“That does not follow logically. We have previously stated that an economist cannot predict what the price of oranges should be. We have not stated that the economist cannot predict that the free market will produce the proper price of oranges. Likewise, you I cannot predict what the appropriate resolution should be for any given dispute.”
But YOU are prediction the proper resolution. You are also prediction what products will be produced by the market. The proper price will be the price of the trial. Now tell me what exactly doesn’t follow logic?
Do you understand the the difference between necessity and possibility? A person might or might not value the truth at any given point in time. But he will necessary value his satisfaction whenever he acts since that’s the definition of what it means to act - to seek one’s satisfaction (elimination of uneasiness). There is no necessary reason why people should value truth in acting and - in the case of a dispute - we can praxeologically predict that they will dispose of truth and justice whenever it gives them an advantage in the dispute.
Any action assumes that the chosen means will bring about the desired end. This assumption may be correct or incorrect and it is - again, by definition - in the interests of the acting being to be correct. We can frame this in the language of modern epistemology and talk about “models” and “prediction” and so on but the danger of this kind of language is that it is umoored from human intentionality. Mises points out in Human Action that a thing is only a means with respect to the intentions of an acting being - there is nothing intrinsic within any object that makes it a means to one or another thing. So, when we speak of “truth in the abstract”, we are in danger of unmooring truth from its relation to human intentionality, that is from its role as a means to attaining human ends.
You’re right here. I don’t think they have an alternative, at least not in america. But are you claiming nobody would agree to this? That would definitely be a prediction of a market outcome. It is definitely not true today. I at least have precendent on my side, I can ask a few people to see what they think. I would agree to it and I just need to find one more person to agree and we’ve got a proof. Actually, you know what… I know a few lawyers that would agree to such a trial. Need I say more?
Yes I do. First you claimed necessity (remember? food is better than truth/knowledge?), then you admitted possibility. That’s a contradiction. In fact I only need possibility for my argument. I don’t need to assume it is always the most valued end. In fact I admitted it by saying I would trade food for knowledge.
I’d like a clarification. Accoding to both of you, what is the difference between a “judge” and a “mediator”. And can you please provide a definition of a mediator?
Your missing the point. People in America have no legal alternative to the state for dispute resolution. If two parties have a dispute, and they want it resolved, they must take it to the state or resolve it amongst themselves. The disputes that go to trial go there because the parties involved cannot resolve it themselves…their only alternative to resolving it with violence is to bring it to the state - they cannot bring it to a mediator because the only reason parties would bring it to a mediator is the threat of violence between the two. And that threat is illegal. So, the plaintiff has an incentive to go to the state court in the current system. The defendant has no choice.
I said it is highly unlikely, and I see no reason why it should be. I also said the same thing for the use of a judge. I have been saying this and I stated it again in a recent post. Please stop mischaracterizing my argument.
@Clayton “Any action assumes that the chosen means will bring about the desired end.”
I’d dispute this use of “assumes”. It isn’t true. When you loan money to someone, there is risk you will not get the desired end. You know that there’s risk and you take obvious actions to show that, such as getting collateral and/or insuring yourself. Even moving your hand has an uncertain end. Everyone is obviously aware of uncertainty.
I think “assume” should be “believe” and I think Mises used that word. You used that word in your other quote, but now you run away from it because it is an obvious allude to my decision theory. Can you link to the quote? It actually doesn’t matter if it says “assume”. Even if we “assume”, like a judge “assumes” guilty after a trial. You have to arrive at this assumption somehow. I’m giving you the process by which you do that. Same point I made before about the beliefs.
I’m sorry, then, I was under the impression you thought perponderance should not be used. We don’t really have an argument, then. We agree that perponderance of evidence is an ok concept, at least in your world, because the market might choose it. Now I have to convince the natural law people and I’m set. Thanks.
I don’t believe preponderance of evidence should be used. That doesn’t mean that it won’t be, just that I find it highly unlikely. I also believe that there is no necessary reason why it would be used, either.
Because I want to try to smash the concept because I think it’s phony baloney. I want to get the concept right so I don’t have to dispute the definition or the distinction between a judge. I will use your definition to give it a fair dealing.
A little less bravado would go a long way to making the discussion more productive.
I should have said “presupposes” instead of “assumes” - the point is that belief that the chosen means will bring about the desired end is a precondition (is presupposed by) any action. So, we can reason backwards: Since Bob is acting, Bob believes that the means he is using will bring about his desired end.
Of course there’s uncertainty. Mises has an entire chapter on it. But there’s no improvement to the theory by saying that a means “might” or “could” bring about the desired end. It is not a more accurate description of reality, it is a less accurate description of the desired end. In other words, allowing yourself to say “might” or “could” is to allow yourself to be lazy in identifying the purpose at which the acting individual is aiming.
