Cain, I understand that, and I do not necessarily disagree with that.
One problem I had with the Rothbard/Hoppe approach to ethics is that it is unclear to me whether they believe that B can own A’s body or not?
They tend to conceive non-libertarian society in terms of self-ownership, and to me this was implying that what is wrong with society today is that we do not have enough self-ownership, i.e., that we are partially owned by others, by the state.
You are writing that B is dominating A. I don’t disagree with that, but I believe this is something different from B owning A, and self-ownership is the concept being employed by Rothbard/Hoppe. (if domination is the same thing as ownership, we should be able to substitute the word “dominate” or “domination” for “own” and “ownership” in the three possibilities Rothbard provides.)
As someone who is familiar with the Rothbard/Hoppe system, do you believe they intend to mean that it is possible to own other people? Can person B in fact own person A, as far as the Rothbard/Hoppe conception is concerned? That isn’t clear from the way their theories are presented.
I don’t think they come right out and say: “The problem with society is that the state owns our bodies.” It is unclear whether they believe that our bodies are currently owned by the state or not. What is your take?
They certainly don’t think it’s logically impossible - Hoppe focuses on whether the ownership in question is legitimate, as in logically coherent and rationally justifiable. So it’s not so much claims of ownership of one man over another that he claims are impossible but legitimate ones. You are thinking of ownership as in legal/physical control, Hoppe is questioning whether this control can be justified without contradiction. In the case of one person owning another he believes it is not. So yes, person B can claim to own A, but according to Hoppe cannot justify it.
Your careful analysis clarifies this mindset quite well. If they avoid stating any purposes, they will have a hard time convincing everyone to accept their universal “ethics” (meaning laws). Also, the idea of a universal ethic that all must accept is only useful for Statists, because only a monopoly on force could enforce such a “concensus.” Finally, if they wish to state a purpose-free moral system that all must follow, then they must be able to say why that is beneficial (and feasible), and we could at least argue that. In my experience, however, the people we are referring to actually do have purposes for their ethics, but of course they don’t all agree on the purposes - which is why I propose making these purposes more explicit in cases where ethical systems are in contention.
I think the bigger picture is that there is a large set of “ethical” concepts designed primarily as useful rhetorical tools for advocacy within a Statist context, as ways to influence voting and public policy. In AnCap, there is only the market, and you get the legal system you pay for. There are no universal mandates, even if adherence to the tenets of natural law turns out to be so popular among court system consumers that it reaches practically universal status.
“What is the purpose for making Locke’s ‘mixing with labor’ the standard for designating property?”
In asking this, I do not attempt to contest Locke’s notion, but simply to ask - to each individual reader - what their purpose (or set of purposes) is for adopting that standard. Because when we come to debate issues of property, homesteading and beyond, we will need to keep our intended purposes for defining such standards fully explicit if we hope to have mutually meaningful discussions.
Because if the underlying purpose is unstated, you might not share the underlying purpose with the speaker. It’s just a common problem I’ve noticed in the debates here recently.
Right of property is as natural as right of life (person). Each person via their individual will power appetitively (act of life; instinctively) and intellectually (by choice) acquires natural and artistic objects to fulfill needs and desires that do not come with the person out of mother’s womb. How’s that?
It is logical and rational. Many debators presuppose that the world values logic and intelligence, that is why we do not address it in every debate. We also need not address that life is better then death and abundance is better then scarcity.
OK, so the purpose is to ensure maximum abundance. The issue is now much clearer: does setting the property standard in terms of “mixing one’s labor with it” ensure maximum abundance in all situations? And how can we be sure that that standard is the best one for maximizing abundance (or wilderness’s “happiness”)?
I’m still not getting what you mean. I agree it is good (essential) for a theory to be logical and rational, but can you give what you consider to be the most important benefit(s) that would accrue to you if your preferred rights system were in place and well-enforced?
…a theory for a thing that is necesscary for life. That is the most benifical part of the theory, that it explains a mode of operation that allows for our existence. Are you waiting for me to discuss some subjective preference that you can dismiss as being a value only found in myself and not necesscarily an objective truth?
I have no intent to dismiss anyone’s values. I am simply aiming to establish that rights are formulated with specific aims in mind. Or for those that define rights to be inborn, I aim to establish that those rights are exercised and enforced with certain aims in mind. Or are they?
Bottom line, I would just like someone to come out and say either
A. “I reject the notion of purposes for rights, I believe in the sanctity of natural law for its own sake.” (or similar)
or
B. “Here are the specific benefits I hope to gain by defining (and having society enforce) rights in this way.”
I have no aim at this time to judge either A or B, just to know where people stand. And to satisfy my curiosity, I would be happy to see argumentation and/or link(s) that support that position.