, “as a passive being [man] experiences sensations that are painful or pleasurable. As an active being he strives to banish the former and multiply the latter. The result, which affects him again as a passive being, can be called satisfaction.” [Economic Harmonies 2.22, Emphasis original] This is similar to a very old moral philosophy called hedonism, though hedonism tends to focus on the pursuit of pleasure as an end in itself (which, in a human action framework, it is not, it is just one means to attaining satisfaction).

Rothbard argued that the correct choice of means-ends is objective and, therefore, that morality is objective. However, I think this is incorrect. The correct choice of means-ends varies from individual to individual as a result of the fact of individual variation. One man likes chocolate ice cream and despises vanilla ice cream. Another man despises chocolate ice cream and loves vanilla ice cream. Morality, like taste, is subjective. However, certain patterns in morality emerge over time, just as patterns in taste emerge over time, in response to survival pressures. Rothbard (in EoL) uses the illustration of eating a poisonous mushroom as an example of an “objectively wrong” act. But here he is confusing the objective patterns of means-ends choices that exist in the population with right and wrong means-ends. There is no right or wrong, there just is. If you choose to eat a poisonous mushroom, you’ve chosen to eat a poisonous mushroom. If you die, leaving no offspring to pass on your proclivities for poisonous psychedelics to, it is less likely that people will choose the eating of poisonous mushrooms as a means-end to the ultimate end of satisfaction.

What is more interesting to me than right or wrong is conflict. What if my chosen means-end involves obstructing one of your chosen means-ends? That is, what if I can only be happy by frustrating you? Lots of examples come to mind… murder, rape, theft, slavery, (taxation… :wink: ) and so on. This is where I think things get very complex and very interesting. First of all, if you and I are at loggerheads over something (say, I picked up a pearl off the beach and you demand that I give it over to you), we can simply fight over it. If one of us is much stronger than the other, that person will probably win. Case closed. So, those who have more power can usually frustrate the means-ends of those who have less power by simply bullying them. But what if we’re both of roughly equal strength? Here, both of us remain uncertain as to the outcome of a contest. If you fight me for the pearl, you just might be the one who ends up dead or with broken ribs. Since we’re both uncertain as to the outcome of a contest, we both have an interest in bargaining.

When two people verbally argue out their differences, either the dispute goes back to a state of war (perhaps a standoff), or it is resolved through some kind of mutually agreed (stipulated) settlement. As time goes by, the parties will either abide by the terms of the settlement because they believe sticking to the settlement is the best choice among their available means-ends or they will end up in a dispute again over this or something else (feud). Good settlements are proven by their ability to prevent a return to conflict or standoff. Poor settlements are proven by the opposite. As many disputes are settled, people learn that certain kinds of settlement are likely to fail and other kinds are likely to succeed in preventing a return to conflict or standoff. Those terms of settlement that tend to work in preventing future conflict can be termed law and the profession of assisting people who are trying to bargain for terms of settlement of a dispute in choosing good terms of settlement (and avoiding poor terms of settlement) can be called arbitration.

But the story does not end here. Law itself feeds back and informs the means-ends choices that people make. Knowing that a certain course of action is likely to result in either direct conflict or unfavorable terms of settlement in arbitration makes that course of action - ceteris paribus - less attractive than it otherwise would have been. Such courses of action come to be perceived as unlawful. As a result of the settlement of disputes through mutual agreement to terms of settlement, society self-organizes and becomes lawful and orderly. A wise overlord is not needed. In fact, the Leviathan of Hobbes is a pox - it is the universal bully that - by virtue of its overwhelming power - may impose its means-ends upon all others. Such an organization is cancerous to lawful and orderly society. We do not have a society of law and order; we have ritualized abuse by the State and a society trapped in the dazed acquiescence of Stockholm syndrome.

OK, that was longer than I thought it would be…

Clayton -

Where {} in my example = <> that you actually type,
insert a {p} tag at the beginning and a {\p} tag at the end of each block of text you want to turn into a paragraph.

{p}This is a new paragraph.{\p}<\p>

Thank you for your comments ImpenitentCapitalist and Clayton.

Clayton: You’ve described anarchy, not libertarianism. Libertarianism is NAP and property rights. You didn’t even mention those.
Raudsarw: That’s not entirely true. Socialists describe “economic exploitation” as non voluntary, so this really depends on your notion of what voluntary is.

Wait a second. So anarcho-capitalism is not libertarianism, NAP and property rights?

Well you can see it as you want, but only goal for libertarianism is NAP and NAP doesn’t mean “a just way in which to solve conflicts between individuals in a way that maximizes personal freedom”, in its pure form NAP means anarcho-capitalism.

