the threat of force

Economics Political Theory
21

I’ve done some searching through the Ethics of Liberty (which is what I should of done before posting) and it really seems that Rothbard makes no justification as to why the threat of force constitutes a violation of rights, but that it just does. In this case, I really have no argument I guess. Rothbard claims what is and is not permissible without justification, and thats that.

I guess my question then is why should anyone agree with the NAP if it is not a logical deduction of a previous truth?

22

His claim is that the “palpable, immediate, and direct” threat of violence is an invasive act against person or property. “Thus, suppose someone approaches you on the street, whips out a gun, and demands your wallet. He might not have molested you physically during this encounter, but he has extracted money from you on the basis of a direct, overt threat that he would shoot you if you disobeyed his commands. He has used the threat of invasion to obtain your obedience to his commands, and this is equivalent to the invasion itself.”

That’s certainly an attempt at justification. Whether you agree it is enough justification is another matter.

23

… which will always be subjectively determined in practice anyway.

Who gets to decide what is palpable, immediate and direct? What if the alleged aggressor disagrees with the paranoid perception of the alleged victim?

At some point, we have to resign ourselves to subjectivity. Either accept it in our definitions of the NAP or accept it in practicing the theory.

There is no reason why anyone should agree with the NAP. It is a choice and a preference.

Anarchists and libertarians who follow the NAP must stop looking for an objective morality or pretending that one exists. None exists on Earth.

24

I’m so glad someone actually agrees with me on this.

25

I’m unsure about palpable, but certainly immediate and direct, at least in this context, are objective terms.

  • Immediate: Right now. The gun pointed at my head is an objective fact of reality.
  • Direct: Clear. The gun’s barrel is clearly pointed at my head. The man holding the gun has clearly told me of his itent to shoot me if I do not give him my money. These are objective facts.
26

Jack,

None of those are objective fact AFTER the alleged transgression has occured. What actually happened, when it happened or how it happened will always be debateable and under dispute.

By the way, who is to say that you did not deserve to have a gun pointed at your head?

Who is to say that you are not hallucinating, for that matter?

27

I’ve had thoughts similar to mika’s. Suppose someone walks up to you in a park with a gun in their hand, but not pointed at you, and says, “I have a business proposition. How about you give me your wallet and I protect you from people with guns?” Is this theft or is it a voluntary exchange? Who determines if it is a threat? Maybe the person really was looking to offer defense services.

I think this boils down to a problem of language. In common practice, someone with a gun asking for money means robbery. But if I take a Rothbardian stance, then as the creator and thus owner of my words, it would seem to follow that only I can determine what they mean. The only alternative is to say that language is in effect collectively owned (uh oh) and that its meanings are determined through patterns of use. But in an unequal society, words (at least in legal terms) have a strange way of being defined in order to serve the elite. Suppose a company had armed guards to defend itself against “intruders.” Now suppose your boss approaches you with one of his “escorts” and asks you if you could stay overtime to finish a project. Of course, you choose to stay “voluntarily.” But suppose you carry a gun to work for your own protection and walk into your bosses office to ask for a raise. Now you’ve held your boss “captive.” You’re a “robber,” an “extortionist,” a “terrorist!” And it is thus in our present society that, with the help of our Big Brothers, exploitation has been defined into nonexistence.

28

The solution should be grounded in considerations of private property.

If an individual X threatens you with bodily harm, of course you can defend yourself, as much as you could if they had not made the threat. In fact, the threat makes it easier for you to defend yourself, as you have been given warning that the individual may attack you.

You asked whether threats are prohibited, but that is only a half-question. Prohibited by whom? If everyone prohibits threats that just means that each individual has declared that no one may make threats while using his or her private property (that is, residing on or using their land), and they reserve the right to take action against the making of threats by others, as well as whatever punitive action they see fit to take. Of course, if every individual prohibited the making of threats by all individuals then only property owners would be left with the power of making threats (since it makes no sense to say that one is prohibiting oneself except in the psychological sense, where here we are concerned with Human Action).

