Theoretical discussion about aspets of A. Knott's theory of action.

Economics Political Theory
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This post continues a discussion initiated at the end of another thread:

AJ provided the following quote found in this essay/book: http://www.praxeology.com/downloads/8642_Knott_TR2.pdf and commented immediately below.

An instructive example of social interaction which I have used previously is that of a person who, upon walking into a park, sees a bronze statue. As he nears the statue, he realizes that it is a person who has painted himself, and is posing as a statue. As he approaches closer, he now realizes that no, it is a statue, and not a person. When he thought that the object he saw was a person posing as a statue, he thought that the object in front of him was an object having a human consciousness, i.e., an acting being. He thus attempted to place or locate “action” or consciousness spatiotemporally.

I just don’t see that there’s any attempting necessarily implied here. The man perceived the object as a person, OK…so what’s this about attempting? It seems to come out of nowhere and yet the text that follows entirely relies on that fact that the man is in fact attempting something.

AJ

The theory is constructed such that there are only two categories of action. One category corresponds to that which is perceptually present to the actor, while the other category corresponds to that which is not perceptually present to the actor, but which he attempts to bring to perceptual presence.

The two categories are those of “presence” and “attempt.”

All phenomena in the theory are conceived from the standpoint of methodological individualism. Thus, if any phenomenon is supposed, we consider it only from the point of view of an individual actor.

Since there are only two categories in the theory, if we suppose that something “exists” for an actor, but this thing does not exist as a perceptual presence, then by our assumptions this thing can only exist as an “attempt.”

The idea is that if we suppose that something called a consciousness is present for a given actor A (A is addressing another consciousness), and if we suppose or grant that this consciousness is not perceptually observable to A, then by our original assumptions, the “presence” of this other consciousness falls under the category of A’s “attempt.”

An example I have used to illustrate this same idea is the example of a formal, mathematical, line.

In action (in consciousness) we refer to such a line. But if we hold that the formal line is not identical to a perceptual presence, and given the premise of only two categories, perceptual presence and attempt, then the line we suppose, in this theory, “exists” as an attempt, not as a perceptual presence.

Mises ill-definition of Natural Law, why?
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Interesting. To a degree that makes more sense. The line example seems cleaner to deal with or discuss from my perspective.

I imagine a mathematical line. When you say, “the formal line is not identical to the perceptual presence,” do you mean (a) it is impossible to visualize a formal line because it stretches to infinity, or it is perfectly straight, etc., (b) it is impossible to visualize a formal line because “formal line” is just some kind of idealized construct that is not subject to visualization, (c) that thoughts or visualizations don’t count as perceptual presences, or (d) just that “if we suppose for whatever reason this is the case, then…”?

And also, do you mean that the line exists as an attempt regardless of whether I am actually now imagining it, thinking about it, etc.?

Finally, I am not sure what exactly you mean by “exists for an actor” in this context. If it is not perceptually present to the actor, in what sense would we mean that it exists for the actor?

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AJ:

I mean something like (b).

“And also, do you mean that the line exists as an attempt regardless of whether I am actually now imagining it, thinking about it, etc.?”

No. The idea is that to the extent a “formal existent” has an existence (concepts, universals, generalities, axioms, etc.), it is as an attempt in action.

“Finally, I am not sure what exactly you mean by “exists for an actor” in this context. If it is not perceptually present to the actor, in what sense would we mean that it exists for the actor?”

As the attempt (as distinct from the perceptual presence). There are epistemological issues involved with this idea that I’m working on.

I believe it’s going to have to involve quantum epistemology; the idea that there are unobservables whose unobservability is a matter of epistemological principle. (imperceptibles whose imperceptibility is a matter of epistemological principle)

Note that the “attempt” of which I speak is the same as the “trying” that you and Grayson were referring to in your discussion with Neoclassical.