The reason this matters is - as Mises explains in HA - acting presupposes that acting matters. That is, it presupposes that the world is governed by cause-and-effect law and that the utilization of means will bring about the desired end. If this were not the case, there would be no difference between acting and not acting, so there would be no reason for the individual to attempt to apply means to bring about a desired end.
In the case of a loan, the fact that default is possible shows that the end in sight is not repayment - the end is profit (or, to be as accurate as possible, the improvement of one’s state-of-affairs). This is, again, definitionally true, it’s not a matter of measurement or evidence. The fact that repayment is not the end is evidenced by the fact that the person giving the loan might take collateral or make sure he has legal recourse to collect or has some other kind of insurance. The creditor doesn’t care how he profits, so long as he profits.
Exactly what I said. Again, I am not claim anything except what the process is by which Bob comes to his beliefs.
The purpose is there and we can observe it through the action. However even the individual is not certain that it will bring the desired end. But what we can observe is that the individual believes that the action is more likely to bring the desired end, according to the individual’s opportunity costs and preferences.
This isn’t true. Because the cause and effect law is not known by the individual, nor is the individual necessarily certain in the law. There is plenty of reason to attempt to apply means to get to an end, even if you aren’t sure you will get there. Otherwise people would never act. You might not even be sure to how to apply the means.
I never said he seeked repayment. He does not know for certain that he will profit, he merely believes he will more than he believes he won’t.
@Clayton: “A little less bravado would go a long way to making the discussion more productive.”
I am just a little wary of cycling around through the various claims and having to go back to explaining logical principles. Given that I have to keep doing that, my best guess is that you and gotlucky are not being sincere and open-minded here. I have accepted many things that you have said, such as your idea that judges need not exist and the way law can be created. I am willing to accept many more things. I don’t think you’ve accepted anything I have said.
I think what I just said is pretty obvious, and if you disagree we’d better end this thread.
“A means is what serves to the attainment of any end, goal, or aim. Means are not in the given universe; in this universe there exist only things. A thing becomes a means when human reason plans to employ it for the attainment of some end and human action really employs it for this purpose.”
As Mises says in Chapter 6, the uncertainty in the attainment of the given end is a necessary condition to calling the application of means to attain that end, action. You seem to think I’m saying a person can or does obtain certainty in acting. Quite the opposite. But the uncertainty of a means in attaining the end does not change the fact that the end is certainly aimed at by the chosen means.
What is crucial to note is that the individual simply ranks the available means and chooses that which he believes is the best (most suitable) for attaining his highest end. I cannot recommend highly enough the first seven or eight chapters (about 150 pages) of Human Action.
As far as I’m aware, the only logical principal you have discussed was xor, and you missed the implications of the specific statement too. You have misrepresented my viewpoint on at least one occassion (but I believe more), and it seems that you are now misrepresenting how many times you have actually explained logical principals. There are a number of my arguments that you have failed to respond to, and I have accepted the implicit concessions to them. If you would like to end this thread, feel free to stop posting in it, but I will respond whenever you post to me.
So, if I owe money to Bob and he dies without descendants, anyone can homestead this debt and sue me for it? What if I pay, and then we discover Bob’s will that donated all its assets to a local church. Can the church sue me as well, while I should sue the guy whom I just paid?
There are cases nowadays when a credit card company sells its debt to a debt-collecting agency X. Then the agency goes out of business. Then someone who borrowed money from the credit card company gets sued by the agency Y that says it bought X’s assets. Oftentimes, in court, the defendant’s lawyers ask for the proper evidence, through paperwork of Y acquiring the loan from X. If it fails to show such documentation, the case is dismissed.
So, do you think it should not show the documentation? I.e., the mere fact that Y found out about the loan means it has homesteaded it after X has gone bankrupt? (Assuming that the defendant cannot bring positive evidence that someone else had bought the loan.)
@FlyingAxe: Good points. Maybe that’s why Somali law (as far as I understand) doesn’t allow it.
However, I’m inclined to say why shouldn’t assets like debts and tort claims be homesteadable like material assets upon the passage of someone who has no descendants and has not left a will? If Bob had died without descendants and without a will but left behind a mint condition, classic Thunderbird, it would become the property of whoever homesteaded it. Perhaps common law would impose some kind of “cooling off” period to allow an unknown will to turn up before such homesteaded property claims could be made binding - I imagine this would apply to all asset classes, including debts and tort claims.
The “multiplying lawsuits” scenario you described is clearly problematic. But I’m more interested in discovering the conditions for the solution of the problem than the actual solution itself (which we may not be able, in any case, to determine in the absence of a market in dispute-resolution).