No, there wouldn’t. You’re confusing ontologic rights (rights that are woven in the fabric of the universe, as it were) with natural rights.
The physical sciences get around the problem of systematic knowledge, I presume you are referring to the problem of induction here as I was above, by realizing that science is, at best, an approximation to the truth that cannot validate its principles, but only falsify them.
If we are to treat ethics like the physical sciences then what are the criteria for falsification?
so too our moral knowledge can be an approximation. we can detect that we have adopted flawed moral principles when we notice that the principles that so far we have adopted conflict. naturally before i discovered libertarianism i had all sorts of conflicting moral ideas, libertarianism was in there but crowded with all the other wrongheaded junk. I appreciate the help from the mises community (professors and lay people) I have had in sifting the wheat from the chaffe, so to speak.
Because the NAP, as I understand it, is an ethic that says that all acting humans ought not ever to initiate aggression against another individual, and since an ethic is merely an “ought” that connects a desired end with the means most appropriate to achieve it, thus, in order for the “ought” to apply to all humans, all humans must share some desired end in common. You have still not yet shown what that universally desired end is.
(Argh, was Mises.org down for anybody else too?)
Hi zefreak,
An impulse for material gratification is natural. And so is the moral impulse for restraint. Not infrequently, if the two happen to be in conflict, the former will win. That is not unnatural. However, having no moral impulses for restraint in the first place is unnatural, because it deviates from the general tendency of man.
In brief, immorality is not unnatural; but amorality is.
Exactly! And as far as ‘intellectual’ discussions go the sophisms of the amoralists are highly boring and annoying.
LOL lam. Do you mind looking up the word IRONY in your dictionary ?
Well, that kind of behavior is what most people think of when they contemplate morality. If you accept my formulation of the second man’s motivations, then you accept the existence of morality.
Which ones do you think are not shared by the preponderance of humanity?
“Killing for kicks is wrong” is a subjective statement. “It is in man’s nature to feel that killing for kicks is wrong” is an objective statement derived from the completely non-normative observation that men tend to have that feeling. True human morality is subjectively felt, but can be objectively recognized.
No, but we can recognize commonalities nonetheless.
Indeed there are exceptions, like people with Aspberger’s. Natural law in ethics is Aristotelean natural law (of tendencies), not what you might call “Keplerian” (of necessary relations).
Nope. I accept the existence of interests in the pursuit of which individuals sometimes act, which the individual may or may not call a “moral.” The fact that people act in the interest of what they perceive to be a moral code does not make the concept of objective universal morality any less meaningless.
Morality about theft (whether Robin Hood is just stealing from the rich to give to the poor), ethics about killing (whether it is right to kill at all), sexual ethics, morality about society (whether society is a holistic whole, or not), theory about the common good, ect.
It is impossible for me to generalize experience into iron-clad laws qua the problem of induction. Just because I observe that every single person I know believes that killing for kicks is wrong does not mean that it is an absolute of human nature.
Again, problem of induction. As N.N. Taleb asserts, black swans do exist.
Who is to decide what is the “tendancy” of nature? Different individuals may percieve different tendencies based upon their prior experience, and subjective valuations.
How, not why.
Semantics, I can ask the question of “Why does this apple fall to the ground”, and it can practically mean the same thing as “How does this apple fall to the ground”. I do not mean “Why” as in essentialism, and that’s what matters.
The difference between them and me is not in our moral feelings; it is in our ratiocination. Moral feelings are either natural or unnatural; the same distinction is inapplicable to rational judgments. A person in a lifeboat who accepts, and even commits, “necessary evils” is not unnatural. The preponderance of humanity and I share basically the same kind of moral feelings. The distinction, which again has nothing to do with nature, is that most of them think they are in a lifeboat situation; thanks to Austrian economics, I realize that I am not. Therefore, I don’t commit or promote the same “necessary evils” most everybody else does, because I know they are wholly unnecessary.
No. Why is applicable solely to the psychological reasoning for actions of beings with volition. Any other use of it is invalid. It’s just like applying the concept of “infinite” to beings.
Man understands the world through teleology, it is semantics.
No. We understand it through metaphysical naturalism, not teleology.
Did I say “universal morality”?
You are playing games with the word “natural”. If killing is natural, then I can kill whenever. If killing is unnatural, then I must never kill. The laws of nature do not change.
Yes, man, as an acting being, views the world from the prism of teleology, and ergo percieves all phenomena as actions.