The NAP is not enforceable or observeable, so it is not subject to tests of consistency, as natual laws would be. One can see that it is absent where agression is not defensive. That is, an individual or individuals have violated it by their actions. But it is unenforceable and not like a penal code or rule that is decreed by an authority. It is self-justifying.

There are only a few positions that one can logically consider regarding the use of force. Either force justifies itself (“might makes right”), force is never justified (pacifism), or force may only be used in self-defence (non-agression principle).

I think there is much more I could say, but I am attempting to clarify what we are discussing first.

29

The “threat” part IS a violation of rights if the threat is made in contravention of another’s private property. If you come to my justly-acquired-through-homestead house and threaten me on my porch, in violation of my decrees that you may not take such actions, you have violated my property. No physical damage has occured, and most libertarian law, like common law, stresses equalization. In this case, you being removed from my property would bring about this equalization. If you failed to remove yourself from my land it would be consistent with the NAP for me to use force to remove you from my land. Agression against property is as defensible as agression against persons, since justly-aquired property is an extension of persons.

If you made threats towards me while standing in my neighbor’s yard and my neighbor had no problem with that, no rights would be violated. It seems pretty clear cut to me.

30

Who decides what I shall eat for breakfast?

I think we need to clarify what we are actually discussing. I think that one assumption was that our society is an anarcho-capitalist society. But in such a society, each individual is free to exchange and dispose of his land, labor and capital as he sees fit. Just as I choose what to eat (or not eat) for breakfast, I also choose how to settle disputes with other individuals, rather than be forced to use the “service” of government courts, police, etc.

No one individual decides what the facts are in a dispute that arises between two people, unless those two people decide to take the matter to one person, and they agree that he shall be judge, jury and executioner (the “tribal chief” model of justice). Many kinds of justices may arise, but it is impossible from an economic point of view to predict what level of variety their would be. We can speculate.

For instance, one part of the legal process involves fact-finding. Now the more time and resources that are devoted to this task, the easier will be the task of the jury (which may be one individual or many, or the same person as the judge, …). But as we live in a world of scarcity, and I assume an anarcho-capitalist world will also be scarce, the level of fact-finding that is purchased will be determined by those who are paying for the trial or hearing. If the judge takes a personal interest, even he may chip in a few coins, so long as he is not barred from doing so by his employer or in any contracts.

If a party in the proceeding is unsatisfied with the outcome, he may not use the services of the court in the future, he may express his displeasure to others, and so on. The court will have to allocate available factors of production in order to continue satisfying customers or risk going out of business, and this is especially true for the marginal producers. As the wealth in society increases, and to the extent that individuals have a demand for dispute resolution, their savings may be used to lengthen the production process in the area of dispute resolution. Some courts may use the newly saved money, for instance, to do research into land property records and land title, research that is too expensive for other courts, or not their area of expertise. These “land records” courts could specialize in cases involving disputes over land ownership. Maybe the next scientific innovation they would adopt as wealth further expands is the use of satellite technology. And so on.

The “decision,” then results from two individuals (or individuals representing companies, firms, etc.) purchasing the services of a court.

Which leads to another question (at least in my mind). “How can the decision have the force of law (or be enforced)?”

In the matter of what constitutes justice, I admit that much that I have read on the matter coming from libertarians appears to be very unenlightening. One popular conception of justice is equalization, or making the victim whole. This may be correct from an ethical point of view, or even a good starting point in deriving an ethics of justice, but it tells us nothing about the operation of justice in a free society. It always runs aground on issues of how to force the perpetrator to make the victim whole, i.e. how to force the perpetrator to accept decisions that are unfavorable for him.

Of course, there is no law (in the monopolistic sense) in anarchy (which is not to say that there is no order). Now if the society is very poor, then enforcement (or failure to enforce) will fall upon each individual, since the resources to pay other individuals to enforce the decision are being allocated by each individual to other wants, or they are hoarding. This is the method of shunning, where each individual shuns the person who has a judgement against them. But I only use “shun” for lack of a better term, it can range from refusal to transact with a person, to some limited charity towards the outcast. Each individual decides how to behave toward the shunned person.