Clayton was trying to get you to realize that there is no main goal for libertarianism and justified his claim by using methodological individualism

Guys, first of all aggression can be defined in many different terms. For geolibertarians the taking of land as personal property is aggression, for mutualists perpetual ownership is by it self aggression. For socialism trade in unequal terms is aggression. Second of all, all of these ideologies can work in anarchy.
So for example If two people who believe in socialism come to an arbitrator and ask him who owes who what, the arbitrator will decide using socialist idea of justice instead of a libertarian idea of justice.

So you oversimplify things when you present libertarianism as the only possible just system in the world. If that was so, then everyone would be a libertarian. Yet we all see that many people disagree with us, because they see justice in other terms. So what makes our justice special? I think our type of justice allows the maximum possible freedom for people. I think libertarianism is not a political structure, it is a system of justice that is based on property rights and NAP, but there are many other possible systems of justice.

*sigh - we’ve been over this many times already. An arbitrator is merely a facilitator, he just helps people decide their own disputes. The concept of an arbitrator as a judge sitting on a Great White Throne is a symptom of the State’s corruption of law. Look at the statues depicting Justice… in one hand she holds a scale and in the other a sword. Now, I know that soldiers hold swords but I don’t see what an arbitrator needs a sword for unless he is something more than just an arbitrator. And that’s exactly it, the State’s courts are much more than mere arbitrators, they are “ultimate decision-makers” as Hoppe puts it. That is, they substitute their own decisions for those of the parties coming to them for assistance in resolving their disputes. Mises points out that when a unilateral exchange takes place, it is really just a kind of autistic exchange (Human Action, ch. X). That is, the mugger sticking a gun in your back and taking your wallet is doing nothing different from his point of view than reeling in a fish. Reeling in a fish is not mutual exchange (involving two humans) but autistic exchange of one set of circumstances for another. The State’s courts impose their decisions which is not mutual exchange, it is a form of autistic exchange.

If the arbitrator is engaging in mutual exchange with his clients (that is, really arbitrating, not just imposing decisions), then he is not deciding anything at all. The ideological beliefs of his clients are irrelevant to the problem of resolving the dispute. All that matters is what terms of settlement, if any, they will both agree to in order to put the dispute to rest. Let’s say Alan plucks an apple and Bill demands half of it because “all must share alike” - if Alan agrees to split the apple and settles the matter, then it is settled. Does this mean that Alan and Bill have created a socialist society? No, it doesn’t, it just means that a socialist argument has worked in resolving a dispute. We can look to the common law in different cultures to see how useful socialistic arguments have been in settling disputes. Not very.

Please quote where I said anything so ridiculous as that.

There is no “our justice”. In fact, there is no justice at all. The concept of justice is inherently collectivistic, it implies a Final Judgment with the all-wise Son of God setting everything right. The peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration is not concerned with creating a just, peaceful or orderly society even though that is its fortuitous by-product.

Clayton -

Clayton,

I am really impressed. Could you credit the most influential inspirational sources for your theory? I would really love to read on this point of view in details.

Oh yes, I’ve read the usual suspects, quite a lot of Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe, and others, I just do not seem to recognize all the pieces.

@Andris: Thanks, I appreciate the positive feedback. Even though I’ve only read some online articles, I think that Michael van Notten’s ideas really impacted me (especially ‘kritarchy’). Mises of course is hugely influential, especially on the methodological front. Hoppe also is hugely influential in providing an acidic reduction of the State to its barest attributes: monopolist of ultimate decision-making and force. Bastiat is also influential as he really strips things down to basics (I especially like his treatment of Wants & Satisfaction in Economic Harmonies). To an extent, my own experience with the court system (divorce) has been influential as I’ve witnessed first-hand and up-close how law really operates and how the court’s monopoly makes it slovenly and apathetic to the needs of what are really its clients, as well as the even more gross distortions that statutory law impose onto the process of dispute-resolution. Edited to add: I should also credit David Friedman though he’s a bit positivist for my tastes… he’s the first AC I read and really got me started down this road. His lecture on “Legal systems very different from our own” is extremely enlightening. I have read what is available online of “Law’s Order” which is valuable in expanding one’s mind in understanding that Western law hardly has a corner on good legal rules. As Friedman is fond of saying, we are only about 1,000 years behind the state of the art in law by virtue of our de facto prohibition of performance bonds.