Aiming, wanting, trying, attempting, desiring, willing, intending, striving, seeking, searching, wishing, hoping, pursuing, needing. These all refer to the same general phenomenon: the attempt to bring about a situation different from the one that the actor is currently faced with.

I have been using the concept “perceptual presence” as the category of any and all things present to the actor. In glancing at some of your posts recently, I see that you are referring to essentially the same thing as “sensations.”

Thus, using your term, we could say that action is the actor’s attempt to bring to sensation a different sensation than the one he is currently sensing.

In this conception, there is no distinction made between “internal” and “external” perceptual presences, and, no distinction made between different kinds of perceptual presences (degrees of intensity, urgency, distinctness, color, position, etc…) It is a singular category denoting any and all things of which a consciousness is perceptually aware.

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“And also, do you mean that the line exists as an attempt regardless of whether I am actually now imagining it, thinking about it, etc.?”

No. The idea is that to the extent a “formal existent” has an existence (concepts, universals, generalities, axioms, etc.), it is as an attempt in action.

I’m still confused by this one bit here. In the above sentence it seems you almost mean something like a Platonic form, but you said no to my question, so it seems you can’t mean that.

“Finally, I am not sure what exactly you mean by “exists for an actor” in this context. If it is not perceptually present to the actor, in what sense would we mean that it exists for the actor?”

As the attempt (as distinct from the perceptual presence). There are epistemological issues involved with this idea that I’m working on.

I believe it’s going to have to involve quantum epistemology; the idea that there are unobservables whose unobservability is a matter of epistemological principle. (imperceptibles whose imperceptibility is a matter of epistemological principle)

Wouldn’t this require an epistemology that posits some kind “real world” outside one’s “private/inner world” of perceptions?

I have been using the concept “perceptual presence” as the category of any and all things present to the actor. In glancing at some of your posts recently, I see that you are referring to essentially the same thing as “sensations.”

Thus, using your term, we could say that action is the actor’s attempt to bring to sensation a different sensation than the one he is currently sensing.

Right, this is where, at one point, I thought my conception and yours seemed to match. Later I wasn’t so sure. It may be a question of starting assumptions.

My starting assumption (I wouldn’t technically even call it an assumption, but well enough) is just to note that I am experiencing sensations (which are all I can consciously experience - by the very definition of “experience” I would say). It’s awkward in language to explain everything - especially other people or other minds - from that starting assumption, but it seems to me that at least thinking (if not writing) in terms of this starting point is important to assure the accuracy of any conclusions reached.

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On an unrelated note, Adam, I wonder if the following might suggest, perhaps with some modification, another example you could use similarly to the east-west and aerodynamic-braking examples. From the Peltzman article linked by Neoclassical in another thread. http://pcpe.libinst.cz/nppe/3_2/nppe3_2_3.pdf (bold mine)

Over 30 years ago, I decided to study the first few years’ experience with the first motor vehicle safety standards. They mandated installation of seat belts and of steering columns and windshields that would give way if someone in the car was thrown against them.

I argued that some of the potential benefits of these devices could be offset, because the regulation would encourage greater risk taking, because the greater protection from the required devices had, in effect, reduced the price of risky driving. Let me explain: when you are in a hurry and tempted to drive faster or more aggressively, there is a price to be paid. It is the extra risk of getting into an accident and then suffering injury or even death. The mandated safety devices would reduce this price by reducing the severity of the consequences you could expect if you got into an accident. If those consequences had been sufficiently severe to deter you from fast or risky driving before the regulation came along they were now less likely to do so. So simple economic logic suggested that, in the aggregate, the mandated devices would encourage more risky driving behavior, and this greater risk taking would offset to some degree the safety benefits these devices seemed to promise.