If we have specialization, then the enforcement of the decision will be by an agency or individual wholly separate from the courts, an agency or individual whose services are purchased on the market. If resources are available and a specialized agency for enforcement exists (due to consumer demnad), then again the market will determine the actions of the individuals running the enforcement agency. Maybe one agency will make notice of judgements against a person and compile “blacklists” for use by businesses or the self-employed. In such a way, the owner of a road or commercial building may prevent someone who is blacklisted from using their service, or charge them a higher fee, or act as a collector for the damaged party. For example:

X agresses against Y (fact). X flees from the scene of the crime. Y (or his insurance company) pays agency G to compile information regarding the incident (similar to a police report, but obviously superior since we now have a profit-seeking business instead of a monopolistic, bureaucratic, wasteful and consumer-unresponsive agency). G contracts with A, where A is the owner of the land where the incident took place. A sells G video from cameras that A had set up. This video will provide evidence when Y makes his case. Y also contracts with H, which is a company that specializes in finding people. H compiles a list of “suspects” for Y. Now Y goes to J, an agency whose business is to disseminate information about alleged criminals. J purchases from Y all of the information about the suspects (who happen to include X) and sells that information to security agencies. These security agencies, concerned with maintaining the safety of individuals on various pieces of private property (those purchasing security services), eventually locate the suspected individuals (including X) and inform them of the claim being lodged against them.

Now none of these individuals need to “surrender”, as they are merely suspects. However, to the degree that the charge against them is serious, they will tend to turn themselves in (or agree to dispute resolution with the party that is making a claim against them). They face, beyond possible physical exile (which would mean they could not cross the property of any other person), varying degrees of forced autarky. Being suspected of a crime would have an effect similar to a bad mark on your credit. When a person’s credit is ruined, that just means that creditors are unwilling to lend the individual money, or to do so but at a much higher premium than otherwise. Similarly, a tarnished reputation means that other individuals are unwilling to let the suspect or criminal use their service for fear of what he might do. The suspect/criminal may say he just wants to use the road to get to where he is going, but the road-owner has reason to suspect that he might be a highway robber. The suspect or criminal will be hampered until he agrees to dispute resolution.

And so the market has a way of bringing about settlements, because of the preferences of the consumers for safety on roads they pay for, or at places of business, or anywhere else, in addition to the preference of individuals to obtain the lowest price for goods and have access to an abundance of vendors, which is hampered by a black mark on one’s name.

31

As far as I can tell, I didn’t actually make physical damage a criteria for rights violation. In both situations, I explicitly stated that no physical damage occurred merely for the purposes of clarification and unambiguity. I’m sorry if it seemed like I was doing otherwise.

Well, would you say that a trespasser has employed force in trespassing? How about a person who has committed non-violent sexual assault?

Maybe I’m confused about your use of the word “force”. I personally equate it to the word “violence”, but maybe you don’t?

And why is that, exactly?

The question is whether threat of force violates rights. I would argue that, in the two situations I presented, no force was used. Yet I (and presumably Rothbard) would say that rights were still violated.

Of course the Non-Aggression Principle is arbitrary. All morality and ethics are arbitrary, as Charles Anthony pointed out. There are no objective definitions for “threat of force”, “aggression”, “property rights”, etc.

As I see it, the debate here is about whether Rothbard’s reasoning is consistent with the premises (including definitions) that he uses. From what I can tell, they are. I’ve tried to provide reasoning to demonstrate that, and maybe I’ve failed so far, but I’m certainly willing to engage the matter further with you.

If there are actions which don’t even threaten force, but are still considered to violate property rights (e.g. the two situations I brought up), then threat of force also violates property rights. But again, it all comes down to semantics - in this instance, the definitions used for “force” and “property rights”.

32

How can there be logical reasoning without any premises? Rothbard simply includes “threat of force” in his definition of “aggression”. You, of course, are free to do otherwise.

