the dishwasher is acting up.
No, we don’t. We look at the form and determine the function in the context. And, as praxeology is of the methodological naturalism bend (branch of metaphysical naturalism), clearly you’re wrong.
In addition, the thesis that man understands the world through metaphysical naturalism cannot explain the existence of supersitions amongst mankind, while the thesis that man understands the world through teleology can because man will then attempt to piece together the percieved action, and its actors.
Moral feelings don’t deal with questions formulated in that way. Give me a concrete action that you have a certain moral response (either approbation or disapprobation) which you think is not shared by the preponderance of humanity.
Again, Aristotelean natural law does not deal with necessary, invariant relations.
Do you think all induction is invalid?
Obviously, which is perhaps part of the reason why you and I have different ethical theories. You keep conflating subjective moral feelings with objective ethical theory.
Again, the same conflation. Subjective valuations are part of subjective moral feelings, not objective ethical theory.
This conflation is what I was trying to correct when I wrote:
“Killing for kicks is wrong” is a subjective statement. “It is in man’s nature to feel that killing for kicks is wrong” is an objective statement derived from the completely non-normative observation that men tend to have that feeling. True human morality is subjectively felt, but can be objectively recognized.
And that does not happen through a teleological perception of the world?
No, the action axiom is a synthetic a priori judgment, and hence holds conclusions about the way by which man percieves his reality.
Such as god…
Yeah, you walked into that. Take the lump.
Anyhoo, metaphysical naturalism isn’t supposed to explain superstitions. Don’t commit category errors.
Polygamy.
Yes, no form of induction survives the problem of induction.
No, our subjective judgments of value effect our view of immorality, and our reactions will be influenced by those judgments of value.
No. Form follows function in teleology.
There’s nothing about “design” there. We have methodological individualism, methodological naturalism, and metaphysical naturalism. Praxeology is of all of them, since it is about action in the natural world.
Yes, man’s propensity towards theism (which I will assume as a given here) is a result of percieving the world via teleology. Why would I find that disturbing?
Indeed, metaphysical naturalism rejects supersitions. Yet, if man percieves his world via metaphysical naturalism, would it not logically follow that man has no supersitions by his very nature.
Which you admit then is a superstition…
Anyhoo, we don’t perceive it through teleology…although I’m suspecting we might be talking about different things. If you’re talking about humans having goals and trying to implement them, then ok. If not, then you’re utterly wrong.
No, it doesn’t.
No.
Not necessarily, I was using “supersition” as a blanket term anyways; plus, enough of this non sequitur.
I am speaking about the teleological result of the synthetic a priori judgment that is the action axiom. Man percieves his world via action.
Yes it does,in metaphyisical naturalism all phenomena are the results of natural forces, and causes hence it rejects the existence of supersitions, which are about the supernatural.
Yes.
Anyways, this is hijacking the thread, so I’m going to stop responding here - if you desire to continue the debate on a new thread, I will follow there.
Do you think polygamists should be aggressed against or merely shunned?
You must have been rolling your eyes throughout all your science classes, then.
Ethical theory doesn’t consist of “views of immorality”. It consists of a view of such views.
Save for ethicists out to prove themselves right, people react to morals, not theories of morals.
I respect their moral decisions even though I do view them as immoral. But, I do that out of respect for God’s commandments, and a desire not to be bothered from them, not out of a moral urge not to agress against them.
K. Popper solved the problem of induction with respect to the natural sciences with his hypothetico-deductive method; I’m actually quite intrigued by the natural sciences, though.
Let me be extremely clear: our subjective valuation on what consititutes an immoral action will influence our reaction to said action.
See the above responce.
Ok then.
You oppose polygamy because of your western european heritage. Opposition to polygamy was super imposed on Western Christianity by Greco-Roman legal tradition. Obviously, Judaism had no objections to polygamy.
Edit: Looks like I misread you. It seems by “God’s Commandment” you meant “do no harm”, rather than “monogamy”. Now my point seems rather irrelevant.
Though I could add, if its good enough for God’s chosen Kings, its good enough for you.
I am not contending that killing is natural or unnatural, only that moral urges against aggressive killing is natural, and that a lack of such urges is unnatural. Whether or not those urges win out over other urges is outside the question.
Tell me this doesn’t incite a moral reaction.
The problem of the unbalanced sex ratios becomes truly problematic at times of war. Native American Indian tribes used to suffer highly unbalanced sex ratios after wartime losses. Women in these tribes, who in fact enjoyed a fairly high status, accepted polygamy as the best protection against indulgence in indecent activities. European settlers, without offering any other alternative, condemned this Indian polygamy as ‘uncivilised’. 60 After the second world war, there were 7,300,000 more women than men in Germany (3.3 million of them were widows). There were 100 men aged 20 to 30 for every 167 women in that age group. 61 Many of these women needed a man not only as a companion but also as a provider for the household in a time of unprecedented misery and hardship. The soldiers of the victorious Allied Armies exploited these women’s vulnerability. Many young girls and widows had liaisons with members of the occupying forces. Many American and British soldiers paid for their pleasures in cigarettes, chocolate, and bread. Children were overjoyed at the gifts these strangers brought. A 10 year old boy on hearing of such gifts from other children wished from all his heart for an ‘Englishman’ for his mother so that she need not go hungry any longer. 62 We have to ask our own conscience at this point: What is more dignifying to a woman? An accepted and respected second wife as in the native Indians’ approach, or a virtual prostitute as in the ‘civilised’ Allies approach? In other words, what is more dignifying to a woman, the Quranic prescription or the theology based on the culture of the Roman Empire?
So killing is unnatural. Yet, why is killing in a lifeboat situation not unnatural:
Because of the tendency for a person’s survival instincts to overpower their social instincts?
So killing is just fine whenever it yields the optimal result for the killer?