The whole article seems to have quite of few of “offset”-based examples that might be similarly useful for illustration purposes (I’m in the middle of reading it).
some degree the safety benefits these devices seemed to promise.Over 30 years ago, I decided to study the first

few years’ experience with the first
motor vehicle safety standards. They mandated installation of seat belts and of steerPeltzman:
Regulation and the Wealth of Nations: The Connection … 191
ing columns and windshields that would give way if someone in the car was thrown
against them.
I argued that some of the potential benefits of these devices could be offset, because
the regulation would encourage greater risk taking, because the greater protection
from the required devices had, in effect, reduced the price of risky driving. Let
me explain: when you are in a hurry and tempted to drive faster or more aggressively,
there is a price to be paid. It is the extra risk of getting into an accident and then
suffering injury or even death. The mandated safety devices would reduce this price
by reducing the severity of the consequences you could expect if you got into an accident.
If those consequences had been sufficiently severe to deter you from fast or
risky driving before the regulation came along they were now less likely to do so. So
simple economic logic suggested that, in the aggregate, the mandated devices would
encourage more risky driving behavior, and this greater risk taking would offset to
some degree the safety benefits these devices seemed to promise.

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Thanks AJ

I suppose Peltzman’s idea works in reverse?

If the regulation or mandate is removed, this encourages less risky (fast) driving. But this is offset by the increased harm the driver faces when an accident does occur ??

What's your favourite Austrian insight?
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AJ:

“Right, this is where, at one point, I thought my conception and yours seemed to match. Later I wasn’t so sure. It may be a question of starting assumptions.”

“My starting assumption (I wouldn’t technically even call it an assumption, but well enough) is just to note that I am experiencing sensations (which are all I can consciously experience - by the very definition of “experience” I would say). It’s awkward in language to explain everything - especially other people or other minds - from that starting assumption, but it seems to me that at least thinking (if not writing) in terms of this starting point is important to assure the accuracy of any conclusions reached” (emphasis added)

These brief passages from Mises touch on what you write:

“The starting point of praxeology is not a choice of axioms and a decision about methods of procedure, but reflection about the essence of action.” (Human Action)

“The starting point of praxeology is a self-evident truth, the cognition of action, that is, the cognition of the fact that there is such a thing as aiming at ends.” (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science)

What Mises is focussed on is not simply that an actor is confronted with a state of affairs (that he is experiencing sensations or perceptual presences), but that he is trying to change his state of affairs from what it is now to something different.

“Action is the search for improvement of conditions from the point of view of the personal value judgments of the individual concerned. … Man’s aim is to substitute what he considers a better state of affairs for a less satisfactory one. He strives for the substitution of a more satisfactory state of affairs in place of a less satisfactory state of affairs. And in the satisfaction of this desire, he becomes happier than he was before.” (The Free Market and its Enemies)

So this is action as Mises sees it, and this is the “reference phenomenon” he has in mind when he writes that the starting point of action is reflection on the essence of action.

If we translate Mises’s concept of action into your terms, Mises is focussed on the individual’s attempt to change the sensations he is currently experiencing to sensations different from those he is currently experiencing.

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I’m not sure. Peltzman seems to be arguing that regulation might have a benefit, but it is always offset somehow (if only somewhat). So maybe it would work in reverse something like this:

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…although in the actual examples he gives, the overall harm is actually completely offset (actually slightly more than offset). I suppose this does provide some ammunition against passage of the regulation and against anti-repeal arguments once it is passed.

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Re: starting assumptions, I can’t find anything to disagree with on that, although I would change your final sentence to one only referring to my own self. For others, it seems I would have to assume, for instance, that there are other purposeful actors (or that that is a useful model), so I am not sure I could call it self-evident as far as other actors, only in relation to my own self. But of course it’s still quite a reasonable assumption, I just wouldn’t call it absolutely a priori.

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I’m not going to source it but I’m pretty sure I read in a Mankiw textbook about this sort of thing, and his version of the analysis was that mandatory seat belt laws shift the risk from drivers to pedestrians. Drivers are less likely to be injured in a crash of a given severity, this is ofset by increased risk taking (driving faster), end result is when pedestrians get hit, they are getting hit faster, and there are no seatbelts for them !