A lot of this has been the result of my own thought process, as well. I posted a thread a long time back that had some of these ideas, though I would now disown a lot of what I wrote then. While propertarianism seems to me to get it right more than any other approach, I’ve been discontent with the propertarian approach because it’s clearly deficient. People get in disputes about lots of things that cannot usefully be reduced to a property dispute. Also, I felt that there was no good reason that we have to restrict praxeological analysis to the situation where both parties mutually agree to exchange (catallactics). The obvious benefit of restricting the analysis to catallactics is that the welfare function of catallactic exchange is easy to demonstrate - both people must be better off else they wouldn’t have voluntarily agreed to exchange. But then I thought how can there be so much of our lives that is affected by legal reality - directly or indirectly - if law is not playing an integral role in improving society? Mises and Bastiat both have very sunny views of the human capacity for cooperation but it is obvious to me that cooperation is only possible because many kinds of non-cooperation (stealing, murder, etc.) are severely sanctioned.

I thought to myself: if I’m living in a very primitive society and I get in an argument with one of my fellow men, what happens? There are no judges and may not even be a chief we can appeal to. So what do we do? We can fight. But if he’s much bigger than me, I won’t fight, I’ll just cave. If I’m much bigger than him, I’ll gladly fight him and probably win. But if you take a random sample of the population, odds are any two men will be about the same size, strength, ferocity, etc. So, I can safely say that I’ll probably be about as afraid of the guy I’m in a dispute with as he is of me. We each are going to be wary of the other. Since we’re human, we can do something that other animals can’t… we can speak and reason. It might consist of a mix of shouting and posturing with calm reason but that is much better than getting my skull bashed in over whatever it was we were arguing about. If we resolve our dispute without further violence, then we have succeeded in a kind of cooperative catallactic exchange. We both agreed together to exchange our present circumstances (fight/standoff) for a better set of circumstances (bargained settlement). I’d rather give up a little of my sustenance to avoid the uncertainty and risk of being involved in a man-to-man battle where I might get to keep everything or I might just lose everything.

This mutuality is the essential difference between the kind of exchange that occurs as a result of dispute-resolution and ordinary voluntary exchange. In ordinary voluntary exchange, each decision-maker is completely autonomous and his decision to exchange or not exchange is determined solely by internal factors within himself. But it is very difficult to get even two people to make one choice that they both agree is the best for the both of them taken together. Each party wants to keep everything and give up nothing. But the prospect of violent conflict if the issue is not settled peacefully drives them to bargain with one another. This is why I reject all forms of pacifism as anti-human. You cannot have social order without the cattle-prod of the prospect of violent conflict driving disputants to arbitrate their disputes. Thieves would simply keep the proceeds of their theft and social order would necessarily disintegrate.

What I believe was missing in my earlier analysis was this component of morality and means-ends analysis. Conflict really arises when my chosen means-ends interferes with someone else’s chosen means-ends. That is what conflict is. This is why morality is central to dispute-resolution. If I choose a particular course of action it is because I believe I am right to do so, that it is to my best and highest benefit to follow this course of action. And the same is equally true of another person who has chosen a course of action which conflicts with mine. Hence, we are not only involved in a dispute but we are each convinced, “I am the one who is in the right, I have the right to do as I’m doing and you are interfering with my rights.” I think this explains why normal people take legal disputes so personally. Statists implicitly appeal to this framework when they try to pit individual rights against the rights of the State or the rights of society as if the State has at least an equal right to act unimpeded as the individual does. But really, they are moral nihilists since they simply reduce the problem to might-makes-right by treating the overwhelming force applied by the State as either amoral or inevitable (like gravity… it might suck but you just have to deal with it). This is why Rothbard is right and David Friedman is wrong… the State isn’t just inefficient or wasteful, it’s downright evil in every sense in which humans use that word.

Clayton -

Also, I’ve spent some time thinking about what precisely we mean by “natural order” or “private law society” etc. Using terms like “natural order” or “private law society” is dangerous because it is easy to fall into the trap of using Utopian language, as if doing one small thing differently could transform society. The defining differences between the status quo and a healthier society that is consistent with the view of morality and dispute-resolution outlined above are a) the absence of a monopoly of arbitration services, b) the absence of a publicly subsidized prosecutor and c) the absence of a monopoly, public police with the power to bully or compel patronization of a particular arbitration service. So, I think we can define what it is that is wrong with the status quo without appealing to metaphysical-sounding things like “natural order society” or “private law society.” End the State’s monopoly on arbitration. Close the prosecutor’s offices (and permit anyone to prosecute their own torts). End the State’s monopoly on police protection. While those steps are not a complete solution, they constitute the first steps towards real social change towards a society where human flourishing and self-actualization is the norm enjoyed by the masses rather than the exception reserved to the Elites.

Clayton -

I think Candide was written as satire.

