Jonathan,
I agree with your response, for the most part, and would not like to derail the thread too much. I would only add that, the waves of liquidity that create the booms/busts discussed here can only happen in fiat money (fractional reserve) regimes. As such, they affect whole economies and not only narrow segments of it. The money sloshes around and finds its way into every edifice of the market. By all means, there are plenty of entrepreneurs that were shining since 2002 and are hurting today even though they had nothing to do with the housing market (bakeries, flower shops, travel agents, etc.). A prudent, conservative baker with no loans since 2002 is Group (1). An aggressive baker that borrowed up to his gills at 3% in 2002 and expanded his business into chocolate and restaurants is Group (2) or Group (3) depending on when he started, how much profits he made, and/or whether or not he was able to sell the whole enterprise to someone else before the bust started.
Central and fractional reserve banking socializes the losses within Groups (1) and (2) and privatizes the profits to Group (3), by default, regardless of, and separately from taxation.
Neoclassical,
The Mises quote you posted just reminded me that you forgot to address my question from couple of pages ago. You claimed that: “…if ABCT were true, businessmen would not persist in the same mistake.”. But wouldn’t that render ABCT false, then? If people stopped making the same mistake, thus rendering ABCT false, what reason would people have to keep avoiding the same mistake? And – lacking such reasons (ABCT being false, and all) – wouldn’t they revert to making it again?
Z.