It seems to me that you’re searching for an “ultimate justification” for libertarian theory. With all due respect, I’m convinced that any such search can only end in failure.

Why should anyone agree that killing is wrong when one’s own life isn’t already threatened or attacked?

33

Amen. Of course, just to be clear, there’s also no reason anyone shouldn’t agree with the NAP. Choices and preferences are two-way streets.

Indeed. As surprising as it may sound, I stopped looking and pretending a long time ago. However, I think most humans instinctively hold to the NAP, or something similar to it, most of the time. That’s why I consider the NAP to be rather self-evident, as it seems (to me) to be an articulation of our moral instincts.

34

In that case, why are we debating anything? Why don’t we all just shut up, stop worrying, and love the State?

35

Loving the state is not the only options when dealing with the reality.

The other option is encouraging a market for law which. An anarchist market for law stands on its own without depending on any omniscience of what objectively happened in an alleged crime.

36

“Forgetting” NAP for a moment, what about:

The threat of violence results in an unequal transaction (I give you my money for you to withdraw the gun from my back). It was a transaction I never intended to enter nor saw benficial to myself, and I can’t withdraw from the transaction peaceably (I get shot in the back, possibly die). Therefore, the threat of violence results in an involuntary, unequal exchange.

37

Force might be a weird word, I’m just using it since it’s sort of a traditional word choice in libertarian literature. At any rate, I’m using it synonymously with breach of property, where property is assumed to privately held and include one’s self, as in the classical liberal and libertarian conception. So threatening force would mean threatening to violate property. Thats actually a much better way to get at what I’ve been trying to say.

From the starting point of the NAP as formulated by Rothbard, his reasoning (and subsequent reasoning by his followers) are consistent. My issue was that I believed that the NAP was founded upon a more fundamental premise of absolute property rights (self ownership and homesteading), and I’m sure Rothbard thought so too, after all he was an ethical objectivist and natural rightster.

If we wish to treat the NAP as a rule developed on an arbitrary set of values held by certain people and nothing more (this is what I think you are suggesting), then we must recognize that any appeal to the NAP as an explanation or justification for this or that is no more meaningful than saying “cuz i feel like it.” For you and I and anyone else who see’s it this way, we simply admit that we value libertarian values and suggest other people value them for various reasons, not because of some rule.

But like I said, I find it hard to believe that anyone thinks that its an arbitrary rule and then constantly evokes it as justification for or against a given behavior. The people who I am posing my questions to, are those who believe that the NAP is a rule deduced from some other axiom, namely, property.

38

It would depend on the situation and the victim of the violence own opinion of the violence whether the case would even reach arbitration. For an example if two people are in a fight at a bar, it is unlikely that the one would sue the other party, if the victim also played a part in the fight. If a case from a bar fight does reach arbitration it will most likely because of an unprovoked and harmful attack that requires some form of compensation or retribution.

People would only have the right to defend themselves and their property from violence and not initiate violence, that is the NAP.

39

People can, and often do, debate objective facts. That in no way negates the objectivity of the facts. The gun is pointed at my head, or it isn’t. The person holding the gun has said he will shoot me, or he hasn’t. One of us could be lying or hallucinating, sure, but neither changes the the objective facts.

That I deserve a gun pointed at my head also does not change the (objective) fact that there is a gun pointed at my head.

40

You are saying that the truth of what happened is out there. That may be so but pointing a gun at your head – without any other facts – alone is not enough to say 100% that an act of agreesion took place. An arbiter has to decide whether the action was against your consent.

In practice of libertarian law, an arbiter ends up deciding how a dispute is resolved or you fight your own battles. Neither situation requires objectivity of any facts. If you provoked the pointing of the gun at your head, an intelligent arbiter would consider that an initiator of force was you. That is where the inherent subjectivity of the NAP comes in.

The NAP is inherently subjective because it addresses what you deserve rather than what happened and there is nothing wrong with that subjectivity. It just is.