The only kind of system it could possibly be is a naturally arising system, and emergent system. Yes, other systems of justice could emerge, but the solutions to conflict can be solved in only two ways: through politics (violent intervention) or through the market (voluntary agreement). Socialism and geolibertarianism require the initiation of force to solve problems, so it does not matter how they choose to define property. Of course, you could redefine force as well, what the heck.

Clayton, you are again describing anarchy, which is fine, but it is not libertarianism. Libertarianism is NAP and property rights, at least that’s the common view is. When two people resolve their dispute (with arbitrator or without), they need some way to define what is just and what is not. They can use many different justice frameworks for it, one of these framework is property rights and NAP, and that’s libertarianism. They can use another framework though. For example they can use property rights without NAP, or they can use NAP without property rights. Or they can use something else entirely.

Thanks again for an extended explanation.

I am far from being a happy customer of propertarian framework, so I arrived to similar conclusions (maybe not so clearly defined). I dug a bit deeper in the direction proposed by David Friedman, studying Schelling and theory of conflict (and even mechanism design, but this at least was useful in understanding auctions), but still do not see all the pieces to combine into a satisfactory solution.

It would be very interesting to see how you extend this reasoning to standard use cases: e.g., those from Defending the Undefendable. Would your conclusions differ from those of Walter Block?

Some other test cases might be: IP, contracts, international security.

In general, no. I think the key difference comes in when you factor in the extent to which people might be willing to pay the costs of suing people for victimless “crimes”. If the amount of money which the government can collect in taxes in the name of stopping victimless crimes is any indication, this could be a very substantial sum. In other words, people would probably be wililng to freely contribute a large amount of money to free market agencies that specialize in intimidating, through physical and legal threats, businessmen who sell drugs, prostitutes, pornography, alcohol or any number of other vices - or their customers. So long as the threats which are made are not themselves tortious, there would be no recourse for purveyors of such undesirable products and the costs of operating such businesses, at least in certain areas, could be very high, maybe prohibitively high.

So, I think that a free market world would end up looking a lot like the Statist world we live in currently looks with respect to vices, the only difference is that people who don’t care about vices or don’t see their sale as a problem could not be forced to contribute support to such campaigns.

Yes, I think it leads to slightly different conclusions with regard to IP. In my view, the degree to which people are generally “willing to fight” (the degree to which they are willing to accept a return to a state of conflict rather than settle for less in court) for rights is what gives those rights being. I don’t think that all rights would be property rights even in a free market of law but I think that property rights would be the long-run forcing function on rights-claims. Just like competition tends to drive profits to zero, I think a free market of law would tend to drive rights-claims closer and closer to property rights. Having to justify your rights-claims in an impartial forum puts a damper on the grandiose rights to which individuals tend to believe they are entitled.

Well, I think the automaton-theory of contracts is bunk. Just because somebody wrote something on paper and signed their name to it or shook their hand on it doesn’t make it law, do-or-die. Of course, I believe that contracts between citizens would be enforced much more strictly in a free market than they are in the State’s monopoly courts. But I think a contract is more like a piece of physical evidence that supports your case than it is a law-in-itself. If you sign a piece of paper saying you will pay me $100 by year’s end, I can present that piece of paper in a legal dispute where you are trying to finagle your way out of paying me as evidence that you did, in fact, agree to pay me $100 by year’s end. I agree with Rothbard’s distinction in EoL between a promise to pay and conditional title transfer. Semantics matter. If I say “I promise to pay you $100 by year’s end” that is not the same as saying “I hereby owe you $100, to be paid by year’s end.” In the first case, you are merely making a promise, it is merely a statement of intent. In the second case, you are transferring title to the $100 and agreeing that the property to which the title refers ($100) will be delivered by year’s end. But even in the second case, the title itself is only evidence of property rights, it is not a property right itself and I think it’s important to keep that distinction in mind. People tend to impart an almost spiritual significance to the writing of things on paper.

Not sure what you mean here… do you mean regional defense (large-scale security)? I’m not sure if it makes any difference except that there is an inherent relationship between security and law. If I live in a well-defended region where outsiders cannot enter and I do business with someone outside that region, he’s going to have a hard time finding recourse against me if I screw him over. Of course, this means that outsiders will tend not to want to do business with people who live in such inaccessible, high-security areas or, at least, the prices at which outsiders will do business with such individuals will be discounted against the likelihood that the other party reneges on his agreement.

Clayton -

A few thoughts:

There is no NAP without property rights, as without property rights, the concept of aggression becomes meaningless.

You’ve defined Libertarianism as, “NAP and property rights.” Government, like all monopolies enforced by violence or the threat of violence, violates the NAP. Therefore, “NAP plus property rights,” is also anarchy. it’s unclear, then, which criteria you are using to differentiate anarchy and libertarianism. That is, A=B, B=C, therefore A=C.